The '1205 Document': Another View

by George J. Veith

author, 'Code-Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War'

"The all-important not yet answered question about it is: what is it exactly?. ... If the Russian document were both authentic and the numbers offered were factually correct. ...It would be the ultimate damning indictment of Hanoi's wartime leadership, and would blow U.S.-Vietnam relations out of the water until the next century." - Douglas Pike, noted Vietnam expert, writing in the Indochina Chronology, April-June, 1993.

Overview
The explosive report unearthed in 1993 in the Central Committee Archives of the former Soviet Union known as the '1205 document' has been the subject of much debate, not only because it reveals a far larger number of American POWs than were released, but also in view of the questions raised over its authenticity, the identity of the speaker, the body being addressed, and the manner in which the document was acquired. This paper does not endeavor to revisit old arguments over the numbers of American POWs. Instead, the author seeks to probe the document's less examined material, to attempt to determine, in the face of vehement Vietnamese charges of fraud, whether the document is a sham or represents an authentic speech. Such Vietnamese denials were recently repeated again during a November 1997 meeting between U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Douglas 'Pete' Peterson and the purported speaker, Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang.

Because of the wild variation in POW totals contained in the document versus the actual number of men who later returned--and after an opening flurry of intense media scrutiny--the U.S. government initially and later formally rejected the speaker's accuracy regarding the numbers, ranks, and locations given for American POWs. That analysis was presented in a January 1994 Department of Defense (DOD) news release. Since then, however, no follow-up analysis has been published to officially clarify, as Mr. Pike stated, exactly what the document is, despite governmental assurances to "continue to assess the document" and that this report "should be considered a step in an ongoing process." Although the DOD report on the document was completed by "a committee of intelligence community analysts," the narration almost exclusively covered the segment on American POWs, accepting the other sections as "credible" and "plausible." The report additionally indicated that subsequent research would only continue "pertinent to the POW/MIA issue. As further information becomes available, it will be updated."

Until lately, even those meager promises have not been acted on. Indeed, in April 1997, immediately after another Embassy meeting with Lt. Gen. Quang, Desaix Anderson, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Hanoi, was quoted by Reuters as saying that "Washington considered report null and void.î Yet, given the wartime acceptance of the document's legitimacy by the Soviet GRU and their portrayal as such to Soviet governing bodies (along with continued Russian depiction of the document as genuine to U.S. authorities, and a wide range of outside experts' agreement as to its authenticity), the repeated rejection by the Vietnamese should raise deep suspicions over their POW/MIA cooperation. Instead, the Clinton Administration continues to characterize Vietnamese collaboration as "superb." Even after numerous calls by many POW/MIA families and others to halt additional movement in U.S./Vietnam relations until this matter had been more thoroughly investigated, the Clinton administration has pressed on. Perhaps the paucity of subsequent U.S. government studies of the speech suggests a hope that the matter has been forgotten, no doubt because of the potentially incendiary impact on Clinton's Vietnam policies. The implications for those relations, however, are far too great for such a critical archival find to remain basically unexamined.

After carefully evaluating this document against other pertinent wartime material, the author believes the report is a transcript of an authentic speech given by a very senior Vietnamese official which accurately portrays communist Party analysis of various political and military aspects of the war. In fact, numerous elements of the Quang speech can be directly correlated to other known communist statements, thus providing a major degree of certitude as to its authenticity. In essence, while minor factual errors may exist in the Soviet cover memo and in the text, the speech closely mirrors the known communist stance on a variety of positions and therefore represents current high-level Party analysis and future actions - a point that seems to have been lost on U.S. analysts. Moreover, because of Vietnamese stonewalling, and a disturbing lack of resolve by the American government to get to the bottom of this, we are sadly no farther along in understanding this document than we were in 1993. There seems to be little official desire, as Mr. Pike stated, to determine exactly what it is.

The speech itself appears to be a combination motivational/instructional update report. The author believes the wording indicates that it was probably delivered to a Regional Party Committee and not the Politburo, but that does not detract from its importance. The possibility of the speech being an outright fraud is quite small, although the author must acknowledge the very slim possibility that the speech is 'disinformation' perpetuated by wartime communist strategists. Given that the U.S. and Soviets were holding trade discussions at the time of the speech, it was reported that the Soviets, under demands from the U.S., were pressuring the Vietnamese to seek an end to the war. The complete impact of the U.S./Soviet trade talks on the DRV's negotiating stance, however, is unknown. The more likely scenarios are that the speech is authentic and that the Soviet source had access to the tape but made an error with regard to the body being addressed, or that the document is exactly what the Soviets claim it is - a speech to the Vietnamese Politburo by a senior military officer.

Unfortunately, since there is no unclassified corroborating internal evidence to support the GRU contention that Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang made this speech, and due to apparent Soviet (and American) confusion over Quang's actual wartime position, until more substantiating data is provided or declassified by the Russians, Vietnamese, or U.S. intelligence, it is prudent to exercise caution regarding the identity of the speaker and the audience. While the Russian assurances of authenticity are certainly strong evidence, due to the delicacy of the matter, more proof should be required before total acceptance of the Soviet claims. While we may wish to accept this document at face value, we must view it objectively, allowing for the fact that the Vietnamese and Quang may well be telling the truth. Concurrently, we should also avoid the trap of over-analyzing it. Regardless, the speech represents an extremely important window on high-level Vietnamese communist thinking about a variety of subjects, especially American POWs. For ease in writing this paper, however, I have assumed that Quang is the speaker.

Lastly, the discovery of this report in a Communist Party archive (author emphasis added) presents clear evidence for the analysis in an earlier paper by Bill Bell and the author that Party documentation would provide greater insight into determining the fates of many missing Americans. Despite the controversy surrounding the Russian report or the disputed claims by the speaker over the correct number of American POWs, this important find strongly reinforces the Bell/Veith theory on Communist Party records. The DOD report agreed, stating in it's last lines that "There probably also is more information in Vietnamese party and military archives that could shed light on these documents. We continue to pursue information on these issues in both locations." Since the DPMO and JTF-FA rejected the Bell/Veith thesis concerning the utility of Party documentation, and has not pursued any research in appropriate Vietnamese Party archives, the author finds this statement both amusing and vindicating, especially coming two years before the publication of our paper.

In fairness, DPMO probably believes that the Vietnamese view relevant Party materials as too 'sensitive' to allow access by foreigners, or that such requests by the U.S. would be construed as 'unreasonable.' By comparison, however, witness the recent U.S. brinkmanship with Saddam Hussein over admittance to the Iraqi Presidential sites by U.N. inspectors. Imagine also the reaction of the Reagan administration if this document had surfaced during that presidency. Yet if continued portrayals of the POW/MIA issue as "the highest national priority" by Clinton administration officials are not inflated rhetoric, then potentially similar refusals by the Vietnamese for top-level access should be met with a equivalent resolve. The author is not suggesting military force be contemplated, just that a comparable firmness be displayed if in fact this issue is "the highest national priority."

At the conclusion of this report, the author recommends several courses of action for U.S. authorities to pursue to determine the validity of the 1205 document.

Who is Tran Van Quang?
Tran Van Quang (aka Bay Tien, or 7 advance) is a very senior communist party official with a long revolutionary history. Piecing together his precise history has been difficult, but we do know some of his service record. According to a captured notebook of the Chief of the Administrative Staff for the COSVN Military Affairs Committee, in September 1961, Quang traveled to South Vietnam to participate in an important conference that reestablished COSVN. A 1968 JUSPAO study indicates that Quang "served as executive officer of the People's Liberation Army as well as a member of COSVN. He reportedly later returned to North Viet-Nam between 1964 and 1967, after developing a nervous condition, and later assumed command of the North's Military Region IV."

This comment highlights the confusion over which command position Lt. Gen. Quang held at the time of the speech--MR-4 in North Vietnam, or Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH, aka the B-4 Front). MRTTH encompassed the area from Highway 9 to just north of Danang. According to a Vietnamese book entitled 'Tri-Thien-Hue Battlefield,' Quang is listed as the "former Region Party Secretary, former Military Region Party Secretary, and former Commander of Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue." This is a very unusual grouping of power in the hands of one man, as Party and military responsibilities were normally divided, and the author can think of no one else who ever wore 'three hats' similar to this. Generally, the commander of the Military Region served as Deputy of the Party Committee, while the Secretary of the Party Committee served as Deputy of the Military Region.

In early 1966, the Tri-Thien Sub Region was removed from the control of the Inter-Region 5 Party committee and the military direction of Military Region 5 and placed directly under the command of Hanoi. The book further mentions that in February 1970, MRTTH was redesignated a Front Command, and also notes that "On 13 March 1972, the Party Chapter Secretary and Commander of the 1972 Spring Campaign [possibly General Van Tien Dung] named the Front Command as the 702nd Command," probably reflecting the date of the Front's initial inauguration. The 702nd commanded all PAVN forces in Quang Tri Province until at least May, 1972.

The wartime reporting of the U.S. embassy in Saigon on the command structure of the MR-4, however, changed by the end of the war. In October 1972, JUSPAO released a fascinating document entitled, 'Bases of Power in the DRV.' This report was an analysis of the most powerful members of the DRV. It noted that, "reports suggest that Maj. Gen. Le Quang Hoa," is military commander of the Fourth Military Region, and is "the key government official in the area." The author recalls several reports from well-placed ralliers describing a Maj. Gen. Le Quang Hoa or Dao as the head of the Enemy Proselytizing Department. Since Tran Van Quang is also mentioned as having headed that department, the coincidence begs further study.

Other competent sources besides the wartime U.S. embassy report also stated that Quang was the MR-4 commander. In a news article printed in the Las Vegas Review-Journal by a Vietnamese writer named T.T. Nhu (a journalist for the San Jose Mercury News), Nhu called Vietnam's representative to the United Nations, Le Van Bang, and asked him directly about the document. He wrote, "Bang assured me that Quang had not written the report and was not, as the document claimed, the deputy chief of the general staff. Quang was the commander of the 4th Military Region in Vinh-Thanh Hoa from 1966-1974, says Bang, and so was not in position to write such a paper."

Further muddying the waters is one of the few articles written by Quang. Published in the Party paper Nhan Dan in January 1988, the article lists him as the "former secretary of the party committee and commander of the Tri-Thien Military Region." However, in a front page biography of Quang on November 21, 1992, Nhan Dan also reported that he was commander of both Military Region 4 and MRTTH. This may be closer to the truth. Given the heavy North Vietnamese losses in the 1968 Tet Offensive, the PAVN may have detached MRTTH from direct control by the High Command and merged it into the MR-4 command. Or, Quang may have been the secretary of a combined Regional Party committee stretching from Central Vietnam across the DMZ and into upper South Vietnam. However, the implication in the above-quoted Vietnamese history is that Quang is the Secretary of the Tri-Thien-Hue Region Party committee only. This confusion may be explained if, as some U.S. experts have speculated, the Region Party committee in central Vietnam encompassed the political boundaries used by the Vietnamese in the war against the French, i.e., Inter-Zone 4. This is doubtful, since later interviews with Vietnamese cadre indicate no such merger. Russian General Dimitri Volkogonov confirmed in a July 1993 meeting with the U.S. side of the Joint Commission that the Soviet GRU were also of the opinion that Quang commanded MR-4. He stated that "while Quang was actually in command of the Fourth Military District in June 1972, he had a special relationship with the Politburo and made reports to them." Moreover, he felt that Quang's wartime position was irrelevant, that Quang had "made the reports in question... According to the Russians, Quang was... frequently sent to South Vietnam to evaluate activities and returned to deliver reports to the Politburo."

There can be no doubt that Quang performed tasks considered crucial for the Vietnamese leadership well past the war. For instance, one former DIA investigator familiar with the information discovered as part of the Cambodian Research Project informed the author that "Quang was sent in December 1989 to Phnom Penh to negotiate a formal agreement for the placement of PAVN "volunteers" in the Cambodian "army" (after the September 1989 total withdrawal of PAVN forces from Cambodia). We even found the original paperwork."

Certainly the Soviets should have intimate knowledge of the Vietnamese leadership structure. One intriguing possible early connection between Quang and the Soviets appears in the testimony of Czech Major General Jan Sejna, who recalls a "General Quong, deputy chief of staff for military intelligence," as being deeply involved with the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. PAVN military intelligence is described in the 1205 document as playing an important role in the development of a key North Vietnamese plan. Senator Bob Smith's extensive report on the 1205 document also quotes a Vietnamese witness at a Senate Select Committee hearing, PAVN Sr. Col. Bui Tin, as mentioning that Quang would be one person to ask about Soviet involvement with American POWs.

If Quang was commander of both MR-4 and MRTTH and concurrently the Party Secretary for both the Party and Military Region of MRTTH, and possibly a member of the Central Military Affairs Committee, he was an extremely powerful individual. The author believes that resolving Quang's wartime position should be a top priority for U.S. authorities, as it would begin the process of determining whether or not the document is a fraud. Unfortunately, the staff at JTF-FA let two such opportunities slip through their fingers. On May 25 and July 21, 1993, shortly after the height of the Quang controversy, the JTF-FA interviewed two groups of senior Vietnamese cadre as part of the Oral History Program. The first group consisted of Nguyen Ly and Cao Nan, cadre in the MRTTH combined Enemy/Military proselytizing section, and also PAVN Sr. Col. Nguyen Van Thoung, a division commander who served in MRTTH from 1965 to 1975. The second group consisted of retired Major General Nguyen Van Thu, an officer who served from the end of 1964 until 1975 in MRTTH, including command of the region sometime in 1972.

In fact, he seems to imply he was commander during the Spring Offensive. Another interview was with retired Lt. Gen. Le Tu Dong, who stated he became Secretary of the Region Party Committee and commander of the Region starting sometime in 1973. Interestingly, he returned from the Soviet Union to assume these posts. More astonishing is the fact that in neither instance did the JTF-FA interviewer ask the subjects if they knew Quang, or if Quang had served in MRTTH, or clarified precisely when these individuals held their respective positions. The JTF-FA interviewer never even asked Thoung which Division he commanded! At a time when the U.S. intelligence community was supposedly researching a major archival discovery, this failure to clarify Quang's position through sloppy field work is baffling. Why this oversight wasn't rectified at a higher level also begs to be answered.

The Disclosure and the Possibility of External Fraud
After the release of the document, the Vietnamese government and the purported author of the speech immediately and strongly denied any involvement, labeling it a 'fraud' designed to prevent improving relations between the United States and Vietnam by forces opposed to such a rapprochement. Shortly thereafter, the discoverer of the report, Dr. Stephen Morris, also came under personal denunciation, including charges that he purchased the document surreptitiously from the then head of the Central Committee Archives.

One fraud theory was postulated by Susan Katz Keating, author of the book 'Prisoners of Hope' (Random House, 1994). She wrote that in June 1994 she learned that the 1205 document was a CIA-planted forgery and that "The agency created the document as part of an effort to force Vietnam to release additional information on MIAs." However, she does not detail how or from whom she learned this information, nor offer any reasonable account of why the CIA would attempt this program, other than that the U.S. government wanted to force the Vietnamese to release a copy of the 'Blue Book,' a list of Americans captured during the war. Apparently Katz Keating was unaware that the Vietnamese had already furnished this document to the U.S. side during the 1973 Paris Peace negotiations.

Despite Katz Keating's unsubstantiated statement, what did ultimately transpire was something close to her envisioned scenario. Shortly after Presidential Emissary General John Vessey's return from his April 1993 visit to Vietnam, the Vietnamese released a second, more extensive log book of American POWs, along with other POW/MIA-related documents. "In an intensified search of its wartime records sparked by the controversial Soviet intelligence report, Vietnam last week retrieved an updated, 20-year-old record listing 495 prisoners of war and turned it over to U.S. authorities. The typewritten ledger names 492 American POWs and three Southeast Asians who were captured in North Vietnam between Aug. 5, 1964, and Dec. 28, 1972. It goes beyond a handwritten log, known to Americans as the "blue book," that was turned over... during a visit to Hanoi April 18-19."

The assertion by Katz Keating that the document is a CIA forgery is unsupported and lacks credence. She apparently learned this more than a year after the document surfaced, which seems very much an after-the-fact or even smoke-and-mirrors explanation. Since it was widely rumored that her book was written with DIA/DPMO assistance, her claims should be investigated to remove any doubts in this area and to learn where she acquired her knowledge. Since the CIA is probably capable of such a feat, Congress needs to investigate that possibility (assuming that the U.S. government would admit such an intelligence ploy) and also to determine if elements in the U.S. government were deliberately downplaying the document's significance.

Shortly after the release of the document, Morris came under heavy attack from many directions, including, as mentioned, charges that he had purchased the document. However, Morris rigorously defended himself against these accusations primarily on the basis of the policies governing research by foreigners that were then in effect at the Central Committee archive. "For anyone familiar with procedures at the archive," Morris stated, "the suggestion made by Hanoi and its Western acolytes that the document was planted is absurd." He was strongly supported by the Cold War International History Project, whose scholars were intimately familiar with the various Russian archives, and under whose aegis Morris was then working. Writing in their 1993 Fall Bulletin, they noted that "nothing Morris did in ordering and receiving the document was at all unusual. His discovery and subsequent use of the report were in full conformity with [Central Committee] rules. Contrary to charges made by the Vietnamese government, it is inconceivable that the document could have been planted or forged, or that Morris could have been steered to it in anyway. Any doubts about the authenticity of the document can be safely laid to rest."

Further, since the 1993 release and subsequent turmoil, the Russians have had plenty of opportunities to distance themselves, and yet have steadfastly continued to certify its authenticity, although their top leadership has been careful not to vouch for the accuracy of the information. Several important figures, however, including the former and current chiefs of the GRU, have departed from this stance and insisted the data contained in the 1205 document is correct. In fact, Russia's chief archivist and former Co-Chairman of the Joint Commission's Vietnam Working Group, Dr. Pikhoya, has continued to defend the accuracy of the report, including the section on American POWs. Former senior U.S. officials, such as Dr. Henry Kissinger, have also accepted it as a genuine Russian intelligence document and admitted that the discussion of the communist negotiating position was exactly as presented to him. As mentioned previously, other U.S. governmental agencies, specifically the Department of Defense, have also acknowledged its bona fides.

Dale Andrade, author of the comprehensive study of the 1972 offensive, 'Trial by Fire' (Hippocrene Books, 1995), believes that, "outside of the number of American POWs, from an Easter offensive perspective, everything in the document is startingly accurate and tracks very well with what we know. For instance, take the description of the surrender of Camp Carroll. The camp was not big enough to hold the entire ARVN 56th Regiment, but the surrender of the "whole" regiment there has become enshrined in mythology. For my money, to see the real story show up in this document means it [the document] is the truth."

Therefore, given the level of endorsement of the document, Vietnamese claims that it is a forgery created outside of Vietnam appear to be unfounded and typical knee-jerk reactions. Worse, though, is the apparent acquiescence of U.S. government officials in the face of these Vietnamese denials. Andrade mentioned that officials from the State Department called him for his opinion shortly after the release of the speech. He noted that "State seemed fixated on tiny errors in the document, as if trying to disprove it. I repeatedly told them that this could be the result of translation errors, and that I thought it was good information, but they kept coming back to these small errors." Morris has also noted the State Department's nit-picking over minor points. Further, the Cold War History Project commented that the purpose of General Vessey's initial 1993 inquiry was "unclear. Presumably, if a U.S. envoy had gone to Moscow in 1950 to ask Stalin about the Katyn massacre, the Soviet response would have been vehement denial... Surely no one in Washington could have expected that General Quang or other leaders in Hanoi would acknowledge that they had done something wrong in 1972." To no one's surprise, the Vietnamese and Quang have remained adamant in their position.

Having eliminated most possibilities of outside forgery, or even that the Russian's source was providing bogus or even partially true information culled from various rumors that was then cleverly integrated and sold to the Soviets as genuine, combined with the acceptance of this report as an authentic Russian document by competent U.S. authorities, this leaves us with three hypotheses: (1) that the speech is disinformation created by the Vietnamese themselves to fool the Soviets, (2) that the document is genuine and that the body being addressed and possibly the author are incorrect, and that the Soviets accepted it without double-checking its origins, or (3) that the document is accurate in all respects.

Let us examine the origins of the disinformation theory.

The term 'disinformation' apparently first appeared in the Las Vegas Review-Journal news article by T.T. Nhu quoted earlier. This 'disinformation' theory was also offered by a senior DPMO analyst in recent congressional testimony and was one of the questions Ambassador Peterson asked General Quang during his November meeting. Quang was notably abrupt in his response to this particular query, but disputed any such program, and also denied passing to the Russians what he termed were 'state secrets.'

Assuming Ambassador Peterson did not dream up the disinformation theory himself, he undoubtedly was briefed on the possibility. This is usually done either through a written position paper or presented in a formal briefing, of which a record usually is made. If so, this material should be released and evaluated.

If the document is disinformation, why wouldn't the Vietnamese have admitted this immediately? Given the potentially explosive nature of the revelations, this would have been a prudent course and could have quickly dissipated any controversy. The fact that the Vietnamese did not use this perfect excuse is telling. Instead they screamed loudly that it was a forgery designed to disrupt improving relations. Yet, the only Vietnamese agencies capable of creating such disinformation would be either the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), or perhaps the PAVN military intelligence arm, the Research Department. Since the MPS was responsible for protecting the Party and for counter-intelligence missions, the MPS appears to be the logical agency for conducting this type of operation. But for what purpose? To discover any Vietnamese acting as covert Russian agents? To fool the Soviets regarding the true number of American POWs? The author will address this last point in a later section.

Morris, however, had already prepared a defense against the disinformation charge. In his opening statement before the House Committee, he wrote "As trained communists, Ivashutin and Katushev were men who were well schooled in the arts of political disinformation and deception in general. They were most unlikely to have been fooled by any effort in that direction on the part of the Vietnamese. And remember, on the basis of our previous discussion, that the document was probably passed by a Vietnamese agent, and that the file contains other documents which were the result, in part, of efforts by one or more Vietnamese agents. What motive could a Vietnamese agent have had for deceiving the Soviets, given the risks he or she was taking? Specifically, the contact the agent had with a G.R.U. officer was in itself a betrayal of the party's trust, and dangerous for the agent's own personal well-being." Nonetheless, scholars need to examine this possibility in greater detail than this paper allows.

The Internal Evidence: The Speech and Vietnamese Policies

In determining its veracity and importance, both the Western media and the U.S. government agencies that have investigated the document have focused almost exclusively on the numbers of American POWs. Other aspects of the document, however, particularly the accompanying Russian memorandum and the descriptions of North Vietnamese proselytizing programs, offer far greater insights into the document's legitimacy.

Could Quang have given this speech to the Politburo? Given his long history in sensitive posts, including his possible inclusion on the Central Military Affairs Committee, it is reasonable to conclude that Quang might have been asked to provide reports in person to the Politburo. The Soviet GRU cover letter statement that this was a 'report' to the Politburo seems to fit Volkogonov's claims that Quang was often dispatched to areas to discover the true situation and then return and provide an account to the Politburo. Certainly, as Ambassador Peterson pointed out to Lt. Gen. Quang, "there were elements [in the document] that indicated the author(s) must have had some special access to sensitive sources in North Vietnam."

If he was the military commander and Party leader of the Tri-Thien-Hue area, and was physically located at the MRTTH HQ's in lower Laos, it is uncertain how much Quang would have traveled back and forth to Hanoi. Yet if we accept Quang as the author, the other mystery then becomes: who is Quang speaking to? A careful reading of the speaker's choice of words and the topics discussed seems to indicate that he is addressing a body below that of the PAVN Supreme Command. The language used makes it appear as if he is addressing his own Regional Party Committee. Quang's first remarks about "covering a number of the Supreme Command's and Government Defense Council's positions" and most notably "Earlier, I analyzed the activity of our command," indicate that Quang is addressing some group under his control. His additional remarks on explaining the victories and analyzing defeats in which he "stated all of this to the Politburo" further amplify that he is speaking to a gathering under his control.

Bill Bell strongly believes that the Soviets misunderstood the body being addressed, and is convinced that Quang's remarks are directed at a regional group. "All official activities in Communist Vietnam," Bell noted, "were controlled by bureaus" (bo) from the top (Chinh tri bo) to the bottom (chi bo). The term for such a political bureau at the regional level (dang bo) was probably translated in error by the Soviet collector as the 'Politburo,'(Chinh tri bo).' To amplify, in the Vietnamese communist political system, 'bo's' are responsible for political affairs. As mentioned, Chinh tri bo refers to the Politburo. The word bo is also used to denote Command Headquarters (bo tu lenh). The term dang bo denotes the organ responsible at region, division, or regimental level, or similar for political affairs. Chi bo, for instance, would refer to a battalion sub-chapter or similar level echelon of political control. Being very familiar with his audience, while speaking Quang may have shortened the reference concerning the controlling organ to simply "bo," like someone would say "CP" for Command Post or 'HQ' for Headquarters, thus causing confusion for the Soviet translator.

Nevertheless, the Russians clearly understood one vitally important aspect. If Quang had been given Party instructions to pass on, he would have delivered them first to the Regional Party Committee. If this analysis is correct, then Quang is reporting what high-level Party officials believe to be true, or want lower levels to believe, including the number of American POWs. As one Russian intelligence officer assigned to the Joint Commission stated, "It was a Top-secret document not intended for anyone outside the chambers of the Vietnamese Communist Party to see... In April 1993, Bell reviewed the translated document and reported his analysis from the American Embassy in Bangkok to State and DOD. His study was incorporated into State's 1993 dispatch which quoted a "well-informed U.S. official" who said, "there were indications in the report on POWs that the briefer was not addressing the Politburo, but some other body, possibly a regional military or Communist Party committee in central Vietnam." Likewise, a report by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research agreed that "The tone, the use of the first person and even the content of the 'Quang report' are out of character for a briefing report to an elite body, particularly the Politburo. It is much more like a pep talk... The closest comparable documents of the era were captured or acquired in South Vietnam."

"If he was the military commander and Party leader of the Tri-Thien-Hue area, and was physically located at the MRTTH HQ's in lower Laos, it is uncertain how much Quang would have traveled back and forth to Hanoi. Yet if we accept Quang as the author, the other mystery then becomes: who is Quang speaking to? A careful reading of the speaker's choice of words and the topics discussed seems to indicate that he is addressing a body below that of the PAVN Supreme Command. The language used makes it appear as if he is addressing his own Regional Party Committee. Quang's first remarks about "covering a number of the Supreme Command's and Government Defense Council's positions" and most notably "Earlier, I analyzed the activity of our command," indicate that Quang is addressing some group under his control. His additional remarks on explaining the victories and analyzing defeats in which he "stated all of this to the Politburo" further amplify that he is speaking to a gathering under his control.

The discrepancy between this analysis and the GRU cover memorandum which indicated that Quang's remarks were to the Politburo perhaps can only be explained as a translation error, a mistake or misunderstanding over which Party agency Quang was addressing, or perhaps that Quang was coming from a meeting at the Politburo, during which time he received these instructions. How many translation errors crept in is impossible to judge, but they could be significant. For instance, the speaker uses the term "we" several times. There are two words in Vietnamese for "we," one including the speaker and one excluding the speaker.

In examining the text, the speech appears to be a follow-up to an earlier report to the same group on the Party's accepted military and political strategy. This account reflects an attempt by the speaker to outline the communists' ongoing efforts in a bid to buttress the morale of his cadre after the serious losses of the 1972 Spring Campaign, [also called the Nguyen Hue Campaign, more commonly known in the West as the Easter Offensive,] so that his subordinates could maintain the "continual offensive" to force the U.S. to acquiesce to the Vietnamese political demands. It also contains phraseology that seems to be a situation report on both the current and future Party military and diplomatic schemes, a sort of state-of-affairs report designed for senior level cadres so that they may in turn direct political indoctrination sessions to improve the fighting spirit in the lower ranks.

Therefore, if Quang's speech is authentic, and represents current Party thinking, material similar in style and content to Quang's should be available in enemy documents captured in the South. In fact, the State Department claimed they had made a cursory examination of such captured documents in their possession and had found the Quang report wanting. Moreover, as Quang noted in his meeting with Peterson, "Concerning the style of the speech, Lt. Gen. Quang said that it was clearly not Vietnamese."

Both charges are manifestly false. Quang begins by stating that "I reported to you earlier... about the fundamental characteristics of the past stage of our people's conflict against the American imperialists. This type of stage-setting is typical of the start of political assessment reports. For example, one captured document of political indoctrination material from the same time period prepared by the Political Staff Dept. of the Hqs., SVNLA, begins by outlining the situation in SVN from 1954 to date as well as the missions to be performed by subordinate units during 1972, which is similar in organization to Quang's speech.

In fact, one document from the same captured batch, entitled The Primary Objective of the Revolution in South Vietnam as Conceived by the Political Staff, Sub-Region 1, Headquarters, SVNLA, and dated August 20, 1972, seems to mimic the outline and purpose of the speech. The captured report contains guidelines concerning a political training phrase... The purpose of this political training phrase is to acquaint all personnel with friendly forces' resounding victories since the 1972 Spring Offensive Campaign, and in the meantime, to instill in them a steadfast determination to launch continual attacks on the enemy until a final goal is attained. This political training phrase is to be studied by all elementary level cadre and Party members, so that they understood that Recent political-military developments in SVN have proven that the Party's concepts and policies... are completely sound. While trying to prepare the country's morale for prolonged fighting conditions, the Party has also clearsightedly coordinated the friendly side's military campaigns with political and diplomatic efforts, thus paving the way for increasingly greater victories. Moreover, the Party has mastered the techniques of utilizing the people's violence [terror] for the purpose of restoring administrative control in SVN to the population.

Thus we can see the how the details provided in the speech were conceptualized and presented to the lower levels. Given that these political training documents for cadre in the south pattern this speech, it would be wise to remember Quang's remark concerning we in the propaganda organization. Since most types of Party appraisals would have been approved in advance, and if the speaker is addressing a lower authority, we can assume that this document originated from either the General Political Department of PAVN or the Central Military Affairs Committee, which again highlights Party input.

The lack of a date is not by itself indicative of a speech versus a prepared text, but the lack of subtitles clearly is. The vast majority of written communist policy documents had an opening title followed by further subtitles. Plus, the opening salutation, Dear comrades, was generally only used when addressing party members.

The opening section of the speech deals with the communist attempts to determine the political perspectives of five key South Vietnamese political and military figures. Naturally, the communists gravitated towards individuals who were potentially anti-Thieu to determine their desire to join a coalition government. Twice the document mentions sending individuals to meet with these South Vietnamese. On page five, We sent one of our comrades from the Supreme Command to Saigon for meetings with General Dzu, and on page six, a subsequent meeting was planned between Dzu and Huyhn Tan Phat. Phat was initially Secretary-General of the National Liberation Front, and later President of the People's Revolutionary Government.

Two other individuals were Nguyen Khanh and Nguyen Cao Ky. A reference is made to meeting five times with Khanh in Paris, but that due to his military connections, we are not striving to directly attract him to our side. This phrase is typical of the psychological evaluation often done in proselytizing, and according to many reports, the interrogation of prisoners.

On page eight, Quang makes mention of contradictions in the Thieu camp and combining military means with contacts in South Vietnam who might join a coalition government. In these statements we see typical Marxist analysis and the classic Vietnamese communist philosophy of armed and political struggle. Obviously, the speaker was familiar with Lao Dong doctrine. Andrade, for example, after reviewing the text of the speech, found the speaker's presentation in this section particularly compelling and factual. For the record, he also believes that the speech was not presented to the Politburo.

Next, the speaker goes into a lengthy discussion of a plan, called 'Ba Be. Statements such as those found on page twelve that mention we must work on the demoralization of the puppet army on all fronts, and on page fifteen The goal of plan 'Ba Be' is introduction of division into the ranks of the enemy and lowering of his will to resist.

These remarks reveal that this plan revolves around the communist concept of military proselytizing (binh van), one of the primary methods the communists were using to topple the South Vietnamese government. Apparently, the communists still believed military proselytizing was a very effective weapon against the South Vietnamese, and in the Ba Be campaign, military proselytizing would be the main emphasis in defeating the GVN's military and political institutions. According to Quang, this effort, evidently in conjunction with terror attacks, would demoralize the South Vietnamese infrastructure and lead to its overthrow. The members of the Ba Be plan would assassinate South Vietnamese provincial and district level cadres and replace them with communist sympathizers. Normally, such assassinations were usually directed by the MPS through use of their Special Action or Armed Reconnaissance teams. If this anal'sis is correct, then captured documents should indicate the increased importance placed on military proselytizing. Indeed, dozens of captured documents from the last half of 1972 on hand in the CDEC collection discuss using military proselytizing as the main weapon against the GVN once the Peace treaty was signed. This again stresses the connection between Quang's outline of this high-level plan and its later appearance, albeit in a more camouflaged version, in lower echelon policy documents.

On page eleven, the speaker mentioned another part of this Ba Be plan, which called for the acquisition of materials which testify to crimes by Americans and their puppets with regard to the Vietnamese, so that we can accuse them of committing these crimes by publishing the materials. This is an odd statement, given that such requirements had been in effect since at least mid-1966. Indeed, the formation of the Vietnamese Committee for Solidarity with People of the United States, in October, 1967, was expressively designed for transmittal of such information to the American antiwar crowd. Other documents captured in 1968 in the South refer to an International Information Office in Paris for denouncing U.S. crimes, especially the use of toxic chemicals.

This program for gathering war crimes materials might have been developed in anticipation of a postwar accounting of war crimes by all parties. The communists might have prepared for war crimes trials such as those at Nuremberg. By possessing evidence, such as U.S. assassinations of Viet Cong cadre under the Phoenix program, they could mitigate or deflect investigation of their own assassinations under the Ba Be plan. A statement in the section on POWs seems to agree. The speaker mentions carefully studying the interrogation reports from American POWs in order to have a basis in specific circumstances to expose US designs in the Indochina war of aggression as well as in other matters.

The speaker further indicated that the Supreme Command and Ministry of State Security discussed all matters related to successful implementation of this plan... and that The intelligence directorate of the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of State Security conducted the training of the personnel. Quang was mentioned earlier as having possibly been involved with military intelligence. While coordination between the PAVN's intelligence arm, the Research Department, and the MPS is not well-understood by U.S. intelligence, captured documents indicate a requirement for close interaction between the security forces, intelligence service, and military proselytizing. Military intelligence agencies, one high level document ordered, at all levels need to have close relations with the public security and military proselytizing branches...

Another seemingly incongruous statement in relation to the Ba Be plan appears on page fourteen; This is the first time we are implementing such a plan on the territory of South Vietnam, and on page sixteen; Until this, the Supreme Command had never tried working out a plan similar to the plan 'Ba Be.' The only possible explanation is that the speaker views the Ba Be plan as a coordinated effort between the military, security, and propaganda agencies to undermine what the communists believe is a coming coalition government. We will return to this coordinated effort later. Obviously, by assassinating GVN officials at the local level and replacing them with communist sympathizers, they could slowly swing the balance of power in the countryside over to themselves. Apparently the North Vietnamese considered this a critical post cease-fire plan in a coalition government. More study would need to be done for the 1973/74 time frame to determine if this was carried out. It certainly was not done in the fall of 1972, probably because the DRV had relented on the idea of a Provisional Government of Concord and Reconciliation.

Given the importance of this plan, finding direct references would be impossible without access to high-level Party documentation. Thus, we are forced to seek comparisons among'the shadows. But some captured documents do contain oblique references to the objective of the Ba Be plan. One document orders subordinate units to complete preparations to accomplish the 1972 mission, which is to liberate the rural areas in Sep or Oct 72, and develop revolutionary organizations, especially in-place ones (possibly to prepare for the postwar contest). Thankfully, however, Quang passed us an even better vehicle with which to compare itÐhis own proof.

Quang's proof: Damning himself

As discussed previously, Quang has claimed that he was the MRTTH commander and has provided U.S. authorities two documents as proof. First, he gave U.S. authorities a document showing the reassignment of senior cadre, which specifically included his departure in November 1972 as Commander of MRTTH. The author has not seen this particular record. The second piece of evidence Quang used to buttress his assertion was a book of letters written by Communist Party Secretary General Le Duan during the war. One of Quang's aides provided a copy of this book to Bill Bell during Senator John Kerry's May, 1993 visit to Vietnam. The book, entitled Letters to the South, included a letter from Duan, dated 13 August 1972, which was addressed to Bay Tien, Quang's wartime cover name. The bibliographic summary indicates that Quang was an Alternate member Party Central Executive Committee, Secretary of the Tri-Thien Region Party Committee, Commander of Tri-Thien Military Region. Quang used this as proof that he was a battlefield commander and thus could not have provided the report to the Politburo. However, if Quang was at this time, in addition to his other duties, an alternate member of the Central Executive Committee, he was indeed one of the most powerful men in the DRV hierarchy.

The letters are in chronological order. Duan's August 13 letter begins with the salutation "Dear Brothers." The letter was addressed to other senior communist commanders, including the leaders of the B-2 and B-3 Fronts, MR-5, and Quang. The letter encouraged the Party regions to increase their Binh Van (Military Proselytizing) programs in South Vietnam as a means of winning the war. Given the date of the letter, it offers a fascinating corroboration of the Ba Be section of the 1205 document and a glimpse into Party thinking at this time. Strangely, U.S. authorities have not mentioned the letter's contents, nor is the author aware of the letter's use by American analysts to compare against the 1205 document. This is unfortunate, because a contrast against the Quang report reveals similar internal keys. These keys strongly support the authenticity of the 1205 document.

Much like Quang's and other communist political documents, Duan starts by providing an overall assessment; Our strategic direction is that of attacks and uprisings. Despite strong PAVN military attacks, he continues, still the masses have not risen up and smashed the systematic domination by the enemy of the rural areas. His current evaluation included a candid appraisal that the GVN effort to pacify the countryside was working. The situation in the rural South is now quite different from the time of uprising or during the Tet offensive. In three years of clamoring about implementing the 'Pacification' plan, the enemy has dominated the masses relatively tightly, oppressed the majority of the population participating in political or armed organizations.

Duan's letter then discusses the need to attack and decimate the GVN's RF/PF forces. He believed that while the communists were militarily stronger when comparing main force to main force, the ability of the South Vietnamese to hold territory, oppress the masses, and reinforce their main units came directly from their large numbers of local militia units. Thus the need to militarily and politically attack and weaken these local forces.

However, while targeting the local forces was an important tactical decision, the greater goal was destroying the morale of the South Vietnamese army and government. Duan states, In this stage, the revolution of our country is on the offense and on the verge of victory; the Americans and Puppets are in a position of continuous resistance and failure. Thus the morale of the officers and men has dramatically'fallen... From this reality we must address the issue that victory over the enemy through Military Proselytizing is as important as victory through combat.

This is at the heart of the Ba Be plan. While Duan does not directly mention the term Ba Be, one can grasp the outline of Duan's ideas and visualize how they were implemented into this program. He continued by stating that Our most profound, most pressing aspiration at this time for the various levels of our populace, especially in the areas of conflict where the enemy is temporarily in control, is to call for the restoration of peace, halt the war, resist mobilization, and the military draft. To do that required attaching special importance to the wide dispersion of Propaganda and agitation, it must penetrate deeply into each hamlet, village, each family... Along with this propaganda and agitation effort, we must conduct secret agitation efforts, develop converts among the enemy's soldiers... In these efforts, no matter how public or widespread we must carry them out in cunning manner, being sure to hide our forces... We must have a movement from the masses to broadly and powerfully conduct Military Proselytizing.

Relating back to one purpose of Quang's speech, that of passing instructions to be carried out, plus the theory that Quang is addressing a Regional Party Committee, Duan's next sentence fits in perfectly. The Party Committees must quickly disseminate directives down through the infrastructure and permeate all levels, branches, organizations of the masses and military forces; at the same time we must have organizational planning for execution at each branch, each level, each unit, and each level must have cadre responsible for arranging research, for follow-up, and for assisting the Committees with firm, explicit direction. During the course of implementation, if you have any opinions transmit them to Central. One month later, this is exactly what Quang is doing.

Earlier we mentioned that the contents of this letter were not used to compare against the 1205 document. Worse, the next letter in the book, which only carries the date August, 1972, [due to similar phraseology and the previous listing in chronological order, we can assume it was written after the August 13 letter], was also not examined. It contains an even more stunning comment. Duan addresses the letter to the same group as his previous letter. ñDear Comradesî, he begins, ñOn the occasion of working with Comrades of Region 5, I want to express a number of ideas. This has been recorded by the Central Party Office, I have read it and made corrections. I am sending this down to you Comrades for research and application in the new situation.î How exactly is the Secretary General of the Communist Party working with the comrades of Region 5? Did he visit them, or did they come to Hanoi, thus lending credence about Quang visiting the Politburo? Even more telling is the comment that this has been recorded by the Central Party Office. Given this remark, how can the Vietnamese claim not to possess documentation on this matter?

Duan's second letter discussed virtually the same material as the first, except it was far lengthier. Toward the middle he mentions the combining of the three prongs that was indicated by the Ba Be plan. The Vietnamese three prongs strategies for overthrowing the GVN were called armed struggle, political struggle, and military proselytizing. On page 334 he wrote, In each area, each main section there exists a need to establish a steering committee (including representatives of the Party Chapters and political, military cadre) for unified command of three prongs: military, political, and military proselytizing... This is the manner of concrete guidance the Comrades of Region 5 have already implemented and the results have been good; the various regions and provinces need to draw experiences in order to concretely guide the movement at the local level.

This last sentence is a classic emulation statement. Indeed, the CDEC Bulletins for the Fall/Winter of 1972 include many military proselytizing directives from MR-5. One document from Quang Ngai province in MR-5 mentions The current situation is more favorable to the friendly side than ever before. Thus, military proselytizing activities should be intensified in conjunction with military and political efforts to gain control of strategic hamlets, in order to accelerate the liberation of rural areas. Another document mentions grouping military proselytizing cadre into action units [similar to the MPS Special Action units] to intensify propaganda aimed at RVNAF servicemen. These action units have to exert every effort... in coordination with secret guerrillas and illegal agents.

Therefore, the author believes that a combination of Duan's wartime writings and captured lower-level Party documents clearly support Quang's discussion of the Ba Be plan, especially the unification of the three prongs to carry out an assassination plan to subvert the GVN.

The DRV's peace proposals of Sept.15 and 26: How do they fit?

What has also not previously been examined is the interplay between the speech and the DRV's peace proposals presented to the U.S. side in Paris at meetings held on Sept. 15th and Sept. 26/27th. The North Vietnamese were pressing the U.S. to force Thieu to resign, withdraw U.S. and allied forces, and then form a Provisional Government of National Concord. The U.S. had staunchly rejected the DRV demands. This lead to Quang's characterization of Nixon as stubborn, a phrase commonly used by the communists to describe strongly held political positions or persistent military actions by the allies.

Kissinger noted in the Sept. 15th meeting in Paris that the Vietnamese were defensive; they professed eagerness to set the earliest possible deadline for an overall settlement; and they have never been so eager to have early and frequent meetings. They repeatedly and almost plaintively, asked how quickly we wished to settle and there was none of their usual bravado about how U.S. and world opinion are stacked against us. Kissinger, however, was holding firm. He informed the DRV that "their political demands were fundamentally unacceptable. We will not accept these plans. I told them they would have to modify them."

The DRV reacted on the 26th at the next meeting, presenting another proposal and agreeing to the total release of all people of the parties... including American pilots captured in North Vietnam. Kissinger still held firm, noting to Bunker that we remain far apart on a number of major issues. They do not formally acknowledge the presence of their forces in SVN and are clearly unwilling to withdraw them as part of an agreement; they refuse to include Laos and Cambodia in any formal ceasefire or POW provision... In this connection you must disabuse Thieu once and for all of any notion that we are working toward a Vietnam ceasefire or bombing halt in return for our POWs. There have been absolutely no discussions along these lines. There is no possibility of this happening.

The DRV proposal included the formation of National concord committees... in all administrative units... all over South Viet-Nam. National concord committees of all levels are led by the Provisional Government of National Concord and the immediately superior national concord committee. Obviously, if these committees were formed, the Ba Be plan would then swing into action and begin killing the GVN members, thus allowing the DRV to gain power at the local level. This in turn would permit the DRV to seize power from below, all the while co-opting the senior ARVN generals who had agreed to form a coalition government. Therefore, between the official DRV documents and the secret Quang report, we can see the true outline of the communist plan to acquire power in the South after the Americans left.

The U.S./Soviet Trade talks: Is there a connection?

Another overlooked influence, at least in terms of the disinformation argument, is the U.S./Soviet trade talks that were being conducted at the same time. Shortly before the Sept 15th meeting with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger spent several days in Moscow discussing a comprehensive trade agreement, along with preparations for a security conference and a resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.

It was speculated in the press that the trade agreement (is the) key to the next stage of Vietnam bargaining... recent private indications that the Russians were tying Vietnam and the trade deal heightened speculation here that the Vietnam issue was being budged... and that some Western sources consider likely, Moscow has firmly urged Hanoi to reach a compromise with President Nixon.

However, other journalists reported the Soviet's disinterest in a peace broker's role, which, according to a recently declassified White House cable, apparently was correct. Kissinger informed Bunker that he had told the Soviets that although the U.S. genuinely sought a settlement, the U.S. would never agree to the other side's demand that we impose a coalition government... The Soviet response was very low key on both military and diplomatic matters. They backed their friends in a minimum way... They were pro forma in endorsing the communists political position. They clearly want the war to end but do not know what to do. Moscow is obviously interested in pursuing our bilateral relations without letting Vietnam interfere.

These trade talks continued into October. If the Russians were not pressuring the DRV to compromise with Nixon, or at least were only passing on the U.S. position, then what possible gain could the Vietnamese get from feeding the Soviets disinformation about the true number of American POWs? While this theory appears unlikely, without more study it seems difficult to completely disprove, although some elements in the U.S. government give this rationale some credence. Why? Because it would blow a hole in the possibility of American POWs being transferred to the Soviet Union. If the Vietnamese are deliberately lying to the Soviets about how many Americans they are holding, the entire transfer theory is destroyed.

The June 26th document: In the same vein Almost totally neglected in the furor over the legitimacy of the 1205 document was an earlier speech reputedly given by Quang dated June 26, 1972, that was discovered by Morris in the same file as the 1205 document. This speech was a report on the Results of the Offensive Actions in South Vietnam and Challenges of Future Armed Struggle. The report appears to be a summary of the war in South Vietnam, including an admission of far higher PAVN losses than were even believed by U.S. intelligence. The document is stylistically similar in format to the 1205 document and also appears to be a transcript of a taped speech. The Soviet GRU again described it as being given by Quang to the Politburo. If this document is also genuine, and the author saw nothing glaring that would indicate otherwise, then the Soviet source is consistent. Unfortunately, space prevents anything more than a cursory review of this document, but many of the same internal keys are present.

Much of the text is devoted to reciting statistics relating to friendly and enemy losses, the situation at the front, disposition of forces, and future plans. The speech is a re-capitulation of the events in the on-going battles in the South, and appears to represent an accurate portrayal of the war. In tone it is less hortatory, and again does not seem to be directed at the Politburo, but to the same group as in the 1205 document. If so, then it appears that the Soviets are making a consistent mistake in regards to the body being addressed. If both the June 26th and the 1205 document are either a fraud or disinformation, then the Soviets are either accepting the source's information as genuine without having the ability to cross-check the data or are mis-translating the body being addressed. This would make sense for Quang, given his location some distance from Hanoi.

Quang mentions that a large part of the 56th Regiment had surrendered or crossed over, which was true. More important, he also noted that we have experienced several negative ideological tendencies. We have observed the appearance of these tendencies, in part, during the course of carrying out the decisions and orders of the State Defense Council and the Supreme High Command. We must... work out a correct attitude towards them. This is an important comment and appears to be a first glimpse of the need to boost internal morale. As we shall see, this domestic propaganda theme became preeminent in the following months of 1972. Quang's comment and the Vietnamese propaganda response to it are covered next.

The Pep talk: Telling them what to believe As mentioned earlier, various phrases of the speech appear to be a motivational summary of the latest Party analysis of the war. In its broadest sense, the PAVN's 1972 offensive was designed to destroy pacification and prove Vietnamization a failure, thus exposing Thieu as rotten. By discrediting the American effort in South Vietnam on the eve of its final departure, the resultant political and military embarrassment would force Nixon to accept the communist proposals for ending the war. In Trial by Fire, Andrade quotes the communist official press organ as clearly outlining these goals;... our general offensive is designed to defeat the enemy's Vietnamization plan, force the enemy to acknowledge his defeat and accept a political settlement on our terms. Based on their negotiating proposals, this clearly was the formation of a coalition government preceded by the removal of GVN President Thieu. Another reason for propping up communist morale was their political analysis of the impending American election, one in which they expected Nixon to win. An interview with Hoang Tuan, editor of Nhan Dan, revealed that his country is preparing for four more years of war if President Nixon... is reelected. Tuan went on to state that the United States bombing and mining had created difficulties, and that Mr. Nixon's war is 10 times more barbarous than his predecessor's. These remarks are almost exact duplicates of Quang's June 26th speech.

Given these main strategic communist goals as a backdrop, the author believes we can properly place Quang's remarks in context. On page eight, phrases such as I have reported to you today on the contacts with all these people so that you would know how the Politburo's instructions to win over these people to our side is being carried out, and In addition to a resolution of the issue by military means on the battlefields of South Vietnam, we have engaged in contacts with several South Vietnamese... who may be able to join the ranks of a coalition government, are consistent with such a purpose.

Ending on page eight and continuing onto page nine, we see the speaker sum up the Party's strategy and analysis of the war. Statements railing against Nixon's Vietnamization of the war, and that the friendly side has won over extensive heavily populated regions, plus the improvement in the friendly side's military prowess, are noteworthy statements which are mirrored in other captured documents from the south.

Why this exhortation? One captured document states the reason; The purpose of this study is to make the friendly (VC/NVA) personnel understand the significance of the friendly victories (during Apr, May, Jun 72) in order to strengthen their determination to fight. It is noted that the friendly members are becoming less aggressive [which matches with Quang's remark]... They fail to realize that large areas can not (sic) be liberated... because the friendly side's leadership and effective use of manpower is still poor. The Party has envisioned enemy reactions... The Americans have considerable military, economic, and political difficulties. They cannot prolong the war... The Tet Offensive was designed to compel the enemy to sit at the conference table. The current Offensive is designed to force the enemy to end the war in accordance with the cease-fire conditions set by the friendly side. This offensive will be continuous.

ARVN forces captured one typical exhortation message, probably written in early May 1972, that was meant for consumption by the lower ranking soldiers and cadre in MRTTH. This document offers some comparison with the Quang speech, since it is a communication from the Politburo and Lao Dong Party Central Executive Committee and addressed through the Central Military Affairs Party Committee to All (VC/NVA) combat units operating on the Tri-Thien Front, (VC Tri-Thien-Hue MR). The message praises them for their outstanding achievements during the offensive, and asks that they now Understand friendly successes and new favorable opportunities, fully understand the strategic determination of the Lao Dong Party Central Headquarters, and surmount all difficulties and hardships. The document closes with a final set of instructions preceded by the salutation Dear comrades! It is signed by the Central Military Affairs Party Committee, of which Quang was reportedly a member.

One illustration of both the use of terror to achieve Party goals and the need to prop up morale is the minutes of the Quang Ngai Province Party Committee from late March 1972, which called for the elimination of (RVN) local officials at the lowest levels (meaning villages and hamlets) and the leaders of (RVN) Regional and Popular forces... The document also provides a glimpse into why Quang would need to reinforce cadre resolve. According to the Party, this offensive would be completely different from those earlier offensives because the one to be launched in the immediate future will occur in the final stage of the war, and better still, at a time when resounding victories are being achieved by the friendly side in the military, political, and diplomatic fields... Another difference is the fact that the prescribed goals (i.e., the capture of enemy outposts, the liberation of the local population, and the laying of a foundation of a new regime) should be attained in fairly short period of time.

Quang Ngai province, part of MR-5, was mentioned previously by Le Duan as having good results following Hanoi's orders. It was one of the few provinces to record an upsurge in guerrilla activity during the month of September. The fighting was noted as harassing operations aimed at destroying belief in the Saigon government's assertion that it can protect the population. Other assaults were noted along the coast below Danang.

The answer to the question on why the need for exhortation is simple. After indoctrinating the troops and cadre that a new offensive would enable the Party to regain lost lands and population, halt Vietnamization, destroy pacification, embarrass the U.S. and possibly lead to the ouster of Thieu, plus win new victories on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts, and then to instead suffer severe losses and watch the ARVN slowly drive them back from their initial gains, one can properly view Quang's speech. It is an exhortation to sustain faith in ultimate victory, and a confidence builder in the Party's acumen in that it has anticipated all enemy reactions and planned accordingly, and to demonstrate progress despite setbacks. In this light we can see Quang's recap of the Party's successes in proselytizing senior South Vietnamese, that it has a new plan developed in Hanoi to assist in gaining land and population, and that finally, as a ace-in-the-hole, they have these American POWs to use as bargaining chips.

The American POWs: What to think?

If, as the author has reasoned, this document represents what high-level communist Vietnamese organs believed or wanted lower echelons to believe about American POWs, or symbolizes some totaling of commandos, remains, and live bodies, it still denotes stunning new information. The Cold War Bulletin scholars certainly agree. They wrote, In view of the close links between the Soviet GRU and the North Vietnamese intelligence organs, [the Soviets] acceptance of the higher totals of American POWs indicates that those numbers must be taken seriously.

The Russians concluded the same. According to General Zolotarev, Volkogonov's replacement as the head of the Russian side of the Joint Commission, he stated We consider the number of American POWs given in that report quite plausible. However, Vietnamese officials, up to this date, do not agree with it and argue against it. As for us, we can only maintain that the document submitted to the American side is an authentic one. As for the figure contained in it, the responsibility lies with the Vietnamese.

The discussion of the number captured in Laos, listed as 43, absolutely does not square with those returned. Bear in mind that at the same time Quang is making his claims, Kissinger is being informed in Paris on September 26th by Le Duc Tho that of, the number of POWs in Cambodia, there are none. In Laos, there are very few. But if you satisfactorily solve the political question... then we can find an understanding. Yet at this time the 27 men who would be returned from South Vietnam were being held in a camp near Mimot in Cambodia. The few Lao prisoners were then in Hanoi. How then do we compare Le Duc Tho's remarks with Quang's? Obviously Tho is lying about the American POWs in these countries. But in dealing with the veracity of the 1205 document, which statement is more important, Tho's discussion of the numbers of POWs, or his assertion about solving the political question? Let us examine the evidence. In light of Quang's earlier involvement with the Enemy Proselytizing Department of the PAVN General Political Department (GPD), if he is the author or is presenting remarks approved by the GPD, in the POW's section we should reasonably expect to find remarks similar to their outlook. Indeed we do. Such statements as the comment on page twenty-one regarding the importance of continuing propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to their understanding of the nature of the war are textbook Enemy Proselytizing material. Moreover, his point number two on page twenty-two in which he mentions that Nixon should not hinder the return of these aviators to their homeland and not undertake any disciplinary measures toward them is precisely the policy followed by the Hanoi government during the September release of American POWs.

The three categories listed for American POWs are very much in tune with rallier reports and known Enemy Proselytizing policies during the war, as was the immediate need to determine the rank of the prisoner. Moreover, another telling series of remarks begins on page twenty-two. The speaker also goes into a lengthy discussion of the numbers and types of American POWs. This sort of quantifying is extremely typical of Vietnamese communist documents. Many of their military proselytizing documents will list the number of leaflets produced and the number of struggle meetings held. While perhaps factually incorrect, in style it is dead on.

Quang discusses that the DRV has been acquiring valuable intelligence from the interrogations of American POWs. No less than three times Quang returns to the subject of this DRV intelligence success and the study of interrogations of American POWs. In fact, this is one of the few items the GRU commander directly mentioned in his cover letter. While this intelligence success was also sporadically mentioned in rallier reports during the war, the vast majority of returning POWs stated they were not interrogated for military information. This has always been a great discrepancy, one which needs further study.

Quang admits that Holding 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us, but that we were able to collect data about American weapons and also valuable scientific materials. Also, We continue to collect and study materials from interrogations of POWs... as well as in other matters. Collection and study of these materials has provided us great assistance in studying the scientific discoveries of the US.

Despite the dismissal of the 1970/71 Dang Tan material in the January 1994 DOD report, this was precisely Dr. Tan's position. The vast majority of his debriefs discuss his admittedly second-hand knowledge of the success of the DRV interrogators in acquiring intelligence from American POWs. Tan had learned this from contacts at the Ministry of Public Security and while attending Party lectures. Although Tan's description of the number of POWs is sharply in dispute, the CIA believed that Tan was reporting reliably in virtually everything else. In many ways then, Tan's earlier reports are similar to Quang's discussion of American POWs. Both talk about using POWs to gain scientific and tactical knowledge, plus employing them as virtual hostages in exchange for a cease-fire, and then present a significantly inflated [by U.S. intelligence beliefs] number of POWs. Historically, though, from the time in the summer of 1966 when the U.S. first began receiving estimates of the number of American held captive in the DRV, that number was always substantially higher than the real totals. Thus, Quang's inflation of POWs is not atypical of prisoner reporting and in no way detracts from the authenticity of the speech.

Quang then makes one of the most revealing statements in the document. He elaborates on the success of this POW interrogation effort, noting that We have been able to uncover US intentions in the international arena and on a number of other issues which are related to the war in Indochina. That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs has and continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW issue, then the other issues would not exert any influence on our policy toward the US (author emphasis added). That is why we are now concentrating on the successful resolution of this problem on the collection and study of materials from interrogations of American aviators shot down in North Vietnam... Further, he goes on to state that We still have among us comrades who think: why do we keep these POWs and not take advantage of the Nixon proposals... when the American government resolves the political and military issues... we will set free all the American POWs. This is precisely the position Le Duc Tho stated to Kissinger less than two weeks later when he acknowledged if you satisfactorily solve the political question and the questions of reparations then we can find an understanding. In determining the authenticity of the speech, Quang's remarks thus exactly match the stance of the DRV's chief negotiator. If this document was disinformation, then someone went to a great deal of effort to make it as factual as possible.

As a final note, despite all the furor over Quang's remarks, one POW/MIA case has never been broached with the General--one he should easily be able to answer, despite his claims otherwise. During his meeting with Ambassador Peterson, Quang stated he recalled no reporting on any specific prisoner or about any specific group of prisoners, because POW reporting was limited to general details.

Yet on March 31, 1972, two Army enlisted soldiers, Sp/4 Bruce A. Crosby and Sp/5 Gary P. Westcott were inside a bunker at Fire Base Sarge in Quang Tri province, engaged in monitoring NVA communications. The base came under artillery attack and their bunker sustained a direct hit. According to an American advisor on the scene, "They were located in a bunker approximately 35 meters to the east of my position. About midday I learned that their bunker had been hit. During a lull in the shelling, I crawled over to their bunker to find it enveloped in flames, and no sign of life about. It was obvious that the two Americans in the bunker had been killed instantly when they took a direct hit."

Eventually the base was overrun by the advancing NVA troops from the 304th Division. The Vietnamese history of the 304th Division, published in 1990, states, the order to begin artillery fire on Dong Toan [Sarge] was received by 68th Artillery Regiment at 1145 on 30 March 1972. The 66th Regiment [of the 304th Division] finally took Dong Toan base at 0600 on 1 April 1972. "We killed 350 men of the 4th Battalion of the 147th Brigade and captured 25 men alive [Vietnamese Marines], including two American advisors."

What happened to Crosby and Westcott? Did they die in the bunker, or were they captured alive as the Vietnamese state? According to the November 1995 DPMO scrub of this case, no information on the two men has been turned over unilaterally by the Vietnamese, a JTF-FA survey of the site in 1993 revealed no remains or much material evidence, and that based on the testimony of Boomer and other hearsay reports indicating the men died in the bunker, and the lack of any further information, DPMO recommended the case be placed in the category of No Further Pursuit, which means that no one is actively looking for Crosby and Westcott. How then can the Vietnamese be said to be cooperating when an officially sanctioned Party document states, indirectly at least, that the two were captured alive? How is it that the Vietnamese have not alerted the U.S. government to the information published in an official history of one of their most famous divisions? Further, if Quang was the commander of MRTTH, of which the 304th Division was a part, and they claim the capture of two Americans in the same location that two men go missing, how is it he doesn't know anything about it? Like most denials by Quang, this one should also be met with deeper analysis.

Conclusions

The author believes that this document represents an authentic speech to a Regional Party committee or the Politburo by a senior Vietnamese cadre, and I have offered evidence to buttress that belief. The comparison of language and purpose of the speech offers a startling similarity between the internal information of the report, Duan's letters, lower echelon captured documents, and the DRV negotiating position, all of which point to its authenticity. Also, given Duan's statement concerning reporting back to Party Central, that the Vietnamese can deny having any documentation relating to this is absurd. The hortatory propaganda is indicative of the speaker's desire to refocus the cadre and improve morale, a problem mentioned in other communist documents. This type of internal propaganda was directed at the PAVN soldiers and cadre to bolster their morale after having suffering severe losses. Quang himself remarked on this type of false propaganda, noting that those who shaped public opinion did not always adhere to the facts. For example, numbers of aircraft shot down and prisoners taken were routinely embellished.

It is often difficult to come to definitive conclusions when using wartime Vietnamese communist policy documents; they lived in a environment of ruse, subterfuge, and deception. By design, their statements are frequently obtuse, but after working extensively with them one gains a feel for their true meaning and internal rhythms. While it is then even more difficult to adequately provide the reader with a similar sense, I have tried to compare the wording in this type of material to the 1205 document to show the reader the commonality of language and purpose, thus providing some quantifiable measure of authenticity.

While the speaker and audience are still open to some debate, I see no evidence that it is a fraud. A few minor errors are to be expected in a speech of this length. If it is disinformation, one should ask why--and at this juncture, there is no plausible rationale for the Vietnamese to have conducted such a campaign against the Soviets. By 1972, PAVN General Vo Nguyen Giap had swung away from Chinese military theory and toward the Soviets. In turn, the Soviets had supplied them with much of the military hardware to conduct the Easter Offensive, including T-54 tanks, 130mm artillery pieces, and Sagger antitank missiles. Since the disinformation rationale appears to have some disciples in the U.S. government, further study needs to be done, but the theory seems without merit. It also is a difficult proposition to prove or disprove, which probably explains its converts in the U.S. government.

This effort to understand the 1205 document should be a dynamic effort, one in which new material is constantly added to our current understanding. This enterprise, while strictly the work of a private individual, should provide the foundation for a more in-depth study by those with access to a wider range of classified and unclassified materials. There is a limit to what those outside the U.S. government can accomplish, as there are resources and intelligence files beyond our reach that should be able to satisfactorily answer many of the questions still surrounding this document. That the U.S. government did not deliberate more carefully on this document in 1993 is also telling. As George Carver, one of the CIA's preeminent Vietnam watchers during the war, testified, it is patently important - indeed, essential - to establish as definitively as possible whether the Morris document is genuine or is a planted forgery, a piece of 'disinformation.' Carver called for a commission of distinguished scholars to examine the document to determine its authenticity, not just for the section about American POWs, but overall. His desires were ignored, unless one accepts the DOD report as falling under that category. The families deserve a more thorough investigation of the report and not the cosmetic whitewash offered up so far.

Finally, given that Quang's comments were probably prepared in advance by controlling Party organs, and that Duan on several occasions referred to information coming back to Party Central, we can reasonably expect that the Vietnamese could provide similar and vastly more enlightening documentation on this matter. That they have chosen not to is indicative of both their true level of POW/MIA cooperation and a continuing sensitivity to providing the United States with Party and high-level information. Whether those engaged in negotiations with the Vietnamese on these affairs can persuade the communists to truly coop'rate and allow U.S. inspectors access to such material, let alone even broach the issue in sterner language than has been used so far, remains as much a question as the 1205 document.

Recommendations
The meetings with Khanh and Ky should be a simple matter to clear up. Both live in the States, and Khanh in particular has attended the last two Texas Tech meetings. A competent translator and interviewer should call Khanh and determine if such meetings took place. Both can be expected to deny any contacts, hence the need for someone of experience.

Actions for U.S. intelligence: Determine Quang's wartime location and command position as of September 15, 1972. Task NSA to examine their SIGINT holdings for the time frame to resolve his status, movement of the Politburo, and old A Group files to review if the Soviets transmitted this message as opposed to using a courier. Also, task DIA to reopen their wartime Order of Battle files for the same. Task the CIA to provide Quang's Personality File, as well as the MRTTH and MR-4 Command and Party Structure.

Competent Congressional authorities should immediately request and study all internal Clinton administration memos, e-mail, etc., pertaining to the 1205 document to determine if a desire for lifting the trade embargo was the motivating factor behind the swift dismissal of this document.

Task DOD to provide a summary of the intelligence it utilized in producing the January 1994 report, especially that outside of the POW material.

Send a qualified researcher to examine the Bulletins and Translation IIR's of the Combined Document Exploitation Center for this time frame and into 1974/75. The author was only able to cull documents from his personal collection and was unable to again examine NARA's holdings for other pertinent material.

Put the Crosby and Westcott case on the Discrepancy List due to the fact that their capture was reported in an official communist publication.
Annotated Bibliography

Report to Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Chairman of the U.S. Side of the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs from U.S. Senator Bob Smith, Commissioner, July 21, 1993: An Interim Analysis. A major compilation of documents and analysis of the Quang report. Still the best source of original material.

Congressional Record, October 31, 1995, pp. 16412-16415. Senator Bob Smith's remarks on the Senate floor during the debate over normalization. Includes much information passed to the U.S. by the Russians. Also see January 26/27, 1994, pp. S130-226.

Dr. Stephen J. Morris, The '1205 Document,' A Story of American Prisoners, Vietnamese Agents, Soviet Archives, Washington Bureaucrats, and the Media, The National Interest, Number 33, Fall 1993. Morris resoundingly answers his critics.

Mark Kramer, From the Russian Archives, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Fall 1993. A thoughtful commentary on the furor.

Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment, DOD News Release, January 24, 1994. DOD's response, focused almost exclusively on the numbers of American POWs.

Bill Bell, The Tragedy of American MIAs: Conspiracy or Politics as Usual?, Air Commando Newsletter, December, 1993. Bell's first survey of the document.

Bill Bell, The '1205' Document of Tran Van Quang, revised December 7, 1994, self-published paper. Bell's best effort, a more thorough analysis.

Bill Bell, Memorandum for the Record, December 15, 1997. Revised on January 13, 1998. Bell's response to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi cable.

Subject: Russian Documents on POW/MIA meeting with LTG Tran V'n Quang, Amembassy Hanoi DTG 040914Z Dec 97. Embassy cable on Peterson's meeting with Quang.

Various translations of captured enemy wartime documents from the wartime Combined Document Exploitation Center. Documents cited are from the author's personal collection. A vast and overlooked treasure trove of communist policies.

Douglas Pike, The Russian Document, Indochina Chronology, April-June 1993. Important commentary from a long-time Vietnam expert. Includes extensive secondary source bibliography.

Various American based newspaper articles.

Hearing before the House of Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, June 30, 1993. Some of the opening statements have been posted on the web site at http://www.aiipowmia.com

Dale Andrade, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle, (Hippocrene Books, New York, 1995). Excellent background material.

New York Times Index for 1972. Where would we be without it.

The Declassified Documents Reference System, 1997. The researcher's best tool for finding quick answers. In particular, the 1997 pamphlets contained material only recently declassified at the Gerald R. Ford Library that pertained to this time frame.

Endnotes
PAGE 22

PAGE 1

Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment, News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), January 24, 1994, pp. 2, 8. The page numbers cite the quoted terms in the same order. Ibid., p. 1.

Although the author understands that the American members of the Joint Commission have invested significant resources in determining the exact Soviet role with the document, and that the Senate Intelligence Committee is currently engaged in reviewing Vietnamese POW/MIA cooperation, which will be published as a Special National Intelligence Estimate, my statement is based on the total U.S. government response. Thus, until a coherent analysis of the document is published I will let the comment stand.

Reuters news wire, April 1, 1997, quoting Mr. Anderson. Several U.S. papers picked up the story, including the Boston Globe and the Seattle Times.

According to the cable from the Hanoi Embassy discussing Peterson's meeting with Quang, the Ambassador wished to further explore this matter to assist him in his discussion with members of Congress. This was probably sparked by the Senate Intelligence Committee investigation and the continuing interest of Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire. Thankfully, the document has not been forgotten by everyone. As recently as February 20, 1998, the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, writing in the Washington Times, discussed the document. See Jim Nicholson, Keep a Light Burning for our POWs, Washington Times.

Another of our main points, that military proselytizing was a critical but badly overlooked aspect, is also borne out by this document. More on this later.

DOD report, p. 9.

The Administrative section handled cadre affairs, such as maintaining lists of cadre and their assignments. Think of it as the Personnel section of the Party staff.

Albert Palmerlee, The Central Office of South Vietnam, Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 40, JUSPAO, p. 5. A translation of the captured notebook is attached to this publication. Other documents place Quang at an Enemy Proselytizing conference in North Vietnam in 1963, which is not surprising given that he commanded this significant political activity during the war against the French. For a full outline, see the biography in the Smith report.

Kien Tam Nguyen, Tri-Thien-Hue Battlefield (Thuan Hoa Publishing House, Hue, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1985), p. 7. The book is marked Internal Distribution Only, meaning the book was considered classified and not to be taken out of the country. Translation by confidential source. Fronts were established by the communists to perform a specific campaign for a specific time.

Letter from Garnett Bill Bell to the author, n. d. The author would like to thank Mr. Bell for his translation work and generous spirit in allowing the author to discuss many aspects of the 1205 document with him.

Bases of Power in the DRV, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes No.107, October, 1972, p. 9. This document also contains several references to Hoang Anh, author of the 735 document. The study reports Anh as Vice Premier and Member of the Secretariat of the VWP Central Committee, (p.3). On the next page it states, Of the three Vice Premiers listed, Hoang Anh is the senior in age and political experience, having been active in the Viet-Minh in Central Vietnam in the early 1950's. He was at one time a Deputy Minister of Defense and then Minister of Finance. On September 19, 1972 Hanoi Domestic Service announced that to his current assignment as Chairman of the Central Agricultural Commission has been added the chairmanship of a new... Thus, Quang's assertions that he didn't know any Hoang Anh are indeed strange, if not outright lies. This document seems to prove that Anh clearly should have been in a position to give the reported speech, despite U.S. depiction's of him as only a Minister of Agriculture. Obviously, many have forgotten that the Agricultural portfolio is one of the most important in the Party structure.

T.T. Nhu, Disinformation explodes after all these years, Las Vegas Review-Journal, April 27, 1993.

Tran Van Quang, Tet Offensive in Tri-Thien-Hue, Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, (Hanoi, January 1988), as quoted in the Smith report. Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service EAS 93-083, 3 May 1993, p. 51.

George C. Carver, Jr, Submission on Vietnam POW/MIA Matters, 'Testimony to the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 30, 1993, p. 15 'of his prepared statement, quoting the Nhan Dan article.

Senator Bob Smith Report to Malcolm Toon, Chairman of the U.S. Side of the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs: An Interim Analysis, dated July 21, 1993, p. 30. Smith's report is quoting a July 2, 1993 Memorandum from the Joint Commission based on a meeting with the Russians. This document appears in full in Smith's report.

Telephone interview with Rich Arant, Indianapolis, Indiana, February 13, 1998.

Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Missing American POWs: What Happened?,
Conservative Review, (Sept/Oct 1994), p. 31. While Sejna believed Quong and Quang were the same individual, he was uncertain until he could view a picture of Quang. According to Douglass, DIA never provided Sejna with a photo or moved in anyway to determine if the men were the same.

The wartime province party secretary of Thua Thien-Hue, Nguyen Van Bon, interviewed in early 1993 by Bill Bell, described Thu as the Chief of Staff for MRTTH. He also noted that the wartime location for the Party administrative apparatus was located inside Laos, and that there were actually two separate administrations, with the Thua Thien-Hue located with the Mountainous Region Front. See Oral History report 290859Z Jan 93 of Nguyen Van Bon by Bill Bell. Subj: Interview of Requested Source, Mr. Nguyen Van Thu, FM Cdr., JTF-FA to SecDef, DTG 120002Z Aug 93. According to the interviewer, He also said that in 1972, his troops attacked a bridge in Hue... Thu said he was the area commander...

Subj: Interview of Requested Source, Le Tu Dong, FM Cdr., JTF-FA, to DIA, DTG 301802Z Jul 93.

Susan Katz Keating, Prisoners of Hope: Exploiting the POW/MIA Myth in America (Random House, New York, 1994), p. 243.

US Delegation visits Hanoi; POW/MIA issues discussed, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, April 26, 1993.

Stephen J. Morris, The '1205 Document': A Story of American Prisoners, Vietnamese Agents, Soviet Archives, Washington Bureaucrats, and the Media, The National Interest, Fall 1993, p. 29.

Mark Kramer, The 'Morris' Affair, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Fall 1993, p. 29.

DOD Report, p. 3. The DOD was careful to state that it appears be an authentic Russian intelligence report...

Telephone interview with Dale Andrade, Washington, DC, January 16, 1998. What is little known is that the communists continued to target the 56th Regiment long after the supposed surrender. Several captured documents refer to focusing military proselytizing activities on the unit, and that although the unit's morale was low, the number of deserters in this unit is insignificant. See CDEC Bulletin #50,275, Military Proselytizing Activities Focusing on the 56th Regiment.

Opening statement of Dr. Stephen J. Morris, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, June 30, 1993.

Bulletin, p. 29.

Subj: 'Russ'an Documents' on POW/MIA, Ambassador's Meeting with LtGen Tran Van Quang, cable from Amembassy Hanoi, DTG 040914Z Dec 1997, p. 5. Hereafter referred to as Embassy Hanoi cable.

Emb'ssy Hanoi cable, p. 4.

Bill Bell, The 1205 Document of Tran Van Quang, self-published paper, dated December 7, 1994, p. 1.

Bill Bell, Memorandum For the Record, revised on January 13, 1998, p. 1.

Senator Bob Smith, Congressional Record, October 31, 1995, p. S16413. Senator Smith is quoting Captain 1st Rank Alexander Sivets of the GRU. Sivets works for the Russian side of the Joint Commission.

State Dispatch, April 26, 1993.

Stephen J. Morris, Ghosts in the Archives; Soviet Records Say Hanoi Held Hundreds of POWs. Will Clinton Take Heed?, The Washington Post, September 12, 1993, quoting the referenced State report. It must be noted that Morris was highly critical of the State report in general and this section in particular.

Embassy Hanoi cable, p. 2.

Political Indoctrination Material Disseminated by the P'litical Staff Department, Headquarters, SVNLA, CDEC Bulletin #50,356, Log #10-1145-72. The Primary Objective of the Revolution in South Vietnam as Conceived by the Political Staff, Sub-Region 1, Headquarters, SVNLA, CDEC Bulletin #50,376, Log #10-1165-72.

The author has used the translation found in Senator Bob Smith's report. Page numbers correspond to the page numbers of the translation section.

As a reminder to the reader, military proselytizing, or binh van, was one of the three pillars of Vietnamese liberation philosophy. Its design was to weaken the morale and cohesiveness of the military forces of South Vietnam, convince dependents to influence their relatives to desert, and insert fifth columnists into the ranks of the enemy. Pike and others have referred to it as the most deadly weapon in the communist arsenal.

VC Committee for Solidarity with People of the United States, CDEC Bulletin #8646, Log # 12-2664-67.

Existence of the International Information Office in Paris for the Denunciation of US crimes in VN, CDEC Bulletin #17,349, Log #10-1903-68. The document asks for a wounded child with a hideous appearance as a victim of US crimes.

Minutes of COSVN 1965 Military Intelligence Conference, CDEC Bulletin #129, Log # 01-1427-66.

Directive 302 Originated by COSVN, CDEC Bulletin #50,259, Log #10-1039-72. The book consists of letters written by former Vietnam Communist Party Secretary General Le Duan during the war. It was handed to Bell during a meeting between Senator Kerry and General Quang, and was brought up in the meeting as proof that Quang had not traveled to Hanoi during this time-frame. Bell recalls a conversation between the two in which the General informed the Senator, in response to Kerry's question, that Quang was in fact located with the MRTTH headquarters at A Ngo in Laos during this time frame. Later, Quang asked Bell if he was the one preparing the questions for the Senator, since he was taken aback by the question.

Duan's cover name was Ba. It is unknown if this has any connection to the Ba Be plan.

Edited by Hoang Chinh, Kim Thoa, Duc Luong, Huy Dieu, Letters to the South (Truth Publishing House, Hanoi, SRV, 1986), pp. 322-325.
Translation by Bill Bell.

Ibid, p. 326.

Military Proselytizing Activities to be Intensified by the Military Proselytizing Section, Quang Ngai Province Party Committee, VC Region 5, CDEC Bulletin #50,355, Log #10-1144-72.

Activation of Military Proselytizing Units, Military Proselytizing Section, VC Quang Da Special Zone Party Committee, VC Region 5, CDEC Bulletin #50,257, Log #10-1036-72.

Subject: My September 15 meeting with the North Vietnamese, From Kissinger to Bunker, DTG 182350Z Sept 72, DDRS #36, 1997, p. 1.

Proposal of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, September 26, 1972, DDRS, #392, 1997, p. 2.

Cable from Henry Kissinger to Ambassador Bunker, DTG 272143Z Sep 72, DDRS #1539, 1997, p. 2.

Flora Lewis, Kissinger and Top Hanoi Aides Hold 17th Private Talks in Paris, New York Times, Sept. 16, 1972, p. 3.

Editorial, Progress of Sorts in Mission To Moscow, New York Times, Sept. 17, 1972, Section IV, p.1, c. 4.

Subject: My September 15 meeting with the North Vietnamese, From Kissinger to Bunker, p. 5.

Dale Andrade, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, New York, 1995), p. 535. Mr. Andrade is summarizing from three earlier studies on communist objectives in the offensive.

Hanoi Aide Sees 4 More Years of War, New York Times, Sept 24, 1972, p. 3.

Training Material of the Propaganda and Training Section, Thu Bien Sub-Region Party Committee, COSVN, CDEC Bulletin #50,306, Log #10-1092-72.

CDEC IIR 6-028-0380-72. The document contains three translations, one of which has instructions on handling POWs sent by the NVA High Command. Although the dates are off somewhat, it could be one of the POW handling policies Quang mentions on page seventeen.

Plan for a Mass Uprising During the1972 Spring-Summer Offensive Prescribed by the Quang Ngai Province Party Committee, VC MR-5, CDEC Bulletin #50,357, Log #10-1146-72. Bell thinks this might be a veiled reference to the Ba Be plan. Ba Be roughly translates as three cracks or three cisterns. Since the plan calls for three actions, and the Vietnamese often did things in three's, perhaps this is the essence of the three cracks plan.

New York Times Index for 1972, p. 2429, describing the article for September 25, 1972, p. 15, c. 1.

Bulletin, p. 28.

General Zolotarev, speaking at the 13th Plenum of The US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs Thirteenth Plenary Session September 24, 1996.

Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Government Printing Office, January, 13, 1993, p. 70, quoting the Kissinger/Le Duc Tho exchange described in a White House Memorandum of Conversation dated September 26, 1972.

I extensively discuss all the prisoner releases and the various machinations of the antiwar protesters, the State Dept., and the desires of the DRV in my book Code-Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Operations During the Vietnam War (The Free Press, New York, 1998).

For example, see CDEC Bulletin #50,275, mentioned earlier. The second document listed on the Bulletin is a report on military proselytizing activities conducted during the first six months of 1972. The document was from the Secretary of the Quang Da Province Party Committee, Ho Huu Phuoc, and provides a lengthy listing of flags hung, slogans posted, letters sent, etc.

Select Committee report, p. 70.

Embassy Hanoi cable, p. 3.

The two men are listed as REFNO 1808.

Interview with Major Walter E. Boomer, Senior Advisor, 4th VNMC BN, 8 March 1983, USMC Historical Oral History Collection. The author wishes to thank Dale Andrade for providing this quote.

Nguyen Huy Toan and Pham Quang Dinh, The History of the 304th Division (Peoples Army Publishing House, Hanoi, SRV, 1990), p. 187. Translated by Bill Bell.

The possibility exists that the PAVN forces recovered the bodies of the two men, which would indicate the ability to unilaterally account for Crosby and Westcott. Either way, the Vietnamese should have the answers to the fate of these two men, answer which have not been forthcoming.

Embassy Hanoi cable, p. 5.

Carver statement, p. 12.

Article ©March 5, 1998 George J. Veith
All Rights Reserved