Senate Select Committee - XVII

Article 21 of the PPA provides that:

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional role, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

The inclusion of Article 21 caused considerable controversy in the United States. As described in pages 114-117 of the Montgomery Committee report, Dr. Kissinger and other Administration officials denied at the time and for years afterwards that any negotiations or agreements concerning specific amounts of aid had been conducted.

These denials occurred notwithstanding a secret letter from President Nixon to DRV Premier Pham Van Dong that was hand- delivered on February 1, 1973, four days after the agreement was signed. The letter, which reflected an understanding reached between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho during the January negotiations, included the following U.S. commitments:

1. The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions.

2. Preliminary U.S. studies indicate that the appropriate programs for the U.S. contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of $3.25 billion of grant aid over 5 years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties. . .

3. The U.S. will propose to the DRV the formation of a Joint Economic Commission. . .

(4.) to develop programs for the U.S. contribution to reconstruction of North Vietnam. . .

In regard to other forms of aid, U.S. studies indicate that the appropriate programs could fall in the range of 1 to 1.5 billion dollars. . ."

A separate codicil to the letter contained the heading "Understanding Regarding Economic Reconstruction Program." It referred to the recommendations of the Joint Economic Commission "mentioned in the President's note" being implemented by each member "in accordance with its own constitutional provisions."

The record of negotiations supports Dr. Kissinger's contention that he repeatedly informed the DRV that any reconstruction assistance would have to be approved by the U.S. Congress and could not be guaranteed by the Executive Branch acting alone.

Another important issue relating to President Nixon's promise of aid is whether it was meant to be linked with any of the POW/MIA provisions of the agreement and associated understandings. During the course of the secret talks, Dr. Kissinger stated consistently the U.S. position that reconstruction aid was a humanitarian matter that stood alone. In the September 26, 1972 exchange cited above, however, Le Duc Tho explicitly linked the resolution of the issue concerning U.S. POWs in Laos to "the political question and the question of reparations."

It seems, given this record, that the U.S. and DRV took mirror image views of the relationship between the promise of American aid and the release of POWs in Laos. It was the U.S. position that the prisoners must be released whether or not aid was forthcoming. The DRV's preferred position was that aid be forthcoming whether or not prisoners were released. Although U.S. negotiators successfully avoided any linkage of the issues in the agreement, they obviously could not prevent DRV officials from subsequently raising the issue of aid in response to U.S. demands that they comply more fully with the POW/MIA provisions of the accords.

The Agreement

The Paris Peace Accords consisted of the Agreement to End the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and four protocols including one on prisoners and detainees. On the military side, the Agreement provided for an immediate ceasefire, the simultaneous withdrawal of all U.S. forces and return of military and civilian POWs within 60 days of the signing, and a prohibition on the introduction of troops, military advisers or personnel into South Vietnam during the 60 day period. It also allowed the GVN and PRG to replace worn out military equipment and materiel after the ceasefire and established military commissions to oversee implementation of the military provisions.

With respect to political issues, the Agreement provided for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the South Vietnamese people, the formation by the PRG and the GVN of a National Council to organize free and democratic elections, the reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means, and a U.S. commitment to contribute to the postwar reconstruction of Indochina, including Vietnam. Provisions for the release of prisoners and accounting for MIAs were contained in Chapter III, Articles 8(a) and 8(b):

Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above- mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

The responsibility for implementing article 8 during the 60 day simultaneous prisoner release/troop withdrawal period was delegated to a Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) and its subcommssion on captured persons. Thereafter, a Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) would assume responsibility for accounting for MIAs.

In addition to Article 8, the Agreement included a Protocol on Prisoners and Detainees. The Protocol specified the terms of prisoner release including--among other things--the immediate, complete exchange of lists of captured persons; the return of prisoners at a rate no slower than the rate of withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces; a requirement that captured persons be treated humanely; permission for Red Cross visits to all places of detention within 15 days; and a requirement that the return of prisoners not be delayed or prevented for any reason, including a possible conviction for war crimes.

With respect to Laos, State Department Deputy Legal Adviser George Aldrich authored a memorandum following the signing of the agreement that noted:

The DRV has assured us that, although not covered by the agreement, 'all U.S. military and civilian prisoners detained in Laos shall be released no later than 60 days following the signature of the agreement.' The DRV has also assured us that it would be responsible for making the necessary arrangements with the Pathet Lao.

Article 8(b) of the agreement concerning the account for missing in action and the location of graves does not apply to Laos. Similarly, the functions of the Four Party Joint Military Commission with regard to dead and missing persons under article 10(a) of the protocol on the return of prisoners, do not extend to Laos. Therefore, it will be necessary to conclude further arrangements for tracing the missing and finding graves in Laos.

Article 20 of the Agreement was intended to pave the way for a regionwide ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces:

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. the parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war materiel. . .

Also of interest is Article 21, cited above, which contains a general U.S. commitment to "contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina."

Finally, Article 22 of the Agreement stated:

. . . the strict implementation of this agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Implementation of the Accords: The First Sixty Days

General Expectations

Given the uncertainties of war, the failure of North Vietnam previously to provide what the U.S. considered a complete list of captured Americans, and the prior unwillingness of communist forces in Laos, Cambodia or South Vietnam to provide any list at all, estimates of the likely number of Americans to be returned when the Agreement was finalized varied widely.

On the day the agreement was signed, the DIA listed 667 American military and civilian personnel as POW and 1,986 as Missing in Action. There was not enough certain knowledge behind these apparently precise numbers, however, to justify confident predictions as to the number of Americans who would be coming home.

Between 1970 and January, 1973, when the PPA was signed, the Nixon Administration had mounted a public campaign around the POW issue to rally U.S. public support and to put pressure on the DRV. During this period, both President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird referred to "1600" American POWs and Congress approved a Resolution, with Administration backing, calling for the release of the "1500 American servicemen. . . imprisoned by Communist forces in southeast Asia."

The Committee conducted a deposition of Col. Lawrence Robson, whose responsibilities as a staff member to the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam included the maintenance of files on servicemen who had been lost. Col. Robson recalls a meeting of service representatives at CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii in August, 1972 in which the estimated number of returnees varied from 400 to 1600.

General Eugene Tighe told the Committee that Admiral Gayler, CINCPAC, had received a tasking from the JCS in the summer of 1972 to work with the service intelligence agencies to compile as complete a list of potential POWs as possible. The goal, said General Tighe in testimony before the Select Committee, was to:

to compile a list, by military service, of the names. . . of each missing individual of which sufficient intelligence and other data was available to reasonably expect that he had survived and would be returned on successful conclusion of the Paris negotiations. . .

The standards we used for determining whether to show a missing individual on the list or not as an anticipated returnee may have been more liberal or less than those used elsewhere. I have no way of knowing. They were intended to be as accurately anticipatory as humanly possible. . .

General Tighe remembers that the list compiled by CINCPAC contained from 900-1000 names and was sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unfortunately, the Select Committee has not been able to locate any record of the list.

Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the JCS from 1970-1974, told the Committee that the range of expected returnees, to the best of his recollection, was between 400 and 600, with the possibility of going as high as 1100, given the uncertainties. Admiral Moorer attributed the differences in expectations at this point to differences in criteria used to place names on the various lists.

Expectations with Respect to Americans lost in Laos

The confident assurances provided by the President and Dr. Kissinger with respect to the return of prisoners throughout Indochina were particularly encouraging to the families of American airmen downed in Laos. In January, 1973, DIA listed 354 Americans as MIA in Laos, but only 12 as POW. The most tangible evidence of live U.S. POWs, such as letters to family members and the acknowledgement of the enemy that particular individuals were being held, was lacking in Laos. But the large number of airmen downed but not confirmed dead, coupled with a variety of other indications, gave grounds for hope that a significant number of those captured in Laos might be coming home.

William Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to Laos from 1964 until 1969, recalls receiving information during that time indicating the possible or probable capture of "around 10" U.S. airmen. He told the Committee "I got the sense that it (total U.S. prisoners in Laos) was not a large number. That is. . . less than twenty." According to the Ambassador, the U.S. believed that the prisoners were being held at two locations, Xianghoang and Sam Neua, both of which he said were under the control of the North Vietnamese.

In May, 1970, Mr. Sullivan, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "most Americans captured by Communist forces in Laos remain in Laos."

Mr. Sullivan's successor as Ambassador to Laos, McMurtrie Godley, was less certain in his testimony about the possible presence of U.S. POWs in Laos. He told the Committee that:

The only reliable sources we had about MIAs or POWs were, of course, Air Force reports as to losses over Laos and Air America, which lost several men in Northern Laos. .

We had, in Vientiane, a special team interrogating many Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese prisoners about American prisoners or MIAs. The information we gathered was not, however, hard proof, but you might say collateral information. . .

Ambassador Godley and Mr. Ross Perot gave the Committee conflicting accounts of Mr. Perot's visit to Vientiane in April, 1970. Mr. Perot and two associates remember receiving a briefing from the CIA indicating that U.S. prisoners were being held by the Pathet Lao. Although Mr. Perot did not remember the exact number, his associates recall the number as 26 or 27. Neither Ambassador Godley nor the CIA station chief who allegedly provided the briefing recall the meeting, nor do they confirm that the U.S. had solid intelligence of that many prisoners being held in Laos. However, a former U.S. Embassy officer in Vientiane, James Murphy, recalled during his deposition to the Committee that he had, in fact, escorted Mr. Perot to a meeting with the CIA station chief at the U.S. Embassy.

The extent of roughly contemporaneous U.S. intelligence information is reflected in an April 17, 1974 memorandum prepared by the DIA for the various armed service intelligence agencies. According to the memo, "it is clear that the Pathet Lao had captured some U.S. personnel." Among these were Mr. Eugene DeBruin, a civilian, and Lt. Col. David Hrdlicka, USAF. Photographs of both men in captivity had appeared in Pathet Lao publications. Pathet Lao spokesman Soth Petrasy had acknowledged in May, 1966 that the LPF were holding Mr. DeBruin and that he was in good health.

Pathet Lao Statements. Although the statements were later to be recanted, other LPF statements made prior to Operation Homecoming heightened U.S. expectations concerning the release of prisoners, as well. For example, in September, 1968, Soth Petrasy told a U.S. official that "pilots are generally kept near the area in which their plane is downed and therefore may be found throughout Laos from the south to the north."

In April, 1971, Prince Souphanouvong, Chairman of the LPF Central Committee, made the following statement concerning prisoners:

The LPF has made public a concrete policy toward enemy soldiers or agents captured or giving themselves up, including GIs. All the American pilots engaged in bombings or toxic chemical sprays on Lao territory are considered criminals and enemies of the Lao people. But once captured, they have been treated in accordance with the humane policy of the LPF. The question of enemy captives; including U.S. pilots, will be settled immediately after the U.S. stops its intervention and aggression in Laos first, and foremost, end the bombing of Laos territory.

According to a September 30, 1971 report in the Wall Street Journal:

The Pathet Lao, a Hanoi ally not represented at the Paris Peace Talks, indicate only that they will "discuss prisoners when the U.S. pulls out of Laos." (Mrs. Stephen Hanson, whose husband a Marine captain, was seen alive on the ground after his helicopter was shot down over Laos, says a high-ranking U.S. diplomat confided to her that there were "70 or 80" U.S. prisoners in Laos. State Department officials, however, say intelligence sources indicate the possibility of "around 30 men, and that's low-level stuff--things like reports of Caucasians spotted on the Ho Chi Minh Trail."

In February, 1972, Soth Petrasy told an interviewer that "some tens of prisoners are presently being held" by the Pathet Lao.

In April, 1972, Soth told the press that U.S. airmen were being detained in various caves in northern Laos.

These types of statements continued until as late as February 19, 1973, more than three weeks after the PPA was signed, when Soth said that the Pathet Lao had a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they were being held.

DIA Background Paper -- 1992. Toward the end of its investigation, the Committee was provided with a Defense Intelligence Agency Background Paper on Laos. According to that document:

Prisoners who were captured in Laos by the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) were immediately transferred to North Vietnam and detained there until the end of the war. Second, intelligence indicates that after 1968/9, all prisoners captured in Laos were turned over to the North Vietnamese Army for transport to North Vietnam, regardless of where they were captured or by whom.

January 27, 1973: the Lists are Exchanged

Under the peace agreement, release of POWs and withdrawal of U.S. troops were to be completed within 60 days of the signing of the PPA, or by March 26. The responsibility for implementing these provisions was vested in a Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) headed, for the U.S., by General Gilbert Woodward. Reports from the U.S. delegation to the JMC were rendered directly to General Weyand, Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and copied to Dr. Kissinger, Admiral Moorer of the Joint Chiefs (JCS), and others. A POW subcommission of the JMC was formed on January 30, 1973, headed for the U.S. by Col. B.H. Russell.

The primary objective of the U.S. delegation to the FPJMC was to obtain the return of American prisoners under both the terms of the agreement and the side understanding between the U.S. and DRV that U.S. POWs captured throughout Indochina would be returned. The unit's historian described the reason this way:

First, they were to ensure the return of the American prisoners of war. Given the reduced level of U.S. troop involvement in Vietnam by January, 1973, the return of prisoners was the major emotional motivating force for the Americans. It was probably also the only issue over which the United States could justify a renewal of bombing raids or other measures involving military force, should the North Vietnamese clearly demonstrate their intent to violate the provisions and understandings reached in Paris concerning the prisoner return. The return of the American captives was also a goal on which almost all Americans in Vietnam or at home, could agree.

The lists of U.S. prisoners were placed in American hands shortly after noon, eastern standard time, on January 27. The lists from the DRV and the PRG included a total of 586 Americans to be returned, and 64 as having died in captivity. This left 80 Americans listed as POW (reduced to 73 after the DRV/Laos list was released on February 1), and 1,276 listed by DIA as MIA.

Reaction: Disappointment and Dismay

The Select Committee was told by numerous witnesses that there was widespread disappointment, especially within the Department of Defense, about the number of names on the list. General Eugene Tighe, for example, remembers "shock and sadness at the paucity of the lists of names we received versus what we expected." Similarly, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told the Committee that "I was disappointed with the list because I hoped that there would be more. . . "

U.S. officials were particularly distressed by the fact that the lists did not include any Americans who were believed held prisoner in Laos, although two Americans listed as MIA in Laos were on the list provided by the Viet Cong. The U.S. was certain that the DRV had information concerning at least some prisoners captured in Laos, because the DIA believed that at least a small number of Americans had been captured in Laos by the North Vietnamese and transferred to prison in Hanoi.

Families of missing Americans that were not included on the lists were also dismayed, especially concerning the lack of a list of prisoners captured in Laos. Mrs. Phyllis Galanti, chairman of the Board of the National League of POW/MIA Families, told the Associated Press on January 28, 1973 that "Everything we have been told led us to believe there would be a list." At a meeting of the WSAG Group on Jan. 29, Dr. Kissinger asked for the Defense Department's reaction to the lists:

Mr. Kissinger: Were there any surprises in the list of POWs from North Vietnam?

JCS staff representative (name redacted): It was pretty close to what we expected. We're hoping for forty more on the list of those in Laos.

Defense Dept. representative (name redacted): Our list had 591 and the one they gave us consisted of 555 (refers to military POWs only), plus 55 who died in captivity. Some of the 555 were not on our lists, although not many. There remain 56 who were previously carried as POWs, but are not on either of the lists they gave us. . .

The information they have given us about prisoners in North Vietnam is quite accurate. We don't know what we will get from Laos. We have only six known prisoners in Laos, although we hope there may be forty or forty-one. We have known very little about the caves where they keep the prisoners in Laos. We just got the first photos of those caves recently and our impression is that they are pretty big. We think they are holding a lot more than six prisoners there.

State Dept. representative (name redacted): We expect none from Cambodia?

JCS: They said there were none in Cambodia and we have no record of any there.

American Protests

U.S. protests about the failure of the DRV to produce a list of POWs captured in Laos were raised immediately at meetings of the JMC and in direct communications between the American and North Vietnamese negotiating teams. On January 29, 1973 Deputy National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft cabled the U.S. delegation to the peace talks in Paris that a letter from President Nixon to the DRV on the subject of reconstruction aid had been prepared, but that it should not be delivered until the DRV had produced a list of U.S. prisoners captured in Laos. After the DRV failed to produce the list at a meeting on January 30, a note was sent to Le Duc Tho the following day warning that the issue could jeopardize Dr. Kissinger's planned trip to Hanoi to discuss economic aid.

Finally, on February 1, the exchange of the letter from President Nixon and the list of prisoners captured in Laos took place. Col. George Guay, who made the exchange for the U.S. side, described it in a cable to Brent Scowcroft of the National Security Council staff:

I exchanged the President's memorandum for the list of U.S. prisoners in Laos. . . at 1600 (Paris time) today. . . When I arrived, he made a grab for the envelope containing the message and without breaking his fingers, I told him that my instructions were to exchange the memorandum for his list. He then said I could read his list while he read the memorandum and if we didn't like what we read we could return each other's papers. At this with a huge smile while he again reached for the envelope. I smiled in return and while picking up the envelope with both hands (tight grip) asked him if he had the list. . . .He went to a cabinet and produced an envelope from which we extracted what was obviously a very short list of names. . . there is a total of 10 people on the list, eight military and two civilians. . . When he finished reading the memorandum, I asked him if that was the total list available. He replied that was all "they" gave him and that they (the NV) were attempting to establish procedures to verify the existing situation with the Pathet Lao. . . I did not tell him that I felt like returning the list and taking back the memorandum until they displayed a more serious attitude. In all honesty, though, he did seem to be somewhat embarrassed when he said that was all "they" had given him.

Reactions to the DRV/Laos List

As of February 1, 1973, 352 Americans were listed as MIA in Laos. Of these, two were on the list provided by the DRV. Of the 12 Americans listed as POW in Laos, three were on the list.

American officials were concerned by the small number of individuals on the DRV/Laos list, compared to the total number of U.S. servicemen unaccounted for in Laos. They were concerned, as well, by DIA's belief that the list appeared to consist entirely of prisoners captured by the North Vietnamese, not the LPF--even though DRV officials claimed to have received the list from the LPF. Individuals like Eugene DeBruin and David Hrdlicka, who were known to have been taken captive by the Pathet Lao, were not included. In addition, the Laos list, unlike the DRV and PRG lists released on January 27, did not include the names of any Americans who had died in captivity.

President Nixon's Cable to Pham Van Dong. The official U.S. reaction to the Laos list was conveyed in a cable from President Nixon to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on February 2nd:

The list of American prisoners held in Laos which was presented in Paris on February 1, 1973 is unsatisfactory. U.S. records show that there are 317 American military men unaccounted for in Laos and it is inconceivable that only ten of these men would be held prisoner in Laos.

The United States side has on innumerable occasions made clear its extreme concern with the prisoner issue. There can be no doubt therefore that the implementation of any American undertaking is related to the satisfactory resolution of this problem. It should also be pointed out that failure to provide a complete list of prisoners in Laos or a satisfactory explanation of the low number thus far presented would seriously impair the mission of Dr. Kissinger to Hanoi.

There is no record in National Security Council or White House files of a specific response from the DRV to this cable, nor is there any indication of further U.S. threats to cancel Dr. Kissinger's trip to Hanoi because the North Vietnamese had not responded favorably. However, Col. Guay, who had personally delivered the cable from President Nixon to the DRV representative, characterized the DRV official's reaction in this way:

He said in effect that one should appreciate the difficulties involved in finding pilots who were downed in Laos. You must understand, he added, that we have the best of intentions as we have already proven during the negotiations, but there are real practical problems associated with the recovery of these people. There were instances where both sides searched in vain after an aircraft had been observed going down. The brush is a long way from civilization and Laos is scarcely populated. I replied that even under the worst conditions possible it was difficult to accept the fact that only ten people had been identified. That even on a percentage basis, he should understand it would be difficult for anyone to believe the figure presented. . . .He replied. . . we have not come this far. . . to hold on to a handful of Americans, after all what would that prove. .

As preparations continued for Dr. Kissinger's trip to North Vietnam, the Administration remained publicly dissatisfied with the Laos list. In testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee on February 8, for example, Secretary of State Rogers said that "we do not regard the Lao list as complete."

Dr. Kissinger's Visit to Hanoi

Prior to the signing of the peace agreement, Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had discussed the possibility of a visit by Kissinger to Hanoi for the purpose of dramatizing the peace agreement and initiating a process of postwar planning that would include substantial amounts of U.S. aid.

Discrepancy Cases

In preparation for Dr. Kissinger's trip to Hanoi, the DIA prepared a list of 80 individuals, many of whom the agency listed as POW but who were not on the January 27 DRV or Viet Cong lists. In some cases, these were individuals who had been photographed or interviewed while in North Vietnamese custody. Others involved airmen whom the U.S. had reason to believe survived their incident and may have been taken into captivity. According to Dr. Roger Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, there were also some cases about whom the U.S. knew very little, but whose names were added in the hope that the DRV would provide information and also to test the good faith of the North Vietnamese. Folders on approximately 20 of the strongest cases accompanied Dr. Kissinger to Hanoi.

The DIA talking points prepared for Dr. Kissinger stressed the fact that the prisoners on the DRV/Laos list had been captured not by the Pathet Lao, but by the North Vietnamese. The DIA also stated that approximately 215 men from the 350 U.S. personnel missing in Laos "were lost under circumstances that the enemy probably has information regarding their fate."

Accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Sullivan, Dr. Kissinger arrived in Hanoi on February 10 for three days of meetings with DRV leaders, including Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho. During a 3 and 1/2 hour meeting on the first day, Dr. Kissinger raised the issue of the U.S. POWs and a number of file folders were given to the North Vietnamese for the purpose of investigation. As Ambassador Sullivan recalled for the Committee:

I do recall that one of the cases involved, I believe a Navy Lieutenant Commander, Navy pilot, who had been shot down and had been photographed and used in a North Vietnamese propaganda photo.

And Dr. Kissinger pulled that out and we discussed this and used it as a sort of serious discrepancy which existed, and therefore merited more study. And we went through, I would say, a half dozen of them, but I don't think all of them. . .

Dr. Kissinger recalls in his memoirs:

We knew of at least 80 instances in which an American serviceman had been captured alive and subsequently disappeared. The evidence consisted either of voice communications from the ground in advance of capture or photographs and names published by the Communists. Yet none of these men was on the list of POWs handed over after the Agreement. Why? Were they dead? How did they die? Were they missing? How was that possible after capture? I called special attention to the 19 cases where pictures of the captured had been published in the Communist press. Pham Van Dong replied noncommittally that the lists handed over to us were complete. . .

We have never received an explanation of what could possibly have happened to prisoners whose pictures had appeared in communist newspapers, much less the airmen we knew from voice communications had safely reached the ground.

Meanwhile, the two sides went ahead with discussions about reconstruction aid and announced the creation of a Joint Economic Commission which would receive and administer U.S. financial help. Dr. Kissinger told the Select Committee that it was his hope that:

after all this anguish of war. . . there might be a period in which they would turn to the reconstruction of their country and improving relations with the outside world, and if you look at the concluding statements that Le Duc Tho and I made off the top of our heads after a 20 hour negotiating session (the previous October), you will see that that was a dominant theme. . .

And in fact when I went to Hanoi in February, that was one of my hopes. I remember one of the newsmen accompanying me on the plane said, what you're really hoping for is that Pham Van Dong, who was then Prime Minister in Hanoi, would turn out to a Chou En-Lai, and I said that's right, that's what I would like to see happen.

Enforcing the Indochina Understanding

Although the release of American prisoners on the January 27 DRV and PRG lists was proceeding satisfactorily, the U.S. expectation that the DRV would guarantee the release of prisoners in Laos, based on the assurances provided to Dr. Kissinger by Le Duc Tho, was badly shaken. Despite U.S. protests, the DRV continued to promise only the release of a small number of prisoners who had not been held in Laos in the first place. No prisoners actually captured by the Pathet Lao were scheduled for release. The U.S. hoped, however, that the negotiation of a ceasefire between the contending factions in Laos might result in the release of U.S. prisoners even though the U.S. had reached no agreement on this subject with the Pathet Lao.

U.S. hopes were strengthened on February 17, 1973, when Pathet Lao spokesman Soth Petrasy told UPI that his group had "a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they are being held." He also said, however, that prisoners captured in Laos would be returned in Laos--a sign that the LPF did not feel bound by DRV assurances provided to the U.S. under the PPA.

The Laos Ceasefire Agreement

On February 21, the long anticipated ceasefire agreement between Royal Lao and Pathet Lao forces was signed. The pact called for the formation of a coalition government and the subsequent release within 60 days of all POWs, regardless of nationality, held by any side. (Although it was hoped at the time that the agreement would be implemented almost immediately, the coalition government was not formed until 14 months later.)

Also on February 21, Soth Petrasy insisted again that the issue of prisoners in Laos had not been settled by the Paris Peace Agreement. "Whatever U.S. and North Vietnam agreed to regarding prisoners captured in Laos is not my concern. The question of prisoners taken in Laos is to be resolved by the Lao themselves and cannot be negotiated by outside parties over the heads of the Lao."

The day the Laos ceasefire agreement was signed, John Gunther Dean, Charge' at the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, was told by Soth Petrasy that the Pathet Lao "does hold foreign prisoners, including Americans."

Dr. Kissinger, returning from China, then cabled to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane suggesting that "Dean follow up his recent conversation with Soth by seeking detailed information concerning those (U.S. prisoners) held and by proposing arrangements for their early release."

On March 13, the subject of U.S. POWs in Laos was discussed at a meeting of the WSAG in the White House:

State Dept. representative (name redacted): You won't complete the withdrawal until the Lao prisoners are released?

Kissinger: Yes, that's right.

Defense Dept. representative (name redacted): How many are there in Laos?

NSC staff (name redacted): They've told us they hold more American prisoners than the eight on the list we received from North Vietnam.

Kissinger: They have? They told us they hold more than eight?

NSC Staff: That's right.

State: We've had contact with the Pathet Lao several times.

Kissinger: And they have admitted they hold more?

State: Yes.

Kissinger: I didn't know that. How many more?

State: They haven't said. They've been giving us the runaround on the details. This is something you may want to keep in mind. You may want to notify the DRV that the Pathet Lao have told us this and ask them to be more forthcoming on POWs in Laos.

Defense (to Kissinger): Will you handle this through your channel?

Kissinger: Yes.

The following day, the U.S. sent a message to the DRV asking for an explanation of the statements made by Soth Petrasy, but no response was received.

Also on March 14, 1973, President Nixon approved a recommendation from Dr. Kissinger to plan for a 2-3 day series of intensive U.S. air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos to be conducted immediately after the third increment of POWs was released on March 16. Dr Kissinger's rationale for the proposed bombing is described in a memorandum to the President as a "response to continued North Vietnamese infiltration and logistics activity in the South." Dr. Kissinger further proposed that the President's final decision be delayed until after the POW release and in anticipation of further developments.

The Problem Gets Worse

At this point, communications with both the DRV and the Pathet Lao on the issue of U.S. prisoners in Laos became even more difficult. In Saigon on March 19, the American delegate to the Prisoner of War Subcommission of the FPJMC asked the DRV to explain when and where the Americans on the DRV/Laos list would be returned. The North Vietnamese replied that they had no authority to discuss the release of prisoners captured in Laos. During a coffee break, the Hanoi delegate approached the American representative and told him that the Pathet Lao were responsible for negotiating the release of any U.S. prisoners detained by them.

The report of this meeting angered and alarmed Nixon Administration officials. On March 20, Dr. Kissinger dispatched the following cable to Pham Van Dong:

The U.S. side has become increasingly disturbed about the question of American prisoners held or missing in Laos. As the DRV side well knows, there is a firm and unequivocal understanding that all American prisoners in Laos will be released within 60 days of the signing of the Vietnam Agreement. . . in the past week there has been further evidence that the DRV and its allies are not taking their obligations seriously. Further conversations between U.S. and LPF representatives in Vientiane have proven completely unsatisfactory. Furthermore, on March 19, the DRV representative to the POW subcommission informed the American representative that the Pathet Lao were responsible for the release of American prisoners and gave no assurance that this would take place by the agreed date of March 28, 1973. . . .

In addition, as the U.S. side has made clear on many occasions, the list of only nine American prisoners presented belatedly by the Pathet Lao is clearly incomplete. There continues to be no satisfactory explanation concerning the smallness of this list nor any assurances that further efforts will be forthcoming.

In view of the very short time left before the deadline for the release of American prisoners in Laos, the U.S. side expects an immediate response to this message and the firm assurance of the DRV side that it will live up to its solemn responsibilities. Failure to do so would have the most serious consequences. Certainly the U.S. side cannot be expected to complete its withdrawals from South Vietnam until this closely linked question is satisfactorily resolved.

U.S. Intelligence Assessment

The new DRV position on prisoners in Laos was clearly contrary to the assurances provided to Dr. Kissinger by Le Duc Tho. As a result, it invited a tough American response. On March 21, while Administration officials were considering what to recommend, acting DIA Director John R. Deane, Jr. sent a secret memorandum to Admiral Moorer concerning the intelligence community's view of the POW situation in Laos. General Deane wrote that the DRV's purported "Laos list" of February 1, 1973 was limited exclusively to U.S. POWs captured in Laos by the North Vietnamese and did "not represent U.S. POWs captured by the Pathet Lao." General Deane said it was the intelligence community's view that: "There is evidence that the Pathet Lao have information on captured/missing U.S. personnel and should be able to provide a list of alive PWs in addition to information on the fate of many others"

General Deane's memo and other intelligence reports and analyses persuaded Admiral Moorer that it was "highly likely" that the Pathet Lao was holding live U.S. POWs in addition to the nine on the DRV/Laos list. In discussions with other members of the NSC and WSAG, the Admiral learned that there was general agreement on this point among high-level national security officials.

Admiral Moorer's March 22 Cable

The next day, March 22, 1973, Admiral Moorer sent an urgent cable to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific ordering that the U.S. troop withdrawal be halted unless and until the DRV provided a complete list of American POWs, including those held by the Pathet Lao. The cable reads:

1. . . . The United States position is as follows: "The U.S. will complete the withdrawal of its military forces from South Vietnam in accordance with the terms of the agreement and coincident with the release of all, repeat all, American prisoners held throughout Indochina."

2. Do not commence withdrawal of the fourth increment until the following two conditions are met: (1) U.S. has been provided with a complete list of all U.S. PW's including those held by the Pathet Lao, as well as the time and place of release. (2) The first group of PW's have been physically transferred to U.S. custody.

Admiral Moorer and others testified that such a far-reaching order never would have been issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff without the express approval of the President, the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of Defense.

In a letter to the Committee, however, former President Nixon wrote:

I do not recall directing Admiral Moorer to send this cable. It appears to be a statement of our policy at the time, namely that we would not commence the final phase of our withdrawal until we received a complete list of the last group of POWs to be released, including those from Laos. We had interrupted our troop withdrawal on several previous occasions until we received lists of our POWs to be released. In this case, we apparently interrupted our withdrawal again because Hanoi suddenly disclaimed responsibility for releasing U.S. prisoners in Laos. As far as I can recall, I do not believe this cable was based on any knowledge that there were POWs held in Laos in addition to the nine we were aware of at that point.

Ambassador Godley's Cable

Also on March 22, 1973, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, MacMurtrie Godley, sent a cable to the Secretary of State advocating a two step approach to obtaining the release of American prisoners captured in Laos:

We believe the LPF holds, throughout Laos, more prisoners than found on the DRV list. But we believe that, for the time being, we should concentrate our efforts on getting these nine listed men repatriated as soon as possible. The release of the nine PW's already acknowledged seems possible within the time frame of the Vietnam agreement. However, we do not believe it is reasonable to expect the LPF to be able to produce an accurate total PW list by March 28. The LPF just has not focused on the PW repatriation and accounting problem until very recently and probably cannot collect, in the next few days, the information we require. Therefore, we believe we should continue to press for the release of the nine acknowledged U.S. PW's within the time limit of the Vietnam agreement, but deal with the questions of accounting for our MIA's, and determining whether there are additional PW's to be repatriated, within the framework and time limits of the Laos ceasefire and military protocol.

In testimony before the Select Committee, Ambassador Godley could not remember whether his cable was in response to, or independent of, Admiral Moorer's cable of nine hours earlier.

The March 23 Cable

On March 23, 1973, Admiral Moorer sent a second cable to the United States Command in Southeast Asia. The cable, again transmitting an order approved by the President, the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of Defense, modified the order set forth in Admiral Moorer's cable the day before. The March 23 cable directed that the U.S. troop withdrawal would be completed within the 60-day period as long as the nine American POWs on the DRV/Laos list were released. The cable reads:

Seek private meeting with North Vietnamese representative. Our basic concern is the release of the prisoners and we do not object to the PLF playing the central role as long as the men are returned to us. We need precise information and understanding on the times and place of release of the prisoners on the list provided 1 February. The routes and place may be designated by the PLF. However, the United States must have the assurances, either privately from you or through other channels, such as the United States officials in Vientiane, that their release will take place by 28 March before we can give assurances that our withdrawal will be completed by 28 March. Of course, we intend to pursue the question of other U.S. personnel captured or missing in Laos following the release of the men on the 1 February list. For your information only, the purpose of the above is to try to get things back on track and moving again.

The revised U.S. position did succeed in getting "things back on track and moving again." On March 26, the North Vietnamese agreed to the release of the ten POWs on the DRV/Laos list provided only that the actual release be made by representatives of the Pathet Lao. The U.S. accepted the condition, thereby clearing the way for the completion of American troop withdrawals and the end of Operation Homecoming.

Summary After the March 19 POW Subcommission meeting in Saigon, the U.S. faced the possibility that the prisoners on the DRV/Laos list would not be returned. As mentioned above, the DRV had switched gears on that date and told U.S. negotiators that they would have to deal directly with the Pathet Lao for the return of Americans captured in Laos.

As the Administration prepared its response to the DRV, the intelligence community weighed in with information indicating that the LPF was possibly holding U.S. prisoners in addition to those on the DRV/Laos list. This provided impetus for an even tougher response than might otherwise have been given. The decision was made, and reflected in Admiral Moorer's March 22 cable, to demand the return of all U.S. prisoners, including those held by the Pathet Lao.

Almost immediately following the sending of the March 22 cable, however, the Administration apparently had second thoughts. Ambassador Godley indicated that the Pathet Lao would probably not be able to provide quickly a list of prisoners that it held. If true, this meant that adherence to the demand that all prisoners be released might jeopardize and would certainly delay the release of other prisoners, including those on the DRV/Laos list. Thus, the March 23 cable makes it clear that the U.S. would proceed with troop withdrawals if the DRV would guarantee the release of those on the February 1 list. Practically speaking, this had been the policy prior to March 19, and it was the policy that was ultimately carried out.

Homecoming Complete, Laos Unresolved

On March 27, one day prior to the release of the prisoners on the DRV/Laos list, U.S. Embassy officials John Gunther Dean and Richard Rand met in Vientiane with LPF spokesman Soth Petrasy and expressed the hope that additional prisoners would be released. The officials reminded Soth of his earlier statements that the LPF was holding prisoners and discussed, in particular, the cases of David Hrdlicka and Eugene DeBruin. Soth replied by saying that he would refer the matter to his superiors in Sam Neua.

That same day, Richard Kennedy and John Holdridge of the NSC staff summarized the situation in a memorandum to Dr. Kissinger:

All U.S. POWs listed by the other side as having been captured in Vietnam or Laos are now to be released by March 29. There still remains, however, the problem of the MIAs. So far, little progress has been made in the Four Party Commission POW Subcommission on this issue. The Pathet Lao have indicated that there might be more POWs than the 9 on the list, and POWs have been identified who were on no list and who haven't been reported by the other side as dead.

Although the release of the prisoners on the Laos list, coupled with the completion of Operation Homecoming on March 29, was sufficient to gain the full withdrawal of American troops, it did not resolve the problem of obtaining a satisfactory accounting of Americans lost in Laos. According to a memo sent by Assistant Secretary of Defense Eagleburger to Secretary of Defense Richardson on March 28:

DIA concludes that the LPF may hold a number of unidentified U.S. POWs although we cannot accurately judge how many. The American Embassy, Vientiane, agrees with this judgment. . .

the U.S. is prepared to accept release of the ten men on the 1 February list along with the other U.S. personnel being held in NVN as the final condition for complete U.S. troop withdrawal. However, there has been no accounting of U.S. personnel in Laos other than the 1 February list of ten who were probably all captured in Laos by the NVA rather than the Pathet Lao. Hence, assuming all the prisoners currently being held in NVN are released by 28 March, we still have the Laos MIA question remaining unresolved.

Secretary Richardson forwarded the memo from Eagleburger to Dr. Kissinger that same day, including a series of options for following up on the issue. Although Secretary Richardson deleted options suggested by Eagleburger for direct military strikes against Laos, he included proposals to:

tell the LPF that the U.S. knows they hold American prisoners, and demand their immediate release as well as an accounting and information on all those who may have died;

conduct intensive and obvious tactical air reconnaissance of North and South Laos; and

direct the movement of a new carrier task force into the waters off Vietnam.