House Subcommittee on Military Personnel


Testimony of Colleen C. Shine

Testimony of Colleen C. Shine
Director, National League of POW/MIA Families
Daughter - LTC Anthony C. Shine, USAF - MIA 12/2/1972
JUNE 28, 1995

Personal Background: I have worked on the POW/MIA issue since I was a child. As an eight year old girl, I passed out POW/MIA bumper stickers on the playground of my elementary school. The firs time I saw the White House was with a "President Carter, Where's my Daddy?" protest sign in my hand. After graduating from Wellesley College in 1986, I moved to Washington, DC and served for two years as the Director of Public Relations for the National League of POW/MIA Familes. In that position and since, I have met with the most senior representatives of successive U.S. Administrations, as well as leaders in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. I have actively participated in countless related meetings and policy forums and have an extensive working knowledge of the POW/MIA issue in general, as well as a keen awareness of all facets of my father's case.

I agreed to testify before this Subcommittee not to point a finger of blame, but to improve a process. I am here because I want a swift and honorable accounting for American servicemen and civilians still missing as a result of the Vietnam War. Congressman Dornan, distinguished members of the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the current U.S. Government POW/MIA accounting process.

Family Background: I come from a patriotic, military family. My grandfather served as an aide to General Omar Bradley in WWII and in the Army Air Corps during the Korean War. All four of his children served in Vietnam; only two returned alive. My father's brother Alexander, who was severely wounded in Vietnam, retired three years ago as an Army Colonel, and now serves as the Commandant of Cadets at Culver Military Academy in Indiana. His sister Sarah, a nurse in Vietnam, retired from the Army just two years ago.

My father was a man of integrity and discipline. He was a leader who set high standards for himself, and the men he led in peacetime and in war. Each year, the Air Force's most distinguished fighter pilot award, the Anthony C. Shine Award, is awarded to the young flier who most exemplifies my father's caliber of professionalism, tactical ability and moral character.

In Vietnam, my father was one of thousands of American airmen who flew and fought, day and night, in one of the most heavily defended airspaces the world has ever known. A career Air Force officer, he knew the risks involved. His youngest brother Jonathan, an Army 1st Lt. fresh from West Point, was killed in Vietnam in 1970. My father escorted his brother's body home for burial and returned to his job in Vietnam. I said he knew the risks involved, and I believe he did know the obvious risks -- that he might get injured, or killed or captured, just doing his job. I don't think my father could ever fathom the way this country walked away from those who served or may still serve in Southeast Asia.

Three Problems: Three problems prevail in the effort to account for Americans still prisoner or missing in Southeast Asia, and I believe an overview of my family's experience and my father's case will serve to enlighten each area. First, the Vietnamese Government continues to withhold information and remains that could readily account for hundreds of missing Americans. Second, the US Government, on both a policy and operational level, is not employing the most effective strategies possible for learning the fates of our POW/MIAs. Thirdly, the burden of accountability continues to rest unjustly on the shoulders of POW/MIA families like mine.

Case History: To give a brief summary of my father's case, he was declared Missing in Action on December 2, 1972 when his A7-D descended a cloud covering and his wingman lost visual and radio contact. No beeper signal was detected and there were no reports of a shootdown. Search and rescue attempts proved futile and despite three generations of efforts, my family heard nothing about his possible fate for almost fourteen years.

In the late 1980's, a stream of refugee reporting began in which various pieces of personal information, photographs of remains alleged to be his, firsthand and hearsay reports were provided by various sources. One of these reports included a photograph of my father's identification "dog tag" that Defense Intelligence Agency analysts deemed authentic. Later, in 1993, we received a live sighting report stating that he and two other MIAs were being held prisoner in Cambodia.

My family has monitored all action and inaction on this case from the beginning. Prior to the establishment of the Joint Task Force For Full Accounting (JTFFA), we responded to Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) reports and investigations. In July of 1993, we received a report of JTFFA's investigation of a crash site they believed, due to approximate location, process of elimination, pieces of an aircraft and a villager's account, might be my father's. This investigation was a follow up to a report received years earlier through the JCRC.

JTFFA's initial assessment following this 24th Joint Field Activity (JFA) investigation indicated the crashsite was that of an A-7, (thought not necessarily an Air Force A-7 and not specifically my father's aircraft) that had been heavily scavenged with "no markings or names." While several pieces of the aircraft were recovered, the helmet was "not photographed nor retained" by JTFFA.

I learned only recently that wreckage which associated this crash site with my father's aircraft was located during this 24th JFA, but left at the site by JTFFA. After repeated requests for a photograph of the piece of fuselage JTFFA said was part of my father's aircraft, I finally received, just last month, a blurry and rather indiscernible photograph of the only photograph said to have been taken of the item. When asked where the item was being retained and whether a clearer photograph might be taken, JTFFA responded that the item had been left at the site during the 24th JFA.

JTFFA reported that the witness saw the pilot dead in his ejection seat and later saw what he believed to be the same pilot being buried by Vietnamese soldiers, though he could not pinpoint the exact burial site. JTFFA's Recommendation: "Recommend this site be closed. This recommendation is based on the knowledge that the aircraft crashed in a creek on the side of a mountain, there is a high probability that biological evidence has been washed away during the rainy seasons." JTFFA's Recommended future Actions: "The team has exhausted all current leads for this case. Recommend this case be placed in the pending category."

I responded with a multitude of questions regarding possible leads and follow up investigation. Regarding the helmet, JTFFA responded, "Due to it's lack of identifiable markings, the helmet could not be correlated to a specific person, aircraft or service. {REDCATED} It was not photographed nor retained." After various prompting and appeals, JTFFA agreed to return to the village to photograph the helmet, which they did. The subsequent photos I received from JTFFA did not depict the angle necessary to reveal the name written inside.

In summary, after only a cursory recive and analysis of possible witnesses and the crash and burial sites, and no accounting results, JTFFA indicated to my family their position that sufficient investigation had been accomplished. They recommended my father's case be placed in a pending category and that the site be closed and no further investigation be done. Following each report, analysis and evaluation, my family assumed the role of providing the rationale for JTFFA to revisit the site, reinterview the primary witness and others and photograph the helmet in order that we might learn all that could be learned from the site, witness and material evidence.

During their 29th JFA, JTFFA reinterviewed the witness and a "joint investigation element excavated the burial site." They found more than thirty pieces of material evidence including "pilot related gear," and 6 small bones. However, the site showed "positive evidence of recent digging" (green leaves were found beneath the surface of the grave site) and the primary witness "probably knows more information than he is willing to tell" as "his explanation of the apparent disturbance of the gravesite was inconsistent." This time, JTFFA recommended the case for reinvestigation. The case was investigated again during the 30th JFA with the recommendation that it be reinvestigated, which it was during the 31st JFA.

Results of My Trip to Vietnam: Frustrated by JTFFA's inability to learn more and awaiting analysis of the recovered remains and material evidence, I traveled to Vietnam in January and February of this year. Escorted by local and regional Vietnamese officials as well as a representative of the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP) only, (JTFFA policy prohibits accompanying family members on site visits), I visited the crashsite and burial site and spoke with the primary witness. I traveled to the crashsite expecting to see an empty mountain devoid of material evidence indicating a crash, as JTFFA had said the area had been heavily scavenged by villagers and the team had only recovered several pieces of material evidence.

Instead, I climbed to the site and in the approximately one and a half hours I spent there, was able to recover more than 30 pieces of aircraft using only a bamboo stick. Furthermore, the witness agreed to lend me the helmet he had kept as a souvenir from the war in order that it might be analyzed. If it proved to be my father's helmet, the witness agreed that I could keep it; otherwise, I agreed to return it to him following testing. After he handed me the helmet, I turned it over and was shocked to see the name "SHINE" handwritten in faded, but clearly visable, black marker inside the helmet. The metal buckle on the helmet also read "US PARVA."

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) analysts have had the helmet for testing for nearly four months now. Their experts have not yet issued their report, but say the handwriting strongly correlates to my father's and believe it was produced by my father. Because of the curvature of the writing space and the effect of a metal grommet tha wore away part of the letter "E," FBI analysts believe it would have taken an extraordinary effort for someone to have forged that name in the helmet during the months between JTFFA's photographing it and my retrieving it.

Last month, as part of their 35th JFA, JTFFA revisited the village to excavate the crash, burial and ejection seat site. This time, JTFFA was accompanied by CILHI representatives and the joint team recovered 26 bones and bone fragments, as well as a dog tag bearing my father's personal identification information - all from the same gravesite they had visited previously. The bones were found "on or near the surface," and JTFFA explained that the fact that the team recovered "only small bones, such as those of the wrist and hand, and small fragments of bone, supports the conclusion that someone found and removed some of the remains." These results are obviously inconsistent with their own recommendation of two years earlier that there need be "no further activity at this location due to the recovery of all remains present." During the 35th JFA, JTFFA also claims to have recovered wreckage exclusive to my father's aircraft and to the crash. I have not yet received photographs of the remains or material evidence, as the JTFFA requires that they be specifically requested by the next of kin following receipt of the initial report, rather than sending them automatically as clarification along with the written report. JTFFA's Recommendation: "We recommend the site be closed."

Going back to my files and notes, attempting to put the various investigations and corresponding analysis in chronological order for this testimony has been difficult. Often, my questions from one JFA were still being answered when the next report was received. Each report generated a series of follow up correspondence, as I asked questions and pressed repeatedly to have the material evidence and remains tested as soon as possible. Despite my efforts, DNA testing of the initial bones was completed many months after they were recovered; unfortunately, the results were inconclusive. My father's case files have expanded to more than 1,000 pages of reports, related documents, letters and memorandums, many of which contain conflicting or incomplete information. Many pages consist of my replies to government replies to initial reports.

Importance of a Thorough Approach: Following each new piece of information, or non information, it has been my role to call each of my family members to share the news. Suffice it to say, had JTFFA had done a more thorough and responsible job the first time they visited this site, the site may well have revealed more concrete information in the form of a complete set of remains. JTFFA could also have spared my family much undue emotional stress, time, effort and financial expense. By doing the job right the first time, JTFFA could have saved the US Government and American tax payers the costs involved in investigating this area on five separate occasions.

While I imagined many things about my father's fate, I never thought he would come home from Vietnam in bits and pieces, over the course of several years, and at such a tremendous personal expense to our family.

Answers Exist in This Case: By the late 1980's, it became apparent by the type and frequency of reporting that someone in Southeast Asia did know what happened to my father. It also became apparent that he did not crash and disintegrate in the type of aircraft explosion that can be six times the heat of a crematorium, as is the case in some incidents. His helmet survived the crash intact and undamaged. The gravesite had clearly been disturbed and manipulated when the JTFFA team returned to investigate it.

Now, finally, it appears that enough evidence may have been collected to learn my father's fate. However, an accounting is dependent on the analysis and evaluation of that material, including DNA testing of the recovered remains. Leads still exist in Laos, where two sources who have not yet been provided to JTFFA for purposes of an interview, claim to have his remains. All the large bones have been removed from the gravesite. It is probably that since Vietnamese soldiers were said to have buried the body, and since it was a border case and Vietnam controlled 85% of the areas in which the U.S. sustained losses in Laos, and since one of his identification "dog tags" surfaced in the late 1980's, the Vietnamese may well have pertinent records, remains or informatin that could help resolve my father's fate.

Manpower and Resources Needed: My grandfather died without knowing the fate of his eldest son. The rest of my family, including my grandmother, who is now in her mid-80's, is subject to the delays caused by limited resources and manpower in the various US Government agencies tasked with evaluation of material evidence and remains. Currently, only 10 cases per month are submitted to the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) for DNA testing, and a significant backlog exists.

The wreckage I recovered and provided to JTFFA in February has not yet been submitted to the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory (LSEL) for analysis. (LSEL's role is becoming increasingly important to the accounting process, and it is essential that they have the staffing, mandate and resources necessary to sufficiently contribute their espertise to the accounting process). Waiting for cooperation from the COMMUNIST government of Vietnam, is very different from waiting on bureaucratic decisions and delays regarding evaluation of collected material evidence by appropriate USG agencies.

Considering the fact that the US Government is spending approximately $100,000,000 annually to resolve the fates of 2,204 missing Americans, it is reasonable to request that delays be removed from this stage of the accounting process. While each of these agencies is responsible for areas other than accounting for POW/MIAs from Southeast Asia, and has much critical work to do, the years that have passed should not make these cases any less critical. Twenty two years ago, my father's case may have seemed more tragic; however, the anguish has not diminished, rather increased, over time.

Implications of Case on Issue: The implications of this case on the overall issue are serious. If the numerous and repeated errors that have occured in the field investigation of my father's case are at all indicative of JTFFA's procedures, and I believe they are, what does this mean for the operational accounting process? Also, JTFFA's public relations role in commending the Vietnamese failes to consider the fact that field operations will never be able to account for cases in which the Vietnamese government has already recovered the remains or is witholding crucial documents. If there have been this many mistakes on a case that has been this closely monitored for so many years, what is happening on cases in which the next of kin are elderly, removed from Washington, or unable to dedicated the time and resources to monitor the progress of each of the USG agencies tasked with the accounting process?

Case Managers: Based on the problems encountered by families in monitoring and promoting progress on their individual cases, the National League of POW/MIA Families has requested that the Secretary of Defense ensure the appointment of Case Managers who would monitor a series of cases to ensure appropriate and timely action and follow up by each US Government agency tasked with a role in the accounting process.

My case has been a prime example of the fact that, all too often, achievable answers are reduced to the family members knowledge of and proper use of semantics. Sometimes it becomes a matter of having to know the exact right question, and ask it with the precise terminology, in order to get the answer you seek. During their first visit, JTFFA conducted a "surface search of the crash site" and an "area search of the burial site." They never claimed to have done a full scale excavation, I was told later, rather, a "site investigation." As a family member, I had no means for distinguishing the difference, nor any means by which to determine whether, in fact, each agency had dedicated the appropriate personnel to accomplish the appropriate task.

In order to promote a resonsible investigation of my father's case, I have had to learn the roles and responsibilities of many USG agencies including the CILHI, DOD, DIA, DPMO, AFDIL, LSEL, Mortuary Affairs, the Air Force Casualty Office, J-2 and JTFFA. The families have of necessity become the experts, when the process would be better served by JTFFA's doing their job in a manner in which the familes could have faith. Semantics aside, JTFFA led my family to believe that no excavation had been done because one was not necessary and would not be fruitful. Following my visit, when they decided to excavate, the effort proved to be tremendously productive.

Burden of Accountability: For more than two decades, the burden of resolving the POW/MIA issue has been on the families of those who served and may still serve our nation in Southeast Asia. We have experiences the inaction, apathy and lies of successive Administrations and fought against the inflexible, recalcitrant governments of Indochina which hold the answers we seek. We have risen nobly to the occasion, focused on the facts, refrained from emotionalism, offered sensible strategies for achieving progress and educated numerous government officials and members of Congress to the history and status of the POW/MIA issue.

Long after the latest political agenda has been achieved, a corps of dedicated people from every state will continue to work for the truth. We, the families of America's missing - the parents, wives, siblings and children of 2,204 Americans who never returned from the Vietnam war -- are linked by a common thread of uncertainty, hope anbd perseverance.

Activity vs. Results: The JTFFA appears more interested in documenting their statistics and activity as they roll through Vietnam, than in achieving real results in terms of accountability. While the families appreciate the decicated efforts of these young men and women in the field, they too often fail to lean the bulk of information that would be available were languagecapable, more experienced personnel assigned to the task.

For my family, and all others, results are more important than activity. My family would have appreciated JTFFA's not only finding a helmet but photographing and/or returning that helmet for immediate analysis; not simply locating and photographing SOME of the available aircraft/engine parts, but recovering ALL avaialble material evidence and identifying parts and serial numbers unique to my father's aircraft; and not recommending a burial site be closed after an incomplete excavation, rather, first repatriating all avialable remains and personal effects for immediate analysis and DNA testing. I wish JTFFA did their job as if it were their father who was missing and not mine. Somehow, I imagine it would be a more professional and timely job with the goal of an accounting versus mere activity.

Normalization: The families do not oppose normalization; instead, we have long supported recirpocal steps to reward real progress. As I explained to President Clinton in a conversation on Memorial Day, we need not normalize relations with Vietnam under the pretense of progress, when in fact, the President's own four POW/MIA criteria have not been met. If the pressures of big business and Congress compel President Clinton to move forward diplomatically, I asked that it not be at the expense of a small group of American veterans and their families who have served this nation above and beyond any reasonable call of duty. When the decision to normalize relations is made, it should be the result of an honest policy and not undermine our ability to gain the fullest possible accounting.

If the President's four criteria aren't met, and he still chooses to normalize, he could maintain integrity by stating clearly that there is more that could be done and that the United States expects the Vietnamese Government to cooperate more fully in the four outlined areas; unilateral Vietnamese efforts to locate and repatriate remains; continued resolution of discrepancy cases; trilateral investigations with the Lao, including their documents on specific cases; and accelerated efforts to provide all related documents and information. While normalization is inevitable, it does not have to be at the expense of men like my father and families like mine. If economic factors are paramount, that fact should be fully acknowledged.

Intelligence Database: A database of factual US intelligence information regarding Vietnam's ability to unilaterally account for hundreds of missing Americans is the basis US expectations regarding Vietnam's cooperation. This information is not the product of wishful thinking on the part of the families nor something that can be disputed by opinion. Rather, it is the result of Defense Department collection and analysis of a range of related information from sources such as the reports of returned US prisoners of war and covert intelligence operations.

Normalizing-Might-Help Myth: History proves that a reciprocity-based foreign policy that does not undermine nor ignore the above-mentioned U.S. Government intelligence database brings greatest accounting results. Furthermore, history fails to support the position of those who believe that we will gain further cooperation from the Vietnamese by normalizing relations. Certainly, the lifting of the trade embargo last year did not result in significant progress. While the families will continue to work within whatever political scenario results, I would hope that America would not be willing to forsake accounting results for political or economic gain.

Those sincerely interested in improving the accounting process could best demonstrate this interest by soliciting and incorporating the input and wishes of the legal next of kin of America's missing. In the case of Assistant Secretary of State for Asian & Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, a vocal public advocate of normalization, the interests of America's missing and their families would be better served were he to take the time to read the negotiating history regarding US/Vietnam relations with regard to the POW/MIA issue.

In a Newstalk Television interview last week, Virginia Foote, head of the US Vietnam Trade Council, indicated that were we to normalize now, the economic gains for America would not be substantial for years. If there is, in fact, not so much gain economically, and so much potential to lose ground in terms of accountability, I would entreat the Congress to ensure that President Clinton's own criteria are met before further diplomatic steps are taken. One agenda need not preclude the other.

Alleged Vietnamese MIAs: For clarification, while they suffered a tremendous loss of life, the Vietnamese do not have 300,000 MIAs, rather, thousands of Killed in Action whose bodies have not been located and who, if found, in most cases could never be identified. These men, if alive, would not be hindered from returning to their families -- a privilege America's POW/MIAs may not enjoy. To equate the issue of American POW/MIAs and the burden of uncertainty shouldered by families like mine with that of the loss of life experienced by the Vietnamese is to miss and misrepresent the crux of this crucial issue. For the U.S., accounting for missing servicemen and civilians is not only a matter of cleaning up a battlefield -- a process families recognize may take decades -- but of learning the bulk of information Vietnam could unilaterally provide to resolve hundreds of cases of men like my father.

Death Is Different than Uncertainty: As a Director of the National League of POW/MIA Families, I represent the 3,800+ family members of America's missing servicemen and civilians. Our members deal with the pain of Vietnam, not as an issue of the past, but as one that continues to twise and change daily. Uncertainty is different than death. With death, there is something to face and move forward from. Uncertainty doesn't lend that peace of mind.

Reasonable Goal: Our goal is reasonable and achievable: the fullest possible accounting, which is defined by the U.S. Government as the return of a live American, his remains or credible information as to why neither is possible. U.S. intelligence and forensic evidence indicate that Vietnam could locate and provide remains which would account for hundreds of Americans, and information which would help resolve other discrepancies. The families are realistic, recognizing that every war has casualties and that for some, there will never be a definitive answer. There is a defined point at which we will be satisfied that all reasonable avenues have been pursued. We are not in pursuit of an intangible, quixotic dream, rather information and remains known to be purposely withheld by the Government of Vietnam and available, in part, in the field.

Honorable Resolution: Right now, America has a unique opportunity to shed a truthful light on a subject that has been shrouded in lies. An honorable resolution to the POW/MIA issue would do much to heal a nation that has clearly not yet recovered from the Vietnam War. As the adage reads, "Poor is the nation that has no heroes....Shameful is the nation who having them, ..... forgets." I cannot stomach the thought of my children reading in their history books false accounts of the "POW/MIA myth" or the "unfounded hopes of unrealistic families." An honorable resolution to the POW/MIA Issue would go far in easing the emotional burden of millions in the veterans community and could help restore much-needed faith among active duty servicemen and women. For families like mine, an honest accounting would alleviate the anguish of uncertainty and the sting of insult atop injury. For those who answered our nation's call to battle in the Vietnam War, it would mean long-overdue justice.

Setting a Precedent: Thanks to the efforts of families of American still prisoner or unaccounted for as a result of the Vietnam war, America has set a precedent that never again will there be as great a time lapse from when our servicemen and civilians are listed as missing, to when an honest effort to account for them is established. This precedent was successfully put to the test during the Persian Gulf conflict. As our troops engage in warfare around the world, I am sure that those who wear the green berets and flight helmets and garrisons are comforted to know that America no longer forsakes her missing. My family is proud to be a part of improving the process by which America accounts for her prisoners and missing.




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