National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia
July 21, 1993
Mr.Chairman, Members of the Committee ....... Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to represent the POW/MIA families.
In our view, the President's decision to end U.S. opposition to the clearing of Vietnam's arrears in the IMF has reinforced to Hanoi that their consistent policy of purposely withholding records and remains of Americans, including those last known alive in captivity or close proximity to being captured, has succeeded. In effect, while overlooking Vietnam's ability to rapidly account for hundreds of Americans and consistent Vietnamese intransigence, the U.S. endorsed Hanoi's rhetoric and cited the level of POW/MIA activities as results sufficient to gain one of their primary national objectives.
In opposing this decision, we were up against the weight of the entire bureaucracy, a separate agenda by some members of Congress, a media, mind-set geared less toward objectivity than sensationalism, intense international pressures, and heavy lobbying from some in the American business community, plus an emissary who had, in our view, betrayed the mission assigned to him in 1967 by President Reagan. I have to say that each year since the end of the second Reagan term has been more difficult and frustrating. Especially since 1989, we could see the downward spiral.
Just before the IMF decision, I met with President Clinton. In essence, I told him that a decision to allow Vietnam access to fund from the IMF, World Bank and ADB would undercut all American interests while supporting Vietnam and international business. I told the President that such a decision would remove the most effective U.S. leverage to get real answers by giving Vietnam what it most desires -- infrastructure development to support increasing investment.
In our brief meeting, I tried to give the President what I was confident he was not getting from policy-makers at the Departments of State and Defense -- a realistic definition of "progress," a word that we have learned to suspect and fear.
The families can count; we know that only 9 Americans previously missing in Vietnam have been accounted for over the past two years. That is a statistic you didn't see in the distorted summary of "Progress Toward the Fullest Possible Accounting" attached to the White House announcement. That summary also stated that 18,000 Vietnamese documents have been reviewed by U.S. specialists; it did not clarify that less than 100 of the documents, so I'm told, even remotely correlate to missing Americans.
When we met, the President assured me that he had not yet made a decision, despite press accounts to the contrary. He also stated clearly that if he decided to move on the IFI's, not one step forward would be made to lift the bilateral embargo or normalize political relations without progress on POW/MIA ... and there it is again... the defination of progress.
Now that IMF access has been assured, Vietnam will depend on the American business community, some in the Congress and the U.S. media to pressure the Administration to lift the embargo, or, at a minimum, waive restrictions to enable U.S. firms to bid on IFI-supported projects funded with U.S. taxpayer dollars. At this point, holding the line for real "results" depends solely on the White House.
Much will depend on the definition of progress, and we have reason for serious concern. Despite solid intelligence and forensic evidence that Vietnam continues to withhold readily available remains and information, and the fact that there is not evidence to the contrary, much of the bureaucracy (other than DIA) appears determined to round the edges on intelligence to reduce POW/MIA accoutning expectations.
President Clinton has placed on the line the credibility of his personal assurances. Based upon our private discussion, I believe that the President is genuinely concerned and wants results. But, I am also confident that the President was convinced by some in the bureaucracy that the best way to resolve the issue is to offer incentives, hopeing that Vietnam will respond. History does not support that approach.
The POW/MIA families met last weekend at Andrews AFB for our 24th. Annual Meeting. There is clearly a consensus that for whatever reason, the President reneged on his commitment that commercial interst would not take precedence over the families' POW/MIA concerns. The views of President Reagan's National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane were not only well-received, but strongly supported. He stated, "The persistent wound -- the lasting damage of Vietnam - is our ability to trust out government. And that won't go away until our government starts being honest with us again -- on this subject and so many others."
Recent actions on the POW/MIA issue serve as an example of why trust has been shattered. When announcing the IMF-related decision, the President's announcement stated that "progress to date is simply not sufficient to warrant any change in our trade embargo or any further steps toward normalization." Yes, the President's Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, in his address to the families, didn't even mention that an additional move toward normalization of relations had already been made. We had to learn from Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord's public announcement that the U.S. proposed to send three allegedly temporary State Department political officers to Vietnam.
Of course, the bureaucracy is trying to pass off this further reward for Hanoi's intransigence as POW/MIA-related. Quite frankly, the families and the American people were deceived by this action. The Administration's intention was withheld when the IMF-related decision was announced. Had this step been taken in lieu of permitting Vietnam access to international funds, it could have been supported. Doing both violated the President's pledge and leaves the families with little confidence that the Clinton Administration will honor the President's commitments.
I agree with the League's Chairman of the Board Sue Scott, an MIA sister as am I. She stated that the President's decision was a sad day for the American military, past, present and future. We need to look at the baseline facts:
- Vietnam is capable of holding Americans alive; unresolved discrepancy cases of Americans last known alive, as well as Vietnam's historical record of manipulation, gives this perception greater credibility.
- Vietnam can rapidly account for hundreds of missing Americans with a collective decision in Hanoi to repatriate readily recoverable remains.
- Further, the fate of a significant number of other Americans where remains are not as readily available can be ascertained through open access to Vietnamese archives.
- Vietnam's knowledge and ability to account for Americans extends to Laos, not only in areas along their shared border but in many other areas of Laos controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war. This fact is confirmed not only be U.S. intelligence but by knowledgeable sources of the former Soviet Union.
The current operational approach to accomplish POW/MIA objectivs is one which does not have the families' trust. Experienced specialists have systematically been removed from in-country investigations, or precluded from returning, by decision of the Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting Major General Thomas Needham, USA, backed by Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, (A copy of my letter to Admiral Charles Larson, USN, is enclosed with specifics given.) General Needham is also responsible for the illogical decision earlier this year to shred historical POW/MIA records. In our view, these actions are sufficient to warrant investigation and oversight by this Committee, or perhaps the Armed Services Committee.
There are many significant problems which warrant the Committee's attention; however, in view of the late notice of this hearing, there was insufficient time to formalize the input. I will add that what is publicly known as "The Russian Document" or the "Quang Document" warrants serious investigation.
The files of the former Soviet Union have an invaluable contribution to make in getting to the truth on the POW/MIA issue. Renewed access to the GRU and Central Committee/Politburo files in Moscow is crucial. I hope that this Committee will intervene with Russian authorties to that end and on behalf of Dr. Stephen Morris as well as U.S. specialists.
In closing, I want to thank you, Mr.Chairman, for allowing me to present the families' views. We are disappointed and alarmed at the present trends. We now must depend upon Hanoi's goodwill, which over the years has been conspicuously absent, and the bureaucracy to reinforce the President's latest commitment by defining the term "progress" with integrity. Were you in our position, you would share our concern and our lack of trust.
Thank You.