Executive Director, American Legion
June 17, 1998
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
On behalf of The American Legion, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing which will examine U.S. government POW/MIA policy world-wide, and undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. POW/MIA policy and operations related to the wars in Southeast Asia, the Korean War and the Cold War.
Mr. Chairman, we are deeply appreciative of the fact that you have scheduled today's hearing on these important issues. Unquestionably, the unresolved cases of our missing American servicemen are a constant painful reminder of what should be the single highest priority of this nation and its government. For many of us, especially the family members and fellow war veterans, there is also a deep personal commitment to bring about the fullest possible accounting of these missing patriots, many of whom gave their last full measure of devotion in our efforts to establish and maintain the principles of freedom and democracy.
At the outset, it should be noted that The American Legion's definition of what would constitute the fullest possible accounting of our POWs and MIAs is the turning over of live prisoners, the expeditious repatriation of the remains of those who were killed in action or who died in captivity, or the provision of a valid, conclusive report as to why neither of those is possible.
It is the recommendation of The American Legion that all who are seriously concerned with this important issue should unite in adopting such a workable, logical definition of "fullest possible accounting" so that there is agreement on the ultimate goal toward which we should be working.
Three years ago, in June 1995, The American Legion appeared before this Committee during a hearing regarding the issue of prisoners of war and missing in action from the war in Southeast Asia. At that time we analyzed Vietnam's levels of cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in the four areas originally specified by President William Clinton prior to the visit to Indochina of his first Presidential Delegation in 1993. As some may recall, The American Legion had been - and continues to be - critical of this Administration's decision in 1994 to lift the trade embargo with Vietnam, and we strongly opposed any further economic or diplomatic recognition of that country. We had long ago concluded that, without appropriate leverage, it would be difficult if not impossible to gain Vietnam's cooperation to the point necessary to achieve the fullest possible accounting of our missing American servicemen.
It has been the consistent practice of this Administration to heap rewards on Vietnam based on empty promises of increased cooperation that have never materialized about unilateral cooperation on the part of the central government. This statement will address, in detail, those issues and others relating to America's prisoners of war and missing in action.
INDOCHINA WARS
VIETNAM
In 1993, President Clinton said that Hanoi should not expect any further favorable action toward normalization by the United States until it fully cooperated in four specific areas relating to the resolution of cases of missing American servicemen. In retrospect, that threat was as hollow as the empty promises it begat from the Vietnamese government.
Since diluted variations of the original four conditions have been used as the benchmarks on which the President has certified to Congress Vietnam's "full cooperation" in helping the United States achieve the fullest possible accounting, we will comment on each of them.
1. Concrete results by Vietnam to recover and repatriate the remains of missing Americans.
There are 2,089 Americans still missing in Indochina, 1,559 of which are in Vietnam.
The Vietnamese Office on Seeking Missing Persons is cooperating relatively well with Joint Task Force - Full Accounting in conducting joint field operations for the purpose of excavating crash sites and other incident locations, as well they should. The United States is paying them approximately $10 million per year for this cooperation.
The joint field activities between JTF-FA and VNOSMP have produced some results. During the Clinton Administration, 130 Americans have been accounted for, all basically as the result of this joint endeavor. The majority have been located during excavations, and some have been turned over by civilians during the operations.
Unilateral cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese government is almost non-existent, and it is unilateral cooperation that would definitely produce results in the accounting process. For one specific example, in August 1993, officials of the U.S. government officially asked the Vietnamese government to turn over information on over 80 cases involving 98 Americans who either died in captivity or were depicted in communist photographs. These are cases on which our government knows the Vietnamese have information. As of today, to the best of our knowledge, Hanoi has been forthcoming with very little in the way of records or remains relating to these special remains cases, despite the fact that The American Legion, family organizations and others have followed up on this request during numerous meetings with high level Vietnamese officials.
It is a well known and documented fact that both during and after the war, Vietnam had a process in place for the purpose of collecting remains and developing information relating to the cases of Americans who were captured, killed in action, or who died in captivity. However, a mere modicum of that which exists has been turned over to our government.
It must be reiterated that the cooperation that is needed is unilateral Vietnamese recovery and repatriation of remains, and unilateral actions in collecting and turning over documents, particularly those which would be helpful in resolving cases of missing American servicemen.
2. Continued resolution of "last-known-alive" discrepancy cases through a priority investigation team, plus continuation of live-sighting investigations.
The infamous list of Discrepancy Cases, originally compiled by General John Vessey in 1991 as a part of a broader plan to accelerate Vietnam's efforts on POW/MIA accounting through the establishment of priorities, has taken on a life of its own. The 196 last-known-alive (LKA) "discrepancy cases" were not meant to be the yardstick by which "fullest possible accounting" is measured. The term "discrepancy cases" goes back to 1975, and the actual development of the list rests solely with the federal government. We know that there were other equally compelling cases not added to the list at the time the Vessey discrepancy cases were compiled. The selected cases were merely representative, not definitive.
Today, 48 of the original 196 cases remain "unresolved." One year ago today, 48 cases had not been resolved. Three years ago this date, 55 cases were reportedly not resolved. With respect to those cases listed as "resolved," the majority of them were done so without the return of either a live prisoner or remains. One explanation may quite possibly be that early on in the process, many of the cases that are now listed among those "resolved" were not thoroughly investigated. A significant number of these were completed in a relatively short period of time during a period when many who take this issue very seriously described the ongoing field activities as "running through Vietnam."
U.S. officials, for two or three years, have said that only the most difficult cases remain, and the Vietnamese have adopted this phraseology for their own use in explaining away the fact that little to no progress is being made on the Discrepancy Cases. Unfortunately, the perceived signal being sent by both U.S. and Vietnamese officials is that once the Discrepancy Cases are resolved, the efforts on the part of both countries will diminish. That is not acceptable to The American Legion.
We continue to have little confidence in the manner in which live-sighting investigations are conducted. This has nothing to do with the capabilities of the Stony Beach investigators. As a matter of fact, we are continually advocating that Stony Beach be increasingly incorporated into the investigation process. It is The American Legion's considered opinion that the expertise of this unit is grossly underutilized, their travel budget is underfunded, and the work that they do is largely unappreciated.
American investigators cannot move anywhere in Vietnam without being accompanied by VNOSMP cadre. Advance notice must be given the Vietnamese, so the effectiveness of U.S. personnel questioning local citizens is jeopardized. Stony Beach personnel, who operate out of Bangkok, Thailand, are at the whim of the Vietnamese government, which must provide them with an official visa prior to their deployment into Vietnam. Thus, instantaneous live-sighting investigations are nonexistent.
Having said that, according to statistics available from the Defense POW/MIA Office, 1,887 first-hand live-sighting reports in all of Indochina have been received since 1975; 1,781 have been resolved, 1,249 have been attributed to Americans now accounted for, 45 have been correlated to wartime sightings of military personnel or pre-1975 sightings of civilians still unaccounted for, and 487 were determined to be fabrications. There are 106 unresolved first-hand live-sighting reports which are the focus of current analytical and collection efforts.
The resolution of Discrepancy Cases is important. However, all unresolved cases must be thoroughly investigated to the fullest extent possible. Those cases that were quickly resolved early on need to be re-reviewed and investigated.
3. Increased Vietnamese assistance in accounting for American missing in areas of Laos where Vietnamese forces operated during the war.
As of today, there are 447 unresolved cases of missing Americans in Laos, and 80 percent of the incidents occurred in areas that were under the control of the communist Vietnamese forces during the war. This is a prime example of an issue where the unilateral cooperation of the Vietnamese government could be instrumental in resolving a significant number of these cases. The American Legion has consistently requested such cooperation during meetings with high-level Vietnamese officials over the past several years. During National Commander Anthony Jordan's meetings with Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in December 1997, we were given assurances that cooperation in both Laos and Cambodia would increase. As of this date, we are not aware of any appreciable change.
In addition to information on individual cases of missing American servicemen, it would be helpful is Vietnam would provide the records relating to Group 559, an anti-aircraft unit that operated along the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the war. A summary report has been handed over to the U.S., and is currently in the hands of the Defense POW/MIA Office. However, the source documents on which the summary is based would more likely be of use in investigating unresolved cases in the eastern part of Laos.
Although cooperation by Laotian authorities is essential in resolving the fate of unaccounted-for Americans, The American Legion believes that strong emphasis for accounting for Americans lost in Laos should fall on Hanoi since about 85 percent of them were lost in areas of Laos controlled by North Vietnamese forces. However, unless and until the Vietnamese government is held accountable by the Clinton Administration, there is no reason for Hanoi to exert any meaningful unilateral cooperation.
4. Expanded access to archives and continuing interviews to resolve questions about the fates of POWs and MIAs.
U.S. investigators have been permitted to do a considerable amount of archival research in Vietnam, looking through war museums and military records made available by the Vietnamese. A vast array of documents, photographs and other memorabilia have been produced. However, most of it relates to Americans who have already been accounted for. Very little correlates to unresolved cases of missing servicemen.
One question that begs an answer is: how seriously have U.S. officials pushed the central government of Vietnam for access to communist party wartime records?
One must consider the fact that against both the French in the 1st Indochina War, and the United States in the 2nd, the North Vietnamese incorporated revolutionary warfare, which involved both military and political leadership down to the unit level. It combines military strategy with communist ideology. The people provided support for those who were doing the fighting, and, as in any communist country, the party controlled everything. It only stands to reason that the communist party archives would contain valuable documents, records and other material that would help in the resolution of additional cases of missing Americans. However, if U.S. officials do not insist on gaining access to such material, the Vietnamese are certainly not going to voluntarily throw open the doors and invite them in.
Examples of information that has not been thoroughly investigated by the Clinton administration are the "1205" and "735" documents. These are Russian language translations of official Vietnamese reports that were found in the old Soviet Union's Communist Party Central Committee archives. the numbers are purported related to the numbers of American pilots in September 1972, and January 1971 respectively, as reported to the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee. Although there was a flurry of activity when the documents first surfaced, once the Vietnamese government labeled them as "fabrications," they have obviously not been seriously pursued by the Executive Branch. However, the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and specifically Senator Bob Smith, Chairman of the Vietnam War working group are continuing to investigate the validity of the documents.
Mr. Chairman, you will recall that in the early 1990s, the United States laid out a plan for normalization of relations with Vietnam that was sometimes referred to as the "roadmap." It established a policy framework that was a step-by-step process where the U.S. and Vietnam would engage in a series of reciprocal steps - a "carrot and stick" approach - to reward positive progress. Unfortunately, that plan was scrapped nearly five years ago, and Vietnam is receiving just about everything it wants from this Administration, based on a hope and a promise that increased cooperation on the POW/MIA issue will be forthcoming.
Then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Soloman appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 31, 1992 to present an East Asia Trip Report and Policy Update. He described in part his meetings with SRV officials as follows:
"In my discussions with the Vietnamese we reached an important new level of understanding on how both sides can improve our humanitarian cooperation, particularly on POW/MIA accounting.
"The Vietnamese agreed to a five-point program to accelerate their cooperation with us on POW/MIA investigations, undertaking to do the following:
"-- Allow us greater access to their central records, archives and museums and to individuals with information on POW/MIA issues;
"-- Implement a mechanism for short-notice live sighting' investigations;
"-- Begin a two-year plan for accelerated joint investigations inVietnam, to include five such investigation cycles over the next ten months, focusing on the 135 remaining high priority discrepancy cases;
-- Continue to work on trilateral cooperation with Lao and Cambodian authorities; and
"-- Reaffirm Vietnam's intention to search for and rapidly repatriate remains of Americans still unaccounted for, and to hold technical exchanges in order that we understand clearly why remains we believe they might have access to are not available, if that is indeed the case.
"If all five agreements are sincerely implemented they should significantly advance us to our goal of attaining the fullest possible accounting' within a reasonable period of time."
Today, six years, two and one half months later, the only progress that has been made seems to be the number of investigations and "resolved" discrepancy cases. And in some instances it appears as though we have regressed over that period of time.
LAOS
In the foregoing section mention is made of the need for increased unilateral cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese government in resolving the cases of Americans who went missing in the region of Laos occupied by the North Vietnamese Army during the war. As noted, those incidents account for about 85 percent of the total number of cases in Laos.
The Pathet Lao have yet to unilaterally provide credible information on American POWs last known alive in their control. Although U.S. officials, veterans and family organizations have for several years urged the Lao government to commence an oral history program in order to elicit information that would be helpful in resolving cases, questionnaires have just recently been developed and distributed. As of now there is no guarantee that any significant information will be forthcoming.
Joint Task Force - Full Accounting is carrying out joint field activities in Laos in cooperation with the Lao government, although it is being done on a restricted - North to South - basis. The Lao have permitted a few exceptions to this, but for the most part hold to the restricted pattern of operation.
Aside from the joint field activities, there is a paucity of unilateral cooperation on the part of the Lao government to provide information, resolve cases and repatriate remains of missing Americans.
The Cold War Working Group is conducting archival and other research in an effort to account for those American air crews who were shot down by the USSR.
The Korean War Working Group has been examining records and photographs in an attempt to determine the fate of American servicemen who went missing during that war.
KOREAN WAR
During the early 1990s, after much prodding, the North Koreans made some overtures toward limited cooperation on the POW/MIA issue, stating that cooperation would be a humanitarian gesture on their part. Since that time, progress on recovering remains, and eliciting information on the possibility of live prisoners from the Korean War has not been smooth.
During the period 1990 to 1994 (prior to discussions on joint recovery operations), the North Koreans turned over a total of 208 sets of remains. These remains are now being analyzed at the Army's Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI), for possible identification. Only a very small number have been identified to date. The fact that the remains were co-mingled has complicated the identification process.
A limited number of joint recovery operations were held in 1996 and 1997, and a small number of remains were discovered. It was agreed that the U.S. could conduct a joint archival review, focusing on materials and exhibits in the military museum in Pyongyang, the capitol of North Korea. The review was completed on August 9, 1997.
During the period October 14 through 18, 1997, a representative of The American Legion participated in a trip to North Korea. The delegation made a site visit to an area where joint recovery operations were taking place, and visited the military museum in Pyongyang.
Recently, it appeared that progress was being made between the U.S. and North Korea in reaching an agreement on the joint repatriation of American remains. However, just a few weeks ago, the North Koreans failed to follow-through on an agreement to turn over the remains of what are thought to be two Americans. Following a ten-day stall, the remains were turned over on May 25.
There are over 8,100 Americans listed as missing from the Korean War. Four additional recovery operations are scheduled for this year. We trust that the process will eventually gain momentum, so that the cases of our missing American servicemen in Korea may be resolved in a more expeditious manner.
U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS
In 1992, Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin established the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs under the leadership of Ambassador Malcolm Toon and the late Col. Gen. Dimitri Volkagonov. The objectives of the Commission are to gain access to people and documents in Russia that could shed light on the fate of missing Americans, to pursue efforts that current or former U.S. POWs may be alive within the borders of the former Soviet Union, and to establish a means by which remains identified as Americans may be repatriated.
The Vietnam War Working Group has been diligently seeking any information available relating to American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia who have not been accounted for. A significant amount of effort is also being put forth to determine the validity of the "1205" and "735" documents.
The Commission recently traveled to Warsaw, Poland and to Prague, Czech Republic to elicit further cooperation and to publicize the efforts of the United States on the POW/MIA issue.
EVALUATION OF U.S.G. PROCESS, PROGRESS AND POLICY
The American Legion has had no quarrel with the job being done by the young military personnel assigned to the Joint Task Force - Full Accounting teams for the purpose of excavating crash sites and the locations of other incidents. It is hard work, and many times the weather and terrain present formidable obstacles. This witness has observed that their attitudes are positive and they carry out their assignments to the best of their abilities.
We have in the past been critical of some of those who have served in senior leadership positions in JTF-FA for a number of reasons. However, The American Legion gives credit where credit is due, and it must be said that the current Commanding General of JTF-FA has opened and maintained lines of communication and information that basically have not existed in the past. He has elicited the input of The American Legion as well as other veterans and family organizations, and has maintained an open and honest dialogue with us since taking command. While we may not agree with every judgment, decision or action, at least we have an opportunity to discuss them in open and honest debate.
The American Legion has, at times, been openly critical of the Defense POW/MIA Office for the manner in which it has approached its duties and responsibilities with respect to the resolution of cases of missing Americans in Southeast Asia, and for the way family members have been treated. The new Director of that office, who serves in a position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, will require a reasonable amount of time to place his imprimatur on the operations of DPMO. He has communicated with us and with others regarding our concerns, and we trust that he will be implementing positive change in the operation of DPMO.
The American Legion does not agree with the policy of this Administration with respect to the series of favorable actions it has taken toward Vietnam, absent a good-faith demonstration of increasing unilateral cooperation toward achieving the fullest possible accounting of our POWs and MIAs. Likewise, as set forth above, we do not agree with the President's determination that "the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is fully cooperating in good faith with the United States ..... related to achieving the fullest possible accounting for Americans unaccounted for as a result of the Vietnam War," which he has certified to Congress as recently as March 4, 1998. Cooperation with joint field activities cannot and should not be interpreted as "total cooperation," particularly when Vietnam has been unresponsive to requests made by officials of this Administration.
Mr. Chairman, The American Legion commends you for your interest and leadership on this important issue for over two decades, and for scheduling today's hearing. As a nation, periodically we ask our young people to go to the ends of the earth to protect the freedoms we enjoy. More and more often, our armed forces are becoming involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions which many times become hostile actions. The highest moral obligation of this nation is to protect and liberate American POWs and to account for the missing in action.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes our statement.