Page 5 these constructive and increasingly candid discussions, Vietnam conducted investigations to help identify remains already at CILHI, turned over documents, and explained many aspects of how remains collection worked. Vietnamese officials also facilitated interviews with personnel who took part in remains recovery efforts and could relate firsthand what transpired. This productive relationship had a direct effect on the accuracy of our findings. We have been assured that we can expect continued assistance in the future. Explicitly noted in this paper are areas in which incomplete information prevents final determinations. In each of these areas, the U.S. continues to employ all possible means to collect additional data. Throughout the course of our review and our dialogue with the Vietnamese, we have aggressively pursued all information, and publication of this paper in no way lessens our interest or efforts. Follow-up continues on two cases that have not been satisfactorily resolved. Also, we have requested additional documents from the Vietnamese government, including the enabling directive that set most remains recovery activity in action, various remains inventories, and additional province records. Collection efforts also remain focused on acquiring additional data on the organizations involved in remains collection and the locations where remains were held before repatriation. In the meantime, however, we can provide more detailed answers than ever to questions that have troubled American policy makers and families for years. · How, when, where, and why did the Vietnamese collect American remains? · How many did they collect? · How many have they repatriated? · Are any more still stored? Our conclusions necessitate reconsideration of how Vietnam handled American remains. They also affect our expectations of what will constitute fullest possible accounting since it is clear that Vietnam doesn’t have additional large numbers of remains it could repatriate, as previously believed. Instead, accounting for Americans killed in the Vietnam War will depend on our own ability to recover remains at loss sites across Southeast Asia. In turn, our success will depend on the continued cooperation of the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian governments. Under the circumstances, factors such as the passage of time and the effects of the environment will play a bigger role than ever in determining whether remains can be recovered.

Page 6 HOW, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY DID THE VIETNAMESE COLLECT AMERICAN REMAINS? During wartime, the Ministry of National Defense (MND, or Bo Quoc Phong) was the agency that had principal authority for collecting and maintaining information on U.S. casualties and graves, as well as managing U.S. POWs. Standard procedures called for military units to transmit information about U.S. POWs and casualties via military reporting channels from the lowest levels through the relevant headquarters, district, province, and military region to the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) high command. These data became part of files maintained by elements of the General Political Directorate, principally the Enemy Proselyting Department, which had primary responsibility for collecting and preserving this information at the central level. Enemy proselyting cadre assigned to military regions, and sometimes at lower levels, collected and transmitted much of these data. This was a relatively minor responsibility for this department, which functioned principally as a propaganda element, as its name implies. It was also responsible for a full range of operations conducted by PAVN against foreign troops, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), and civilians. According to one former member of the Enemy Proselyting Department, the organization’s other missions contributed directly to the PAVN’s war-fighting mission. Because reporting on foreign casualties did not contribute directly to war fighting, it was a relatively low priority. In practice, the Ministry of Public Security (Bo Cong An) provided operational assistance to the MND on tasks related to remains and POWs. During wartime, for instance, public security personnel assigned to village and district levels helped local military and militia units secure crash sites and oversee the burial of U.S. casualties and the maintenance of their graves. In the North, some American POWs were interned in prisons belonging to the Ministry of Public Security. In those instances, the Ministry of Public Security was responsible for maintenance and security of the detention facility, while the military was responsible for managing the daily routine of POWs. The MND’s Department of Military Security provided physical security, and the Enemy Proselyting Department was responsible for prisoner handling and exploitation. Data from Vietnamese documents and witnesses indicate that sometime in 1969, the MND issued instructions reiterating the responsibilities of subordinate echelons regarding U.S. casualties and graves. Apparently, these instructions prompted local officials to inspect, and in some cases repair, the graves of U.S. casualties. We believe that at this time many, if not all, northern provinces were asked to inventory casualties and graves in their areas so central authorities could update their own information. One military region enemy-proselyting officer from the North explained that he was told to take actions that would facilitate an anticipated peacetime requirement to return the remains of American casualties. We see a relationship between the commencement of peace talks in Paris in 1968 and the central government’s greater interest in U.S. remains during 1969. The 1954

Page 7 Geneva Agreements, which ended the French Indochina War, had provided for the recovery of the remains of deceased military personnel of both sides. The Vietnamese apparently anticipated that the issue would come up again. In early 1971, PAVN forces captured large numbers of RVNAF troops in conjunction with Operation Lam Son 719 in southern Laos. When these captives were brought to North Vietnam, they combined with the growing population of American POWs to overwhelm the prisoner-handling capabilities of the Department of Military Security and the Enemy Proselyting Department. As a result, the General Political Directorate began planning for a new organization, Group 875, to deal with all aspects of the detention and exploitation of U.S. and South Vietnamese prisoners (see Figure 1, Group 875, April 1972-October 1974). Established in about April 1972, this organization also assumed responsibility for overseeing the collection and maintenance of information on U.S. casualties and graves, as well as the recovery, treatment, and storage of U.S. remains. Group 875’s staff consisted chiefly of personnel detached from the Research Department (PAVN’s central military intelligence department), the Department of Military Security, and the Enemy Proselyting Department. It also drew from a pool of unassigned military personnel within the MND. Group 875 was directly subordinate to the General Political Directorate. It was organized into four elements. Office 22 administered the POW camps that held Americans. It also had responsibility for the graves of the 23 Americans who died in captivity in the North and were buried at Van Dien Cemetery in Hanoi. Office 23 administered camps for RVNAF POWs. Office 24 was responsible for logistic support for both the American and RVNAF POW systems, and an office for Finance oversaw expenditures and accounts for all of Group 875. There is some uncertainty regarding the exact nature of Office 22’s responsibility for issues relating to the remains of U.S. casualties who did not die in Hanoi prisons. A former chief of one section of Office 22, Col Doan Hanh, has asserted that Group 875 played no more than a minor role in this effort; he said he had no specific knowledge of remains recovery activities. Members of the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP) have indicated that this mission was assigned to a single junior officer, Pham

Figure 1: Group 875, April 1972-October 1974