Authentication and Discussion on the '1205' Document

Authentication and Discussion on the '1205' Document
United States Senate

Memorandum for the Record:

Unclassified and Based Entirely Upon Unclassified Sources and Information

From: (REDACTED)

Date: April 8, 1993

Subject: Russian Document From Soviet CPSU Central Committee International Department Archives Reveals 1,205 American POWs Were Held in North Vietnam in September, 1972--Five Months Before Operation Homecoming Returned 591 POWs.

Summary: The Newly Acquired Russian Document Has Been Authenticated by the U.S. Executive Branch, and it Reveals That About 700 American POWs Were Kept Behind by the North Vietnamese in 1973. There is also Corroborating Evidence from Two Credible Sources, Buttressed by Declassified Overhead Imagery and Other POW Prison Systems in North Vietnam Where These 700 POWs Were Kept, Other Evidence Shows that Some American POWs Were Sent to the Former Soviet Union in yet Another Separate Prison System.

President Clinton was Briefed on this Document and its revelations before his April 3, 1993, Summit Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, But President Clinton Reportedly Failed to Bring up the Subject of POWs at all with Yeltsin. (End Summary).

1. ACQUISITION OF RUSSIAN DOCUMENT. In late February, 1993, a scholar from the Harvard University Russian Research Center discovered an important document while doing research in Moscow. The scholar's name is Steve Morris (Phd. Columbia University), and he was researching a book on Soviet-North Vietnamese relations during the Vietnam War. The document which Morris discovered was in the archives of the Central Committee, Communist Party Soviet Union, International Department, which was the successor to the "COMINTERN."

The document was a Soviet GRU (General Staff Military (Page2) Intelligence Directorate) translation into Russian of a presentation to the North Vietnamese (DRV--Democratic Republic of Vietnam) Politburo by a Deputy Chief of the North Vietnamese General Staff, General Tran Van Quang.

(Senior Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang is now retired, and currently serves as head of the Vietnamese War Veterans organization. General Quang has been the Vietnamese counterpart to General Vessey since Vessy's missions to Vietnam on POWs began in 1987. General Quang has been actively deceiving General Vessey for seven years.)

General Tran Van Quang's presentation to the North Vietnamese Politiburo concerned the status and number of American POWs in North Viet Nam as of September 15, 1972, which was five months before Operation Homecoming began in early February, 1973.

2. CONTENTS OF RUSSIAN DOCUMENT. The most important point in General Tran Van Quang's presentation was the statment that 1205 American POWs were then held in North Vietnam.

(But 3 Military Regions in South Vietnam, and parts of Laos and Cambodia, were not under North Vietnamese control, so any American POWs held captive in these areas were not included in the total of 1205. Moreover, about 60 more Americans were believed to have been captured in the last four months of the war, and these men were also not included in the 1205.)

3. AUTHENTICITY OF RUSSIAN DOCUMENT. The General's report also stated that North Viet Nam had acknowledged to the United States in diplomatic channels that it held only 368 POWs. This was an explicit admission within the document that the North Vietnamese had lied to the United States on the number of American POWs being held. The Russian document stated dramatically:

"WE HAVE NOT TOLD THE WORLD THE TRUTH ABOUT THE NUMBER OF THE PRISONERS."

This statement in the document was therefore an "admission against interest" which proves the document's authenticity.

Morover, the North Vietnamese indeed did acknowledge to the United States that some number--368--of POWs which it held as of September, 1972, also supporting the bona fides of the document. Finally, the U.S. Government believes in the authenticity of this document.

4. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: The document reveals that if there were 1205 American POWs in North Vietnam five months before Operation Homecoming, then at least 614 American POWs were left behind after Operation Homecoming returned 591 POWs from North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam.

Page 3, UNCLASSIFIED

However, about 60 more Americans were captured in the last 5 months of the war in various locations, and about 50 of the 591 returnees came from communist forces in South Vietnam. Neither of these groups, totalling about 110 POWs, were included in the 1205, and therefore must be added to the 1205, for a total of about 1315. When the 591 returneed are subtracted from 1315, the number left behind totals about 724. Thus according to the Russian document, at least about 724 American POWs were left behind in Vietnamese hands, and this does not include some 350 POWs/MIAs who are believed to have been kept in Laos by the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese, any American POWs in Cambodia, or any American POWs sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

5. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE: A member of the DRV Politburo, Mr.Le Dinh, defected to the West in 1979. He was debriefed (unprofessionally) by DIA, and he revealed that as of 1975, the Vietnamese possessed about 700 American POWs.

This number is consistent with the Russian document, and corroborates it. Mr. Le Dinh said that the decision had been made in 1973 to keep a large number of American POWs in order to trade them for their own people who were captured by the South Vietnamese, in the still ongoing war.

Le Dinh also mentioned POW camps about 60 kilometers Northwest of Saigon (designated "C-23, B-22, and B-17"), and Southwest of Hanoi which housed American POWs kept behind. Overhead imagery as recent as June, 1992, has detected ground signals at these locations containing emergency authenticators of American pilots known to have been captured.

Again, Le Dinh's statement that about 700 American POWs were kept back is authoritative, it is consistent with the Russian document, and corroborates it. Moreover, the belated returnee Robert Garwood reported in 1979 that several hundred American POWs were kept behind, and his bona fides have recently been confirmed by a Vietnamese Colonel.

Finally, the U.S. Defense Department expected about 1200 American POWs to be returned in Operation Homecoming, and was deeply disappointed that only 591 returned. This expectation of 1200, based upon strong intelligence evidence, is fully consistent with the Russian document, and also consistent with Mr. Le Dinh's evidence.

6. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: The document also states that the 368 American POWs who had been acknowledged to the United States to have been captured by North Vietnam were so-called "Progressives." Moreover, these 368 "Progressives" were those POWs "who could be freed first." There were also 372 "Neutrals," and 465 "Reactionaries" among the 1205 American POWs in North Vietnam.

Page 4. UNCLASSIFIED.

(The document also stated that 36 American advisors to South Vietnamese commandos, or "diversionary troops," were among the 1205 captured, and Garwood said that he had seen some of these American POWs and South Vietnamese commando POWs at "Tach Ba Lake" in North Vietnam, when Garwood had gone there to fix generators. The Vietnamese Colonel confirmed that Garwood had indeed been at "Tach Ba Lake" to fix generators there, as Garwood had claimed.)

7. DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN DOCUMENT: Steve Morris brought a copy of this document back to the United States in late February, 1993. He immediately recognized its significance, and made it available to a colleague at the Harvard Russian Research Center, Dr. Richard Pipes. Pipes had served on the National Security Council staff in the early Reagan years, and he immediately concurred in the judgment that the document was both authentic and highly significant. Pipes sent a memo describing and analyzing the document to Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to President Clinton, as well as a copy of the document itself.

8. PRESIDENTIAL INACTION: Tony Lake gave a copy of the Pipes memo and the document to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, who also gave it to DIA. The U.S. last week informed the Russians in diplomatic channels that we possess the document, but U.S. General Loefke has strangely not asked the Russians for confirmation of the document, all without authority from Washington.

Lake briefed President Clinton on the document before the Vancouver Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Meeting. Clinton reportedly did NOT raise the subject of POWs or the document during the Summit with Yeltsin.

9. FURTHER EVIDENCE CORROBORATING EXISTENCE OF SEPARATE PRISON SYSTEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM:

Admiral Tuttle, former Deputy Director of DIA, has stated to the Senate Select Committee that four factors obtained from debriefing the Homecoming POWs made him believe that there was at least one prison system separate from the one which contained the 591 Americans released during Operation Homecoming:

a) No amputees were repatriatied/

b) No returnees were interrogated by Soviet interrogators/

c) No returnees were debriefed about nuclear weapons matters/

d) No returnees were held in caves, even though U.S. Intelligence had evidence of American POWs held in caves in North Vietnam and Laos. There is additional, even stronger direct evidence of one or more additional, separate prison systems. At the time of the Son Tay raid on November 20-21, 1970, U.S. Intelligence had confirmed that there were 8 camps for American POWs---5 were in Hanoi, and 3 were (Page 5 Unclassified) outside Hanoi, at Son Tay, "Faith," and at "Briar Patch." The U.S. raided Son Tay, and found it to be deserted, but immediately after the raid, U.S. Intelligence detected emergency defensive reactions at Faith and Briar Patch, such as new anti-aircraft emplacements, trenching, and sandbagging. This activity indicated that these camps were occupied by American POWs. U.S. Intelligence also carried 18 other camps in the category of "suspected" POW camps. Immediately after the Son Tay raid, similar emergency defensive reactions were detected at three of these "suspected" camps--Cach Mai, Tom Giong, and Cam Chu, indicating these camps were also occupied by American POWs.

After the Son Tay raid, U.S. POWs at Faith and Briar Patch were consolidated into the 5 Hanoi camps, and some of the 591 returnees had at one time been held at Faith and Briar Patch. But there were never any returnees who had been held at Cach Mai, Tom Giong, and Cam Chu, and overhead imagery of ground signals of authenticators of known POWs as recent as June, 1992, has reportedly been detected at these three "suspected" camps. In Hanoi, at the prison complex known as the "Hanoi Hilton," there were reportedly about 160 POWs who participated in the so-called "Tap Code" system of communication, and who knew of each other and knew of all the Hanoi Hilton POWs.

Analysis of the Russian document reveals that the group of 591 Homecoming returnees probably consisted of the 368 "Progressives" who could be "be freed first," together with the 160 "tap coders" who knew the "Progressives," together with about 61 captured in South Vietnam and 12 captured in Laos. Most of the "Neutrals" and "Reactionaries," and the newly captured, plus those in Laos and Cambodia, and in the Soviet Bloc, were never returned. There seems to have been a separate prison system for each type of POW.

10. DE-BRIEFING OF THE 591 U.S. HOMECOMING POWS: All 591 Homecoming returnees were de-briefed, and many reported torture. Fear of torture was pervasive. The de-briefing reports established that conditions were so bad that a separate intelligence reporting channel called "Blue Plate" was established for derogatory information of POWs who "broke" due to torture or fear of torture. This corroborates the judgment that the 591 were mostly "Progressives" and those who knew them. The Senate Select Committee was not allowed access to most of the POW de-briefing reports, because they reportedly reveal that most of the returned POWs were broken by the North Vietnamese.

11. DEFECTING RUSSIAN COLONELS CONFIRM THAT AMERICAN POWS WERE TAKEN TO THE SOVIET UNION: Recently defecting Russian Army Colonels have reportedly confirmed that American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russian General Volkogonov, head of the Russian Commission on U.S. POWs, has reportedly confirmed this privately. There is other corroborating evidence that American POWs were in Eastern Europe under Soviet control, and also in the (Page 6, Unclassified) Soviet Union.

UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES:

1. TWO KNOWLEDGABLE JOURNALISTS:

2. POW EXPERTS AND RESEARCHERS:

3. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POWS DECLASSIFIED FILES AND RECORDS:

4. UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL ARCHIVES:

5. CONFIRMED ALL THE ABOVE INFORMATION WITH ONE KNOWLEDGEABLE INTELLIGENCE EXPERT IN AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, OVER NON-SECURE TELEPHONE LINE IN AN UNCLASSIFIED CONVERSATION.

CC CPSU
1 DEC 1972 38995

Must be returned to the General Department CC CPSU

CC CPSU

REPORTING:

Translation of the report of Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Vietnamese People's Army, General-Lieutanant Chan Van Kuang, at the session of the Politburo, Central Committee PTV, 15 September 1972.

This report outlines the operations which are being carried out by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in South Vietnam to establish the possibility for cooperation with and recruitment of representatives of the Saigon government; and army in support of the Patriots. With this in mind, contacts have been established and meetings conducted with several civilian and military leaders, to include generals Ngo Din Dzoo (Commander, 2C Regional Corps), Nguen Khan and Zing Van Min (former leader of the Saigon administration), Khoang Suan Lam (former Commander, 1st. Regional Corps), and others.

From the words of the reporter, during these meetings many of the generals have spoken against the Thieu regime and against the U.S. policy of "Vietnamization," they have acknowledged most to be part of the future governmental coalition for South Vietnam. The leadership of the DRV is convinced that, even though they have anticommunist views, these people will be able to greatly assist the Patriots in their goal to overthrow the Thieu dictatorship and the formation of a coalition government.

Chan Van Kuang has presented details of the plan "Ba Be" which was planned for execution in South Vietnam. This plan envisions the resolution of a number of tasks, the principal one of which is the physical extermination of the reactionary leaders of the Saigon administration.

The development of plan "Ba Be" was undertaken by the Ministry of National Defense of the DRV along with the Ministry of State Security, which was assigned responsibility for the management of its execution.

It should be pointed out that preparation for fulfilling (Page 2) plan "Ba Be" is going successfully. Up until the middle of September of this year 406 people, who had received special training and know local conditions well, have been sent from the DRV to South Vietnam. The task for carrying out operations according to plan "Ba Be" was also assigned to these people. The reinsertion into South Vietnam of specially trained agents is scheduled for completion by the end of September.

The report states that conduct of operations in accordance with plan "Ba Be" is scheduled for October of this year. It is assumed that its successful execution will assist to a significant degree the realization of plans for combat operations and will lead to the development of a favorable environment in South Vietnam for the Patriots and in addition, will exert substantial influence on the course of negotiations in Paris.

Chan Van Kuang shed light on American POWs in great detail. The total number of American POWs captured in the course of combat actions and who are now in the DRV consists of 1,205 of whom 671 were taken prisoner in North Vietnam, 426 in South Vietnam, 43 in Laos, and 65 in Cambodia.

There are 767 aviators among the prisoners, 3 of whom went through training for space flights, and 15 of whom have more than 4,000 flight hours each.

All of the American POWs are held in 11 prisons and were assigned to them according to military rank (there are 16 colonels, 104 Lieutenant colonels, 235 majors, and the remaining prisoners are of lower rank.)

It should be noted that in the course of the interrogations of the prisoners the VPA command succeeded in collecting valuable information on the Armed Forces of the USA, on combat equipment, and various types of weaponry, including chemical weapons, which provides the opportunity to develop countermeasures against the enemy.

According to the reporter, the U.S. government does no know the precise number of POWs in the DRV since the VPA command holds this information in strict secrecy, and up until now a list of 368 prisoners has been published officially. There are indications taht the leadership of the DRV considers that the issue of the liberation of American POWs is a part of the whole Vietnamese problem and can be regularized only after the resolution of the political and military issues.

Attachment:

1 brochure (incl. no. 14233), Top Secret, Copy no. 6.

Page 3 Top Secret

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Section of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union for
Communications with Communist and Workers
Parties of Sovialist Countries

Fund No. 5
Inventory No. 64
Case No. 478

Information from the General Staff, Armed Forces of the USSR on the situation in the DRV.

(information) on the "Ba Be" plan conducted by the DRV in South Vietnam.

Translation of:

reports and speeches of the Secretary of the Tsk PTV before the propaganda workers and leadership of central institutions;

(reports and speeches) of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Vietnamese People's Army in Tsk PTV Politburo sessions "On the results of VNA offensive actions' in South Vietnam and on goals of further combat actions;

(above has brackets around it and these: p.183-208)

a report of the Governmental Council session on the state plan for the development of the DRV's 1972 national economy.

DRV- Demokratichaskaya Respublics V'etnams,
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
TSK PRV - Tocentralmij Kemicot Partii
Trudyashchikhsyz V'etnams
Central Committee of the Workers Party of
Vietnam
VNA-V'atnamskaya Narodnayz Armiya, Vietnamese Peoples Army total = 02

General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
Main Intelligence GRU

Title: Report of the Deputy Chief of the Central Staff of the Vietnamese Peoples Army

General Lieutenant Chan Van Quang
at the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the PTV
15 September 1972

In addition to these questions in accordance with direction from the Politburo I will report to you today on American POWs captured on the various fronts of Indochina.

Dealing with American prisoners has always been under the jurisdiction of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions, such as the decision number 21 DCT dated 23 March 1971, and the decision dated 4 April 1972. Both of these decisions touch on the questions of exploiting these American POWs captured in time of war. This disturbs the public opinion of the whole world and the USA. There are various thoughts on the question of American POWs. Some of these are correct, others are not, who differ from the opinion of the Politburo. In their judgments these comrades are not taking into considerations the particulars of the developing situation and the inherent difficulties. These opinions hinder us in our search for methods of resolving the question of American POWs.

Honored comrades! The question of American POWs is very complex. World public opinion, and the public opinion of our brother socialist nations want to know the exact number of POWs located in North Vietnam. Allow me to inform you specifically about this question. From the time that the USA introduced their troops into Vietnam, expanded the air war against North Vietnam, and widened the general scale of their aggression, onto the territories of Laos, Cambodia, we have captured a very large number of American POWs on the fronts of Indochina. At first the number of American POWs was not large, and world public opinion paid little attention to them. However, after the imperialists of the USA started massive bombing and off shore bombardment by the 7th. fleet on 5 August 1964 of the territory of North Vietnam, after expanding their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia, the number of American POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day. The number of American POWs in the DRV has not to this day been made public, we have kept this figure secret. At today's session of the Politburo, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American POWs.

The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of Indochina, in other words in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, (Page 5) Laos, and Cambodia totals 1205 people. Of this number, 671 people were captured in North Vietnam and 143 pilots (were captured) in South Vietnam. This means the total number of pilots, and diversionary [special operations] (American advisors on special craft), captured on the territories of North and South Vietnam comprise 814 people. In addition, from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured 391 people, including in South Vietnam---283, in Cambodia--65, in Laos--43 people. 814 and 391 comprise 1205 people.

Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.

In North Vietnam, we have captured 624 American pilots, including: 7 Colonels, 85 Lt. Colonels, 183 Majors, in other words, the total number of senior officers of the US Air Force and Navy comprise 275 people. The 624 American pilots include 3 astronauts, in other words, three people who have completed the necessary training for space flight. For instance, Jim Katlo, (who was) captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 U.S. Air Forces aces, having more 4,000 flight hours each; Norman Klarvisto, Carmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. Such are the specific data on American pilots captured in North Vietnam.

Among the other 47 prisoners, captured in North Vietnam, there are 36 special operations forces advisors who were inserted in the border region between DRV with Laos; individual special operations personnel who were conducting reconnaissance of transportation routes from helicopters and reconnaissance vessels; and several seamen who abandoned their damaged vessels and were picked up by us. Therefore the figures 624 plus 47 add up to 671.

In South Vietnam we have captured 143 U.S. aircrew members, mainly helicopter pilots, and some jet pilots.

Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, we have 9 Colonels, 19 Lt. Colonels and 52 Majors. The remainder are officers from Captain down, and American enlisted men.

In summary, I want to remind you that the 1205 American POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam are:

- pilots, captured in North Vietnam - 624;

- pilots, captured in South Vietnam - 143;

- special forces and other American servicemen, captured in North Vietnam - 47;

- American servicemen of other categories - 391, of whom 283 (Page 6) were captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.

All of them are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently we have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large prisons; however, after the American effort to free their POWs from Ha-Tay (Son Tay) we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds approximately 100 POWs.

Seven Air Force Colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels of other services captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (16 officer in all) are being held together; we are attempting to understand the current situation in the American Army, gather the information we need, and determine our relationship to it.

104 American Lt Colonels are kept together and we are attempting to extract from them materials and secret information about disposition of troops, and information concerning the Defense Department of the U.S. 235 Majors are concentrated in two camps.

Thus we have dedicated special prisons for the senior American officers; one for Colonels, one for Lt.Colonels and two for Majors. The rest of the POWs, Captains and below, are at other prisons.

A few words about the political views and the inclinations of American POWs.

368 POWs have progressive inclinations. They well understand that this war is unjst and unpopular on their part. They condemn the American administration and express a decisive protest against this war. We will be able to liberate these 368 POWs first of all under the condition that, as a result of the struggle of the progressive peoples of the world (including the American people), a favorable international environment will take shape, thus forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of the political issue. We are carrying out work with this category of POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being carried on by the Nixon administration and the nature of the Nguyen Van Thier regime, and also to make them understand the unjust character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their political views.

372 of the POWs hold neutral views, i.e., their political outlook is not fully progressive, yet not too reactionary. We fully believe that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.

(Page 6 of this document)

The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they hae not changed their reactionary views.

The following is a summation:

-- 368 POWs holding progressive views can be liberated first of all;

-- 372 POWs hold neutral positions;

-- 465 POWs hold reactionary views.

All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e., they do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest against his policies, and they invalidate our course of action. We understand that these officers are products of rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of this.

We well understand that the question of American POWs has great significance for the resolution of the South Vietnamse problem. WE must continue propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to their understanding of the nature of the aggressive war which the USA is carrying out in Vietnam, as well asthe senseless obstinance of Nixon, which only delays the liberation of POWs and their return to their homeland. Soon we will free several POWs in order to put pressure on Nixon's government, observe his reactions and those of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in this matter.

Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the fronts of Indochina (in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently kept in prisons in North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American army, a basic part of which is made up of American pilots.

The large number of American pilots imprisoned during the time of Johnson and Nixon inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This should cause the government of the USA and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend to resolve the question of American POWs in the following manner:

1.The government of the USA must demonstrate concessions, in other words, a cease fire and the removal Nguyen Van Thieu, repatriating POWs to the Nixon government.

2.During the time that the American that the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems, we can free some more pilots from the number who are progressively inclined. Nixon should not hinder the return of these pilots to their homeland and not undertake (Page 7) any disciplinary measures toward them.

Here then are the principles on the basis of which we may resolve the problem of American POWs. However, Nixon continues to resist the solution of the Vietnamese question, thereby delaying the resolution of the problem of American POWs.

I have reported these specific numbers and fundamental aspects of the problem of American POWs to the Politburo. But we have comrades who also don't understand this problem correctly. It is necessary to resolve this question taking into account stabilizing the military and the political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a path of concession toward Americans and liberate POWs we would be at a great loss. That is why our point of view on this issue remains the same: this issue must be resolved on the basic of military and political stabilization aspects.

The composition of the 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us. Most importantly, 1205 POWs, particularly pilots, is a great loss to the American Army, particularly the U.S. Air Force. At the same time we are able to collect data about American weapons and valuable scientific materials about U.S. Army (for instance, material on how to utilize different type weaponry, tactical/technical characteristics of the aircraft, instructions of the air force, as well as materials about other types of armament of the U.S. Army,) We have been able to uncover U.S. intentions in the international arena and on a number of other issues, which are related to war in Indochina.

That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs was and continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW issue, then the other issues will not exert any influence in our policy toward the United States, that is why we right now we are concentrating on the successful resolution of this problem, why we study materials from interrogations from American aviators who were shot down over North Vietnam and American scientists who were captured in this war (particularly Air Force specialists, as well as scientists in other technical areas). Their loss is a major demoralizing factor for the American Army, because in no other war have there been so many captured Americans as there are in this war of aggression.

1205 American POWs are kept in the prison of North Vietnam--that is a large number. For now, we have officially, published a list of 368 POWs, the rest are not acknowledged. The government of the United States is aware of this, but they don't know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume an approximate number based on their losses. Therefore in (Page 8) accordance with the decree from the Politburo we keep secret the number of POWs.

We are continuing to collect and study materials from POW interrogations...

[Continuation not provided.]