Testimony of Garnett E. Bell
September 17, 1996
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today regarding an issue of utmost national importance and priority. As a veteran of the Vietnam War, and as a former POW/MIA expert, I am encouraged that although our government has moved rapidly forward to do business as usual with a very determined former adversary, there remain at least some members of this traditionally prudent institution who remain determined to find the truth concerning our missing men.
I welcome the opportunity to share with you what I have learned over some 30 years of involvement with Indochina, especially the country of Vietnam. Learning the intricacies of Vietnam has been a long, arduous process, and I feel that there is much more for all of us to learn. Our government officials being assigned to the area today will find that in reality, little has changed. If I was asked to give advice to any young official going over to work with the Vietnamese on this important issue, I would first of all suggest that he study carefully the voluminous records available detailing how the COMMUNIST Party of Vietnam has dealt with the POW/MIA issue in the past. I would recommend to him that this clear recoed notwithstanding, he should always be objective. If encountererd doubt, I would beseech him to give the benefit of that doubt to the missing man. Concerning a proper working relationship, I would advise him to be familiar but not friendly. Perhaps most importantly, I would emphasize to him that he should always remember that he is going to Vietnam to work with the Vietnamse rather than for them.
In Hanoi during 1992 I was replaced by a young infantry officer with a degree in physical education. At that time a visiting senior member of the new Joint Task Force-Full Accounting from Hawaii invited me to remain and do some type of unspecified work in the new office. I was told that if I remained in Vietnam, I would soon learn that "POW/MIA work can be fun." Since I held the belief that POW/MIA work was a very solemn and serious matter of the highest national priority, and that my primary mission was to lay bare the facts and let the facts speak for themselves, I declined to become part of this new effort.
Although resources, both human and material, were increased greatly, and although "activities" were rapidly expanded, actual results began to diminish and our government quickly found itself in a vastly weakened negotiating stance. While the opinions of those experienced in negotiating with, and working with the Vietnamese experts were ignored, the opinions of young, inexperienced personnel recently arriving in Vietnam were readily accepted. At the same time, a very small number of our former POW's began to cite their long periods of captivity during the war as having provided them with the expertise and background necessary to make sound recommendations regarding our government's handling of the POW/MIA issue and the development of relations with COMMUNIST Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman, please do not misunderstand me on this point, I believe that any man who answered our nation's call to duty and served honorably in Vietnam deserves credit for his service. This is especially true regarding our former Prisoner of War. But there is nevertheless one point we should all pause and reflect on from time to time, and that is the fact that many of our troops who served as "grunts" lived under extremely miserable conditions on a daily basis. Those who were returned for second and third tours of duty in Leech infested swamps never knew from one moment to the next when their head might be blown off by mines. I can't speak for all grunts, and I am somewhat ashamed to admit it, but I have seen the time when I would have been willing to give almost anything in order to be able to crawl into a dry prison cell and be provided a bowl of pumpkin soup. In my opinion, although Service as a POW or a grunt is both admirable and commendable, it does not automatically qualify either to give advice on highly technical matters such as POW/MIA.
During 1992 and 1993 we found ourselves in a position where we were represented on the ground by young, inexperienced personnel, and guided here in Washington by a small number of personnel who had literally spent years in Vietnam during the war, but who were isolated from the outside world. This too may prove to be a valid point for evaluation by not only this important Committee, but other Committees dealing with the foreign policy aspects as well, because the fundamental question needing an answer is: does an individual gain profound insight concerning the geography, inhabitants of any country, especially regarding the leadership, if he is confined to a windowless room and permitted to meet with only those who are professionally trained to emply psychological techniques designed to influence his behavior.
I believe that in this regard our analysts here in Washington have consistently underestimated the Vietnamese, especially their capability for proselytizing and psychological warfare. During a symposium on Vietnam held in April of this year at the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict, Texas Tech University, my colleague, Mr. George Veith and I presented a research paper entitled "POWs and Politics: How Much Does Hanoi Really Know?" I hope that all members of this Committee will find the time to read this detailed paper, which we believe sheds more light on the issues of proselytizing and propaganda by Vietnamese government experts. I might add that the foreign affairs element of this National Liberation Front, code named "CP-72" was positioned only 90 miles off the coast of Florida during the war and their personnel worked closely with the Cuban Government in manipulating the anti-war movement here in the United States. Many of the propaganda themes directed at influence groups here in our own country were developed from information gathered by CP-72 and the Cuban Interrogation experts who were involved in exploiting American POWs held in Vietnam. For those of us who believe we have made far too many concessions in advance to Vietnam already, the time is long overdue for our analysts here to conduct the research necessary to fully understand the clandestine operations of the former Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam vis a vis our POWs and MIAs, before upgrading or expanding the extant relationship.
However, unless we remain both objective and determined we will not find the answers we need. It has become common practice for our government officials to make excuses for the Vietnamese while making exaggerated claims of "full faith" or "superb" cooperation. In analyzing some of the evidence indicating that we have not been given the truth by Vietnam, our officials tell us that the reports probably pertain to nationals of other countries, that the information contained in the reports could have different meanings, that 217 might be 210, or that 210 might be 210B, that 44 might refer to the 44th Battalion, the 44th Military station, or the 44th hospital. What is important for this Committee to understand, however, is that if the Vietnamese have failed to share with us the information and records necessary to resolve these reports, then who in their right mind can say that they are cooperating in "Full Faith". I believe that this is one reason our government has never requested COMMUNIST PARTY records from Vietnam, because the request would be refused and the lack of "full faith" cooperation would be obvious to all. We must remember that the mission of the proselytizing element in Vietnam is to gain the active support of a small number of our population in order to achieve the passive acceptance of the majority of our population. The proselytizing element is very adept at exploiting character defects in order to gain this active support and greed certainly falls into this category. We must be cautious of claims of handsome profits to be made, fast growing economies, and potential for investments. With every step forward in the normalization process we come closer to the point of no return regarding an honest accounting for our men. If we allow ourselves to become passive, the small, active segment of our population will begin to establish front groups for trade and friendship. Our collective memory can tell us the outcome from such front groups because we have seen them operate in the past, under the guise of peace and solidarity.
Ultimately the POW/MIA issue has become one of national character. We have rationalized as to why we have maintained an embassy and an Ambassador in China for over 18 years and now have more than a 50 billion dollar trade deficit with China, even though there is no democracy or human rights in that country. We have rationalized as to why we have maintained an embassy and Ambassador in Moscow for over 50 years, even though we still do not have full cooperation in achieving an accounting for our men missing from the Korean and Cold Wars. After reflecting on this situation, and considering the fact that an American serviceman captured in Vietnam in 1972 at the age of 18 would be only 42 years old today, how can we allow ourselves to once again rationalize in the same manner regarding Vietnam? This brings to mind just how angry respected CBS News Correspondent Dan Rather was when he went to Vietnam just prior to the lifting of the Trade Embargo by President Clinton. Upon his return here to the United States Mr. Rather described how a COMMUNIT Party Official in Hanoi said to him point blank: we know your President will lift the Trade Embargo, because Americans will do anything for money. It saddens me that this comment was ignored by those who did not see this comment made by a Vietnamese Government official as an affront to our national character.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, we veterans of the Vietnam War beseech you to view this tragic issue as a matter of national character. We are so tired of hearing exaggerated reports and promises which are never fulfilled. Please remind American officials going to work in Vietnam that they are there to represent the best national interests of the United States, and that regardless of how they fell personally, they owe honest answers to the families of the POWs and MIAs. Our analysts must be objective and thorough in conducting the research necessary to uncover the truth. If American businessmen want to invest in Vietnam let them do so but at their own risk. If they expect the families to trust the Vietnamese with accounting for our nation's heroes, then surely they can trust the Vietnamese with their money, and there is no need for OPIC or Export-Import Bank financing.
QUESTIONS FOR BILL BELL:
In 1973 you participated in Operation Homecoming. At that time was it your understanding that both sides had released all prisoners in Vietnam and Laos?
After that period, as a Defense Department investigator in Asia on POW/MIAs, when you came to Washington for briefings, what type of assessment did Defense Department give you regarding Vietnam's level of cooperation in accounting for our missing men?
When you first began post-war field operations on the ground in Vietnam, what was the general attitude of Vietnamese COMMUNIST officials?
Did you have access to reports or studies encompassing intelligence from all U.S. agencies to prepare you and other investigators for investigations involving Americans who were last known alive in the custody of COMMUNIST forces?
When you traveled to Vietnam to do those investigations, did you provide the Vietnamese any information on the cases scheduled for investigation?
In 1991, you were assigned as Chief of the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi. Were you satisfied that this office building was a proper place to conduct important, official U.S. Government business? What is the Boss Hotel?
When you returned to Washington to testify before the Senate Select Committee in November 1991, were you coached by DOD on how to answer Congressional questions?
Did you testify that in your opinion that some American prisoners remained in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming concluded in 1973?
What was the response of the DOD and Pacific Command to your testimony? What was the response of the Vietnamese to your testimony?
When was the U.S. POW/MIA Office relocated to a more permanent site in Hanoi? Was the construction done by Vietnamse or U.S. personnel? Did this affect security?
Were your telephone and facsimile communications installed by American or Vietnamese Government personnel?
As a result, did you feel that you had a proper facility in which to plan investigations for important discrepancy cases, discuss negotiations strategy and so forth?
Most of the so-called "live sighting" reports were eliminated during 1992 and 1993. Were these investigations conducted in a professional manner?
Are you aware of any attempts to influence the objectivity of the important discrepancy case investigations?
Have our investigators ever made an unaccounced, spontaneous investigation of any location where our government has received reports indicating Americans were being detained?During visits to Vietnam by Codels and representatives of major veterans organizations, for example the Kerry-McCain, VFW, American Legion, VVA, DAV, Codel to Hanoi in May 1993, were members of what has now become known as the "U.S./Vietnam Trade Council" involved in the meetings held with COMMUNIST Party officials in Hanoi during that visit?
Can you shed any light on reports to the effect that the two primary experts assigned to complete investigations of the critical discrepancy case list both left government service and accepted employment in Vietnam with the Caterpillar Corporation just prior to the lifting of the trade embargo?
Are you aware of any information indicating that the Vietnamese have attempted to orchestrate or manipulate the case investigations in the field?
Based on your experience, what qualifications are possessed by U.S. military officers assigned to supervise the technical case investigations, especially the discrepancy case list cases?
According to the DPMO, COMMUNIST Forces conducting the March 1968 attack on Lima Site 85 on Phou Pha Thi Mountain in Laos did not create any type of records of this attack and are, therefore, now unable to provide us with any. This is important because we have 11 American servicemen assigned to the Top Secret facility there who were presumed dead. Do you believe that the DPMO assessment is correct?
If LTC Truong Muc was actually there, this particular attack must have been one of the most difficult operations of his entire career, and can justifiably be called legendary. Do you therefore, believe his contention that he is unable to recall the identity of anyone who accompanied him on the operation?
We are aware of a report of an intercept of signal from Vinh in Central Vietnam, indicating that "BANDIT PILOTS" had been captured. According to the DPMO this intercept cannot be correlated to the Baron 52 case because of the distance involved from the incident site to Vinh is too far. What is your opinion of this analysis???
Do you believe that the Vietnamese Politburo and Central Committee Documents and records contain information relevant to American prisoner of war?