July 14, 1993
"TOWARDS AN HONEST ACCOUNTING OF POW/MIAs"
Chairman Ackerman and Mr. Gilman:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am concerned that President Clinton's decision to permit international loans for Vietnam at this time is sending Hanoi the wrong message. This decision is based, in part, on claims of greater cooperation by Vietnamese officials in accounting for MIAs. However, at closer look, this new progress is mostly an illusion. American officials have been allowed increased travel authority and access to some documents. However, this "process" has resulted in few honest answers about American prisoners last known alive.
For example, at a recent press conference to debunk the document Dr. Stephen Morris found in Soviet archives, General John Vessey heralded a register he received in Hanoi called the "Blue Book." He claimed it was proof that the Vietnamese Communists had accounted for all American prisoners held in North Vietnam. Sadly, General Vessey and his staff of Pentagon experts didn't tell the media that at least two former prisoners -- Michael Benge and Orson Swindle, as well as, the majority of prisoners captured in South Vietnam and Laos--had never signed the Blue Book. This lack of basic investigative integrity and rush to judgement by General Vessey, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Task Force Full Accounting contradicts their public relations efforts. How many other American prisoners held in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia under Hanoi's control never signed the Blue Book? How many remained in custody after the war?
My research into the MIA issue began in Europe in 1982. While interviewing former Vietnamese Communist officials and survivors of the post-war gulag, a number of them, told me of Hanoi's policy to hold American Prisoners after the war. The reasons included, "for political and economic bargaining....as punishment...." and "tradition, like holding French prisoners after 1954." In addition, we discussed Hanoi's near-absolute control of Laos and Americans captured there.
For these reasons, the document found in Soviet archives attributed to General Tran Van Quang is not surprising. Some of the information may not be totally accurate. However, a wealth of intelligence information supports the fact that Hanoi maintained a secret prison system in Vietnam and Laos. As well as, Soviet Bloc and Chinese involvement.
Among documents recently handed to U.S. officials in Moscow is a March 1967 "Top Secret" report by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi. It details extensive*S activities of Soviet technical teams at fresh crash sites of American airplanes in North Vietnam. Their task was to study and obtain military equipment in order to improve Vietnamese anti-aircraft efforts and for shipment to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet document also describes competition with Chinese technical teams to scavenge crash sites. In some cases, after extracting technical equipment, the Chinese destroyed airplanes before Soviet teams arrived. Today, this raises serious questions about U.S. investigators' desicions to declare MIAs dead based on crash-site conditions. [See enclosed "14 March 1967 USSR Embassy in the DRV Entry No. 166."]
All U.S. military prisoners released from Vietnam claim that they were never interviewed by Chinese or Soviets, or questioned about technology. However, it is inconceivable that Soviets and Chinese would not have exploited American pilots and techincal experts. This was especially important to the Soviets, whose allies in the Middle East were being devastated by American technology used by the Israelis. A second prison system would have remained top secret, with no chance of prisoners being transferred to the primary system. Because it was critical that the U.S. government not learn what information was extracted, in order to prevent adjustments in our technology.
A detailed 1971 CIA Intelligence Information Report describes Soviet Chinese and Vietnamese officials at a prisoner interrogation center in Vinh Phu Province in North Vietnam. According to the report, "two U.S. pilots were taken to the debriefing point in 1965, eight in 1966, and an unknown number in 1967." [See enclosed CIA Report No.CS - 311/04439-71.] Where are these pilots today?
U.S. intelligence records show that throughout the war Soviet technical advisors and air crews were present at Bai Thong [or Yello Star] Airfield near Thanh Hoa and near Hanoio at Phuc Yen Airfield. Soviet advisors were also in Laos at Vieng Sai, Sam Neua and at Phong Savan Airfield near Khang Khay. In a 1991 Australian "60 Minutes" television documentary, Soviet pilots claimed to have flown American prisoners from Laos to Vietnam. And former U.S. National Security Agency analyst Gerry Mooney claims that his agency monitored Soviet involvement with American prisoners at Bai Thong Airfield.
Mr. Chairman,
Have American investigators interviewed the Soviet pilots or officials in charge of those operations in Vietnam and Laos? If so, what information was learned about American prisoners? Were they moved to the Soviet Union? Are they alive today? Does the U.S. have access to all records of those air bases*S and the Soviet advisory units? In mid 1992 -- six months before the Quang document was found in Moscow -- former Czechoslovakian General Jan Sejna, now employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, revealed that while he was a high ranking Soviet bloc intelligence officer, American prisoners were transported to Eastern Europe. Sejna reports that he met a Vietnamese General during the first prisoner exchange. Was this General Tran Van Quang?
A series of eight recently declassified U.S. Navy, Army and Air Force Intelligence documents dated from Spring 1971 through Fall 1972, cite reports from unrelated sources in Vietnam, Burma and Taiwan who describe the transfer of American prisoners from North Vietnam to prison camps in Kwangtung Province, China and the Kunming area of Yunnan Province, China which is some 200 miles from the Vietnam border. [See enclosed: Naval Message R191503Z September 1972, and U.S. Air Force Ingelligence Report 1 773 0095 71, November 15, 1971.]
These reports state that China,"...secretly agreed to keep a number of U.S. POWs for North Vietnam, and would never release them without Vietnamese approval... The North Vietnamese sent them to China because they felt the U.S. could never send aerial reconnaissance or troops into China to rescue the POWs because of the risk of glabal war." Recently, intelligence also held an Nanning, in Kwangsi Province, China and near Zhanjiang naval base in Kwangtung Province.
Until 1975, Hanoi continued to receive massive amounts of military aid advisors and "volunteer" soldiers from both the Soviets and China. Hanoi paid back these rival allies with access to American military equipment and captured technical experts. As the Sino-Soviet split intensfied, China was desperately trying to build an independent military industrial complex, especially fighter aircraft. For this reason, China sought to exploit American prisoners who had technical expertise.
A similar report of U.S. POWs in China appeared in February 1973 in the London Evening News. [See enclosed article: "U.S. POWs Reportedly Held in South China."] The June 1973 edition of American Opinion magazine, quote Reverend Paul Lindstrom that U.S. prisoners "are being held in prison camps in Yunnan Province." [See enclosed article: "The Code," by Alan Stang, American Opinion, June 1973.] Kay Bosiljevac, wife of an MIA pilot, told me that in October 1975 in Bangkok, a senior officer from the intelligence section of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAG/THAI) confided to her about a list of U.S. MIAs "probably sent to Yunnan Province, China because of their technical skills." Where are the records of JUSMAG/THAI? Were they among the JCRC files shredded by General Thomhas Needham at the U.S. Embassy Bangkok in March 1993?
Yunnan Province has played a historic role in the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Party relationship. Beginning in the mid-1920's Ho Chi Minh was an organizer for the Soviet Comintern in southern China. Throughout World War II, Ho's Viet Minh forces were based in the Kunming area. After Mao Tse Tung seized power in 1949, numerous Vietnamese Communists were sent to China for advanced training.
For example, in the mid-1950s General Tran Van Quang recieved political and Chinese language training in Yunnan prior to his becoming head of Hanoi's Enemy Proselytizing Department, responsible for exploiting foreign prisoners. After the French war, a large number of eastern Europe members of the French Foreign legion captured by the Vietnamese were forcefully transported through China to the Soviet bloc for execution. Was General Quang involved in these transfers?
During the French War, as in the subsequent war against South Vietnam, Hanoi considered all of Indochina as one battlefield. The Vietnamese held French captives in Laos before and after they claimed to have released all prisoners.
During the war against South Vietnam, Quang was a member of the Central Military Affairs Party Commitee, which was the ultimate decision making power for all military matters, including exploitation of American prisoners. And throughout the war, Quang was Commander of Military Region 4 and the B4 Front, that extended from Thanh Hoa Province in central North U.S. JUSPAO Saigon, "Central Military Affairs Party Committee."] More importantly, his comanded included an extensive area of Laos around the Ho Chi Minh trail where many American MIAs were captured or lost.
Mr.Chairman:
More than 500 Americans were captured or lost in Laos. Only 9 were returned after the Paris Agreement. Senior U.S. diplomats posted in Laos during the war have testified that more than 80% of Americans were captured, lost or imprisoned in areas under Vietnamese military control. The Vietnamese government has refused to turn over the bulk of their records of operations in Laos related to the fate of American prisoners. Recently, Hanoi has promised more information and provided a few records and private journal entries of lower ranking officers. But they have not turned over important records related to Laos from General Quang's former headquarters of Military Region 4, nor records of the Northwest Military Region which controlled military operations and the capture of U.S. prisoners -- such as the Lima Site 85 incident -- north of Region 4.
Among the few American prisoners who were released from Hanoi in 1973 who had been transported through Laos on the Ho Chi Minh Trail is Michael Benge, a recipient of the State Department's highest award for heroism. He witnessed an elaborate network of prison camps in the Cambodia-Laos frontier under North Vietnamese interrogators continually told him, "We are still holding French prisoners. We can hold you forever."
For more than two decases U.S. officials have systematically misled the Congress and American people about the large amount of intelligence our government has gathered on American prisoners in Laos. I am including for the record, declassified CIA and Defense Intelligence documents from 1967 and 1968 that gives precise locations of Americans -- some by name -- in prison camps in Laos. [See CIA Report CS-311/10502-68, 15 October 1967 - 15 October 1968; and CIA document "Locations of Prison Camps in Laos."]
Following the war -- even after all American prisoners were declared dead by the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations -- our intelligence agencies continued to track American prisoners held in Laos. I am including for the record declassified U.S. intelligence reports from 1979-84 summarizing military radio intercepts in Laos related to the control and movement of American prisoners. [See enclosed U.S. Government Memorandum Si-1163/Di-7 of 12 December 1979; NSA document R 022201Z of December 1980; and NSA document P 13210Z of September 1984.]
Throughout the Vietnam War and in the aftermath, the Pathet Loa military has been advised and controlled by Hanoi. We cannot claim that Hanoi has shown good faith and is being cooperative in resolving the MIA issue until Vietnamese leaders either produce American prisoners known to have been alive in Laos or hand over their remains. In December 1992, Senators John Kerry and Bob Smith met with Vietnamese President Le Duc Anh in Hanoi. I have a video and audio tape of that meeting that I will make available to your committee. In reference to Laos, Senator Kerry told Le Duc Anh: "We understand that there are records [in Vietnam] that pertain to the Ho Chi Minh Trail shootdowns. This would be very helpful to us in understanding in an area where we have many questions about lost pilots. Whenever we ask Laos they say, "Talk to Vietnam." Senator Smith and I have been to Laos three times. Each time they say, "We weren't in control. It was mostly North Vietnamese."
Mr.Chairman:
It is disingenuous for U.S. officials to talk of "satisfactory" cooperation by Vietnam on POW/MIA matters. The National League of POW/MIA Families news- letter of June 16 states, "In reality the last 2 to 3 years have been the worst since 1981 in terms of accounting for our missing loved ones." The Pentagon's*S Joint Task Force Full Accounting confirms that since January 1991, of 99 sets of remains returned to the United States in flag-draped caskets, only 14 have been identified as Americans. The 4,800 photos given to Senator McCain by the Vietnamese in November, 1992 that President Bush hailed as "the final chapter of the Vietnam War," turned out to be a pre-election ploy by Hanoi. Those photos have confirmed the fate of only ONE MIA.
In a similar manner, most of the documents, records and films recently shown to Senator Kerry and Joint Task Force Full Accounting are of American prisoners already returned or from provinces where there has already been exhaustive crash-site investigations. The "Blue Book" and other prison rosters handed to General Vessey and Senator Kerry are related only to some pilots kept in Hanoi. They do not contain the names of POWs captured in South Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos. And they have no bearing on the status of anyone held in North Vietnam outside of the main prison system.
Most of the personnel currently assigned by the Pentagon to investigate this issue both in Indochina and in Washington are not qualified to make final judgement on cases of prisoners last known alive. Man of the current senior Defense Intelligence Agency officials were discredited and described in the 1985-86 "Brooks and Gaines" internal DIA evaluation reports as "unprofessional .... sloppy and with a mindset to debunk" live sightings of MIAs. In addition, Senator Bob Smith has asked the Justice Department to investigate what appears to be systematic fraudulent testimony by Pentagon officials before Congress.
Biographies of supervising officers of the Joint Task Force Full Accounting show that few have any training or experience in human intelligence investigations, POW/MIA or Vietnam War history studies and only rudimentary Vietnamese or Lao language ability. Besides crash site excavations, the oral history interviews of senior Vietnamese cadre -- if properly done -- is an important component of POW/MIA investigation. These cadres' personal testimony may fill important information gaps missing from official documents. Unfortunately, General Needham has removed the most experienced American expert Garnett Bell -- who has 25 years of POW/MIA investigative experience and historical expertise and language fluency. Instead, interviews are being conducted by a civil servant whose background is in signal communications and who has limited knowledge of Vietnamese military history. He is assisted by two 21 year old enlisted men.
As a professional oral historian, I can assure you that it is impossible for young people with a lack of historical knowledge, language ability and professional experience to do meaningful interviews. There is no way that senior Asian officials will have any respect for young inexperienced enlisted people from a foreign country.
In addition, American investigators are not permitted by the Vietnamese government to conduct spontaneous candid interviews with villagers in areas of live sightings. U.S. personnel are almost always accompanied by Communist officials, who by their presence intimidate witnesses. And there are many accounts of witnesses appearing to be pre-rehearsed by government officials, as a member of the advance team for Senators Kerry and McCain's recent trip to Hanoi.
I disagree with claims by U.S. officials that if Hanoi doesn't get economic and trade concessions that Vietnam will stop cooperating. First, Hanoi has everything to lose in terms of economic devlopment if they become obstinate. They need us a lot more than we need them. More importantly, to resolve the cases of Americans last known alive in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Vietnamese leaders, including General Quang, must hand over any LIVE men, remains of those who perished and all records -- including those regarding Laos and the roles played by the Soviet Union and China -- without further delay. To reward Vietnamese government prematurely will encourage them to continue dribbling information and bodily remains according to their own political interests.
For the past decade, the U.S. government has claimed that resolving the MIA issue is of the highest national priority. Debunked live signting reports must be reevaluated. The bottom line is that while U.S. officials claim to have no proof of survivors, there is a cumulative body of evidence -- including unresolved satellite photo analysis -- that indicates some American MIAs may still be in captivity. We must now remind our allies in Europe and Asia who are eager to do business in Vietnam that since 1941 thousands of American servicemen have sacrificed their lives -- and families of the missing have suffered unbearably -- in the defense of these nations' freedom. They can assist Hanoi best by encouraging Vietnam leaders to swiftly and honestly return out missing men or their remains.
Mr.Chairman:
The efforts of your Committee should not end with this hearing. Subsequent hearings should focus on the standards and process of MIA investigations and on specific cases of prisoners last known alive where families believe that there has not been an earnest effort by the Pentagon. Recently, I.D. cards and other belongings of American servicemen who were previously listed as "Killed in Action" have been found in Vietnamese museums. The status of these men should be added to the JTF-FA Discrepancy List. And the Vietnamese must be required to hand over these men or their remains.
President Clinton has ordered the declassification of thousands of POW related intelligence documents. Congressional oversight is needed, especially*S of some 120 boxes of National Security Agency files that may contain important information. It would undercut President Clinton's promise to honestly account for our men, if the trade embargo is lifted before all of these documents are declassified and thoroughly analyzed by a non-partisan independent investigative body.
Most important, Congressional oversight is needed to monitor the work of U.S. investigators in Southeast Asia and the Pentagon. Those U.S. officials who have proven disingenuous or incompetent must be replaced by experienced people with a non-biased "total quality" attitude. And in Southeast Asia, Russia and China, at this critical stage of the process, we must be assured that only the most honest and best qualified personnel are conducting the investigation.
Thank You.
Al Santoli July 14, 1993