Phou Pha Ti - Lima Site 85 - was a strategic, special navigational site secreted in the jungles of northern Laos. By the end of 1967, it was evident that North Vietnam was aware of and heading to Site 85, its high-tech equipment and high-tech technicians. As early as January 1968, the site was attacked by two small aircraft, both of which were brought down by the US. Immediately afterward, 6 Vietnamese battalions slowly and meticulously made their way to Site 85, building roads and hauling materiel to do so, while US officials sat, watched, wrote to one another and waited. The following cable traffic shows that the US knew for an extended period of time that Phou Pha Ti and its personnel were in imminent danger yet officials allowed it to fall and its men to go missing in a secret battle over a secret site.

What is particularly disturbing is the following:"As you know, the TSQ 81, as well as a TACAN facility, is located at Site-85. When the decision was made to install these facilities it was understood that no last ditch stand would be made to defend them. Although this equipment is costly, it is expendable--the men who service it are not and they will be removed prior to the fall of the site, if the situation becomes hopeless.

It is evident from cable traffic and contemporaneous reports that the situation was hopeless, yet the men were left like sitting ducks on that mountainside, ultimately removed not by the US, but by enemy forces. Although the US maintains that the men perished in or as a result of the assault on Site 85, consistent reports of men being taken off the mountain and the issue of Mel Holland's name surfacing on a Soviet list counter official US claims.

Ultimately we find this final 'I told you so' in the cable traffic:"We made clear from the very beginning that this site could not be defended against a determined and superior enemy force. We gave regular and accurate estimates of its progressive deterioration, and as early as Feb. 26, advised you that it could probably not be held beyond March 10. Therefore, its fall should have come as no surprise to anyone."

The cables are presented in chronological order. All emphasis is by AII POW-MIA.

Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas

Washington, December 26, 1967, 6:02 p.m.

CAP 671165. Laotian Situation Report (as of 6 p.m. EST, 26 December 1967).

1. Communist forces are keeping up their pressure against government positions in Laos.

2. An enemy unit, estimated at about battalion strength, raided the government base and airstrip at Muong Phalane on 25 December, and destroyed most of the camp's facilities, including the USAID and Air America buildings. Although government reinforcements apparently have moved into the area, they have not yet reoccupied Muong Phalane.

3. Preliminary reports suggest that the attack was specifically aimed against the U.S. presence at Muong Phalane. Two American technicians who manned a navigational station which assists U.S. air operations in southern Laos are missing. The station itself apparently was not damaged.

4. The attack on Muong Phalane is the first significant enemy action in this part of the Panhandle in over a year. It may be related to recent attacks farther south in the Bolovens Plateau area. These operations appear to be part of a new Communist campaign to forestall stepped-up allied efforts to interdict the infiltration corridor.

5. In northern Laos, the Communists launched a mortar attack on the government airstrip at Nam Bac on 24 December. Continuing reports of a Communist build-up in the vicinity suggest that more ground assaults against Nam Bac's outlying defenses may be in the offing. Government troops are being repositioned in an effort to reduce their vulnerability.

6. Although the Communists appear to be putting a little more bite into their dry season offensive this year, there is no evidence that they intend to mount a concerted drive into government-held territory. We agree with the U.S. Embassy's appreciation that the Lao reports out of Vietnam on the status of the North Vietnamese threat are highly exaggerated. In fact, the recent Communist effort against Nam Bac in the north and the Bolovens positions in the south, appears designed to restore the status quo. Until last year, both areas long had been under Pathet Lao control.

7. Nevertheless, we believe that the Communists will make things even hotter in the coming months as they attempt to regain some of the military initiative in Laos. This probably will be particularly true in the Panhandle, where stepped-up allied operations into the infiltration corridor will hit a highly sensitive nerve.

Memorandum From the County Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, February 1, 1968.

Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz. Copy sent to Habib.

SUBJECT
Enemy Pressure on Site 85

1. The most recent reports of enemy action around Site-85 (Phou Pha Thi) indicate that an attempt to seize the site is imminent. Two key outposts defending the approaches to Site-85 have already been taken by the North Vietnamese and pressure is continuing to close in around the site.

2. Over a year ago when Vang Pao attempted to defend Site-36 (Na Khang), his troops suffered a great number of casualties. At that point he decided never again to commit his units to the all-out defense of a position.That tactic is still being followed and, while his units will continue to defend Site-85 as long as possible, he does not intend to accept heavy casualties in exchange for real estate.

3. As you know, the TSQ 81, as well as a TACAN facility, is located at Site-85. When the decision was made to install these facilities it was understood that no last ditch stand would be made to defend them. Although this equipment is costly, it is expendable--the men who service it are not and they will be removed prior to the fall of the site, if the situation becomes hopeless.

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen)

Washington, February 23, 1968.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret.
Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Herz.

SUBJECT
Air Support for Counter-insurgency Mission in Laos

Ambassador Sullivan has requested our assistance in obtaining a re-ordering of air support priorities in order to give him sufficient tactical air strike support for key targets in Laos at the time he needs it. He has specifically asked that the 56th Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, be "dedicated" to Laos. In view of the increasing enemy pressure in Laos, and the important but fleeting opportunities there to inflict damage on the enemy, we think Sullivan's request should be strongly supported. -2-In telegram 4585 from Vientiane, February 20. (Ibid.)

The over-all counter-insurgency mission in Laos is to harness in an efficient manner three elements--Lao irregulars; perishable, all-source intelligence; and air power--in order to inflict the greatest damage possible on enemy personnel and logistical facilities. Operations have been highly successful when all these elements are present.

With the priority attention of the 56th ACW, Ambassador Sullivan believes he would get the number of daily sorties he needs: (a) nine A-26 sorties, (b) eight T-28 sorties, (c) eighteen A-1 sorties. In addition, U-10s and C-123s would be regularly available for Forward Air Control (FAC) and flare ship roles.

Sullivan would use this air support in the following order of priority:

a. hitting fleeting targets identified on motorable roads which the enemy uses in Laos;

b. striking enemy logistical facilities and troop concentrations throughout Laos; and

c. providing close air support to irregulars who are being infiltrated into hostile areas, attacking enemy positions, or defending base areas.

[2 lines of source text not declassified] A specific and immediate area of high concern is Site 85, a guerrilla base and command post in northern Sam Neua province, which has been the target of concentrated enemy pressure for several months. The USAF installed its TSQ-81 navigational device there last fall. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Recommendation

That you discuss Ambassador Sullivan's request urgently with the Joint Chiefs with a view to getting a sufficiently high priority for air support operations in Laos to meet his requirements./3/

/3/In telegram 120863 to Vientiane, February 27, the Department informed Sullivan that in light of a CIA presentation to the JCS about an imminent attack on Site 85 and the urgent requirement for increased air support for the defenders, the JCS contacted CINCPAC about Sullivan's request and the Department "weighed in" with the Department of Defense. The question of "dedicating" air support for Laos was more fundamental and required resolution at a high level. The issue was being considered by McNamara. (Ibid.)

Editorial Note

On February 24, 1968, General Maxwell Taylor reported to President Johnson that he had spent 3 hours at the Central Intelligence Agency going over order of battle information on Vietnam and discussing possible "surprises" which the future might hold. Taylor summed up his impressions in a February 24 memorandum to the President. Part of the memorandum concerned Laos and reads as follows:

"Enemy Activity in Laos

"Recent enemy activity in Laos can hardly be termed an offensive since all movements have been to regain terrain which the communists have claimed since 1962. The areas attacked had been taken over by Laotian government forces in 1966 or 1967 so that the Pathet Lao probably feel that they are merely reclaiming lost property. However, the Pathet Lao supported by North Vietnamese troops are capable of moving almost anywhere in Laos and could use this superiority at any time to score a victory in concert with successes, real or claimed, in South Vietnam."

Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Laos and Cambodia Affairs (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, February 27, 1968.

SUBJECT
Air Support for Counter-insurgency Mission in Laos

(Non-relevant points EXCISED by AII POW-MIA)

6. The Larger Context. Although Sullivan is immediately concerned about protecting Site 85, where we have the TSQ-81 and a TACAN, the lack of sufficient air strike assets for Laos has been flagged by him repeatedly, including in his periodic discussions with the Joint Chiefs, since 1965. He has been proven right in his "Sopwith Camel" approach--that propeller-driven craft are superior to jets in the Laos situation. He has also stressed the importance of hitting NVN traffic as far north in the trail structure as possible (i.e., in the vicinity of Mu Gia) before it disperses under jungle canopy further south. We are, and he is, not taking a parochial Laos point of view: "Dedicating" air assets to Laos will improve also our posture in South Vietnam as well as Thailand. Also, we are not adjudicating a dispute. It is merely a question of upping the priority slightly in one country, in the interests of our position on that country and in the interests of the overall war effort.

Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 28, 1968.

SUBJECT
Significance of Phou Pha Thi (Site 85) in Northeastern Laos

This is in response to your request for information on the significance of Phou Pha Thi.

Equipment. Phou Pha Thi is the site of a very important US radar-navigational station for supporting US air operations in North Vietnam and northern Laos. Equipment installed at the site are:

TSQ-81--a portable version of the MSQ-77--an extremely sophisticated radar-navigational device used by US bombers for precision-bombing of targets in North Vietnam north of Vinh at night and in inclement weather. It has an effective range of about 200 miles (see map for area covered in North Vietnam) (not printed) Installed on November 1, 1967, it is the only device of its kind in Laos. Two MSQ-77's are installed in Thailand, and two in South Vietnam.

TACAN--a navigational aid which emits beams to help orient US aircraft operating primarily in northern Laos. It was installed about a year ago. There are three other TACAN sites in Laos, the nearest one to Phou Pha Thi being at Long Tien, south of the Plain of Jars (see map).

US Personnel. At any one time, there are 15 Americans stationed at the site: 12 to service the TSQ-81, two to service the TACAN, and one presumably to oversee the operation. As at the other TACAN sites in Laos, these individuals are USAF personnel, formally converted to civilian status as Lockheed employees for the duration of their tour of duty in Laos. There are three teams based on Udorn, each serving a five-day shift. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has authorized the stationing of US personnel at the TACAN sites, but he has not been told about the TSQ-81 at Phou Pha Thi.

Guerrilla Base. Pho Pha Thi, which is situated only 25 miles from Sam Neua town, has also served for some time as a major base for guerrilla operations. At present, about 700 Meo irregulars are based there to carry out forays into enemy territory as well as to man a defensive perimeter with a radius of about 12 miles. This perimeter has been breached during the past week.

Enemy Threat. The enemy is undoubtedly aware of the importance of the site as a radar-navigational installation and of the US presence there. The site was bombed unsuccessfully by North Vietnamese aircraft on January 12./3/ Since then, the enemy has been completing elaborate preparations, including the building of roads, to make a ground assault upon the site. Ambassador Sullivan believes that this will take place within two weeks. We believe that should enemy artillery come within range of the 600-foot airstrip, it would become extremely difficult to extricate the small US unit as well as the 700-man Laotian force.

/3/The attack was by two Soviet-manufactured Colt (AN-2) single engine biplanes, which bombed the site at 1:20 in the afternoon. The aircraft dropped 15 bombs of 250 lbs. wounding three Lao soldiers and one U.S. technician. The bombing resulted in slight damage to the TACAN antenna and temporarily closed it down. The TSQ-81 continued to operate. Both planes were lost after the raid. One crashed into a ridge after being hit by small arms fire from the ground, and the other was shot down by a sharpshooter with a rifle from an airborne Air America helicopter. (Telegram 3779 from Vientiane, January 12; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)

Central Intelligence Information Cable

TDCS DB-315/00869-68

March 9, 1968.

SUBJECT
Appraisal of the security of the guerrilla base at Phou Pha Thi, Site 85, as of 9 March 1968

ACQ
Laos, Vientiane

SOURCE
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] This is a field appraisal of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this Agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretation of [1 line of source text not declassified] at the time of its preparation.

1. Since 25 February 1968, when FOV 13,429 (TDCSDB- 315/00669-68) was prepared to appraise the security of the guerrilla base at Phou Pha Thi (UH 6663-6860), the enemy has methodically continued to prepare the battlefield for his attack on the summit of Phou Pha Thi. In a series of penetrations of the 12-kilometer defensive perimeter around Phou Pha Thi the enemy has focused primarily on bringing more troops into the area and in so doing to consolidate his breach of the perimeter. As of 9 March the enemy has a total estimated force equivalent to seven battalions that could be brought to bear in a ground attack on site 85. In effect, in the period 25 February to 9 March the enemy has expanded his hold on Phou Den Din (UH 790595), has consolidated his position on the ridge line running west from Phou Houei Hao (UH 735583), and has extended the depth of his probes up toward the base of Phou Pha Thi and has thus penetrated deeper into the 12-kilometer defensive perimeter so that by 7 March 150 enemy troops had clashed with a guerrilla patrol in the vicinity of UH 725581, only about five kilometers from the base of the mountain.

[Here follows details of the NVN buildup of an attack on site 85 over the last 15 days.]

Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State

Vientiane, March 11, 1968, 0532Z.

5038. 1. As Dept has probably learned from military sources, enemy has effectively eliminated air navigation facilities at Site 85. Action began yesterday evening with artillery and mortar shelling. Decision to destroy facilities by self-destruction was taken in small hours of morning. Helicopter evacuation was arranged for first light this morning.

2. Evacuation plans have been seriously disrupted by enemy activity and several [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel have apparently been dispersed from pre-planned evacuation sites. Although seven of them have been accounted for as of this time, eleven are yet to be located. Of those seven accounted for, three are dead on the site, one died in the helicopter en route and three are at Udorn.

3. In addition to these personnel, two CAS and one AIRA forward air controller have been withdrawn from their evacuation sites. Other local personnel (wounded, etc.) have also been extracted.

4. Fighting and shelling continues, as well as helicopter and ground evacuation efforts. Because of confused situation at site and withdrawal our CAS personnel (one of whom was wounded) it will doubtless be some time before we have clear picture or further significant reports.

5. We will, of course, continue reports as information comes in. At first glance, however, it appears we may have pushed our luck one day too long in attempting to keep this facility in operation.

Sullivan

Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State

Vientiane, March 13, 1968, 0558Z.

5073. Ref: Vientiane 5038.

1. Evacuation operations at Site 85 have been completed and site is currently in enemy hands. Personnel from mountain-top positions have been extracted by helicopter with exception relatively small group SGU local troops who have descended to base camp positions, joined other units there, and are withdrawing overland to previously agreed safe havens. Since we may assume that these safe havens will also come under enemy pressure soon, there may be required a second phase of withdrawals for these latter personnel.

2. Final count on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel accounts for all but three. One of these may subsequently be listed as dead if and when we can get more coherent information from survivors, some of whom in state of considerable shock./3/

/3/In telegram 5103 from Vientiane, March 12, Sullivan reported that there would be a search and rescue operation for personnel still unaccounted for, the remaining structures at Site 85 would be destroyed by napalm bombs dropped from U.S. aircraft, no publicity would be given to the battle, Souvanna would be informed, and the next of kin would be notified in the United States. (Ibid.) In telegrams 5119 from Vientiane, March 13, Sullivan reported that he informed Souvanna of the capture of Site 85. Sullivan also reported that 11 U.S. personnel were killed; the 3 previously unaccounted for were killed according to the survivors. (Ibid.)

3. Contrary to figures cited reftel, there was total of 16 of these personnel at communications site, rather than 18 as we had earlier understood. Of these 16, five were extracted alive but one was killed in helicopter when he was hit by ground fire. Eight others are known dead. Three are unaccounted for, although one of these, as stated above, may be presumed dead.

4. Confusion surrounding extraction these personnel stems from two factors not yet fully explained. First was fact that these personnel, instead of assembling at pre-arranged evacuation site, decide to climb down over face of sheer cliffs to a narrow ledge, using some sort of cargo harness system which they devised for this purpose. It is not known why or when they decided to take this action. But it is presumed that they must have thought, contrary to fact, that trail to evacuation site was blocked.

5. Second was fact that small enemy "suicide squad", which seems to have made improbable ascent up these same cliffs, surprised and caught these [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel on their narrow ledge, gunning and grenading them while they were trapped in this inescapable position. It was here that these men suffered such heavy casualties and where most of them are reported to have died. Three bodies were subsequently seen on this ledge, but remainder are assumed to have fallen off sheer 2000 foot drop.

6. We and Air Force personnel at Udorn will attempt reconstruct story further from survivors when latter have recovered from sedation and shock. Conclusion, however, seems quite definitive that none of missing personnel are likely to be alive.

7. For this reason, USAF late yesterday afternoon flew several missions against remains of navigation and communications equipment on mountain top, as well as abandoned artillery position, in order destroy materiel left behind. Photo missions are being run today to determine whether further strikes are necessary.

8. Several follow-up actions remain to be accomplished, and will be subject of meeting this afternoon between Ambassador and DEPCOM 7/13 AF.

A. We must discuss with RLG and determine what, if anything, needs to be said about this action. It remains to be seen whether Hanoi or Pathet Lao radios will announce their victory.

B. We must decide how to handle next of kin notification, casualty announcements, etc.

C. We must expedite action for replacement site, at least for TACAN.

D. We should discuss possibility that Site 36 will be next on enemy list and what contingencies we should consider there.

Sullivan

Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State

Vientiane, March 14, 1968, 0841Z.

5136. Ref: A. Vientiane 5123. B. AIRA Vientiane 00341 (notal).

1. Fall of Pha Thi (Site 85) in Sam Neua Province opens a new time of troubles for Vang Pao and the Meos of Military Region II. The size of the attacking forces and their heavy supporting weapons are greater than anything friendly troops can muster in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, there is no alternative but to evacuate friendly troop units and their dependents in order maintain them intact for counterattack activity in rainy season. Ref A indicates dimension of refugee problem with which we are attempting to cope. A fleet of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft is engaged in this effort today.

2. It should be borne in mind that North Vietnam mounted attack of this size and intensity because it wished eliminate U.S. installation, which had become "attractive nuisance" for them. Consequently, this vast uprooting of human resources and abandonment of useful territory is direct result U.S., rather than RLG, operational interests.

3. Site 36, which is used as forward launch base for ARS helicopters, is another U.S.-dedicated activity which will doubtless also attract enemy attention. Although it is more heavily defended than Site 85, it is questionable whether it can withstand a determined assault by seven NVN battalions, the strength we feel enemy is probably able to deploy against it.

4. Faced with these prospects, Vang Pao has sent message to Prime Minister Souvanna and to me asking for maximum air strikes against a series of targets in Military Region II. Most of the targets are in or lie close to towns and other centers of civilian population which Prime Minister has previously asked us to avoid. I went over list with Souvanna yesterday and we agreed to have U.S. photo-interpreters examine prospects for carefully controlled strikes against a number of Vang Pao's targets. We agreed to take joint look at photography as soon as my people can get target folders assembled.

5. Last evening subsequent to discussions reported para 4, Souvanna told me he had received disturbing message from Vang Pao which he interpreted as preparation for withdrawal from additional forward territory in Region II, raising prospect that north and east defenses of Vientiane plains would be significantly reduced in depth. Souvanna felt this was imprudent and hoped to dissuade Vang Pao from any such steps. He felt he needed assurances of air strikes as persuader for Vang Pao and again urged early meeting on subject.

6. Comment: Subsequent Embassy discussion with Vang Pao, who came to Vientiane for military meeting this morning, indicates Souvanna may have misunderstood his message. He reportedly was referring merely to location of new refugee centers rather than relocation of old. Of some possible interest to Embassy Bangkok was his thought of placing some of his Meo refugees in hills of Sayaboury, along Lao border with Nan province in Thailand.

Sullivan

Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State

Vientiane, March 27, 1968, 0610Z.

5412. Following sent action immediate Seventh AF; info COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPAC, CSAF, 16 Mar; sent to you for info. Request this be given absolute minimum distribution to be determined by Mr. Read, S/S, only.

"Personal for Gen. Momyer from Amb. Sullivan.

Reur 141246Z Mar 68.

1. I thoroughly concur that post mortem of loss Site 85 is in order. Suggest your people and mine work out procedures for such analysis at next weekly Udorn meeting.

2. Believe you should understand, however, that enemy force was not "relatively small." Our intelligence indicates their numbers between five and seven battalions, with artillery and rocket support, considerably outnumbering local defense forces, which never numbered more than 1,000 men in 12 kilometer defensive perimeter which drawn around Site 85.

3. We made clear from the very beginning that this site could not be defended against a determined and superior enemy force. We gave regular and accurate estimates of its progressive deterioration, and as early as Feb. 26, advised you that it could probably not be held beyond March 10. Therefore, its fall should have come as no surprise to anyone.

4. The manner in which enemy accomplished its fall is, however, instructive, and should, I think, be carefully studied with view to future operations. Artillery fire, at relatively long range, was surprisingly accurate. According fragmentary reports of survivors, direct hits were scored, very early in the barrage, upon personnel quarters, operations structure, and bunkers. It seems possible that installations were rendered effectively inoperable even before destruction order was given. There may be some lessons in this which should be studied with respect to length of time technical personnel should be required stay at their posts after installation falls within artillery range. In hindsight, it seems to me we should have pulled all technicians out morning March 10 even if this meant losing the last several hours of the installation's capabilities.

5. What concerns me most is not the defense action, but the disruption of pre-planned evacuation procedure. It is still not clear why technical personnel went over cliff to a narrow ledge rather than down trail to chopper pad. CAS and local personnel subsequently went up same trail to installation searching for technicians, so we know trail was traversable, even if under artillery fire. It is also not clear to me how small Vietnamese suicide squad got to installation site, although it seems they must have scaled the cliff which all of us considered impassable.

6. We can give you details of action taken by 224-man local defense forces at the site and casualties which they suffered in fighting. In their defense effort, these amounted to 8 killed, 18 missing, and 33 wounded. Their defensive tactics, of course, are based on guerrilla doctrines, and we will be pleased review with your people how we think these should be handled in future instances, and especially the role which air power can play in these tactics."

Sullivan

For those interested in more on Lima Site 85, we recommend the following:

Project CHECO Report
The Fall of Site 85