Appendix 6 : Selected Excerpts From Hearing Testimony - Part 2

Accounting - Nixon Statement Lord 09/21/92

Chairman Kerry: ...it is very hard for the committee to understand that if the United States Government is publicly saying we do not have any indication of anybody alive, it would kind of be meaningless to sit with [the North Vietnamese] and make real your notion that you are worried about discrepancies or that they have to worry about it...

Accounting Maguire 12/04/92

What Mr. Mooney seems to have done is, in every case where it either mentions a shoot down, a parachute being seen, a search being conducted for an individual, he put that person in a POW status, and that just -- that's a jump in logic that's not supported by the other evidence.

The problem is that Mr. Mooney was really restricted to a small body of intelligence with which to make his assessment, and that body of intelligence was the known U.S. losses at the time of the report.

What we have information on is the search and rescue efforts that happened after the loss incident. We've had subsequent intelligence reports from other sources, and when you put that all together, you can't support 300 or more people ever even being captured through signals reports.

So if he saw a report that said on the 22nd May the 283rd AAA Battalion shot down an F-4, he would go to a list of F-4 losses on that day, and any F-4 that happened to have a person unaccounted for, he would put that person into a POW status, totally disregarding any other losses where we may have rescued an individual, and in many cases he totally disregarded the losses of anything other than U.S. aircraft.

Accounting - Left Behind McCain 09/22/92

...if both former Secretaries of Defense knew or believed at the time that there was Americans left in Southeast Asia, then I think they have a great deal of answering to do as to why they did not do more, especially before the Woodcock and Montgomery Commissions, to bring these concerns or their beliefs to light.

Accounting - Left Behind McCain 09/24/92

[to Moorer] Your message on March 22nd says, the JCS message says, "Do not commence withdrawal of the fourth increment until the following two conditions are met: the U.S. has been provided with a complete list of all U.S. POWs, including those held by the Pathet Lao, as well as the time and place of release; and the first group of POWs have been physically transferred to U.S. custody." That was the criteria on March 22nd.

Then, on March 23rd, a message was sent, and I know, Mr. Chairman, this is part of the record, both of these messages, it said:

"Seek private meeting with North Vietnamese representative. Our basic concern is the release of the prisoners, as we do not object to the PLF playing the central role as long as the men are returned to us. We need precise information and understanding on the times and place of release of the prisoners on the list provided by 1 February. Of course we intend to pursue the questioning of other U.S. personnel captured or missing in Laos following the release of the men on the 1 February list."

Accounting - Nixon Statement McCain 09/22/92

I would like to, again, refer to the full statement made by President Nixon on March 29th, 1973. The chairman and others continue to refer to a statement where he says all of our American POWs are on their way home. I think it is important to add that he one sentence later said: "There are still some problem areas: the provisions of the agreement requiring an accounting for all missing in action in Indochina, the provisions with regard to Laos and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting [et cetera] have not been complied with."

So the President of the United States did not just say all Americans are on their way home. He caveated it, and very strongly. . . . So both Dr. Shields and the President of the United States in 1973 stated unequivocally that there were still serious problems with the full accounting of the MIA/POWs.

Accounting - Left Behind McCain 09/24/92

One reading this would reach the conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff dictated a certain policy: suspend everything on one day, and then the following day said go ahead and move forward with the proceedings.

Accounting - Nixon Statement Mooney 01/22/92

Chairman Kerry: What did you do in 1973, when you saw Operation Homecoming? At that time you knew that there was a discrepancy between those coming home and those who most readily, in your memory, were on the list.

Mr. Mooney: Yes sir. I was not really concerned, because we still had the highest requirements on the book, and we did not expect many of these people to come home.

Accounting - Nixon Statement Mooney 01/22/92

When President Nixon made his statement that all the men are back, that wasn't even taken seriously. . . . [because] when Nixon made his statement. . . the highest tasking on every reporter's desk in the field was to continue to search for, identify, isolate, locate American POWs, particularly in Laos. And that requirement stayed on the books.

Accounting - Nixon Statement Moorer 09/24/92

Yes, could I make a comment please, sir? I believe that you will find that when the President made that statement he was in Key Biscayne. He made it through Ziegler, the public affairs officer, and I'm confident he was referring to simply the package that we had ready to come out. And all of those, 150 or so that were ready to come out except one that was found a little later down in South Vietnam, but they were on the way back. And I think that is probably what he meant when he said all. He meant all of the ones that we had scheduled.

There is another sentence in that public announcement, I think, that goes on to say but there are probably others we've got to search for.

Sen. Grassley: It is unfortunate, but I believe the public then and now has not read that statement any other way, and I do not think there has been any effort on the part of Nixon to clarify it.

Accounting - Left Behind Moorer 09/24/92

...I think that for all practical purposes we really lost the war, particularly from a political point of view, because we couldn't get in an airplane and go to each point of contact where we thought there might be a POW confined and held against his will.

Accounting - Left Behind Moorer 09/24/92

...the question arises now whether you would be willing to detain those boys who thought they were coming home while we went through another long discussion and negotiation with North Vietnam. So my position was, let's get those we have home and continue to press to find out whether there are any more.

Accounting - Left Behind Murphy 09/24/92

...in my personal view there were no confirmed reports of live U.S. military personnel left behind in Vietnam or Laos. I do not recall seeing any such reports, and I would have been very upset, as you would be, if you had to read such a report in that position.

Accounting - Comptroller's Records Murphy 09/24/92

It would seem to me, somebody in the comptroller's office would have to testify to just how they were using these numbers. I will admit that it says current captured, is a real number going down to 67 by the end of this period.

Accounting - Left Behind Nagy 12/01/92

There certainly was a change in attitude on the part of the Reagan administration that was evident during the 1980's. That certainly let, and I believe throughout the period of the seventies and eighties that it was basically a continuation inside of DIA, and that was that there remained the possibility that there were still live Americans present in Southeast Asia remaining after the departure of the United States from that area.

Accounting - Left Behind Oksenberg 06/25/92

Sen. McCain: Did you see any hard evidence or any evidence that Americans were alive?

Mr. Oksenberg: I saw no hard evidence that Americans were alive. Obviously, with the upsurge of refugees came increasing reports of live sightings.

Accounting - Left Behind Oksenberg 06/25/92

I can assure you, Senator, that at no point during my time on the watch did we come to the conclusion that there were certainly no live Americans in Indochina.

Accounting - Left Behind Otis 12/03/92

In spite of the high visibility of Commander Dodge's case, the North Vietnamese chose to deny any knowledge of him. Commander Dodge was not repatriated in 1973.

I was extremely concerned about the media reports that proclaimed all POWs returned. I received letters from President Nixon, Vice Admiral David Bagley, Chief of Naval Personnel, and Roger Shields, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, all assuring me of their commitment to securing the fullest possible accounting.

The only letter that even mentioned live Americans was that of Dr. Shields, who stated, quote, there is no specific knowledge of any live Americans left, unquote. In other words, fullest possible accounting meant search for remains.

There was no public challenge of the Vietnamese by the United States that captured servicemen were left behind. There seemed to be a naivete that all prisoners had been returned and that remains would be forthcoming. I was shocked and bewildered, but I could not believe that the missing were already abandoned by our own Government, press, and public.

Accounting - Shields Statement Perot 08/11/92

...[the Vietnamese] said, your own Government declared these men dead in 1973. Why should we think your Government wants them back?

Accounting - Shields Statement Perot 08/11/92

I said Roger, I'm surprised that you declared all the men dead in April 1973. He said, I was ordered to do it. And he said he was ordered to do it by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements. Then he said words to the effect that he protested, because just two weeks earlier these memos were going around.

Accounting - Left Behind Richardson 09/24/92

Chairman Kerry: Looking through this, obviously retrospectively, but looking at it as we're trying to look at it and looking at it as the American people are looking at it 20 years later, unfortunately, would you say that the record suggests that the American people and certainly the families were not leveled with respect to this?

Richardson: I would say that information on the face of it was withheld from them, and one would have to use some rationale for doing that -- that is, for withholding it.

Accounting - Nixon Statement Richardson 09/24/92

Well, I tried to call attention to the distinction of the degree of certainty with which a given proposition can be stated. For purposes of our best estimates as to the number of current captured, the intelligence resources of the Government would put together all the bits and pieces they had and come up with a number which represented the weight of that evidence, and I suppose that is what this number reflects.

The President's statement would presumably be tilted in a direction designed, as I suggested earlier, not to raise false hopes and so on, whatever may have been the considerations. Somebody could rationalize the distinction between the basis for this number and the basis for his statement.

But how it actually came about, for all I know he deliberately chose to lie. But I don't -- I try to give him the benefit of the doubt, I would say that he -- what he meant was that every prisoner as to whom we have definitive information.

Accounting - KIA/BNR S. Stockdale 12/03/92

I don't think we're as close to it as some might like to believe, but I think that there will come a point in time when you have to take the responsibility to make the judgment that some people are never -- no remains -- nothing is ever going to be returned. And that's your job.

Accounting S. Stockdale 12/03/92

I can see why they are that convinced, because of the long history of the deception. And maybe a lack of recognition that there are always some people in war who are lost. There will never, in my opinion, be a satisfactory accounting. In our League's list of objectives we said that we wanted to get the fullest possible accounting.

When you lose a war, you don't get to go in and account for your people. Even if you win the war, you don't find everybody.

Accounting - Left Behind Schlesinger 09/21/92

Chairman Kerry: I think I want to start by asking a very simple question. In your view did we leave men behind?

Schlesinger: I think that, as of now, that I can come to no other conclusion, Senator. That does not say that there are any alive today, mind you. But in 1973, some were left behind.

Accounting - Left Behind Schlesinger 09/21/92

Despite the Paris agreement, there was no reason, in my judgement, to assume that the North Vietnamese would release everybody.

Accounting Schweitzer 12/04/92

Why has it taken 19 years for us to get to this starting point, is probably the most important of these three questions... First, the U.S. emphasis has been on live-sighting reports, and much of the POW/MIA community simply wasn't interested in researching existing proof that these men were dead. This lack of vision has cost us years in the search for answers.

Accounting - Left Behind Secord 09/24/92

Sen. Kassebaum: It seems to me one of the major debates after Operation Homecoming was how to rate the intelligence. You made the comment earlier that creditable evidence, I believe, led you to argue that there were Americans still Laos. Is that correct?

Secord: Yes, Senator, that's right.

Accounting - Left Behind Secord 09/24/92

Sen. Grassley: I would like to have you describe for the committee how confident you were in the data, and how specific it was. And just give us some examples.

Secord: I think a lot of the data was flaky, but there is a law of large numbers that comes into play here. And we had a lot of case studies on each and every one of these downings, or nearly every one of them. Some of them were just gone, and we had nothing, but many, many hundreds of downings. We had all kinds of operational data, including some that I described earlier -- everything from good beeper, good chute, good beeper on the ground, transmitting on the survival radio.

Accounting - Left Behind Secord 09/24/92

Sen. Grassley: In your view, were there prisoners left behind in Laos after Homecoming?

Secord: Yes, sir.

Sen. Grassley: Were the number of prisoners significant enough to warrant military action?

Secord: We believed so.

Accounting Sheetz 06/25/92

Sen. McCain: Why is it that it took 20 years to get one list, in your view?

Sheetz: 20 years to get one list? We always had access to the files of the JCRC in paper files. What's been difficult is every time a team goes out into the field in one of these joint iterations we learn something that we didn't know before, and that information causes you to then reevaluate what you know about a particular case, and our databases are always sort of chasing after one other as new information comes in. This is not -- these numbers are not static numbers. They are always in fluidity.

Accounting Trowbridge 06/24/92

In some cases, we had very good information that the individuals had been held but had died there. In many other cases, there was no information beyond the original loss data. There were also a few cases where the services listed men as prisoners of war based on data which they later learned was erroneous in that it correlated to a different man. Much of this we learned through debriefing all of the returnees, who also told us of men who had died before entering the prison system.

Accounting Trowbridge 06/24/92

...the war years within DIA, our office was the focal point for POW/MIA information.

Accounting Trowbridge 06/24/92

...the agency's position at the time was that we held no information that individuals at that time were being held against their will.

Accounting Trowbridge 06/24/92

DIA thought it possible that a man was a POW, yet the services carried him as missing in action. The status the service assigned was always their legal status.

Accounting Trowbridge 06/24/92

DIA did not and does not determine the legal status of a serviceman. That is the sole responsibility of each of the military service secretaries.

Accounting Trowbridge 06/24/92

We had a very close relationship. Our agency supported Dr. Shields with intelligence information.

Accounting - Returned POWs Vessey 11/05/91

We know through extensive debriefings and subsequent investigations that all Americans seen by U.S. prisoners of war who did return in the Vietnamese prison system have been accounted for as either returned POWs are through the return for remains, or having been reported as died in captivity.

Accounting - Left Behind Walters 09/21/92

Sen. Grassley: What happened in your view to those who we expected back who did not come back?

Walters: I think they killed them. They're that kind of people.

Accounting- Left Behind Trowbridge 06/24/92

Until Homecoming, you expected them to come home alive. When they did not come home alive, you ceased to think they should be home alive.

Accounting -KIA/BNR Sheetz 08/04/92

...some of the KIA cases, the descriptions that you read, are more compelling than others, but having reviewed each and every one of them, we do not find that there are fatal flaws in the documentation and the judgments that were reached by the field commanders who were responsible for reporting the status of their lost men.

Accounting Sheetz 12/04/92

Chairman Kerry: Let me understand. You have 196 discrepancy cases?...

Sheetz: Fate has been determined on 61 of those. So, when you subtract that out, that gets you down to the 135 figure. The 196 is the actual cases that existed, and we've been able to get answers on the fate on 61 of those. So, 135 are still to be determined; fate to be determined.

Chairman Kerry: And 90 in Laos? How many fate determined in Laos?

Sheetz: None, sir. But I might add, again, from prior sessions we have explained that 85 percent of the losses that took place in Laos that are still unaccounted for took place in the Eastern-most provinces, right along the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, and only 9 of those 90 discrepancy cases are cases in which they took place clearly in areas of Pathet Lao control.

So, essentially, 80 to 81 of those cases are in the border, Vietnamese-controlled areas where we are going to be working in the tripartite arena with the Vietnamese and the Lao to try to get answers on those cases.

Accounting - KIA/BNR Sheetz 08/04/92

Chairman Kerry: ...And the person is listed as KIA in that particular category based on first-hand reports from people within a unit or aircraft, or whatever, is that correct?... So what I am saying is that in the case of almost 100 percent of those 1,095, there are sufficient multiple reports of the incident to permit you to draw the conclusion you've drawn, are there not?

Sheetz: Yes, sir...

Chairman Kerry: So I ask you again the same question I asked you a moment ago. Is it not fair to say, and even more appropriate to say, that there ought to be, maybe, a new category that in the case of those 1,095, while their body has not been returned, in some cases based on the report it is clear, is it not, that a body will never be returned?

Sheetz: That is true, sir...

Chairman Kerry: So that person is in effect accounted for. The family has accepted the accounting, and in point of fact it does not belong on a POW/MIA list. It is not POW, it is not MIA, it is KIA, body not recoverable.

Accounting - KIA/BNR Sheetz 08/04/92

Chairman Kerry: Now, if you are saying that 1,095 were KIA, well, they have not been returned. Are they not accounted for?

Mr. Sheetz: The fullest possible accounting has three levels of evidence, if you will. [Level] 1, the most ideal outcome would be the return of a live American prisoner. Level 2 would be... recovering their remains and repatriating those remains to the United States. The third level of outcome is for those who perished, where remains cannot be recovered, to develop sufficient documentation as to confirm the fate of the individual...

Chairman Kerry: These 1,095 fall into the third category, correct?

Mr. Sheetz: At the present time, they do.

Accounting - Nixon Statement Shields 09/24/92

Chairman Kerry: Why did not the President of the United States stand up and say, the prisoners are not back? Why did not the Secretary of Defense say, I stood up a few months ago and I had 14 people I said did not come back and, by God, they are still not back, and why will Americans not care about it?

Accounting - Shields Statement Shields 09/24/92

Chairman Kerry: Now look at the cause and effect. Here are the papers coming off your press conference. [Headline] "POW unit boss: no living GIs left in Indochina." Here, [Headline]: "Rumors that there were hundreds of U.S. servicemen still left in Laotian prison camps do the families of the missing a disservice." Headline: "All U.S. POWs free Pentagon maintains." Headline: "Unreturned GIs are feared dead..."

Shields: I never said that the men were all dead. I never said that. I've never said that to this day.

Chairman Kerry: No indication that any of the missing are alive in Indochina. We went through this last time; there were indications.

Shields: Senator, I don't believe that I could tell Mrs. Hrdlicka or Mrs. Van Dyke or the Van Dyke parents or anyone else that I had indications at that time that their loved ones were alive.

Accounting - Nixon Statement Shields 09/24/92

Vice Chairman Smith: But from March 28th to April 12th a heck of a lot of things have happened here that reversed all information that we had in the pipeline on prisoners of war, in Laos especially. And in 2 weeks we went from a memorandum to the President of the United States via the National Security Advisor from the Secretary of Defense saying there are POWs in Laos. Not alleged, there are POWs in Laos, and we had better do something in terms of getting them out before we get out of here. Now that is essentially what the memorandum said. We went from that to a press conference by the President of the United States the next day which says all POWs are coming home. There are no more living Americans in Indochina, you then said on April 12th.