July 12, 1995
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify concerning a matter of importance to all Americans, our POWs and MIAs who are still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.
I believe a hearing concerning this issue today is most appropriate, because only yesterday our President made an historic decision to normalize diplomatic relations with the socialist Republic of Vietnam. Recent comments by those in favor of this move have been designed to encourage veterans across the country to put the Vietnam War in the past. The slogan used by communist officials in Hanoi, and mimicked by some here in America is "Vietnam is a country, not a war." Considering the importance of the POW/MIA issue and human rights to veterans; perhaps it would be more correct for us to say that "the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a country established after the conclusion of the Vietnam War."
The desire to erase the war from the colletive memory of our nation, prior to a full accounting for, those answered their nation's call, does not bode well for America's future as the leader of the Free World. And it appears that the same spiritual poverty that allowed our leadership to abandon American POWs and MlAs after World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War, is destined to cause the abandonment of 2,202 more Americans in Vietnam.
Noticeably absent from recent rhetoric concerning the the diplomatic initiatives toward Vietnam are several fundamental aspects related to the overall POW/MIA accounting process. We are told that improved relations will help the Vietnamese people with their quest for democracy and human rights. If this dream on the part of our leadership is realized, it would have undoubtedly been appreciated by the 58,000 Americans who gave their lives for the cause of freedom in Vietnam. However, for those of us, who are still living, we are more interested as to when these political changes in Vietnam might occur. We are also told that there are opportunities for trade in Vietnam, and this will be good for our nation as a whole. Since Vietnam has a per capita income of approximately 200 dollars per year, and a national habit of rescheduling debts, those of us who are tax payers have a great deal of apprehension concerning the source of capital for this anticipated economic boom.
And there are also those who hold the opinion that Vietnam can serve as a buffer to China, enhancing regional stability. But scholars who understand the aqe--old Relationship between these two coexisting communist nations will most likely find this view to be inconsistent with reality. The political and economic aspects notwithstanding, the centerpiece for this new initiative is apparently the likelihood for even better cooperation from the government of Vietnan in accounting for our MIAS in the near term. Unable to predict the future, veterans can only monitor the process, to see whether the fullist possible accounting is truly the objective of our government's efforts, or merely one possible by-product of the new relationship motivated by other factors. Veterans have certainly taken note of the fact that in the ensuing 17 months subsequent to the President's lifting of the trade embargo, only eight (8) Americans have been accounted for in Vietnam.
Althouqh the U.S. Government claims that Vietnam is doing everything it can to account for the 2,200 American personnel still unaccounted-for in Indochina, this contention is not supported by facts. On the contrary, all available evidence suggests that the Vietnam Communist Party could rapidly account for a significant number of MIA cases, especially the 95 men associated with the "Special Remains" cases, who either died due to disease or were executed in wartime prisons camps, or whose remains have been depicted in photographs released by Vietnam. Evidence of a complex wartime record keeping system indicates that Vietnam could also provide important information on many of the 305 last-known-alive discrepancy cases, as well as crash sites and grave sites.
Reinforcing the argument against claims of outstanding Vietnamese cooperation by the current administration, captured wartime documents and Sources provided overwhelming evidence that as a part of their training, PAVN forces were given detailed instructions concerning the handling of American personnel captured or killed on the battlefield. According to those instructions "a detailed file was to be prepared on each POW as soon as he was brought to a detention camp. With regard to the deceased ones, records should be maintained, listing such information as deceased date and burial location. Personal belongings of the deceased should be carefully kept. Similar records were to be prepared for the U.S. POWs who escaped, were missing, became lost, or were killed by enemy bombing."
According to the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, the combined efforts of the Vietnamese agencies responsible for processing remains and, personal effects resulted in a very efficient system for recovery and storage. A 1991 memo of the lab indicated that "CILHI had, prepared a bar chart displaying the number of identified remains received during official repatriations from the SRV since March 1973, with contrasting bars showing the number of remains exhibiting some evidence of storage. The chart and supporting statistics were as of 31 January 1991. The total number of identified remains was 260, the total number showing evidence of storage was 158. But what is more important for this committee to comprehend is the fact that the total number of remains exhibiting scientific evidence of storage and curation account for only approximately 60 percent of the stored remains reported by sources deemed credible by our own intelligence community.
After reviewing all aviiilat)le information concerning Vietnam's handling of the remains issue, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced a detailed report outlining the U.S. Government's expectations for cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese in unilaterally turning over both remains and records. This study incorporated information obtained from defectors involved with processing or storage of remains, scientific analysis of remains, wartime interrogation reports, wartime captured document translation and analysis reports, and a detailed survey undertaken by the highly respected Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), indicating that 1485 remains could be recovered and repatriated by the Vietnamese, without the Deployment of U.S. field teams in Indochina. There was no emotion or speculation displayed in the straightforward presentation prepared by professional Pentagon analysts. According to a key point of the DIA briefing: "Finally, our forensics experts tell us that approximately 70 per cent of U. S. remains returned by your government show evidence of long-term storage. By this we mean they exhibited minimal bone mass lose, commingling with other remains of individuals lost in widely disparate areas, and coating with preservatives and/or disinfectants. Thus, while your government has returned many sets of remains that exhibit evidence of storage, the information available to us leads us to the conclusion that there are still American remains that are readily available or easily retrievable and that could be repatriated to the U.S. in a very short period of time." Concerning the ability of Vietnam to provide records, the briefing indicated that: "Based on information acquired through original documents, wartime and refugee interviews, and other sources, we have learned, that PAVN developed a specialized cadre and a dedicated organization to handle foreign prisoners and casualties during the first Indochina war. That cadre and organization, which appear to have continued to, operate into the early 1960's, was adapted to deal with U.S. Forces when they were introduced into Indochina."
Chief Warrant Officer, Solomon Godwin, from Hot Sprinqs, Arkansas, who was captured in Hue, died while undergoing a lengthy period of interrogation by the Public Security Police. Due to his assignment as an Intelligence Adviser to the RVN National Police Special Branch in Hue, both CWO Godwin and captured CIA agent Eugene Weaver were held in a highly secret camp far removed from other American prisoners. Mr. Weaver survived the ordeal, and more recently the Soviet KGB has admitted to officials that not only did they have direct access to Mr Weaver for interrogation in Vietnam, their also attempted to recruit him for intelligence Operations here in the United States. Although an American eyewitness account provides proof that Godwin was in the custody of communist forces at a fixed location, his remains have never been returned. Another clear example of Vietnamese intransigence is the case of SSGT Harold Bennett from Perryville, Arkansas. Another American captured with SSGT Bennett was told by guards that he was executed, because he had been wounded and unable to keep pace with the movement to a new camp. Although the American survivor provided a location for SSGT Bennett's burial, his remains have not been returned by Vietnam.
There is additional information available indicating that the intelligence shared by the Ministry of Public Security with the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was considered valuable to the extent that it created competition between the two countries: "In spite of the obvious great importance for both sides of this collaboration, our military scientific specialists in the DRV continue to operate under difficult circumstances, which are often artificially complicated by our Vietnamese comrades. It is known that trips to the sites of downed aircraft is the is the Soviet specialists' main method of collecting pieces of equipment. This system is set up by the Vietnamese side. The Vietnamese, however, hide the aircraft crash sites from us using various pretexts. They delay our trips, even after giving us permission to go to the crash site. It is for this reason that the main source of information regarding aircraft crash sites comes from the observation of Soviet specialists. There have been many times when downed aircraft were examined by qualified specialists before the arrival of our specialists. That has now been cleared up, it turned out to be Chinese.
Concerning Vietnamese knowledge of the 505 MIA cases remaining in Laos, several advisory units were deployed by Vietnam to that country during the war. One recently declassified study of the CIA describes Vietnamese involvement: "In support of increasing requirments for PAVN involvement in Laos, the Lao Dong Party established in 1959 a central control authority over all PAVN activities in Laos. Designated after the date of its establishment, Group (Doan)/Office 959 was under dual command of the Central Committee's Central Western Affairs Department (Ban Cong Tac Mien Tay Trung Uong) Military Staff and the Ministry of National Defense. Until 1968, Offic 959 was responsible for control of all PAVN units in Laos. In 1968, control over PAVN combat units and advisory personnel to the DPLA was reorganized. Office 959 relinquished its control over PAVN units in north to the PAVN Northwest Military Region, and its control over PAVN units in central and south Laos to PAVN Military Region 4 Group 68, which later became known as Group/Division 968. Office 959 and its subordinate advisory groups became solely responsible for advisory assistance to the LPLA, although it continued to coordinate its activities with the PAVN Northwest Region and with PAVN miitary Region Group 68.
Approximately 85 per cent of the remaining MIA cases in Laos, involving U.S. personnel, have incident locations in areas that were under the wartime control of Vietnamese forces. The PAVN-advised Lao Binh van efforts were similar to those conducted unilaterally by the Vietnamese in Vietnam. An example of Lao record-keeping is evidenced by the acquisition of a document pertaining to CPT Walter H. Moon from Rudy, Arkansas. This document was obtained from refugee sources in Thailand, and was titled "Biography of a Prisoner". It was obtained from a collection of similar documents from the Lao Military High command Headquarters in Vientiane during the early 1980's. Although CPT Moon was executed while being held prisoner in a fixed camp, his remains have not been returned. Lao Military Security personnel observed in the same office where the document was obtained have been identified as having been involved with U.S.- POW's during the war, and having participated in meetings with U.S. officials and MIA family members arriving in Laos to discuss the POW/MIA Issue. Moreover, the government of Vietnam has already returned the remains of two U.S. pilots with incident locations inside Laos, with one of the locations in the Plain of Jars.
Regarding the manipulation of Public opinion in America, the KGB trained Vietnamese services were responsible for both penetration of, and recruitment from the POW population. This element was charged with the mission of "promoting the antiwar movement and urging US and satellite troops to refuse to take part in operations and to demand prompt returns home". This element also played a keyrole in advancing the strategy of the party far into the future. Charismatic cadre were also tasked with developing lasting friendships with some selected U. - S. POW, believed to have the potential for influencing public opinion after being released to go home. Documents captured during the war included one Military Proselyting cadre's guidebook, which in addition to essays by American antiwar critics, contained the following instructions: "Special treatment was to be granted to U.S. PW's having special social standing, such as those who were the sons or relatives of American celebrities or high ranking officials in the U.S. Government. Intense propaganda and motivation should be imposed on these PW's."
This aspect was researched to a degree by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA. Deepening the dismay of MIA families dismay, shortly after the Senate Select Committe adjourned, some key personnel assigned to the committee tasked to investigate this controversial issue quickly seized high salaried positions within the U.S./Vietnam Trade Council, a business group designed to facilitate normalization and trade between the U.S. and Vietnam. According to a biographical sketch on the President of this business-lobby group, the U.S. Vietnam Trade Council has also developed close ties with the leadership of the Veterans of Foreign wars (VFW), if these reports prove to be accurate, I am sure this subject will be debated in great detail at our annual convention in Phoenix, Arizona next month.
Efforts of the Military Proselytizing Department to exploit U.S. officials and private,, businessmen began in earnest after the collapse of the south in 1975. Cadre assigned to the proselytizing effort were transferred to duties placing them in positions insuring continued contact with American targets with potential for exploitation regarding political and economic concessions, such as removing the trade embargo and improved U.S./Vietnam relations. For example female cadre, Ms Nguyen Thi Ngoc Suong has been reassigned as the Vice-chairman of the Vietnam Petroleum organization dealing with representatives of American oil companies. Military Region-5 Military Proselytizing Cadre Nguyen Chinh was transferred to become the Deputy Director of the Religious Affairs Department in Hanoi dealing with U.S. officials on religious freedom and human rights. Senior intelligence Cadre Ho Nghinh was assigned to the Committee for Economic Development. The former Chief of the Military Proselytizing Department and Deputy Minister of Defense, LTG Tran Quanq, has been assigned as head of the National Veterans Organization of Vietnam and targeted against U.S. veterans organizations.
The postwar reassignment of experienced proselytizing cadre into political, economic,, human rights, and veterans affairs organizations involved with the United States indicates that the Vietnam Communist Party intends to continue its long established process of exploiting U.S. officials, business groups, and veterans organizations. The extent to which this has already occurred, to the detriment to MIA accounting, can only be determined by careful scrutiny of the official and unofficial contacts by representatives of organizations from both sides over the years. The amount of influence that Vietnam's proselytizing efforts have had on postwar policy-level decisions made in Washington can only be assessed by comparing concessions made to Vietnam by the white House with those made to the United States by the Politburo in vietnam.
Given the political ramifications surrounding this issue, the various charges and denials have undoubtedly confused the average citizen. Additionally, for an American raised in the relatively simple aspects of democratic politics, understanding Vietnamese communist bureaucracy and policies can be daunting. Unfortunately, little has been published concerning the actual mechanisms, systems, and policies the Vietnamese Communists used to process American POW's and remains. In an effort to provide the members of this committee with some factual information regarding the degree of knowledge and unilateral capability of the Vietnamese, my colleagues and I have prepared a brief research paper, which with your permission, I will enter into the record at this time. Please note that the content is referenced to specific official documents in archives from which the information was extracted.
Perhaps this Committee will perceive my testimony to be somewhat critical of our government's efforts. Please be assured that my remarks are intended to be salutary, in an effort to improve the process. Although I am no longer a part of the official process, I intend to follow this issue closely. I am not dedicated to the POW/MIA issue, but rather dedicated to an honest resolution of the issue. I am bound and determined that the veterans of this nation will never abandon our comrades-in-arms who cannot be here to represent themselves today. Whether these men are classified by our government as POW, MIA, or KIA they are nonetheless veterans, and their loved ones are family members in distress. Their welfare and piece of mind cannot be anything other than the highest possible priority for any veterans organization in America today. In order to strengthen the efforts of our government, I and my colleagues have been working with the MIA family members to construct a plan whereby both veterans and family members will have an opportunity to contribute to the achievement of the fullest possible accounting for our missing men. I would like to enter this plan into the record, and we ask for your support in putting it in place, on the ground in Vietnam.
In closing, I would like to cite one brief passage relevant to the nature of war:
War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which believes that nothing is worth war is much worse. A man who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, and who cares only for his own personal safety, is a miserable creature who has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself.
Those left behind in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming are the better men, and we sincerely hope that your Committee will work with us too bring them home.