Senate Select Committee - XIX

Covert Operations

The purpose of this investigation was to determine what, if any, official U.S. covert operations may have been launched after 1973, or specifically after Operation Homecoming, to confirm the presence of live American POWs in Southeast Asia, and what intelligence information may have been available that necessitated the need for such operations.

There have been numerous allegations made of possible clandestine intelligence or military operations conducted by the U.S. government into Southeast Asia. Many of these allegations contend that such official operations succeeded in returning with confirmation of live POWs in captivity, but that information was kept secret from the American public. In May 1981, the Washington Post and other newspapers printed a story of an official incursion into Laos by American sponsored mercenaries, to confirm the presence of POWs at a specific camp monitored by U.S. Intelligence. In addition, there have been several unofficial operations mounted by private groups, attempting to penetrate Laos in search of POWs and allegations that some of these attempts were secretly sanctioned by the U.S. Government.

Investigative Procedures

This Committee held a closed hearing on October 16 into the circumstances of the alleged 1981 covert operation reported by the Washington Post. The Committee has spent many months, and conducted numerous depositions of present and former officials to determine exactly what occurred in this case. Because of the level of classification of some of this material, and in order to protect current operations and capabilities, the details of this case remain classified. Much of the intelligence information, however, leading up to this event may be ultimately declassified.

The investigation into unofficial or "private" operations focused primarily on whether there was official U.S. government sanction or support for any of these operations. Other aspects of these private forays were examined under a separate Committee investigation pertaining to oversight of private POW/MIA organizations and their activities. The private operation commonly known as "Grand Eagle" has been investigated, in regard to government support of that private initiative. We have obtained, enough documentation from Army intelligence files to allow the Committee to draw rather conclusive findings regarding official U.S support for that operation.

Discussion

The Committee has identified only one official operation mounted after 1973, to confirm the presence of American POWs in Southeast Asia; this makes the distinction between major cross-border intelligence, military or paramilitary type operations and normal intelligence operations involving collection agents or clandestine sources. There have been numerous intelligence operations involving individual sources or collection agents, with requirements relating to the POW problem.

The Intelligence relating to the 1981 operation was perhaps the most compelling and multiple source intelligence ever made available to intelligence officials and policy-makers of "possible" live American POWs still in captivity up until that time. The actions of U.S. officials in response to this intelligence attest to the quality and quantity of that intelligence.

The U.S. intelligence community had several human intelligence sources reporting the presence of American POWs held in a particular area in Laos from 1979 through early 1981. One of these was a sensitive source with unusually good access. That particular source provided a series of reports, indicating possibly up to 30 Americans working at a detention camp in Laos. The source indicated the prisoners were periodically moved from, then back to the camp on work details. Based on the HUMINT reporting, the intelligence community was able to locate a detention facility through overhead photography near a Lao village in late 1980. A second-hand DIA source, in November 1979, reported the camp held an American POW named "Ltc. Paul W. Mercland." DIA stated in a briefing to the HFAC on 25 June 1981, that although they could not correlate a "Mercland" to any missing Americans, there was a Paul W. Bannon lost in Laos in 1969. Lt. Gen. Tighe, then Director of DIA was at that briefing and told its members that "Mercland" could have been a mispronunciation of "American" and speculated that "Bannon" may have been inadvertently dropped as the information was passed out by the source. The secondary source passed a polygraph test given by DIA.

Admiral Tuttle, who was Deputy Director of DIA at the time, testified in his deposition that he also recalled SIGINT reports referring to American POWs at a detention camp in Laos. NSA has not been able to confirm Admiral Tuttle's memory of SIGINT reporting of Americans in Laos. Among the declassified reports found at NSA, however, was a copy of an intercept that originated from a allied government, that did report the movement of American POWs from Attepeu in late December 1980. This report, which was deemed to be unreliable by CIA at the time, was remarkably similar to an independent HUMINT report within days of intercept, that the American POWs, who had been working at Attepeu, were being moved back to a detention camp in Laos.

In late December 1980, what appeared to be the number "52" scratched in the row crop area within the compound was detected on photography. CIA, in a Jan. 6, 1981 "Spot Report" stated:

analysis of further imagery of 30 December 1980 located what appears to be the number "52," possibly followed by the letter "K," traced on the ground in an agricultural plot insider the outer perimeter of the above facility. DIA is unable to ascribe any particular significance to the number, but "K" was given to U.S. pilots as a ground distress signal. It is thus conceivable that this represents an attempt by a prisoner to signal to any aircraft that might pass overhead.

The "52" was observed over a period of time. DIA imagery analysts in 1981, stated in an Imagery Analysis Memorandum dated February 23 1981 that "the number '52' is still visible with no change. The lack of change indicates that the numerals may have been dug into the earth." This contradicts current DIA analysis, provided during the Committee's Oct. 15, 1992 hearing that because the "52" changed shape in different photographs, it therefore is questionable as an intentional symbol.

The "sensitive" HUMINT source reported that the American POWs had been moved to Vietnam for security reasons by the end of January 1981. Imagery analysts reported the "52" had begun to fade away by February. Other aspects of the intelligence and actions taken to confirm the presence of Americans at the camp remain classified.

A report of a sighting of one possible Caucasian at the suspect camp was received by CIA, but not reported outside the agency. CIA has been unable to answer exactly why this was not reported to DoD, State and the White House, but contend it must they must have had a valid reason why it was not. They have speculated that they may have determined the possible Caucasian was a Chinese prisoner, or that the reporters were fabricating.

The CIA and others conducted an investigation in 1981. A key Lao member of the investigation testified to the Committee in closed session that some members of the Lao resistance tried to persuade him that he saw an American at the suspected camp. He told them he could not say that.

Later in 1981, the intelligence community interviewed a refugee who was at a camp similar to a detention camp in Laos and saw no Americans or Europeans. They admit, however, they are not certain it was the same camp, and it was during a different period than when the American POWs were allegedly detained there.

Efforts taken by the intelligence community and the U.S. military to investigate and prepare for the possibility of a rescue of live American prisoners were extensive. President Reagan and his National Security Advisor, Richard Allen were aware of this intelligence and the actions taken. It had the highest national interest.

The intelligence community's actions to confirm the presence of American POWs at this camp were inconclusive. Steps were underway to resume efforts to obtain a conclusive answer, when a press leak killed any further efforts.

Private Operations with Official Support

On the question of official U.S. support being provided to the private operation known as "Grand Eagle," U.S. Army intelligence documentation confirms that a component of Army intelligence did in fact provide a long range camera, polygraph and other equipment and financial support to Mr. Gritz in support of his group. This equipment and financial support, however, was provided in advance of that intelligence component receiving full approval to provide such support, and in fact the request (or CIOP proposal) was ultimately denied. The equipment and money had, however, already been released. (Army contact reports.)

The Committee also became aware of allegations of off-line U.S. Government (NSC) support to private organizations in regard to fundraising and movement of funds to indigenous rebel groups. Allegedly, this activity was related indirectly to the POW issue or used as a cover for providing financial support to resistance groups using non-appropriated funds. Due to time constraints, the Committee was unable pursue these reports. This is discussed in some detail in the chapter on private fund-raising.

In 1982, the U.S. Government monitored the communications of a private organization operating from Thailand, attempting to undertake a private foray into Laos in search of POWs. DoD requested a determination from Justice Department as to the legality of monitoring the communications of American citizens abroad. This was in fact carried out. (NSA file documents forwarded to Committee.)