Senate Select Committee - XLI

Post-War Government Policies

Presumed Findings of Death

For years after the war ended, few Americans wanted to re-examine its effects; families' questions were greeted with silence.

Then, beginning in 1978 and continuing through 1981, came proceedings to declare missing servicemen dead. The "presumptive findings of death" pitted families against the Government, with many trying to prove life against a presumption so strong that even post-capture photographs and other "hard evidence" failed to persuade the judges. Only one, Charles Shelton, remained listed as the symbolic POW.

For those who accepted the death of their kin, the proceedings were welcomed. They provided finality for a situation that left families dangling, letting families go on with their lives. But for those who had not gotten satisfactory answers, the rulings were traumatic. Their own words best express the experience:

These men -- many -- were declared dead not on information, but on the lack of information, that we had. . . . Your comment that 'this thing has taken on a life of its own' is so very true. It has taken over my life, and many others' unable to go through the steps of grief and dying and acceptance because of this limbo.

Commander Dodge's status change hearing was in February 1979. The next-of-kin had to prove the missing serviceman alive. The Government, with all of their resources, did not have to prove him dead.

In 1977, the Air Force Casualty Office contacted me and advised me that they were going to review David's case, and unless I had any new evidence that he was alive, they were going to declare him dead. I then stated that I had no evidence since I was not allowed access to intelligence. Why is it that the burden of proof is always on the families?

The process, and not only its conclusion, worsened the matter for many families. As the wife of a serviceman missing in Laos in December 1967, explained:

He said the hearing would be held and told me the day. I told him I'd get in touch with my children and we'd be down. He said, "Oh, you don't need to come. It is just a hearing. We will let you know about it." I said, "You are talking about killing off my husband legally. The way you've talked to me so far, I don't trust you."

. . . . He said, "Isn't there anything I can do?" I said, "You can make reservations for me at the visiting quarters. There will be my son, two daughters, my mother and myself." He said, "Oh, I can't do that. You can't stay there. You'll have to get a motel."

They closed my husband's case and declared him killed in action as of August 17, 1979. He was such an honorable, straightforward man; he would not be pleased with the situation I'd been placed in all of these years.

The League of Families chronicled the process from families' perspective:

Immediately after the signing of the Paris Accords, January 27, 1973, the Department of Defense planned to initiate presumptive finding of death rulings based on U.S. knowledge of incident circumstances and lapse of time without information to indicate the individual was still living. What was obviously not yet available was knowledge from the Vietnamese, Lao or Cambodian governments. . . the families, under the umbrella of the League, initiated a class-action suit to stop the status reviews. . . .

The court decided. . . that PNOK [primary next-of-kin] receiving compensation must be provided hearing rights. The Defense Department extended these rights to all PNOK, whether or not currently receiving government benefits. . . .

some in the League publicly offered to return their government pay if active-duty status could be retained. This was to prevent the Indochinese governments from throwing back the claim that our own government had legally determined our relatives were dead. This, too, was unsuccessful.

With the presumptive findings of death came another problem; the more presumed dead, the fewer it appeared were still prisoner, missing or unaccounted for from the Vietnam War. We, the families, knew that legal administrative rulings had nothing to do with accountability and that the numbers were actually more [than mere numbers] -- they were Americans. . . .

Changing Definitions

At the same time, the U.S. Government added to the POW/MIA list. At the end of 1978, 224 were listed as POWs; by the end of 1980, that had grown to 2,500 -- simply by changing the definition to include war-time killed-in-action.

Taken together, the action seemed to signal that the Government had made a decision was being made to move on -- that one serviceman, whose fate was uncertain, now would get the same level of attention as the next, whose death was witnessed by his comrades.

The solution was satisfactory to no one, and the stroke-of-a-pen changes, based not on facts but on some other consideration, raised even more questions about the sense and sincerity of Government efforts.

Live-Sighting Reports

For scores of families -- including some whose kin's remains had been returned -- the next information to be confronted came with the flood of Vietnamese refugees: reports that Americans were alive in Southeast Asia. The reports were tantalizing, and the heavily blacked-out sections of classified information made them more so. The slowness of live-sighting investigations, and the fruitless efforts of families to gain access to the intelligence contained in hundreds of these reports, marked a new battlefront for many families.

Questions during the mid-1980s about the sincerity of U.S. efforts heightened families' concerns. While some of the allegations of conspiracy or incompetence came with fund-raising appeals, others were leaked by insiders with no readily apparent motive besides altruism. A spate of internal DIA reviews spelled out the agency's shortcomings and, for many, confirmed fears that the "highest national priority" label assigned to POW/MIA efforts by the Reagan Administration was nothing more than words.

Repatriation of Remains

For some 379 families, the next development was the return of remains from Southeast Asia. In many cases, the remains were only fragments of bone, sometimes commingled in the casket with another servicemen who had died in the same crash. Sometimes, they were determined to be the remains of Asian people; in a few cases, they were found to be animal bones. Serious questions about the capability of the U.S. lab that identifies remains to make accurate determinations further shook families' faith in the U.S. Government (see Chapter 5).

In the half-century since World War II, technology has bettered the chance of identifying remains, but the science is far from an exact one.

There have been so many conflicting reports concerning Bill. We have always felt he was alive, and being held in Russia, even though remains (a few single teeth said to compare favorably with Bill's) was sent home in November of 1957. When we had the casket opened by court order, we found a sack with a few single teeth and a few bone fragments so that identification was impossible as far as we were concerned. We buried the body as Bill, even though we still believed that he was in Russia.

We have felt so helpless all these years, trying and trying to get positive proof of whether he is in Russia or not. My parents both died believing that the U.S. Government had not been honest with them. . . .

The combination of:

past experience with the Government on POW/MIA matters;

only partly conclusive results; and

the few number of bones available to make the determination makes it impossible for many families to accept the remains as proof of their kin's death.

Each day I wait, and look, and hope for some revelation as to how did my son die -- if he did! Oh yes, I know my Government considers [his case] a closed book because Hanoi sent back a box of bones with his name on it. But there was no identification tag, nor picture, nor anything in the way of personal effects found on his person returned to us. No fingerprints! No dental records!

I do know Hanoi had David either dead or alive -- the Pravda (1965) article told me that. He did not go down in his plane as previously thought. I want any and all information my Government has on David -- my family can handle it!. . . .

Casualty Officers

I was shocked, surprised and stunned. . . . It took some getting used to, and I can't describe the overwhelming relief I felt, knowing how, where and when he died, and that it was quick. . . . My baby, Sue, was six weeks old when the telegram was delivered to me. . . . In an instant, I [had] lost my husband, home, status as a wife, social life, my planned future -- and I was just getting over childbirth. I heard nothing from the three surviving crew members. All official business was handled by mail. I had no advisor or advocate from the military to help me sort out my life and figure out what I should do. I felt abandoned. . . . a way must be found to see that dependents of men who died serving their country are given the personal support they need.

The Defense Department has come a great distance since the days of telegrams announcing the loss of a serviceman. Today, officers serve the point of contact for families and the efforts of most are well-regarded by the families they serve.

However, few have the experience and clout needed to pry information out of the DIA, and their stints in the job are short: except in the Air Force, assignments last no more than three years. This forces families to drive the information-gathering process -- and their lack of security clearance and knowledge ill-equips them to get the answers they seek.

Simply put, the agencies of our Government responsible for the MIA issue do not provide us of their own volition and in a timely manner all information that they had about my father's fate, despite their often-repeated promise to do just that.

The inability of casualty officers to satisfy families' legitimate needs for information often worsens communication. In their eagerness to learn all they can, many families have turned to other channels -- pressing intelligence analysts or private activists for more. The different interpretations, and sometimes different facts, obtained through these channels have exposed a bureaucracy that is lumbering and often senseless in its operations. It has left many families unsure about who to believe.

Our family has never been officially told that Steven was taken prisoner, but we had received a declassified document from another POW/MIA family, that stated Steven was positively identified by photograph in November of 1968 (three months after his disappearance) as being taken prisoner. I do not know which list he now falls under, the 111 confirmed to have died in captivity or the 133 of whom no other information is available. I'm sure we will be notified in time.

I just wanted to say we are proud of Steven for his unselfishness in fighting for his country, and how proud we are of you and the committee for having the courage to look into this matter to the extent you have in order to resolve the issue.

Secretary Cheney's plan to use the POW/MIA office to trouble-shoot is commendable, but further efforts to unify POW/MIA operations are needed. Too much is lost in "translation" between the men and women in the field and POW/MIA families, because information goes first through DIA and then casualty office channels. Oftentimes, information also is passed through the Inter-Agency Group (see Chapter 5), further delaying notification of the individual's family.

While the Committee recognizes the need for some "channels," it also urges DoD to let the public, and especially family members, hear directly from those who have first-hand information about searching for unaccounted-for servicemen.

Families Turn Elsewhere for Help

The National League of Families

The League's origins can be traced to the West Coast during the late 1960s. Sybil Stockdale, wife of Admiral James Stockdale, the ranking POW in the "Hanoi Hilton," initiated the movement which evolved from a loosely organized, small group of families into the formal organization now known as the National League of Familise of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

The impetus for this action was the strong belief by these POW families that the U.S. Government's policy of keeping a low profile on POW/MIAs was unjustified and causing the families undue pain -- and perhaps even risking the lives, health and the very return of their missing loved ones (as described above in "War-Time Secrecy.")

In October 1968, the first media account of a POW story was published. As a result of that story, many families began to communicate directly with each other. What once was a small group grew to hundreds and ultimately several thousand family members.

The League's first major activity was to directly confront the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris with inquiries about the fate of their loved ones. On other occasions, family members travelled to Laos and Vietnam on their own to seek answers.

Over the past 25 years, both during and after the war, the League has pressed hard through its public awareness programs and its intense pressure on the U.S. Government to get answers. The League's goals are:

to obtain the release of all prisoners;

repatriation of all recoverable remains;

to provide the fullest possible accounting for all of the missing.

Through the U.S. Government's POW/MIA Inter-Agency Group, the League has participated over the last decade in the development of official policy in the areas of intelligence and diplomatic efforts on the POW/MIA issue. The participation of the League's Executive Director, Ann Mills Griffiths, as a member of the IAG has led to great controversy and division among family members (see Chapter 5), but even criticics recognize that Griffiths' participation on the IAG has givven the League a key role in influencing government policy on the POW/MIA issue, however. In addition, the Committee recognizes that the League has provided a continuity to changing U.S. officials' responsible for policy on this issue spanning 25 years and five Presidencies of both political parties. The National Alliance of Families

The Alliance was founded in Seattle in June 1990 under the leadership of Dolores Alfond, sister of Maj. Victor Apodaca who is missing from the Vietnam War. The Alliance has been a leader in the effort to unite family members, former POWs and other citizens who seek information on missing personnel from World War II, the Korean Conflict, Cold War incidents, and the Vietnam War.

The Alliance also has been a strong advocate for the declassification of all Government documents pertaining to the missing from these wars. Another primary purpose of the National Alliance has been to educate communities (including public and civic organizations, schools, and the general public) about POW/MIA issues. Like the League, the Alliance also has held major forums with family members and Government officials in Washington, D.C.

Fellow Combat Veterans

Another, natural alternative for families hungry for information was the men who served with their kin. Contacts were ad hoc and often secretive: officially, the Government observed servicemen's privacy rights; unofficially, individual servicemen often passed on information as personal favors, and witnesses regularly reached out to their buddies' families voluntarily. For untold numbers of families, the stories that these witnesses told made the difference.

I know my brother went down into the South China Sea. The radar technician was a very good friend of the family and he watched the plane go down into the sea. So I feel I know where my brother is. I feel he was not captured, so as far as I'm concerned, he's gone. Let him lie in peace.

For some veterans, though, the requests continued -- from family members unable to accept their necessarily incomplete stories, or from children who wanted to hear it first-hand. Often, the requests were not only for the facts of a 20-year-old incident, but for an explanation of the war itself, an answer to rumors, and more. In one letter to the son of an MIA, his co-pilot struggled to answer cosmic questions with a careful recounting of facts:

What happened to your dad and I was the real definition of rotten coincidence. . . . [We were on a mission to make] strikes into Laos and Cambodia to stop supplies from getting into South Vietnam from the North. We didn't talk much about them only as a matter of policy. There were not "secret missions" or CIA-driven. . . . As we rolled in and released the bombs, two anti-aircraft rounds struck the airplane on the starboard (right) side forward of the engine intake. The explosion caused the engine to explode also and the right wing blew off at the fold. At this point, we looked at each other and ejected from the aircraft. I went out a second or so before Mike and wound up on the west side of a small river. He was on the east. . . the material and people we were after were there.

I gathered my stuff, hid it, called our wingman and tried to talk to Mike on the radio kind of all at once. I also found that my hands and face were burned pretty well and there was some shrapnel in my arm and head. At this point, these were the least of our problems. I then tried to find Mike by wandering around in the jungle in the dark (12:30 a.m.). Not a good idea as I fell down a small cliff (8-10 feet) and had to climb out. At this time I could see down to the river and saw 4-6 troopers come across the river and head my way. I hid in a bamboo thicket and waited. . . .

There was enough evidence that Mike might be held in the general area where we were hit that a "bright light" team was interested to attempt to find and rescue him. They are mercenaries that "lived in the area." They found nothing indicating his having been there. You've been told the rest and most likely more than I. It was hard to accept, but I feel he was killed that first night. I would hope that I was wrong.

Your dad was a great guy and a good friend. He did his job better than most, but unfortunately was killed. The best part is he was doing what he loved the most.

Private Groups

. . . you become obsessed. You cannot sleep, eat, work, because you would waltz with the devil to bring one man home.

The Government's shortcomings in live-sighting investigations and elsewhere prompted some families to turn to latter-day Rambos, as well as to responsible veterans and family organizations, for additional help.

Most of us have been tempted at some point to participate in some form of POW rescue based on nothing more than questionable and circumstantial information at best, such as unverified photos, live sightings, and anonymous reports. If it sounds hokey and mystic, it probably is, and it almost always plays a very cruel hoax on the families by raising false hopes. . .

I am very pleased to know this committee will take up these issues and problems in the near future, and hope this will eliminate once and for all the con artists, and clear the way for those who are credible and knowledgeable to resolve the long standing tragedy of our MIAs.

Another POW/MIA wife was not able to ignore the information profferred by a private group:

After the [positive] analysis had come out from Los Alamos and Dr. Charney I began to doubt my own view of the picture, which was there was a slight possibility that it could be Don. I mean I just -- I did not know. But something that my son said to me sort of turned me around. He said, "Mother, that picture is obviously an American. I mean he looks like an American to me. . . . he's somebody's father, he's somebody's brother, husband, cousin. If there's a chance in a billion that it's my dad, you've got to do something."

So with that, that's when I started.

The result of many encounters are devastating, emotionally and financially.

One former Congressman was shown on a nation-wide television show telling a national audience that he knows who the prisoners are and where they are. He should be made to go on nationwide television and retract his lies.

One former Lieutenant Colonel has been exposed on television for claiming a photo he obtained was of an American prisoner still in captivity. This was nothing more than a diabolical plot to raise money; [it] caused the family involved untold grief and compelled our Government to expend untold assets to track down this 'prisoner.'

One extremely convincing former Lieutenant Colonel Bo Gritz hoodwinked me into believing his story that he knew where prisoners were being held in Laos and could get them out. In 1981, the prisoner and missing issue was getting little or no attention and I saw this as an opportunity -- not necessarily to recover my son, but to get at least one prisoner out to prove what we had been working for. Since my wife and I had been notified by the Navy Department that our son "had survived to evade" and were informed by his squadron commander that Nick had been captured and escaped, I am sure you can appreciate the vulnerable situation we were in. The "secret rescue mission" failed very quickly; it never got out of the state of Florida and cost us $30,000, with nary an apology.

. . . I am not bemoaning the loss of money since that operation is one-tenth of the amount our family has spent in our 23 years of involvement. But I do believe that this Committee has a responsibility to investigate and, where necessary, prosecute these incredible liars. . . .

The fraudulent sideshows also sidetracks U.S. investigators away from serious leads and force them to chase phantoms:

Sen. McCain: "How much of the effort that your organization is engaged in has been -- how much of your assets have had to be diverted to tracking down the bogus pictures and the hoaxers?

Mr. Sheetz: At times, Senator, I would tell you that that process has literally precluded us from doing anything else. Because the political pressure has been so intense and the high interest among the people in the Government, this committee, the American public, to know what is the truth on those cases. . . It's an opportunity-cost argument. Essentially, what you're doing is dropping the work that would probably have more payoff to chase after things that ultimately turn out to be useless exercises.

Discussion

The committee wishes to commend the families and advocacy groups for their strong leadership and perseverance over the years. They have moved the issue in a positive manner in spite of incredible obstacles. The most difficult obstacles were the intransigence of the Communist governments and the lack of focus and attention by the U.S. Government at many points during the last 40 years.

At the Committee's first round of hearings, in November 1991, all witnesses -- families, activists, and government officials -- agreed that, ." . . one of the most important things that could come out of the early days of these hearings is a new structure, and a new relationship process with the families." Assistant Secretary Carl Ford explained:

. . . we didn't lose our credibility with you, with the families, with the American people overnight and we're not going to gain that credibility back overnight. . . . The only thing that is going to persuade people is our actions and our results, and to prove over time that we are serious, that we do mean what we say, and that despite occasional setbacks, despite occasional human errors, we're going to demonstrate over the next months and weeks, years, that we can do it better than we have done it in the past. That's our only commitment, to try. And if there are problems that this committee uncovers, we'll try to fix them.

In addition to other steps noted above, two actions taken on behalf of POW/MIA families during the last year have been significant:

To answer families need for an ombudsman that both DIA and casualty officers would respond to, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney created a top-level liaison office at the Pentagon in January 1992. The job of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs is to spearhead POW/MIA policy-making and to try to get answers when casualty officers cannot.

POW/MIA documents were ordered declassified in July 1992 by President Bush, at the unanimous request of the Senate. This step was taken in conjunction with the establishment of a central "library" that families can turn to for consolidated information about their case and others, in accordance with an amendment sponsored by Sen. McCain and enacted in November, 1991. (See Chapter 5, Declassification).

The most substantive response to families' concerns, however, has been field operations that have put American troops on the ground in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to search for answers. For most of the past 20 years, U.S. investigators shuttled back and forth from Bangkok to Hanoi whenever they could get permission from Vietnam. Then, a month before the Committee was formed, a temporary U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi was permitted to open; that became permanent in November, 1992.

Increased Vietnamese cooperation, won by Presidential Emissary Gen. John Vessey (USA, Ret.), Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, and three Senate delegations to Southeast Asia, widened U.S. investigators' access, letting them go to places where Americans were reported seen alive after the war, talk to prison guards and others who may know what happened to missing Americans, and examine archives and top-secret files that hold promises of more answers.

For many POW/MIA families, however, 20 years' experience dealing with the Government makes it difficult to accept these new promises. Answers about their kin's fate are still necessary -- but they are not sufficient to explain the intervening 20 years of U.S. Government run-around and worse -- and the lack of concern by Communist governments for basic human dignity.

The Committee's review of past family experiences reflects an array of problems in dealing with our government that never should have happened. With proper organization, planning, sensitivity and openness, the Committee believes these problems can be avoided in the future.

Recommendations

The Government has wavered repeatedly in its efforts to account for missing servicemen. Their families never have.

POW/MIA families want action, not more promises. The best that the U.S. Government can do for them is to do its best for their missing kin. The Committee believes the following steps must be taken to assure families that the Government is doing its best, and not simply assigning a priority that is merely words.

Accordingly, the Committee recommends:

Those actually working on POW/MIA accounting in the field in Southeast Asia should be made available, when schedules permit, to meet with families in the United States.

Military service casualty offices should be headed by civilians who are not subject to the kind of routine duty rotations experienced by military personnel. Individuals in these sensitive positions must have experience and a base of institutional memory if they are to deal effectively and knowledgeably with family members.

The resumed publication of a regular newsletter containing POW/MIA related information would be a useful means of sharing new developments with the families.

Guidelines should be established immediately for the creation of a central computerized data base within the Executive branch with information on all unaccounted for U.S. personnel from past military conflicts, to include World War II, Korea, the Cold War and Vietnam. All relevant casualty and intelligence data, in addition to any recently obtained information potentially correlating to a specific case should be made readily available to family members and researchers through the central data base. On-line access to the central data base should be made available through an easily accessible modem system.

Procedures also should be developed to ensure that requests for information contained in the data base can be processed easily so that family members receive prompt, printed responses when necessary. Additionally, procedures should be established by the Department of Defense and the Department of State to ensure that the data base is updated regularly. The Committee further recommends that the Secretary of Defense authorize the DOD family liaison officer to work with the service casualty officers to develop a data base program which meets the needs of families and researchers who need to use the system.

Family members of Vietnam era POW/MIAs who would like to travel to Southeast Asia for direct discussions with appropriate U.S. and foreign government officials should be encouraged and helped to do so.