National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia
February 10, 1994
Mr.Chairman, Members of the Committee.......Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to represent the POW/MIA families.
Although we support a policy of reciprocal steps by the U.S. to respond to concrete Vietnamese actions which account for missing Americans, we strongly opposed President Clinton's decision to lift the embargo at this time. In our view, the President's decision was premature and based upon an orchestrated series of events. Senior Clinton Administration officials and military officers heaped praise on Vietnam for cooperation and POW/MIA results which, by omission, were vastly over-stated, even distorted.
The final push to get the embargo lifted was kicked off by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord's mid-December trip, during which he termed Vietnam's cooperation as "absolutely superb" and noted that the Vietnamese were going "all out" to be cooperative. His trip was followed by the spate of Senate delegations, all reportedly briefed by Joint Task Force-Full Accounting Commander Major General Thomas Needham or his subordinates that if the embargo were not lifted immediately, all POW/MIA cooperation with Vietnam would halt. Then followed Senator John Kerry, again praising Vietnam's cooperation as he has so many times in the past.
Topping off this public relations stream was Admiral Charles Larson, Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces Pacific, the most senior active-duty officer to visit Vietnam since the end of the war. Widely quoted by the media and subsequently by the Senate in considering their vote on the Kerry/ McCain amendment, Admiral Larson expressed his belief that the Vietnamese "are not holding anything back." Like his subordinate General Needham, the Admiral was even quoted as advocating that the embargo be lifted, stating that it would facilitate achieving the fullest possible accounting.
This orchestration set the stage for passage of the Kerry/McCain amendment to give President Clinton the political cover his advisors felt he needed to move forward. This great push occurred despite the lack of evidence that Vietnam is being fully forthcoming. In fact the U.S. Government holds evidence to the contrary, but policy-level administration officials are dismissing or ignoring its relevance.
There is no evidence to refute 20+ years of intelligence assessment that Vietnam can unilaterally account for hundreds of Americans if they make the political decision to do so. There is nothing except Hanoi's denials, and senior Vietnamese authorties who have lied again and again -- during the war, after the Paris Accords, to Reagan and Bush administration officials, to the families, to General Vessey, to our nation's veterans and to Members of Congress. Yet, policy-level officials in the Clinton Administration continue to insist that Vietnam's cooperation is "outstanding, absolutely superb," etc. They label progress as "enormous" and "significant" or another "breakthrough." These same officials admitted not even having read the negotiating record covering the crucial years of 1982-1989 before entering what they term negotiations.
Earlier, the League had opposed President Clinton's July 2nd decision to drop U.S. opposition to the clearing of Vietnam's arrears in the IMF and his September 13th. decision in bidding for internationally funded contracts in Vietnam. We viewed these steps as signalling Hanoi that their consistent policy of withholding records and remains of Americans was succeeding. Now,in effect, the Clinton Administration has fully endorsed Hanoi's rhetoric and cited the level of POW/MIA activities as results sufficient to gain their national economic and political objectives. This, despite the President's listed POW/MIA criteria which, by any objective assessment, have not been met.
The President's earlier commitments and assurances were obviously set aside last week when he decided not only to lift the embargo, but to "establish a liaison office in Vietnam to provide services to Americans there and help us pursue a human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese government." But, the President went on to assure our nation, "These actions do not consitute a normalization of our relationships. Before that happens, we must have more progress, more cooperation and more answers." What the President didn't say was more accountability - the man alive, or his remains or convincing evidence as to why neither is possible.
We are realistic; we don't get false hope, and our sense of responsibility has been demonstrated over the years. Our expectations are bases solely on U.S. Government evidence which is known to the families and was for many years the subject of official testimony before the House and Senate. We don't expect to receive accountability for all missing Americans, but we want and deserve real, measurable results which bring peace of mind to the families.
President Clinton, U.S. Senators, and administration officials and military officers have all stated their view that lifting the embargo will bring greater results. During the Senate debate on the Kerry/McCain amendment, most Senators who voted in favor cited the hope for more progress in the interest of the POW/MIA families as a primary rationale. History does not validate their assumption. I hope that I am wrong, but years of direct experience tell me that inducements don't work.
Regretfully, each year since the end of the second Reagan term has been more difficult and frustrating. Especially since 1989, we have seen the core of the issue -- Vietnam's knowledge and ability to unilaterally return remains being withheld -- virtually ignored, while the focus turned to expanding the process. The shift from serious negotiations to field operations was further altered with formation of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, a decision made late in the Bush Administration.
The dedication and hard work of the newly assigned field personnel are recognized and deeply appreciated, but the current operational approach to resolve the core issue is one which does not have the families' trust. Field operators, particularly without the years of investigative experience, knowledge of the issue and language ability, cannot be expected to obtain results during field operations which have been recovered previously by Vietnamese personnel and are being withheld.
We have learned to suspect and fear the definition of "progress" as defined by JTF-FA and the policy-level bureaucracy. Just prior to President Clinton's July 2ns decision to remove U.S. objections to international loans to Vietnam, I met with the President. He assured me that if he decided to move on the ÙÉ IFI's, not one step forward would be made to lift the bilateral embargo or normalize political relation without progress on POW/MIA....again....the definition of progress becomes crucial.
The families can count; we know that only 11 Americans previously missing in Vietnam have been accounted for over the past TWO YEARS. That is a statistic you don't see in the public statements recently made by senior U.S. officials. Even the President stated, "Since the beginning of this administration, we have recovered the remains of 67 American servicemen." Though misinformed, the President's statement is inaccurate; never before have unidentified remains been listed as remains of American servicemen.
In February 8th's WASHINGTON TIMES, and across the country since the report was by George Esper of Associated Press, Army LTC John Cray, head of the JTF-FA office in Hanoi, was quoted as stating, "This is the first repatria- tion ceremony since the embargo has been lifted. I think that instead of hurting, it will in fact enhance our process."
Even worse, LTC Cray goes on to state, "We have no evidence that they're holding any warehouse full of remains as occurred in the past." These statements are not true! It should concern the Congress, the executive branch and the Army, as it does us, that this recently assigned infantry officer with NO knowledge of the negotiating history or intelligence assessments regarding remains being withheld by Hanoi is being widely quoted on his beliefs.
In February 7th's NEW YORK TIMES, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations from 1970-1974, wrote in support of the President's decision to lift the embargo, citing the turnover that same day of 12 unidentified remains as "a promising first step" by Hanoi to respond. He echoed other State and Defense Department public affairs distortions, perhaps another victim of "spinmasters" distributing inaccuracies. The question is, are we going to continue to see such official distortions? Are all long-delayed bits and pieces of progress to be credited to the embargo lift? I believe the Sub- committee could play an important role by establishing a baseline for truthful reporting on the POW/MIA issue an I would be happy to work with your staff on such an effort.
Some important summary documents have been provided, but the casespecific source documents which went into preparation of the summaries are being with- held. You don't see any emphasis on the fact that from over 30,000 artifacts, documents, photos and materials reviewed by U.S. specialists, only 570 corre- late to 242 missing Americans, though some in that number are duplicates. That huge volume of material peratins largely to returned POWs and other accounted for U.S. personnel. Of the 570, less than a dozen contain really new case-related information.
According to our own government's intelligence, considered valid until the Clinton Administration, the Vietnamese have not responded in good faith and are not responding in good faith now. It appears, however, that the President was convinced by policy-level officials in the bureaucracy that the best way to resolve the issue is to offer incentives, betting on the come that Hanoi will respond. Again, I hope they are right, because we, the families and our nation's veterans have the greatest stake and will be watching closely. But, we need to look at the baseline facts:
Vietnam is capable of holding Americans ALIVE; unresolved discrepancy cases of Americans last known alive, as well as Vietnam's historical record of manipulation, gives this perception greater credibility.
Vietnam can rapidly account for hundreds of missing Americans with a collective decision in Hanoi to repatriate readily recoverable remains.
Further, the fate of a significant number of other Americans where remains are not as readily available can be ascertained through open access to Vietnamese archives.
Vietnam's knowledge and ability to account for Americans extends to Laos, not only in areas along their shared border but in many other areas of Laos controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war. This fact is confirmed not only by U.S. intelligence but by knowledgeable sources of the former Soviet Union.
I hear increasingly from some in government that pressures are being applied to skew the long-accepted data base by omitting relevant facts that would give an accurate perception, but less positive for the Vietnamese. Redefinition of long accepted terms is taking place. Rather than focusing on results which account for our missing, cases of Americans last known alive are being investigated to determine fate or confirm death.
We are told that information gathered through joint investigations has been sufficient to confirm the death of 123 of these discrepancy cases, and we welcome that confirmation. Not stated, however, is that in most such cases, information also confirms that remains are likely available to the Vietnamese but have not been returned.
A glaring omission by Vietnam is their failure to return remains of 98 Americans involved in 84 incidents carried by the U.S. Government as remains discrepancies and the U.S. Government's failure to emphasize Vietnam's lack of serious responsiveness. These are individuals known dead through photographs, listed by Vietnam as having Died in Captivity or on graves registration documents, and joint field investigation reporting that Vietnamese authorities had earlier recovered the remains.
There is some reason for optimism that the special U.S. remains team is making progress, reportedly having located, with Vietnam's cooperation, grave sites of seven who died in captivity in southern Vietnam. But, we have always known they were there. Hanoi was asked to provide them during almost every negotiation since the end of the war, and these case were highlighted in the proposed two-year plan in 1985. The majority of the 84 incidents, however, occured in northern Vietnam where remains are known to have been recovered, stored and still withheld by Hanoi.
Similar distortions occur in official statements addressing trilateral cooperation -- the effort to investigate incidents of missing U.S. personnel lost along the border of Laos an Vietnam in areas controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war.
We were hopeful when Vietnam provided the Group 559 summary of shoot-downs along one area of the border, and apparently there were references to 217 U.S. personnel involved in 111 incidents. Vietnamese officials, however, did not provide the case-specific documents used to compile the summary, so little useful information in terms of accountability was obtained. Nevertheless, if the Vietnamese provide the case-related data, follow-up of possible leads in the Group 559 summary, and advance requests of the Lao are made to permit Vietnamese eye-witnesses to cross the border to assist in field investigations, there is reason for some optimism that results can be achieved. Unlike incidents which occurred in heavily populated areas of Vietnam, those lost in remote areas along the border or elsewhere in Laos have a better chance of results from joint field operations.
Significant differences exist regarding efforts to account for Americans missing in Laos and those missing in Vietnam. Nearly 85% of the 509 Americans unaccounted for in Laos were lost in areas under Vietnamese control at the time. All but a handful of the roughly 70 last known alive discrepancy cases in Laos were lost in such areas. A decision by the Vietnamese leadership to release relevant documents is crucial to accounting fro these Amercians, though territorial access is the Lao Government's responsibility.
In Laos, there has been marked improvement in accessibility, as well as flexibility during joint field operations, and the rate of recovery from excavations has also improved. With greater sentitivity to Lao concerns about questions of territorial integrity, I believe the bilateral US/Lao and trilateral US/Lao/Vietnamese processes holds significant potential for real accountability.
Looking to the prognosis for results from Vietnam post-embargo, it again appears that further steps will depend on the bureaucracy's definition of progress and cooperation. With recent experience as a guide, we have reason for continued serious concern. Despite a solid intelligence an forensic evidence that Vietnam continues to withhold readily available remains and information, and the fact that there is no evidence to the contrary, policy-level officials in the bureaucracy seem determined to round the edges on intelligence to reduce accounting expectations.
There are specific ways to measure whether current pledges of continued priority are being implemented, and it is our hope that this Subcommittee will watch the situation closely, as we will. Most important is whether the Clinton Administration will finally decide to negotiate on the core accountabi- lity issue -- the remains and case-specific documents that are known to be withheld. Such an approach may not lend itself to advance publicity, but the Congress can request advance notification and obtain classified debriefings after the fact.
I also recommend that you ask for briefings from former DIA personnel now assigned to the Defense POW/MIA Office on Vietnam's knowledge base and ability to provide documents and return remains which would account for hundreds of Americans. In this regard, it is important that the Record include a copy of the interagency-approved official text provided to the Vietnamese in May, 1992 at the policy and technical levels.
Official intelligence assessments on cases that Vietnam could resolve unilaterally through remains repatriations have remained in the hundreds. This includes at least three assessments form 1987 to 1992. Did all of the intelligence change in one year? Apparently Admiral Larson, Major General Needham and LTC Cray think so. I believe that the Congress should request these assessments. If the Clinton Administration has a new one, they should let us know, but the rationale and the experience level of the analysts need to be evaluated as well.
Another means to measure our own government's seriousness is to monitor JTF-FA for any reduction in funding, personnel or resources. If reductions are proposed, and there are certainly noises to that effect in Cambodia, then it will be easily noticed. Already, DIA's Stony Beach POW/MIA operation in Thailand, though authorized 27 personnel at its height, has been reduced to 21 authorized billets. In fact, current manning is less than half that number, and I am told that the empty 13 slots will not be filled with permanent personnel. This needs to be corrected; with Congressional oversight, I'm confident that the manning problem would be solved.
The files of the former Soviet Union also have an invaluable contribution to make in getting to the truth on the POW/MIA issue. Renewed and expanded access to the GRU and Central Committee and Politburo files in Moscow is crucial. I hope that this Committee will intervene with Russian authorities to that end on behalf of Dr. Stephen Morris as well as U.S. specialists. The President should also be requested to invervene with Russian President Yeltsin.
I was alarmed recently to learn that Russian officials are apparently questioning whether the U.S. really wants additional Vietnam War documents. Reportedly officials in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have heard of what is known as the "1,205 Document" was "harmful to U.S.-Russian and U.S. - Vietnamese relations." Apparently, the Russians were of the opinion that our own State Department officials "were not pleased with release of the document and were discouraging further releases of such documents."
The Interim analysis of the "1,205 Document", the "Dang Tan Reports" and the "725 Document" pertaining to Vietnam having withheld hundreds more Americans than were known to the U.S. Government were inconclusive. It was "deja-vu" to see the official verbiage which, for the most part, reminded this reader of an old theme: If it doesn't match what we already know, it can't be true." In this case, that which was judged accurate pertained to other matters; that judged invalid pertained to POW/MIAs. Though an admittedly interim report, the timing of release was more than coincidental - to at least partially meet the President's pledge than an evaluation would be made public before he authorized further economic or political steps with Vietnam.
With the lack of integrity and principle recently displayed by some U.S. officials, were you in our position, I believe you would share our concern and our shaken trust and confidence.
Thank you, Mr.Chairman, and I look forward to your questions.