September 17th, 1996
Chairman Dornan, Committee members and other distinguished guests, thank you once again for asking me to appear before your Committee to discuss the POW/MIA issue. I wish today to concentrate on two areas. First, the use of Special Intelligence, often called SIGINT, in resolving the fates of many Americans still Missing in Action from the conflict in Southeast Asia, and second, from my perspective as a private researcher, whether the accounting process is flawed.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, in terms of Special Intelligence, Mr. Jerry Mooney, a long time NSA analyst responsible during the war for monitoring PAVN Air Defense communications, has often discussed how he developed a large list of Americans who were captured by the PAVN forces, and who subsequently never returned home. Unfortunately, Mr. Mooney was unable to appear before this committee, but since I have worked closely with Mr. Mooney on an almost daily basis for the past ten months, he has asked me to speak for him, and to share with you the results of both my research into this aspect of the issue and, just as importantly, the knowledge of NSA systems and procedures he has so carefully taught me.
To provide you with some background, I have reviewed every single SIGINT message and NSA memorandum released to the Library of Congress (LOC), which comprises thousands of wartime intercepts, along with various internal NSA messages dealing with many facets of the issue. Additionally, I have gone through all files of the investigators from the Senate Select Committee who worked with SIGINT material, and I have interviewed both Mr. Bob Taylor and Mr. Tom Lang, both of whom worked with Mr. Mooney and other NSA individuals. Lastly, I have read every deposition and / or interview of NSA employees by the Select Committee. Consequently, I have shared everything I found with Mr. Mooney, and we discussed this material and other items at great length over the last ten months. Therefore, I would like to provide your Committee with several very important results of that research.
The first thing I want to discuss is the government's protrayal of Mr. Mooney. In testimony before the Select Committee on Dec. 4th, 1992, by the DIA's Lt. Paul Maguire, Lt. Maguire attempted to paint Mr. Mooney as making analytical mistakes in two separate areas in his assessment of whether Americans were captured. According to DIA, Mr. Mooney only had access to a single source of intelligence, namely SIGINT, and second, because he only had access to this source, and not the all-source that DIA has, he made errors in correlations because he was unable to distinguish between multiple loss incidents. Mr. Chairman, both of these statements are so patently false that they appear to be crafted so as to damage limit Mr. Mooney's claims. Let us deal with the first point, that he only had access to a single intelligence source.
Mr. Chairman, NSA collected and analyzed an enormous amount of information about the PAVN into a tremendously effective technical and product database, which included not only SIGINT but HUMINT, ELINT, RADINT, and PHOTINT, along with additional information collected by other non-U.S. intelligence agencies under Third Party Agreements. This database was so effective that NSA could predict PAVN responses, and just as importantly, NSA could follow their reporting on events down to the gun crew level, which provided NSA the ability to discern what was the truth, and what was not. This database enabled NSA to easily discriminate between the different message categories of Emulation, "Hot B", and Control/Dummy Traffic, versus information NSA initially judged to be reliable, and which was then later confirmed. This database was called the Central Reference files, or C/REF, and it had a sister computer database called COINS. For example, in May, 1970, US Forces captured a large cache of COSVN radio messages. From this, NSA created a study of the PAVN-B-3 Front Rear Services Department. Additionally, if you look closely at any CDEC address list, it clearly states as one of the addresses, "DIRNSA FOR B-6", which was the section Mr. Mooney worked in. Lastly, also in 1970, ARVN forces captured some of the personnel who worked in the Signal Battalion for PAVN MR-5. Based on the interrogation reports, NSA published a study on the communication procedures in this area. Therefore, we can clearly see that even the lowest levels of intelligence reached both NSA and Mr. Mooney's shop. All of these NSA reports are currently located in the LOC.
As for the second point, Mr. Mooney wants you to understand the differences between people who just read SIGINT, and those who understand SIGINT and work it on a daily basis. Mr. Mooney calls this understanding both the Art and the Science of SIGINT. Let me give you another example. (EXAMPLE).
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss with you one of the most shocking items I uncovered in my research. Mr. Mooney has talked for years about an incident that occurred in the summer of 1972 in which the NSA intercepted a PAVN communication that stated they were about to execute ten Americans. I found that message in the LOC files, and it was exactly as Mr. Mooney described it. But, as usual, DPMO states that the incident described by this intercept never occurred. Why, because NSA is just a passive collector of information, they have no way of knowing if information passed in PAVN comm channels is valid, and well, DPMO just knows better.
Let me provide three reasons why NSA thought this was a valid message. First, the priority attached to the message as represented by the "Z" in the upper left corner. This represents "Flash" priority, the highest level. Second, this execution message appears in the NSA Daily Summary, which contains only the most important material and is sent to the highest consumers in the government. Third, NSA requirements are that if they believe the message is in error, they issue a "CANCEL" message. No "Cancel" message exists in the LOC files, nor according to Mr. Mooney, was one ever issued. By the way, Mr. Mooney was the drafter of this message.
Mr. Chairman, the contents of this message beg for a deeper examination beyond the casual brush-off by DPMO. If accurate, they go to the very heart of whether Vietnam is cooperating and whether the process is working. Special Intelligence is very different from the more familiar world of Human Intelligence. It is more complex, often highly technical in nature. Because Special Intelligence is so unfamiliar to most people, the ability to penetrate through attempts at Governmental deception is made much more difficulty. As a concerned citizen, I am asking you and your Committee to press DPMO and other Governmental agencies to thoroughly examine this message and its ramification.
In summation of my remarks concerning Special Intelligence, I would like to provide you a quote from the book about the NSA called the "Puzzle Palace" by Mr. James Bamford. One of the people Mr. Bamford interviewed was a former NSA director, LTG Marshall Carter. When asked about the ability of SIGINT vs other types of intelligence, LTG Carter remarked, "HUMINT is subject to all the mental aberrations of the source as well as the interpreter of the source. SIGINT isn't. SIGINT has technical aberrations which give it away almost immediately if it does not have bona fides, if it is not legitimate. A good analyst can tell very, very quickly whether this is an attempt at disinformation, at confusion, from SIGINT. It is better than HUMINT, it is more rapid than HUMINT (but) SIGINT is right now, its bona fides are there the minute you get it."
In other areas of whether the process is working, as a private researcher who has spent vast amounts of time reviewing U.S. wartime POW/MIA material, I was appalled to learn that the U.S. government had provided to the Vietnamese two sets of documentation that I believe have seriously eroded our ability to conduct impartial investigations. First, in late 1993 we gave the Vietnamese a complete copy of the 954 microfilm rolls from the wartime Combined Document Exploitation Center, known as CDEC. This microfilm set contains captured Vietnamese documents and their English translations and was given to the Vietnamese under the guise of helping them locate their own MIA's from the war. What is so distressing about this decision is that the microfilm also contains most of the wartime HUMINT interrogation reports from the war in completely unredacted format. We are constantly reminded by the intelligence community of the need to protect sources, yet here we provided to the Vietnamese the names and background on almost all of the individuals who gave information to us during the war. To clarify this, any "Brightlight" report from the war that we are using to determine the fate of any individual is now also being red and studied by the Vietnamese. For instance, in April of this year, an alternate Politburo member was put under house arrest for "actions detrimental to the Revolution during the anti-American war." This individual had been captured during the war, and Mr. Bell and I suspect that the Vietnamese Security Services ran across his interrogation report in the CDEC collection.
To further muddy the waters of an honest accounting effort, the U.S. government has also provided to the Vietnamese a streamlined version of what is knonw as the "Brighlight" database. This is a computer database of all the Missing in Action from the war and contains all the casualty records on it. The database was "streamlined" in the sense that most of the wartime intelligence was taken out. Since that initial turnover, the JTF-FA has updated the database twice, and also provided a Vietnamese language version to each of the Vietnamese Province leaders.
Mr. Chairman, I ask you how our Government can conduct an honest accounting effort for our missing soldiers and civilians if the Vietnamese already have a great deal of the intelligence that our own Government possesses. I am not familiar with any style of investigation where one provides to the suspect the evidence against them beforehand, unless of course one believes that the Vietnamese are indeed cooperating superbly and are hiding nothing from us. Even in the best environment, given the long record of Vietnamese intransigence on this issue, it I was a family member, I would find this difficult to accept. Perhaps you can request from DPMO whether the Vietnamese having much of our wartime HUMINT has any impact on the accounting effort.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind you of the statment I made to you in June, that many of the answers are at the NSA. In that vein, Mr. Moonwey has asked me to privately provide you and this Committee something he believes you will find of great importance. This is not a "Smoking Gun" per se, but is a excellent starting point to begin researching whether American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. Mr. Mooney has authorized me to tell you the code systems, frequencies, and aircraft tail numbers and call signs for the movement of all POWs from all wars by Soviet Missile Range had aircraft to the Soviet missile test sites as reflected in NSA product reports. In addition, Mr. Mooney has provided to me the NSA electronic systems where this material is located, the process by which it was transferred to NSA, and the intercept sites involved so that your office can easily retrieve this material. I forewarn you, however, that this is a very large body of material that will require much analytical time and effort. Again, it is an excellent starting point and I do not wish to overhype it.
I welcome any questions you have at this time.
ATTACHMENT:Page 1 of documents
1891548
Z 071545Z JUL 72
FM
TO
NVN 377TH AIR DEFENSE
DIVISION
PLANS TO EXECUTE 10 AMERICANS
On 6 July, the NVN 377th Air Defense Division (unlocated, lower Quang Binh Province) THE 284th AAA Regiment and Directed the Execution of 10 Americans. ?ON ?? ???V
{XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX}Cadres{XXXXX
Shall be left behind to kill the 10 Americans{XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX}
Complete the task and return {XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX}
The 284th AAA Regiment departed Quang Tri City on 5 July and is presently locating in the areas of Cam Lo (16-49N 107-00E), Dong Lon (16-47N 107-05E) and Tan Vinh (16-46N 107-06E)
page 2 of documents
(large REDACTED section)(what appears to be a graph of several oblong boxes with some type visible)
1892200
P 072000Z JUL 72
FM
TO
TOP SECRET (has line drawn through it) (REDACTED) SECTION ONE
(REDACTED) Southeast Asia (REDACTED) Summary
(REDACTED)
(REDACTED)This report summarizes developments noted throughout southeast Asia available (REDACTED) as of 1500Z, 7 JULY(REDACTED)
(Large REDACTED area)
284th Regiment had withdrawn from Quang Tri City, on 6 July, the Division (REDACTED) 284th AAA Regiment to Execute Ten Americans. Elements of the 274th SAM Regiment in the Vinh Ling/DMZ Area Have (REDACTED)to Prepare to Retreat (REDACTED)
(Large REDACTED area)
Page 3 of documents
(REDACTED)
(REDACTED) 1880339
(REDACTED) R 062127Z 1UU??????
FM (REDACTED)
TO (REDACTED)
(REDACTED) S E C R E T(REDACTED)
(REDACTED) FOLLOW UP TWO TO (REDACTED) 071949Z JUN 77
(REDACTED) LAOS (REDACTED) REMAINS OF AMERICAN WAR DEAD
(REDACTED area)
Laotian officials have been searching for American War Dead somewhat earlier than originally thought, as recently available information reveals the search was ongoing in April and May rather than early June (REDACTED)
(REDACTED) IN XIENG KHOANG PROVINCE (REDACTED) ONE
INDIVIDUAL TO SEARCH THE PROVINCE FOR GRAVES OF AMERICANS (REDACTED)
(REDACTED) PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPULIC
(LPDR) (REDACTED) (REDACTED) THE
REMAINS OF SOME AMERICAN WAR DEAD HAD BEEN TAKEN TO OFFICE 208 (REDACTED) (REDACTED)
Phah Province,(REDACTED) (REDACTED) SOMEWHERE IN HOUA PHAH PROVINCE.
(REDACTED) (REDACTED) (REDACTED) AUTHORITIES
IN VIENG SAI (2024N 10413E VH 1955) To investigate the location of the
remains (REDACTED) (REDACTED) FINDING THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN AND
having moved the body (REDACTED) NEITHER THE NAME NOR SEARCH HAD NOT
UNCOVRED ANY ADDITIONAL REMAINS (REDACTED)
(REDACTED) Laos agreed to account for American servicemen.
Missing in the Indochina War and had established a "COMMITTEE" to search for
information. (b) (REDACTED) 071949Z Jun 77. (REDACTED) 092128Z JUN 77. (REDACTED)
Page 4 of documents
071949Z JUN 77
PW
TO
LAO PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY (REDACTED) TO DISINTER REMAINS OF AMERICANS KILLED IN LAOS
On ? JUNE Lao People's Liberation Army Company is, (REDACTED)
(REDACTED) NAS (REDACTED)
(REDACTED) T - EXHUME the remains (REDACTED)
(REDACTED) of Americans interred at an unnamed location, company 18 personnel were ????????????????????????? not to lose or comming ? Any remains. ?????????????????????????????? TO REMOVE, if AT ALL POSSIBLE, an identification number from the aircrat in which the deceased were found and to place the number with the remains.
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