Testimony of James 'Bo' Gritz
November 23, 1992

JAMES BO GRITZ POW INVOLVEMENT

THIS STATEMENT WAS PREPARED BY BO GRITZ FOR PRESENTATION ON 23 NOVEMBER 1992 BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS DEPOSITION STAFF AND IS TO BE OFFERED INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT IS THE TRUTH, SO HELP ME GOD, AS I KNOW IT TO BE: ATTESTED TO BY MY SIGNATURE ON THE 22D PAGE THIS 23rd DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992 IN THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, VA.

OVERVIEW

I have outlined my involvement in POW/MIA matters in the 22 pages that follow using operation (OPN) titles to separate events and times. It is my studied opinion over the past 12 years that responsible officials within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government (USG) knowingly abandoned U.S. Prisoners of War (POW) held by Communist powers as a result of World War I, World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia. I believe that presidents up through and including George Bush have known that Americans were left alive and in violation of law, these high officials and certain of their appointed subordinates have continued and perpetrated a cover up of this reality. I believe certain members of the U.S. Congress have aided in the oppression and diversion of critical information that could have revealed a fullness of truth long ago. I am convinced their exists a mindset in most USG offices that everything possible must be done to discredit the living POW movement and those that support it.

It may not be economically or politically expedient for the USG to deal with the POW issue in real terms, but I am certain it is right. It may provide excellent photo opportunities, but it is my view that for U.S. officials to look interested posing with Communist officials before stacks of old uniforms and equipment is an insult to the heros who once were apart of it. The fact is that the Communist in Laos for whatever and all the reasons did not return our POWs! The fact is that the Vietnamese held Americans after 1973. The fact is that Americans were sent to Russia that have not been returned. "Accounting" is a term used in reference to things, like boots, helmets, pistols, et al. Our POW/MIA should be returned! STOP THE BUSHLIP AND GET TO THE HEART OF THE MATTER -- HERE AND THERE!

OPN LIBERATOR

I was asked in October 1978 by the Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. Gen. Harold R. Aaron, to go in search of U.S. prisoners of war thought to still be held against their will by Communists in Southeast Asia. At the time, I was assigned to the U.S. Army Element, Office of the Secretary of Defense as a Chief of Congressional Relations (DSAA). I retired from active duty in February 1979 for the specific purpose of resolving this political dispute.

General Eugene Tighe, Director, DIA, requested H. Ross Perot sponsor a private effort to determine whether or not any U.S. POWs were left alive. Perot called me to his EDS, Dallas office in April 1979. He instructed me accordingly: "I want you to go over there and see everyone you have to see, do all the things you need to do. You come back and tell me there aren't any American prisoners left alive. I don't believe it and I'm not interested in bones." COL Arthur D. "Bull" Simons was there. In contrast to Perot, he told me: "I'm going to plan the operation and you're going to execute it." I left for Asia immediately. Bull Simons died while I was away.

I went overseas hoping to prove that all our POWs were home. I came back convinced that they were still alive. Everywhere I went in Asia, people I knew who were actively engaged in intelligence operations were certain we had failed to bring them out. COL Frank Collins was one of the most convincing. He was the senior Defense Attache. Frank said that he consolidated reports from the entire East Asia region. He was positive American POWs had been abandoned. He offered Nguyen Giang as one example. Giang was in a refugee camp having escaped from Vietnam. He said he was with 49 American POWs only months before. Two of the POWs had died. Giang buried them. The others were still alive at the time of his escape. The Americans were being held as Tan Lop, a camp near the Red River, north of Hanoi.

I reported the results to Perot and recommended that we make Giang available for interrogation by electronic and chemical means for verification of his claim. Perot telephoned GEN Tighe and requested that Tighe bring Giang to the USA. Tighe wrote a memo to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown making the request. Brown forwarded the recommendation to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. A month later, Vance wrote a note to Brown turning down the appeal. These documents have since been denied by the Executive Branch, but they were written and I have copies. I returned to SEA for more convincing evidence. Patrols were launched into Laos to suspected POW holding areas using forces loyal to GEN Vang Pao (CIA mercenary chief Military Region II -- Laos during the war). One of the units returned with a positive sighting of 30 U.S. POWs at Nhommarath, Laos. Satellite photography confirmed "30 non-Asians by measurable shadow" and a figure 52 made in the ground to be visible by air. The Nhommarath report became Top Secret -- Special Intelligence! Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle told me that he briefed President-elect Reagan on the finding in the West wing of the White House in January 1981. The information was so sensitive I was told by Tuttle "never to even say the word Nhommarath!"

OPN VELVET HAMMER

I formed a pilot team in Florida to begin initial planning for a possible private sector rescue effort. I had maintained liaison with Ann Mills Griffith who was director of the League of Families since my first trip to Southeast Asia when it appeared POWs were still there. Ann made two trips to our base. I had been told by Admiral Tuttle in his Pentagon office to stand down. He stated, "President Reagan is excited and intends to make the rescue using Delta Force." I questioned the acceptable risk of the new president invading Laos in the wake of the Iran raid and criticism of Russia in Afghanistan. I used the planes being turned around during the Bay of Pigs as an example. Tuttle assured me, "The planes will not be turned around in this case!" Still I was concerned that politics would get between us and our POWs.

Ann brought George Brooks with her to the Overstreet Ranch where we has assembled those asked to be part of Velvet Hammer. Brooks offered to write a check for $20,000 to help keep the effort together. Gordon Wilson, my executive officer, handled all funding. I didn't feel right about accepting money from a "Family" member, but George was insistent. As I recall he arranged through Gordon to made the check payable to the Special Forces Association. The time soon came at the termination OPN GRAND EAGLE when Ann, with George always faithful, would become adverse to those who support the "living POW movement." This was because things didn't go Ann's way. They have been acutely critical of my operations and George has even said that I asked him for $250,000 to bring his son home. That is a total lie and absolute fabrication. George knew perfectly well from information given to him by Ann that Velvet Hammer was oriented only towards Nhommarath and we had no idea who might be there. COL Earl Hopper, former director of the League, can verify the truth. Both Hopper and I questioned Brooks at the Crystal City Stouffer Hotel concerning the money Brooks donated. Brooks clearly said he had no problem with Gordon's accountability. I state for the record that I have never sought funds from any POW family, nor led them to believe in any way that we were going on a mission to rescue their specific missing loved one.

We held the team together for as long as possible and then sent all except the most critical personnel home. Gordon told me that Brooks even helped with the transportation. I went to Ft Bragg and learned that Delta was indeed gearing up for the rescue. Still I was concerned the Reagan staff would not be willing to take the risk of sending an official military force into Laos. The Thais wouldn't actively support such an overt launch so the heliborne force would have to infiltrate a high risk corridor across Vietnam. I wrote a Top Secret memo to President Reagan outlining a private sector alternative. The message was delivered to National Security Advisor Richard Allen on 30 March 1981, the day President Reagan was shot! I was told that Haig was outraged that such an option existed. I was warned by Tuttle to watch out for a witch hunt and protect my sources. Tuttle said he was recommending to Lt. Gen. Phillip Gast, JCS Operations chief, that I be brought back on active duty for the operation.

I sent what remained of Velvet Hammer personnel home. Admiral Tuttle called me at my Los Angeles home on May 20th and said that the next day's Washington Post would carry a front page story stating that CIA mercenaries were sent into Laos looking for POWs, but found none. The planes had been turned around!

OPN GRAND EAGLE

Next, I was contacted by Jerry King, officer in charge of the Intelligence Support Activity. Even the initials "ISA" were classified because Congress knew nothing of the organization which was headquartered in Arlington Hall under the code letters "TCA." King wanted to continue Velvet Hammer under the new designation, Grand Eagle. I was to establish a network throughout Asia to gather information. Part of the operation was to focus on photographing POWs in captivity using ground units. I met with GEN Vang Pao in LA and arranged to use COL Soubane's troops. A four man training team was assembled in October to prepare the ground recon units for launch in December. Former Special Forces Master Sergeant J.D. Bath was the training team leader. Scott Barnes was an unfortunate add on!

Barnes identified himself as a close personal friend of GEN Vang Pao. Barnes sad he had worked in the Army Security Agency during the Vietnam war and had met Vang Pao at a special forces camp. Barnes was present but aside during the Vang Pao meeting. I had no reason to doubt Barnes. He had no operational talent, but said that Vang Pao wanted him to go along to monitor our relations with Soubane. The general's letter to Soubane instructed him to provide men for operational cost only, but Soubane was prone toward profit taking. It made sense that Vang Pao might want someone he trusted to oversee the operation. ISA said "NO." Their records check found him to be a flake who was dropped from military service as "unsuitable." I protested since Barnes would have no operational responsibilities. They relented -- I'm sorry to say.

Bill Macris (MI specialist) punched Barnes in the nose one week into the field mission. Barnes was returned immediately to the States. He did not go into Laos. He did not photograph POWs. None of these claims came up until long after the mission was over. What Barnes did tell Rob Ostrow of the L.A. Times was that I had sent him with Ed Wilson to Thailand to train for an assassination of President Reagan!

I was slated to go into laos to photograph American POWs in December 1981. Instead, Jerry King put the mission on hold and called me to D.C. Admiral Alan Paulson had replaced Jerry Tuttle. A bureaucratic tug-o-war developed. King told me that Paulson was tring to pull in ISA's POW authority. Paulson was complaining that I had "too much visibility" to be a principal field agent. King said that Paulson suggested that I function within the agency as a staff assistant. House Foreign Affairs, POW subcommittee Chairman Robert Dornan had called a hearing to question both Paulson and CIA deputy, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman about inner-agency problems in POW field operations. I was asked to meet with Admiral Inman. There was conflict over who has final POW operational control. King said that DIA was only a coordinating agency -- not an approving authority. Inman said he would contact me before Christmas with a decision. King called on 4 January to say that "Grand Eagle was to be put on the shelf as if it never existed. Too many bureaucrats in Washington didn't want to see live Americans returned!" King said he was empowered to have me returned to active military status as his deputy.

Ann Griffith called. She said Admiral Paulson wanted to continue Grand Eagle under his auspices and that he would soon be contacting me. Ann was very excited. Jerry King telephoned warning me about Paulson. King stated that Paulson only intended to completely dismantle the net so that no future operations would be possible. King indicated further covert support. Paulson was angry when I turned down his proposal. He contacted J.D. Bath and told him I had gone crazy and wouldn't cooperate with on-going efforts. He convinced J.D. to meet with DIA rep Pat Hirt and divulge what he knew of our operation. Ann Mills was furious. I didn't feel it appropriate to share with her all that happened between Paulson, King, Inman and myself. From that moment forward, Ann became critical of all I did. Let there be no doubt -- Ann Mills has full access to DIA POW data.

OPN LAZARUS

Using the assets and resources already in place, I prepared to launch Operation Lazarus. Fred O'Green, CEO Litton Industries was supporting the mission with night vision and nuclear fire control communication devices. He informed me that continuation of the mission was meeting resistance in the Pentagon. I acknowledged problems with Paulson. O'Green confirmed that Paulson was the choke point. I asked, "Is the mission on or off?" O'Green said he would confirm things on his end and let me know. The next day I received word that we had a green light.

We spent from August 1982 until November overseas setting up the operation within Thailand. I had 10 potential targets from ISA/CIA to check for POW presence. It was important to define which of three Lao resistance groups has the highest potential for mission success. We worked with Phoumi Nosavan, Vang Pao and Kong Le organizations. Gordon Wilson briefed President Reagan on the operation in the Santa Barbara White House. Gordon coordinated through the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

We made two precursory patrols into Laos in November and December 1982. A decision was made to conduct our main operation using Kong Le's people. A guerrilla organization was trained in the use of HF radios, codes, cameras, and special reconnaissance techniques. The commander, General Kham Bou Phimasen, agreed to survey the target sites and communicate any positive findings. Gary Goldman and I spent more than a month in Laos.

Scott Weekly had been operating a radio relay station through Esso at Khon Khan, Thailand. A CIA liaison informed him that we would not be allowed to reenter Laos even if POWs were found. He said higher authorities had feared our capture and compromise. That prediction turned out to be true.

On 10 January 1983, we received confirmation that one of the targets contained live U.S. POWs. I was told by O'Green that operational funds had been cut off and no return was authorized. When I proposed to sell one of the "boxes" we were cleared to return. Scott Weekly, Gary Goldman and I re-entered Laos 30 January 1983 with the purpose of rescuing U.S. POWs. We spent the next 30 days toward that end. We received messages from the CIA to return immediately. One message said that if we did not "stop and return -- all support is off!" Our mission was compromised within the United States and international attention made it extremely difficult to return safely to Thailand. I was charged by the Thai authorities with opening a high powered radio and fined. A State Department rep named Mulkey came to us saying he was there to help, but wasn't cleared for any POW conversation. The team returned to the U.S. in March 1983. ASA personnel reported they were instructed that it was life and death that they find us and maintain a fix on our location. I believe Jerry King may have been right.

Upon return to LAX, we were met at the plane by FBI agent Fred "Rusty" Capps. Who was there to give us swift and direct transportation home. He was concerned about sensitive equipment, until assured that everything would arrive in the U.S. secure and separate. Persons from the Munitions Control Board wanted an interview, but Capps explained that we would have nothing to say. Capps would later testify that he had communication with the CIA and, while I had not revealed to him my contacts, he had determined they came from a "unit that didn't exist" at Arlington Hall from a non-existent Jerry King. Later I saw Capps in the Los Angeles USG Wilshire building with a man he said was taking their files on our operation to Washington. Capps said the IG was making an inspection and wasn't to have access to the information. The sensitive devices were all received and restored to proper channels.

During the mission, Walter Jones, a team member was given a package containing bone fragments by a Lao. The source said they were from a crash site. He presented photographs showing himself in company with others digging around obvious aircraft debris. The pictures were of personal USAF equipment and human remains. There was enough evidence to convince me that the package should go to DIA for examination by the ID lab in Hawaii. A short time later the Pentagon made a press release that I had brought back "chicken bones" claiming them to be U.S. MIA remains. I have nine graduate level semester hours from the University of Kansas in Anthropology and undergrad work in bioscience and toxicology. I am certainly not qualified to make serious judgement calls on identification, but I can distinguish between bird and human bones. DOD's demeaning treatment of our good-faith effort was to become standard fare from a bureaucracy determined to keep its skeletons hidden! For some reason it was "kill the messenger" instead of "seek the truth."

The "Nhommarath 30" has been put off like everything else that the USG would rather not deal with, as "old information that has been thoroughly investigated and been found without substance." I don't believe Nhommarath has ever been properly looked into. Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle told me he personally briefed the president! It was A-1 Top Secret Special Intelligence! He was a key DIA-POW official. To my knowledge, Tuttle has never been called to testify before the Kerry, or Murkowski, or Solarz, or any other so called POW concerned Congressional hearing. Subpoena and question Tuttle -- under oath -- in detail about Nhommarath.

I was asked to testify before a Solarz sub-committee hearing upon our return to the U.S. in March 1983. When questioned whether or not I had any official sponsorship in my POW pursuit, I responded in the affirmative, but would not identify the agency in open session. That afternoon Admiral Paulson disclosed the existence of ISA during executive session. True to confidential Capitol Hill tradition, the information was immediately leaked and the Washington Post ran an article, "Reagan told to reign in rouge intelligence operation." In accordance with intelligence tradition, ISA went further underground to resurfaced with a new face.

OPN BROKENWING

Gary Goldman and I then went to Paris to meet with General King Le who had just made his way out of exile in Red China. Kong Le agreed to help resurrect Operation Lazarus. One of his former officers had a son that reportedly was in charge of three U.S. POWs at a camp near Xieng Khouang, Laos. I contacted the father along the Thai border northeast of Vientiane. A communication net was developed to allow indirect contact with son. Positive relations were established to the point where to demonstrate access to physical U.S. POW intelligence, the source acquired Lance Peter Sijan's U.S. Air Force Academy ring for a reward of $1,000 and a photo-signature of Major Walter H. Moon who was missing in action. The ring was genuine containing the proper Balfour markings, class date '65, wear marks, and inside scripted name of "Lance Peter Sijan." The photo showed a full-face close up of a bearded caucasian in prison garb with a bandaged head. The picture had been taken by someone considerably shorter than the subject. A scrap of aged paper had written in pen the following inscription in three lines: "1. Name WALTER HUGH MOON 2. Date of birth 31 MARCH 1923 3. Place of birth Rudy, Arkansas, USA." Under that in an Asian cursive hand was" "Name and Signature of prisoner." Beneath was a clear and bold "Walter H. Moon."

I immediately sent the ring back by courier with instructions for John Mangham to personally contact the Sijans and arrange for it to be returned with honor to the father and mother in Wisconsin. Peter Sijan had received the Medal of Honor for his valiant acts as a POW. One of the USAF Academy dorms is named after him. I knew the family would treasure the ring. When Mangham called, Mr. Sijan contacted DOD for guidance. I later learned that Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage advised them not to accept the ring since it was a fake!

Upon returning from overseas, I was puzzled at the refusal and angry that a high government official like Armitage would be so quick to powerfully discredit something without so much as an examination or inquiry. Armitage's knee-jerk reaction was standard Pentagon response to any private sector offering. I telephoned the Sijans. They expressed doubt as to the rings authenticity. An Air Force colonel and military lawyer from Nellis AFB came to view the article and wanted to know if I would give it to them so they could send it to Armitage. I refused and personally went to Milwaukee to offer the ring to Mr. and Mrs. Sijan. They instantly recognized it as genuine and having belonged to their son who died in captivity. They showed me a duplicate that Balfour had made for them.

I dutifully turned over the photo, negative and "signature of prisoner" to chairman Solarz of the House POW sub-committee. He gave it to DIA who denounced (They said Moon had been executed shortly after capture) even though the wife, Mrs. Ruth Moon verified both the picture and handwriting as clearly those of her husband. Actual samples of MAJ Moon's signature and file photos matched those given to me in Laos by the Kong Le contact. Armitage testified before Congress that I was unscrupulously withholding personal articles from POW families and that I was turning over manufactured intelligence. The Fate of MAJ Moon still remains unresolved largely due to a constipated Executive Branch not willing to view its own mess for fear someone may be found responsible! Why wasn't the Moon document ever presented to the Lao authorities for explanation and possible resolution?

You can possibly begin to see why it becomes non-habit forming to furnish Congress such findings. They end up on the DIA scrap heap while you are defamed and lied about in undated and unsigned National Security Council memos that are released to the media, sent as responses to public inquiry, and publicized by Ann Mills in her League reports.

One of the three POWs was described as having the use of only one leg. An effort was coordinated to have the three American delivered by the son on the Thai side of the Mekong River near Si Chiang Mai west of Vientiane, Laos during the Christmas-New Year period 1984-85. A Lao police colonel was to drive brokenwing in his truck from the camp to meet with the others at the river. The son and six defecting Pathet Lao guards were to escort the other two Americans on foot to the rendezvous.

Agents reported their safe arrival -- except for brokenwing and the son. They said the police colonel had lost his nerve and returned brokenwing to the camp after the others had departed. It was also reported that the son had been killed in an altercation during the cross-country move! At the appointed time and place a reconnaissance/boat team was sent across the river to pick up those who has arrived. Contact was made and the party started back in two dug-out boats. Mid-stream the lead boat was taken under fire by a patrol boat hidden along side an island. The boat then ran down what was left. The second pirogue was seen to turn back and successfully make land. Agents reported the two Americans safe. Two dead and two wounded members of our team were recovered by the Thais and treated. We tried throughout the week to arrange another pick-up without SUCCESS.

The final effort came when our reconnaissance team reported contact with the POWs and their guards by radio near midnight at a pre-arranged crossing site. As we prepared to launch a rubber boat for the pick-up, I noticed through night vision goggles a strange "glitter" along the far bank adjacent to and about 100 meters from the pick-up point. One of the recon team was directed to move along the shore in that direction. I monitored his progress through the PVS-5 goggles. As he approached, the suspect area erupted in gunfire. Rounds were fired not only at the recon but across the river into Thailand! Thai military liaison said that I was to report to the Province chief the next day. The Thai-English newspapers printed a story saying U.S. Embassy officials were officially inquiring as to Bo Gritz presence along the border. I was informed the mission was over.

Aside from OPN BROKENWING, Special Forces Major Mark Smith had been assigned from his duty as SFOD-KOREA commander to monitor my POW operation in Thailand. Mark knew that U.S. POWs were scheduled to be brought across the Mekong, but he was not informed of the intercept and subsequent abort. Major Smith was left to believe that Americans had been abandoned with no one to receive them. I was to meet Major Smith face-to-face in 1986.

OPN SOUTHSIDE

The following dry season (September thru March). I was still working on trying to verify the facts concerning BROKENWING and three MIA POWs. I was introduced to a source who said he represented a Pathet Lao general officer willing to turn over five U.S. POWs in exchange for safe passage to the U.S. for his family and support in fighting Soviet sponsored Vietnamese occupying his south-central region from Saravane to Sepone (Tchepone). Huge caches of munitions had been removed from Vietnam during the 1973-75 period by Erich von Marbod and Richard Armitage. These were located in Thailand and the Philippines to continue resisting Communist forces. I figured that some of this would be made available if Americans were returned from captivity.

The source said the general would personally escort the senior U.S. prisoner as a show of good faith to a point near the border where we would meet. Once identification was verified, I would receive the POW who was reported to be Richard A. Walsh. Walsh was shot down flying an A-1J Skyraider on 15 February 1969. I questioned the wisdom of a general officer driving a U.S. POW along Route 23 and 9 through roadblocks we had determined were occupied by Vietnamese. I was told the general had authority and passes to allow such a trip and that I should only be concerned with safely negotiating the border to arrive at a point just north of Savannakhet. Once Walsh was safe, I was to arrange acceptance of family belonging to the general and several of his key officers. Four more Americans were to accompany them across the border into Thailand.

Christmas-New Year 1985-86 was the target date. Liaison reported both the general and his passenger had been intercepted and were being detained by the Vietnamese. The only evidence that gave this report credibility was a joint public release by the Lao and Vietnamese in the press on or about mid-January stating they had "apprehended and were holding a U.S. citizen."

As part of the coordination, I had furnished the liaison with a U.S. Passport to be used as ID by Walsh as required once we crossed into Thailand and before he was returned to U.S. control. The Thais supported our efforts throughout, but if caught without proper credential, a foreigner would immediately be arrested. It was possible to lose a POW in the Thai bureaucracy unless surface effort was made to satisfy all their requirements. It was feasible that Walsh or another AMerican was carrying that passport when stopped by the communists. Not knowing the true identity and poor communications could have misled them into thinking they had someone else.

A second comment added to that theory. Not long after returning, I was in the U.S. State Department. A friend, Colonel Nestor Pino, noticed me and made the comment, "Good to see you alive. We thought maybe you had been captured -- your passport turned up in a strange place." The question remains: Why didn't U.S. officials follow up on the communist report of an American in custody?

Tom Harvey had worked as a military assistant to Senator Warner, but was currently assigned to the National Security Council. Harvey was following the Murkowski POW hearings. He was especially interested in what Mark Smith had to say about POW video tapes. A person having the tape was to make it available through Mark, but was to remain anonymous. Somehow his identity was revealed through government leaks and the person had gone underground -- with the tape. All that was left was Smith's testimony.

Harvey had been in touch with DeConcini from Arizona. Senator Dennis DeConcini asked that I personally question Mark Smith to determine whether or not his report of a video showing U.S. POWs was genuine. I talked to Mark and brought him to speak directly with Senator DeConcini. Mark was to be recalled and further questioned along the lines developed in his conversation with DeConcini. Additionally, at the Senators interest and insistence, I gave to Mary, the Senator's Chief of Staff, in the presence of Tom Harvey several POW cases in original document form that I thought if properly investigated would conclude that our brothers were certainly still in captivity. Mary assured me that they would be safe and presented before the committee. They were locked in the safe and I was to receive the originals back after the hearings concluded. Murkowski canceled the hearings. Mary sadly could never locate the "secured files," Mark Smith was labeled a charlatan and Medal of Honor recipient, Howard a drunk. I was glad the committee did not call me to testify.

Later, in the third-quarter of 1986 I included Mark as part of an Afghan training team. I wanted to have adequate time to determine if his story about seeing the POW video tape in Lebanon was fact or fiction. After spending days with him in after-hour conversation concerning every detail of his experience with the video, I'm convinced he saw exactly as he testified. I was to involve Mark in a 1987 exercise code named RED BULL.

OPN EMERALD CITY

Harvey called me the last of October 1986 from the White House (NSC). Vice president Bush had received information that a most infamous drug lord in Burma has U.S. POWs! The DIA, CIA, and DEA had no means to verify the report, but it came from very high placed and reliable sources. Harvey wanted to know if it was possible for us to confirm the information. He said that President Reagan was prepared to do whatever was required to get the men back if General Khun Sa had and would release them! Scott Weekly and I flew to DC and met Harvey outside the White House. He gave us letterhead and language that identified us to Khun Sa as having only a humanitarian interest in POWs. We left in November for Burma.

I had previously established several ethnic agent networks. I had never activated a Malaysian-Chinese group. Since Khun Sa spoke Mandarin, I felt our best bet was through the Chinese mafia. It worked and within a short time Scott and I were inside Khun Sa's headquarters. We established good rapport and determined that the reports of his having American POWs were false. I used both video and a CIA provided portable polygraph to produce proof that Khun Sa had no knowledge of U.S. POWs. The VP report said that Khun Sa has five POWs and sightings on 70 more. It said that Khun Sa had lost four POWs drowned along with some of his own men trying to cross a rain swollen Mekong River to safety.

Khun Sa said while he had no information on POWs, he would send agents to scrub Laos along a north-south line running from Vientiane -- west to the Burma border. He promised to either secure any Americans found or give me 2,500 of his best troops to recover them. I was told to return in March for the results. I asked Khun Sa about trafficking in Heroin. He told me to take an offer back to President Reagan. Khun Sa was willing to eliminate all the Golden Triangle opiates and disclose the U.S. government officials who were his best customers for more than 20 years! In return Khun Sa wanted a trade agreement which would allow free world exploitation of the Shan State natural resources. VP Bush was leading the war on drugs and it sounded like an offer we couldn't refuse.

I turned over three video tapes to Harvy just before Christmas 1986. Two tapes showed polygraph interviews of source information to the vice president wherein deception was obvious. The third tape included Khun Sa's drug eradication offer and verification that the things attributed to him that were reported to VP Bush were false.

Harvey telephoned with congratulations on successfully resolving the POW report, Khun Sa's sweep of western Laos and offer to help in any rescue operation. When I inquired about the drug offer, Harvey said there was no interest. Such a negative response was surprising, but staff assistants in DC tend to develop tunnel-vision and see no importance outside of their own narrow focus. I returned to Burma and found reason why there was "no interest!"

OPN RED BULL

I left again for Thailand in January 1987 to follow-up on POW leads from BROKENWING, SOUTHSIDE and Khun Sa's sweep of western Laos. Upon arriving in Bangkok, I was given residence in the Prime Minister's quadrangle. Som Suk, an asset who normally works as a representative for the Thai Bull union, reported that he could not help. He would be traveling to Vientiane with the minister of commerce to speak with Kaysone Phomvihan about a up-coming rice dead. The Red Bull was similar to Jimmy Hoffa's Teamsters. No rice was marketed that did not include their participation. In return the government used the Red Bull to quell such disturbances as student up-risings at the university. Posing as "plain people" the union members quickly and mercilessly broke up demonstrations.

A short time later, Som Suk burst in to say that he had spoke with Keysone in social conversation about the possibility of buying out U.S. POWs. He said that the Prime Minister asked "how much do you think we could get?" When Som SUk replied, "10 million Baht for each," Keyson's reply was, "Good, that's 8 million for me and 2 million for you."

Som Suk was excited to know if he had acted correctly in making the offer of 10 million Baht -- he was quick to add that we did not have to pay him the 2 million. I assured him that his action was proper. Kaysone had told him that there were two Americans near death being held in Vientiane and two more not far away. If the operation could be kept secret, Americans could be officially listed as having died in captivity when they were actually being covertly transferred to U.S. control.

A meeting was held to work out the details with lawyers and persons representing Keystone. A Thai Special Forces general would provide security fro Udorn to Bangkok. The police chief at Nong Khai would clear the route from the border. We would present a bank voucher showing sufficient funds in an "overseas account" for the transaction. Once the money was in-country, the Lao would produce positive ID of four U.S. POWs. Satisfied with the currency of ID, the first deposit of 10 million Baht would be made into the "in-country account." Satisfactory proof of deposit would produce the first live American. After positive ID, we would transfer the money as directed. Subsequent transfers would proceed as mutual confidence evolved.

Scott Weekly assured me that our planning messages were passed to Tom Harvey and that "the money is on the way," but it never showed in the account. I have no way to know all or exactly what happened, but after a short time of not being able to demonstrate a deposit, the Lao went home, as did an angry Som Suk. It is conceivable that Harvey relayed the information to Assistant Secretary of Defense RIchard Armitage who was responsible for POW/MIA recovery and "other arrangements" were made that cut me out of the net.

OPN HEROIN HIGHWAY

I delayed going back into Burma until April because of newspaper reports that "Khun Sa's mountain stronghold had been seized". Banner headlines proclaimed; "U.S. Declares No Mercy in Drug War Against Khun Sa." It looked like air strikes along with joint Thai and Burmese ground operations involving 26,000 soldiers had finished the Shan State and Khun Sa. Still his messages arrived wondering why I hadn't returned as invited. I decided to brave the battle and try to get through the lines to Khun Sa. I was surprised to find the border wide open. Not only that, but a major road building operation was underway that allowed one day service by pick-up truck from Mae Hong Son, Thailand to Khun Sa's headquarters! I took team members Lance Trimmer and Barry Flynn as observers. On our November 1986 visit, Weekly and I had used horses over a three day journey along narrow winding opium trails.

Khun Sa was in rare form. He had a new crew-cab Toyota, hospital and temple. He laughed and wondered. "What took you so long?" He was delighted when I answered that I had waited for the war to die down. "That was a newspaper war," he boomed! "After you left with my Reagan message in December, I thought maybe I'd see B-52 bombers overhead. Instead both the Thai and Burmese came to me and said they had to make it look like they were doing something or they could lose millions of U.S. drug suppression dollars. I told them to do anything they wanted as long as it included a road from Mae Hong Son Air Port." Ten-ton trucks had replaced the horses and mules as the drug tonnage quickly indicated. A news article showing the U.S. Ambassador presenting the Thais with a $1.8 million check for all their hard work cooled political concerns.

Khun Sa said he understood the problem. He sadly reported that after an exhaustive search his agents had turned up no evidence of U.S. prisoners alive in Western Laos, but he was willing to reveal some of the U.S. officials he had dealt with since winning the Burma-Laos Opium War in 1967! My ears pricked up when Richard Armitage was named as the person who handled the money with the banks in Australia! I was familiar with the Michael Hand's Nugan-Hand Bank chain that laundered CIA drug money worldwide. The Chiang Mai branch telephone was answered by the DEA secretary. Mike Hand had been a Special Forces operative. Nugan was found shot to death after the bank examiners revealed their nefarious dealings. Hand disappeared. If Armitage was the bagman, then he wouldn't want live POWs coming home. Follow-on investigations would involve him as the responsible bureaucrat. Armitage and Harvey were close associates who lifted weights together at the Pentagon Officers Athletic Club. If Armitage was involved and saw Khun Sa's offer to name names, it could have sparked the "newspaper drug war" -- something certainly did!

Immediately upon arrival at the Bangkok safehouse on 19 May 1987, I was called by Joseph Felter who informed me that U.S. Government authorities, had come to him so that I might be advised to erase and forget everything I had just learned from Khun Sa and return IMMEDIATELY with all documentation to be turned over to Harvey upon arrival. My failure to properly respond would "hurt the U.S. Government!" Felter lives in the DC area and knew of my association with Harvey.

Felter called again on 29 May after my arrival in LA at the request of William Davis, a State Department official to warn me about any disclosure of Khun Sa information. I was told that if I did not cooperate, aggravated charges and hostile witnesses would be brought against me -- that I would serve 15 years as a felon! My oath was not to lie, shred, or cover up. I chose instead to present the information and was called to testify before Larry Smith's House Sub-Committee on Narcotics Oversight. It was a mistake. Smith did not allow the members to view the Khun Sa video record and questioned the "heroin highway" as being a road to attack Khun Sa. He said the charges against Armitage were old, investigated, and unfounded.

The DEA finally admitted to a new road from Mae Hong Son to Khun Sa's HQ, but they said it was a "graduation road." Khun Sa wanted Thai officials to attend a special ceremony and didn't want them riding mules for miles so he had a highway built that they could drive along. Official heroin statistics record that in 1986 Khun Sa shipped 600 tons of opiates out of his Golden Triangle. The amount went up to 900 in 1987 (per highway), then 1,200 tons in 1988 and 3,050 tons in 1989! The road became so visible that Khun Sa had to alter the direction of flow and means of transportation, but not the volume. As Khun Sa said to me, "How do you think I can move so much opium product out of the jungle if it is not with badges?" Attorney General Richard Thornburgh indicted Khun Sa calling him the world's blackest criminal. Khun Sa had offered President George Bush one metric ton of #4 pure Asian Heroin that sell for over $1 million per pound on the metropolitan streets of America. It was to be a show of good faith that he would eliminate every once while divulging his best customers. There was no interest!

Charges were brought against me in Oklahoma City for training Afghan. No true bill was ever obtained. In Los Angeles, it was for violation of the neutrality act. The FBI came to my rescue and the charges were dropped. I was indicted in Las Vegas for using a false passport. After two years and more government phone calls trying to get me to stop talking about government drug operations and POWs, I was taken before a sealed Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) hearing. White House, NSC, State Department, and Justice Department officials testified. Judge Phillip Pro ruled that all I could say before the jury was that I had been asked by a high level U.S. intelligence agency official to go in pursuit of U.S. POWs and that I had been doing so. I was acquitted, but had been prevented from travel for two years. On May 9th, 1989, State Department Special Agent Scott Farquar made an official statement: "Let me start by telling you that Gritz has been confirmed to have been an agent of the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) of the United States Army. His mission and the mission of the ISA are deemed to be classified."

OPN DUCES WILD

As of late 1990, OPN Lazarus member, Marine Gunnery Sergeant Jack Thompson, assigned to the Philippines, had been working on U.S. POW photo/dossier reports out of northeast Thailand. He had developed source information to a point where more experienced operatives were needed to handle and evaluate the agents and their offerings. The source was offering for sale a photo showing three men holding a sign. The non-Asians in the picture were said to be POWs Lundy, Robertson, and Stevens. I had rejected the buy based on Jack's description of what he saw. Robert B. Keplinger from Reno, Nevada was asked to go with Jack and determine whether or not additional Lazarus ground personnel and resources should be dedicated to follow up the agent reports Jack thought might be valid.

Bob Keplinger left with Jack for Thailand in April 1991. The source said he had contact with U.S. POWs. He again offered as proof a black & white photograph showing three Caucasians with a sign. The photo was rejected as a fake because of obvious alternations. The handwriting on the sign was Asian. The sign appeared to be in the corner of a paper (manila) folder written on and placed on the photo of three men and retaken to look like a poster. Markings on the sign indicated a "Lao Date" of 25 May 1990 and location of Nanon Thakhet (NNTK). Our records indicated John Robertson was shot down over North Vietnam while the other two were missing from Laos. It didn't jive.

I supplied Bob with "Key Question Dossiers" containing 55 queries that only the POW could answer correctly. Four times the source said he gave the dossiers to the POWs, but while there were hand and finger prints, not one of the written answers were correct or even written in an American hand. We concluded that the source was phony and only trying to scam money out of those interested in POW info.

OPERATION EMERALD SEEKER/INSIDE STRAIGHT

Robert B. Keplinger had reported contact with a source in the summer of 1991 who said they had connections out of Hong Kong with U.S. POWs in Vietnam. Bob said the source claimed relationship with a French-Vietnamese narcotics operation wherein a freighter was loaded with drugs out of Vietnam in return for $1 million (U.S.)> The Vietnamese intelligence officials involved had asked if any of the French side knew of Americans with an interest in recovering live U.S. POWs.

Bob went to Hong Kong to check out the connection and was convinced that the source apparently had access to VN officials with information on American POWs in SOutheast Asia. Communications developed into third and fourth 1991 visits to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) and Laos under the cover of resource mining business interest by Bob Keplinger and Chuck Johnson. In compliance with the Logan Act, the Lazarus Team had been asked in writing by families of U.S. servicemen missing in action to represent their interest in both Laos and Vietnam.

The Lazarus Team (R.B.K.) was sponsored beginning in August 1991 by an "International Company," Guernsey Limited, Channel Island calling itself C.O.D.E. with Nguyen Hao Tam and several French nationals. On one occasion I was asked to send a fax to the United Nations Laos delegation chief verifying that Bob Keplinger was representing me (Bo Gritz) and the Lazarus POW Recovery Team. Two other verifications were to be included from Eugene McDaniel and Ross Perot assuring the receivers that Bob was not a USG official. I prepared the fax and sent it to Red. Capt McDaniel said he would get Perot's chop and send the consolidated message on to the UN.

Bob took Gary Lane with him to Hanoi. Gary was part of a Red McDaniels POW/MIA documentary team. Bob opened doors through our VN defense contacts that allowed Gary to preview hugh amounts of VN war footage showing shoot downs, injured Americans and U.S. personnel captured as a result of ground action. Gary selected what he wanted and Bob arranged for the film to leave Vietnam. The team was sharing the same hotel in Hanoi with GEN Vessey and his group.

After a trip into Laos with Tam, Chuck Johnson and several French nationals, Bob Keplinger called to say that a Laotian official was stopping by Reno, Nevada to see him. The visitor turned out to be the son of the ruling prince in Laos, Souphanouvong. He was accompanied by a U.S. State Department escort officer. The Lao instructed Bob to "be patient -- we will be doing business." During a subsequent visit to Vietnam, Bob and Chuck Johnson were shown an area in Saigon and told that Americans were being held there under the authority of the Interior Minister. Further developments prepared Bob to go to Vietnam for a physical inspection of U.S. POWs.

January 1992, Bob Keplinger left Reno, NV for Saigon via Paris accompanied by Nguyen Hao Tam with assurances that he would be taken to a VN resistance chief and allowed to interview 10 U.S. POWs. The POWs were part of a 50-man American group being held in the Ban Me Thout highlands area (IICTZ) of Vietnam west of Nha Trang.

On the previous trip, Keplinger and Chuck Johnson had been asked to list 10 U.S. POWs they wanted to see. Since inspection tours and talks had taken place over the past six months in both Vietnam and Laos and not knowing whether the sample should be taken from either one or both areas, Lance Trimmer and I supplied a list of 10 from each country who we felt were still in captivity.

Keplinger was to be allowed 10 minutes with each of the 10 POWs (whether it was to included any of those we listed wasn't known) to thoroughly document their identity by video-audio tape, photography, fingerprinting, and key question dossier. Once there was no doubt as to confirmed POW identities, at a near term date to be determined, two of the Americans were to be released and given safe VN escort to a neutral zone (that would be determined mutually between the VN and our joint U.S.- French team). The others were to be freed in phases. H. Ross Perot had agreed to pay for the transfers. Eugene "Red" McDaniels was "in the loop."

By Mid-February '92 Keplinger and Tam were in Saigon. Keplinger sent a fax stating that he departed Saigon at 0530 on 17 Feb '92 north to Nha Trang and west to the RV near Ban Me Thout. Keplinger reported that he and Tam were taken by VN guide overland in a van type vehicle of Nha Trang. He met with armed guerrilla on the beach near Cam Ranh Bay who guided them westward through a restricted travel zone to a rendezvous in two vehicles. Keplinger reported hearing explosions to the rear during a night drive and was later told that the second vehicle was ambushed and destroyed. Keplinger said the atmosphere with the so-called FULRO reps was less than cordial and threatening if not almost hostile.

The FULRO chief did not produce the 10 American POWs as agreed. Instead, Keplinger said the VN took offense at the inspection requirement and offered the two POWs for instant turn-over without compensation. When Keplinger said he wasn't prepared to accept two U.S. POW at that moment, he said the FULRO chief told him to make arrangements and be ready within the next 30 days.

Keplinger returned the last of February from the failed inspection trip to Ban Me Thout with FULRO amid press reports from a Frenchman, Michele Honorin, who said he had been part of our team in Laos and had recorded U.S. POW locations on film. The Kerry Committee wanted to hear from Bob in March. I advised Keplinger that this was not a good time to discuss the forthcoming rescue plans with anyone outside our team. He agreed and said that he would keep comments about what had happened involving the Frenchman vague. Keplinger would use the "emerald" business cover to conceal active POW dealings. Keplinger said that he would not admit to, or discuss live POWs with the committee.

For the record, Bob Keplinger told me, Jerry Gillespie and other team members that he had personally viewed two U.S. POW. He said they were identified as A-6 pilots and that the G-chief was willing to turn them over immediately. Keplinger told me that he refused custody of the two Americans because he had no infrastructure at that time to insure security and safe passage home. Keplinger reported that he was working necessary arrangements through Tam for the contemplated turn-over.

Chuck Johnson had other ideas. He was in Paris wanting to go to Saigon to help, but had been vehemently rejected by Bob. Chuck was of the opinion that Bob had been less than sincere. Chuck suspected he was more oriented on personal business than our POWs and had made [Joyce's note: This word was crossed out in the text ->] major a major error in not accepting the two POWs he said were offered. Gary Lane had said that Keplinger had identified himself using another name five years ago in Washington D.C. when Lane was doing a POW TV segment. Lane further complicated the issue by stating Bob referred to himself as "working for the company." Chuck was in close personal contact with Tam and reported that little or nothing was being done to prepare for the turn-over. Chuck began an approach through Tam that would involve Lance Trimmer, Tam and himself, but exclude Bob.

Travel to Saigon was set for the last week in March. Lance joined Chuck in Paris at Tam's headquarters. According to Chuck, Tam received a fax from VN saying that all was ready. All that was needed was for them to "bring two suits of clothing and two passports." The POWs would be turned over per the FULRO agreement. Travel documents and tickets were secured, but the day before departing, Tam said the VN were putting the meeting on hold since it was announced that Senator Kerry was coming to Vietnam. Chuck and Lance were told that the VN did not want to risk any initiatives that might be reached through the chairman's official visit. Chuck and Lance waited in Paris until it was announced that a 56-man DOD "search team" was being dispatched to Vietnam.

Our private sector effort closed out in May 1992. We had secured film records from the VN allowing Red McDaniels and GAry Lane to produce their POW documentary video. We had visited areas of Laos and Vietnam. Government officials from Laos and Vietnam had demonstrated considerable interest in our live-POW effort. We had successfully assessed and exercised a French-connection into Communist Asia. Keplinger was last in Vietnam with Tam the last of October 1992. SInce April 1992, I have received no further communication concerning VN willingness to access U.S. POWs.

Many of the contacts and comrades made over these past 12 years are dead. Almost everyone who dedicated themselves to this righteous cause is worse off. I must conclude that while we have labored long and hard, the enormity of government opposition has taken its toll. I salute all the those who have kept the faith with our missing in action. Our reward may not be now, but someday it will be noble. I pray for those who may remain in captivity that their hope might forever burn bright knowing that they will never be forgotten as long as Old Glory flies and even one true American lives -- that we will forever be in search of them until we all come home!

THIS CONCLUDES MY OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO THE U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS. MY COMMENTS RECALL EVENTS AND EXPERIENCES SPANNING MORE THAN 12 YEARS. I HAVE FAITHFULLY RECONSTRUCTED EACH COMMENT WITH CARE AS TO ACCURACY IN AS MUCH AS MEMORY AND RECORDS ALLOW. I CERTIFY THIS A TRUE STATEMENT AND AFFIX MY SIGNATURE THIS 23TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992 IN THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, VA.

James G. "Bo" Gritz