CHAPTER I

Antecedents

Although it had been universally customary for warring powers to exchange captured military personnel once peace had been made, in 1919 the Bolsheviks established a precedent by using Allied prisoners of war as pawns in an attempt to force the Allied powers to extend diplomatic recognition. Because these Bolshevik actions set the stage for Soviet machinations following World War II, a brief account of them is necessary.

The 1918-1919 Anglo-American Winter War with Russia, or the Intervention in Russia, occurred as a direct result of the Bolshevik coup that overthrew the legitimate post-Imperial government. The United States, already involved in the war in Europe, was supplying the Allies with war materiél, some of which had been sent to the Russians at Archangel, Murmansk, and Vladivostok, along with the military personnel to guard it. (1)

After the coup in Moscow, the Allies were faced with the dilemma of "Who's in charge in Russia?" When the Bolsheviks seized power, they initially maintained contact with the Allies. (2) The Allies strengthened the Bolsheviks' bargaining position with the Germans, but Lenin's promise to the Russian people of "Peace, Bread, and Land" made it impossible for the Bolsheviks to continue fighting on the Allied side. (3) Lenin had to make peace with the Germans in order to consolidate his power and turn his forces against the growing anti-Bolshevik military threat. (4) Before the Soviets signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in 1918, however, Trotsky had ordered the Murmansk Soviet to cooperate with Allied forces to protect the vast amounts of supplies stored there. (5) The German occupation of the Baltic countries and landings in Finland threatened the supplies. To protect the materiél and keep it from the Germans, the Allies landed more troops at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok. (6) Although Trotsky had originally ordered cooperation with the Allies to prevent a German attack on Murmansk, after March 3 the Bolsheviks no longer feared a German attack. (7) The treaty did, however, raise the Allies' fears that the supplies would go to the Germans. (8) On the Western Front the Allies now faced German troops who had been withdrawn from Russia and sent there. (9) The Germans were no longer suffering as severely from the Allied blockade because the treaty with the Bolsheviks gave them access to many sorely needed items. (10) Because of this, after March 3, 1918, the Allies sent even more reinforcements to Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok.

After the war in Europe ended, the Allies were concerned lest these supplies fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks. There was growing fear among the nations of the West that the Bolsheviks were planning to carry their revolution to neighboring countries. (11) As an alternative to Bolshevik domination, the Allies supported various anti-Bolshevik groups. After signing the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, the Bolsheviks viewed the increased number of Allied troops on Russian soil as a threat to them and to Russia. (12) The Allied presence did serve the Bolsheviks as a propaganda device in their war with the Whites. (13) Accusing the Allies of territorial designs on Russia, they protested the stationing of Allied troops in Russian territory. The Bolsheviks also appealed to the "masses" of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan to overthrow their bourgeois governments and stop the intervention, then began arresting Allied citizens. The Allies responded by arresting Bolsheviks, although the United States deported rather than detained the Russians. (14)

The American forces sent to Russia were placed under British command in violation of President Woodrow Wilson's original intent and despite his warning that:

^{Military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it [and] would be of no advantage in the prosecution of...the war against Germany. [The United States could not, therefore,] take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle.... Military action is admissable...only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance....the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed...is to guard military stores and to render... aid...which may...be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence.} (15)

United States forces were, nevertheless, used in combat missions.

During the fighting, the 339th Infantry Regiment suffered casualties, including both KIA (killed in action) and MIA (missing in action). The 339th departed in the summer of 1919, and by the following spring all United States and other Allied troops were out of Russia. (16) As the British withdrew they seized a number of hostages to trade for British POWs and MIAs held by the Bolhseviks. (17) There were several hundred unaccounted for British, American, and French troops. The official history of the American expedition states that there were "hundreds missing from our ranks." (18) First Lieutenants Dwight Fistler and Albert May of I Company attempted to secure the release of captured Allied servicemen. "We had 500 Russian prisoners. They had seven of ours. We were worried about hundreds missing from our ranks and arranged a truce to effect an exchange....Negotiation was difficult....But the Reds learned what we were up for, and haggled. The end was, they traded us two of the seven Americans for the 500 Russian soldiers, and we had to toss in a round of cigarettes to seal the bargain. We never did learn what had become of the missing." Official United States military cables cited only about 70 MIAs, ignoring the hundreds mentioned in Fistler's and May's account. (19)

Negotiations for the repatriation of the missing failed. Colonel J.A. Ruggles, the United States military attaché in Archangel, reported on April 14, 1919, that "negotiations for the exchange of prisoners have been terminated by orders from General Pershing, after having been delayed, although under discussion from both sides, through the failure of the Bolshevik commander to obtain authority from Moscow." The Bolsheviks' refusal reflected their realization that the MIA/POW issue could be used to their advantage. (20)

The withdrawal of the Allied military forces left the POW issue in diplomatic hands. Russian intransigence over the return of the POWs was a Bolshevik attempt to force the United States and other Allied governments to deal directly with them, which would constitute de facto recognition and tacit withdrawal of support for the White forces.

The United States refused, however, to fall into that trap. On May 12, 1919, the Secretary of War informed Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk that with regard to "negotiations with the Bolshevik government in Russia for the exchange of Allied prisoners...a cablegram was sent to the Military Attache on May 1, reminding him that the United States has not recognized the Bolshevik regime as a government either de facto or de jure." (21) This United States' non-recognition policy made it difficult for the Bolsheviks to obtain credits and loans that would have helped stabilize their economy and, indirectly, the Bolhsevik regime. The United States did not, however, give in to emotional, political, financial, or any other type of blackmail or extortion in order to facilitate the release of its citizens. (22) As Secretary Polk wrote on June 24, the United States had no intention of recognizing "the so-called Soviet Government of Russia" and did not contemplate "recognizing any Government in Russia not based on democratic principles." (23)

Despite being adamant on the issue of recognition, the United States continued to press for the release of its citizens. The government refused, however, to "deal" for just one or two individuals. As acting Secretary of State Davis would inform the United States Minister in Czechoslovakia in 1921, "The Department has deemed it unwise to single out any one individual American citizen for special consideration, but based its endeavors on the broad ground of principle." (24) The government made many attempts to obtain the release of American citizens. The United States also made no distinction between military prisoners and civilian detainees, for to do so would have complicated an already maddening situation. The British and French governments had also tried to obtain the release of their nationals from the Bolsheviks. After the reported arrest of French nationals, Polk ordered the United States Ambassador to France to "learn...what...cooperative action on the part of Great Britain, France and the United States might be effective in obtaining the release of subjects of...the three governments." (25) A similar telegram was sent to the British, and Davis reported that they had made a proposal to the Bolsheviks an exchange of prisoners. "It is not thought that it will be accepted but that a counter proposal will be made in reply to which the British government would like to make a demand which would include our nationals who are imprisoned, as well as their own." Consequently, the Foreign Office would "like to be informed as soon as possible [as to] the number of American citizens imprisoned in Russia and where they are....[It is believed] there is but one British civilian prisoner at Petrograd and 50 or 60 military officers and men at Moscow." (26) Polk responded that the Department would be very glad to have included in the proposed demand for exchange the American citizen Kalamatiano...[but] the number of American military prisoners in Russia, if any, is not yet definitely known. (27)

According to G.J.A. O'Toole in Honorable Treachery (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1919), p. 294, Xenophon Dmitrevich de Blumenthal Kalamatiano had worked in Russia for the Case Company, a manufacturer of farm equipment machinery. While in Russia he married a Russian woman who was a member of the Tsarina's court. This gave him an entree into the closed circles of the court. He left Case and became an independent agent for some thirty American and European firms. It was during this time, in 1914, that he was approached by an agent for Secretary of State Lansing and asked to report any court gossip he might pick up, which he agreed to do. A mail drop was established in New York and when the United States entered the war in 1917 his intelligence role was expanded and he was given a State Department salary of $2400 a year. He was also given other funds to open safe-houses and hire agents in Russia. Eventually, his role having grown, he was given a case officer, DeWitt Clinton, who was a foreign-service officer attached to the American Legation. Kalamatiano (and other sources) proved to be invaluable, providing important insights and information about the Bolsheviks. This information showed for example "that the Sisson documents linking the Bolshevik leaders to the German government were bogus." (p. 265) Unfortunately for Kalamatiano, he had been "made" by the Cheka. Due to a former spy of the Tsarist secret police who worked in the Embassy and "whom Dzerzhinski [head of the Cheka] had coerced into working for him...from about October 1917 onward Dzerzhinski had read all of Kalamatiano's intelligence reports." Kalamatiano and his network were arrested by the Cheka, and he and his "principal sub-agent, Lt. Col. Alexandr [sic] Friede, a Russian officer, were sentenced to death. Friede was shot, but Kalamatiano was confined in Lubianka...apparently on the orders of Lenin, who saw him as a potential pawn in dealing with the United States." Kalamatiano was eventually freed in August 1921 and returned to the United States. According to Ernest Volkman's Warriors of the Night (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1985), "Kalamatiano returned to the United States and took up his teaching again, but was later killed in a hunting accident." Ft. #28, p. 383. See also Telegram No. 4589 To: The Ambassador in Great Britain, From: The Acting Secretary of State, February 21, 1919, in FRUS 1919, Russia, pp. 173 -174.

The United States government continued to try, through other intermediaries, to obtain the release of American prisoners, but without success. On February 10, 1919, the State Department received a new Bolshevik offer to trade an American citizen and an English missionary (although it is unclear whether it was an English missionary or English mission) for Bolsheviks held by Allied troops. The United States refused to consider the proposal unless it included the American Consul Tredwell. (28) Again the Bolsheviks inquired if the United States government had agreed to the proposal "made by the Bolshevik government for the exchange of Russian prisoners at Vladivostok against simultaneous delivery of Kalamatiano at [Moscow]." (29) The United States had, however, no Bolshevik hostages and sought substitutes. When they asked the French government for help, the American Consul in Paris reported that the "French Government would be most happy to cooperate in every way possible with the United States in obtaining the release of the citizens of the two nations...[but] the only effective manner of dealing with the situation was the exchange of imprisoned citizens and...unfortunately the French have just effected such an exchange with Russia." Consequently, there were no "important Bolshevist persons remaining in France" who could serve for the exchange. (30)

On March 31, 1919, Chargé Grant-Smith in Denmark informed Polk that Bolshevik Commissioner Karasu Khan (31) had informed the Danish Red Cross that "all civilian and military Americans...now arrested in Russia will be liberated as soon as the Russian subjects now arrested at Blagoveshchensk [and] Vladivostok are liberated. All...who might desire to leave Russia will be exchanged with the previously mentioned Russian subjects and will be able to cross the Russian frontier at the proper place simultaneously with return...of the Russian subjects." (32) In the meantime, Consul Haynes at Helsingfors reported that he had worked out a way to obtain the release of prisoners by allowing the Bolsheviks to "purchase from America at current prices...about $260,000 [worth] of drugs" for which the Bolsheviks would be "required to deliver to me on [the] border about one hundred American, British and French prisoners." He also requested full discretionary power to make [the] bargain. (33) Secretary Polk refused, however, as one of the prisoners was the American Consul Tredwell, whose detention was a gross violation of international law. "His release and safe delivery outside the territory under Bolshevik control must be insisted upon as a condition to entertaining proposals for negotiations with Bolsheviki for release of other prisoners...[your] plan cannot, therefore, be approved....[Furthermore] proposal has not been communicated Nav[al] intel[ligence] [sic] and that so far as the Department of State is concerned no proposal to effect the release of American prisoners, including civilians improperly detained, in return for right to purchase drugs in this country would be approved." (34) Consul Tredwell was released, along with twenty-one other prisoners, eleven days later on April 25, 1919, without any bribe or promise of reward to the Bolsheviks. (35)

Unfortunately, the freeing of Tredwell did not presage a general release of American prisoners, either military or civilian. The Bolsheviks continued to hold other Americans as well as other Allied nationals, and they still demanded the release of "arrested Bolshevik Russians." A report from the Moscow office of the Danish Red Cross on April 4, but not received by the U.S. State Department until May 15, 1919, informed the U.S. Chargé in Denmark that the Bolshevik Commissioner of Foreign Affairs had asserted "that contrary to reports of the American State Department....there are beyond dispute arrested Bolshevik Russians with the Americans at Vladivostok and Blagoveshchensk and...remaining Americans...will not be released before these arrested Russians have been released." A later report from the same source, dated April 26, stated that "chances for exchange and departure are growing worse and worse, so that the Allies ought to accept proposals as soon as possible. It is almost too late even now concerning Kalamatiano and the other arrested Americans." The Danes proposed that the United States authorize them by telegram to agree to the release of "all Russians arrested for political offenses in east Asia, Vladivostok, and Blagoveshchensk" in return for the Americans. If the Bolsheviks accepted the proposal and released the Americans without waiting for the arrested Bolsheviks to arrive, the United States was to "permit Russia to buy and import American medicine through the Danish Red Cross." The Danes were sure the Russians would accept the proposal if it were "forthcoming from the American government in the very near future." (36)

On May 27, however, Polk informed the Chargé in Denmark that the "Department has positive report from American consul, Vladivostok, confirmed by General Graves, that Americans have not taken any Bolshevik prisoners in Siberia either at Blagoveshchensk or elsewhere." (37) In response to a second dispatch from Grant-Smith and dated May 15 (but not printed), Polk ordered the Chargé to "reiterate to Danish Red Cross that American authorities in Siberia hold no Bolshevik prisoners whatever." Polk also said that the United States had "no objection to Danish Red Cross purchasing in this country medicines for needy population in European Russia." Polk added that the United States government could not possibly object to a "humanitarian matter of this kind...proposed through neutral agency such as Danish Red Cross....[but] in these circumstances endeavour to secure the release of Kalamatiano." (38)

On June 25, 1919, Polk informed the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris that the Danish Red Cross would try to include Kalamatiano in its negotiations for British and French prisoners whose release was being arranged in return for the repatriation of Russian soldiers in France. It had been suggested that shipping be provided for the exchange of the prisoners, which Polk agreed to. Polk also inquired as to what action was "being taken by the French government for the repatriation" of Russian soldiers. The American Mission in Paris informed Polk that the "French Foreign Office considers that negotiations for the exchange of the French subjects now prisoners in Russia have come to a standstill and that nothing is to be expected from the Bolsheviks." The French were, nevertheless, going to "repatriate the Russian soldiers in France as soon as possible" even without "reciprocal action on the part of the Bolshevik government." (39)

The return of all Russians outside of Russia or with Allied forces was something that the Bolsheviks had insisted upon in all their dealings with the Allies. In 1919, William C. Bullitt, on his "unofficial" mission to Russia, attempted to discover under what conditions the Bolsheviks would agree to a cease-fire in the ongoing hostilities. The Bolsheviks responded that they would accept only their own proposals provided they were "made by the Allied and Associated Governments on April 10th." In the proposals the Bolsheviks had demanded that the "Allied and Associated Governments [were] to give a general amnesty to all Russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and to assist their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia." And in return for the Bolsheviks giving "full facilities for repatriation" of those "prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in Russia" as well as "all nationals of those powers now in Russia," the Allied governments were to repatriate "the Russian prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, likewise all Russian soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all foreign armies." Upon the signing of the agreement, the Allied governments were to withdraw immediately "all troops of the Allied and Associated Governments and other non-Russian governments...from Russia and military assistance [was] to cease to be given to anti-Soviet Governments" that had "been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire." (40)

This March 16, 1919, document, although couched in diplomatic terms, demanded the repatriation of Russians, especially Russian officers, whether prisoners of war or serving in an Allied army. In addition to the aforementioned demands, the Bolsheviks insisted on formal diplomatic recognition and the repatriation of all expatriate Russian nationals. The United States refused, however, to recognize what was at best nothing more than a minority government, and which had "no mandate from anybody." (41) The United States was not the only country refusing to bow to Bolshevik pressure. The British Foreign Office assured the American Ambassador that Britons were not participating in the Dorpat Conference: although a British officer happened to be at Dorpat, he was "under strict instructions not to discusses politics." And the British representatives in Copenhagen were there only to discuss an "exchange of prisoners between British and Soviet Governments [and] are similarly instructed" not to discuss politics. (42)

The British Mission at Copenhagen under James O'Grady had been instructed to "enter into negotiations with Litvinoff [who was] representing Soviet Government Russia for exchange of war prisoners, military and civil." (43) O'Grady informed the American Ambassador that he expected the negotiations to last about a week, or longer if Litvinov brought an armistice proposal. O'Grady's personal opinion was that stopping aid to Denikin and Kolchak "would logically imply raising [the] blockade." In Denmark, American Minister Hapgood concluded his report on his talks with O'Grady by stating that "outside arrangement for prisoners...[O'Grady] has power only to examine proposal[s] and report." (44)

Secretary of State Lansing believed, however, "that the negotiations for the exchange of prisoners may become the forerunner of more general discussion with the Bolsheviki." He therefore ordered Hapgood to remain "entirely aloof from the negotiations...and in no circumstances come in contact with Litvinoff." Reports had reached Lansing that the Commissar of the Interior at Petrograd had "reported to the Council of Peoples' Commissars at Moscow that [because of a] lack of cooperation among workmen and their failure to grasp communistic principles, the early fall of the Soviet Government is inevitable unless recognition can be obtained from the Allied and neutral countries." Lansing also suspected that reports of Lenin and Trotsky holding democratic elections for an assembly, and the talk of an alliance with the moderates as well as rumors that they would make peace overtures to Kolchak and Denikin, were nothing more than an attempt to create "public sentiment abroad favorable to a composition with them." Lansing was concerned that the British government would "give to the Bolsheviki at this critical juncture the moral support they would derive from negotiations of a general nature...or an expectation of recognition." He believed that this would give the Bolsheviks the false assumption that they would not have to make concessions to their opponents in order to maintain their grip on power. (45)

In response to Lansing's concerns, on November 28, 1919, the British government stated that British representatives at the Copenhagen conference were "most emphatically instructed not even to listen to any peace proposals from Bolsheviks." (46) The next day, however, Polk informed Lansing that he had met with Lloyd George. In the course of their conversation, Lloyd George informed Polk that the British would "give no further aid to Kolchak or Denikin" after the current supplies were disposed of. Lloyd George was convinced that it was no use to continue helping them, for they were losing ground in the fight against the Bolsheviks. His view was "that the time has arrived to see whether it is not possible to reach an agreement with the Soviet Government." Lloyd George also believed that the Bolsheviks who were "anxious for peace...were prepared to recognize their international obligations." (47) On November 30, Hapgood informed the Secretary of State that the situation in Russia was such that four courses of action were open to the United States, but that probably the most effective course was to do nothing. The prevailing opinion at the Paris Peace Conference was to treat the "Russian situation as a civil war and to favor no faction." Hapgood's opinion was "that Bolshevism must inevitably be increased, strengthened and spread by war and must inevitably disappear in peace and prosperity." (48) On December 2, 1919, he informed the Secretary of State that Litvinov's credentials, which had been signed by Lenin and Chicherin, had turned out to be "extremely sweeping....[giving] him full power to conclude peace with any country on general terms indicated and also to alter such terms....O'Grady has applied [to] London [for] greater powers. [In addition] difficulties in the negotiations about prisoners [were] caused by Litvinov's wish to include Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria." Hapgood also informed the Secretary of State that O'Grady was beginning to concentrate on foreign trade. (49) At the same time Ambassador Davis reported that the British Foreign Office had assured him that all "negotiations with Litvinoff have so far been confined entirely to proposed exchange of prisoners. No reports have been received from British representative regarding Bolshevik peace offer." (50) It was obvious that the Bolsheviks were using the prisoner question as leverage to force diplomatic discussions, which would include trade, an exchange of consuls, and then full diplomatic missions. On December 10, the Allied missions in Denmark all received letters from Maxim Litvinov that should be regarded as "a formal offer of peace on the part of the Russian government." (51) Chargé Schoenfeld in Denmark informed the Secretary of State that he, in concert with the other Allied Embassies, had returned Litvinov's note with a statement that "I am not authorized to receive communications of this character from him. This decision was based on the grounds that Litvinoff's mission here was directing [sic] in connection with exchange of prisoners and that this attempt to open peace negotiations [is a] violation of [the] ruling under which he was allowed to come to Denmark." (52)

For more than a year there was no movement in the negotiations for prisoners, but by January 1921 the situation was beginning to change. (53) That month the Czechoslovakian government offered to assist "in repatriating Americans in Russia or help them in other ways....There are several hundred Russians in Czechoslovakia many of whom are prisoners who have not been returned to Russia nor are they included in the numbers of prisoners of war [now] being repatriated to Russia." The Acting Secretary of State ordered the American Minister in Czechoslovakia to thank the Foreign Office for the offer of "assistance in repatriating Americans in Russia and...Department would appreciate any efforts they might...make." (54) By February 26, 1921, however, it had become apparent that there would be no movement on the prisoner issue, as Litvinov was now a "strong factor in foreign policy and [he is] determined to request recognition of Soviet Russia before dealing with foreign powers."(55) A month later Nansen inquired as to whether or not "there is any likelihood that the Government of the United States will soon be willing to negotiate direct as the Soviets have frequently intimated a desire that it do so and, [as] negotiations have been quiescent for several months, this seems a favorable occasion" for doing so. (56)

On March 30, the U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia (Crane) informed the Secretary of State that the Czechs were of the opinion that the Soviets expected the United States to "treat with them directly on the question [of American POWs] and that the Americans are held more or less as hostages." The Czechs would, of course, keep trying, but neither they nor Crane expected success. (57) On April 7, 1921, Nansen, still acting as agent for the American government in the matter of prisoner repatriation, telegraphed Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs George V. Chicherin that he had been requested to try to obtain an agreement concerning the release of American prisoners held in Russia. Nansen hoped that the Soviets would "allow all Americans [to] leave Russia, in which case, I feel certain it will be possible to bring all Russians you desire back from United States." Nansen also had new lists of Americans known to be in Russia and whose release was desired. The Soviets replied on April 9 that "as for American Government we will wait until it enters itself in negotiation with our Government upon matter referred to....We cannot see why [American Consul] should not enter in negotiations reciprocal repatriation." (58) The American Minister in Norway informed the Secretary of State that the French had been treated in the same manner. The French government "had been promised the release of all French in Russia but they were not released and negotiations were conducted through a French official owing to Russian insistence and the French Government at once stated that its fleet would bombard the towns on the Black Sea if the persons retained were not forthcoming immediately. As a result all were promptly released." (59)

In May 1921, the Secretary of State ordered Schmedeman to inform Nansen that the United States would not even communicate with the Soviets until all Americans were released. The American public was beginning to lose patience with the Soviet refusal to repatriate American citizens; therefore "it would be desirable to make the foregoing message to him public...[but] ask if he believes...[that] this will interfere with his efforts to secure the release of Americans or if it would embarrass him." (60) Nansen replied that not only should the reply be published but that he was thinking "of sending the text to the Soviets." (61) Whether or not Nansen sent a copy of the United States telegram is unrecorded, but if he did, and there is no reason to believe that he did not, it received a prompt response. Nansen's reply to the Secretary of State had been sent on May 10; the Soviet reply to Nansen's subsequent communique was received on May 15. "Answering your wireless of May 13th [are we] to understand that the detention of American citizens in Russia is the only hindrance to the resumption of trade and de facto relations between Russia and the United States of America?" Nansen asked the United States for approval "to reply personally and not on behalf of the Government of the United States that such detention is not the only hindrance but is a very serious one." (62) The next day, May 20, the Secretary of State replied that "Nansen should reply personally that this Government declines to discuss any question of hindrance to resumption of trade or to consider such resumption in any aspect until American citizens detained in Russia are released unconditionally." (63)

In June the Secretary of State learned from a letter sent by two Americans confined in a Moscow prison hospital that "American prisoners...[were being] held for exchange purposes....Americans are continually changed from place to place and information [on] their whereabouts withheld." The letter indicated that "Americans in prison have received especially cruel and inhuman treatment following Cooper's escape...some of the them...cannot survive under present conditions." (64) The Secretary of State asked the American Ambassador to Great Britain if the British might be able to bring "effective pressure...upon the Bolhseviki." Secretary of State Hughes ruled out direct negotiations with the Bolsheviks because he was convinced "that the Bolsheviki would make such negotiations the occasion for discussing innumerable unconnected issues involving the general relations of the United States with the Russian Soviets." (65) On July 1, 1921, Schmedeman informed the Secretary of State that Nansen had "received no reply to his telegrams [and] that Litvinoff seems opposed to the release of American prisoners....Also suggest following the plan adopted by France to force the release of French prisoners. [April 12, 1921, Cable 12]" (66)

Conditions were soon to change, seemingly in favor of the United States. On July 15, 1921, Secretary of State Hughes was informed that Maxim Gorky had appealed to Nansen to help obtain supplies from the United States to feed the "Russian people...[many] of whom are doomed to hunger and death." Nansen replied on July 14 that only the Americans would be able to help the Russians, owing to their "unique charity work during and after war," but warned him that a "serious obstacle will be that Americans [sic] citizens are retained in Russia and in Russian prisons....Urgently advise that they be released at once, otherwise...you cannot expect much help from America." (67) Of all the openings in the process of getting Americans home, this seemed to offer the most promise. The United States appealed again to the British, who were quite willing to help. American Ambassador Harvey informed the Secretary of State that Lord Curzon had "expressed most warmly his desire to help us in this matter. He is giving instructions to Hodgson, who is head of the Trade Commission leaving here for Moscow tomorrow, to do everything he can to secure the release of Americans detained in Russia or betterment of their conditions at least. Full lists and data [emphasis added] are being supplied to Hodgson for his confidential use." (68) Unfortunately, during this time Nansen informed the Americans that he had received a telegram from Chicherin in which he reiterated the Bolsheviks' refusal to discuss releasing any Americans. (69) The only hope, therefore, was trading aid for prisoners. The Bolsheviks would "win" no matter what. If the United States refused to send aid, then the Bolsheviks could use that as propaganda to emphasize how the West was trying to destroy Russia. If the United States did send supplies, the Bolsheviks could return as many prisoners as they wished. They could claim that the lists that the United States supplied were erroneous, or that they had no control over their field officers, as they had done in the Tredwell affair. (70) Aid even without recognition would supply the Bolsheviks with exactly what they wanted, an infusion of food and medicine, which they would not have to purchase with hard currency on the world market. They would have to make no concessions other than to return some prisoners. Except for recognition, the Bolsheviks would get everything they wanted and manage to keep the upper hand by returning more prisoners than the United States had asked for; this implied not only that there were still more Americans being held but would also embarrass the United States government. Reports indicate that there were indeed more Americans being held, but none ever came home.(71) Most of the prisoners returned in the Aid agreement were women and embassy and business employees. (72)

On July 25, Secretary of State Hughes sent a personal telegram to Litvinov through Albrecht, the Consul at Reval, in which he told Litvinov that there would be no relief until all American prisoners were released. (73) Three days later Gorky informed Herbert Hoover, Chairman of the aid program, that the Russian government found the "proposal quite acceptable as to its basis including the release of American prisoners." (74) According to Hoover, on August 2 Chicherin had sent a telegram to the foreign offices of Europe and the U.S. State Department asking for help. Except for the U.S., no concrete offers of help were made in response to the appeal. (75) On August 8, Litvinov informed the American mission in Reval that "all Americans in prisons and camps in Moscow are being sent to the frontier in number of six....If other additional are found in Petrograd they will be included in the party." (76) Two days later Consul Albrecht notified the Secretary of State that the six had arrived. Albrecht noted that one of the prisoners, who had been listed as Hazlewood, was actually Russell Pattenger, who had been "captured on January 22nd, 1920 while five hours from Red Army at Vladivostok while member of Company A, Siberian replacement detailed to temporary duty base hospital 17 and gave name Thomas Hazlewood because [he was] required to sign paper he could not read." (77) On August 12 Izvestia reported that Chicherin had announced that all "American citizens may leave Russia after presenting satisfactory proof [of] citizenship to Anglo-American division commission Foreign Affairs." (78) It seems apparent, however, that the United States was suspicious of Bolshevik promises. Commissioner Young at Riga reported to Secretary of State Hughes that "Keeley, whose arrival [is] expected shortly, should be able [to] give us accurate information regarding Bolshevik real attitude in matter [of] Americans still in Russia." (79)

On August 20, the United States and the Soviets signed the Riga Agreement, which spelled out the conditions under which the United States would undertake to carry out relief work in Russia. Among the conditions was the return of American prisoners. Specifically, the Agreement stated that

^{The Soviet Authorities having previously agreed as the absolute siné qua non of any assistance on the part of the American people to release all Americans detained in Russia and to facilitate the departure from Russia of all Americans so desiring, the A.R.A. reserves to itself the right to suspend temporarily or terminate all of its relief work in Russia in case of failure on the part of the Soviet Authorities to fully comply with this primary condition or with any condition set forth in the above agreement.} (80)

It should be pointed out that the U.S. authorities knew there were more than the six prisoners who had been most recently released or the US would not have needed this clause after the August 8 release, nor would Chicherin have announced on August 12 in Izvestia the aforementioned statement on citizenship proof.

On August 22, Secretary of State Hughes, in response to Young's warning, informed him that Hoover had also expressed doubts about Bolshevik veracity. Chairman Hoover had telegraphed John C. Miller, Chief of the American Relief Administration Mission to the Baltic States, that the Bolsheviks/Soviets might be using "satisfactory proof of citizenship" to "permit further detention of American citizens on technical grounds as many Americans have no doubt lost their identification papers." Hoover also noted that others, whom the Bolsheviks would seek to retain, "are wives and children of naturalized American citizens now in this country....Relief Administration anticipates liberal interpretation of clause in agreement covering release of Americans. Inform Litvinov." (81)

On September 1, the Soviets released more than 100 Americans. This number was many more than the American government had officially estimated as being prisoners, despite the military reports of numerous American military men being held.(82) In his memoirs, published in 1961, Hoover stated that Secretary of State Hughes had told him that "the Department knew that there were about twenty of them....the number [released] was a surprise." Hoover also claimed that those who were released were Russian naturalized American citizens who had fled to Russia "to escape from crimes committed in the United States." (83) If that were true, then it still begs the question as to what happened to the Americans captured in the so-called Winter War. The published documents for 1921 have no further information on American prisoners in Russia after September 1. Indeed the last printed document that deals specifically with prisoners is dated August 22, 1921. One may infer that the United States realized that it would never get back its citizens without recognizing the Soviets as the legitimate government of Russia. This the administration had already refused to do, and it would continue to refuse to do so until 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the Soviet government. Unfortunately for Americans still being held prisoner, there was no quid pro quo. In return for recognition, the Soviets delivered nineteen sets of remains. (84) Given the relatively primitive nature of forensic science in 1933 and the decomposition of the remains, it was impossible to determine that the remains were actually those of American soldiers or soldiers of any other Allied nation.

Exactly how many Americans were prisoners, MIAs, or dead? The Secretary of War published figures of 137 Killed in Action (KIA) (including 28 presumed killed), 43 dead of wounds, 122 dead of disease, 46 dead of accidental causes, and 5 suicides, for a total of 353. (85) These figures, however, "conceal the fact that out of the 144 combat deaths of American soldiers officially reported in 1919 in Northern Russia, 127 of those deaths, or 88% of those official combat death figures," included "some 70 MIAs declared dead, and...57 soldiers who were declared KIA-BNR [Killed in Action-Body Not Recovered, emphasis added]." This mixing of MIA and BNR figures with the KIA figures makes it impossible to gauge the credibility of the official count, which the government itself admitted in 1930. In a War Department memorandum to the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject: Alleged confinement of American Officers and Soldiers in Russian prisons: "An administrative determination has been placed on each of their records that they were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing." All of the men who had been designated MIAS were thus "determined to be KIA-BNR on the date they were reported missing." It was an admission that there were still American prisoners of war in Soviet hands in 1930, and that the United States had no way of getting them back. They were, therefore, written off as dead. (86) This practice established a precedent for World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

In this same period another precedent was being established, and that was the problem of Russian prisoner of war repatriation. With the defeat of the Central Powers, the Allies were faced with cleaning up messes left in Germany. One of those messes was Russian prisoners of war. Sick, starving, and longing for their families, the Russians could not be repatriated as the British and French prisoners were. There was a revolution ending and a civil war beginning and these men were in no shape emotionally, physically, or politically to return to Russia. Many of the former Tsarist officers were offered repatriation to any place they wished to go, including destinations outside Russian territory. Most expressed, understandably, a desire to return home, but as J. Stuart Castle (87) stated:

^{Before the final dispersal, we had already heard reports of ex-prisoners being executed on return to Russia. Apparently, the Bolsheviks were in a frenzy of suspicion about those who had spent time abroad, and these ex prisoners were considered 'politically unreliable'. Soon I received a letter from the inter-Allied Commission, instructing me to warn them of the dangers facing them if they returned to Russia. Carrying out this instruction, I particularly remember the response of some officers of the Guards Regiments of St. Petersburg and Moscow. "But we are Russians!" they insisted. "We are going back to our own country, our own people. How could such things happen?" I could only repeat the warning. Many went back. What happened to them was learnt from a few survivors who passed the news to Russian emigre circles in the Netherlands: they were herded into the square of a small town and machine guns were turned on them.} (88)

If these Russians, both officers and enlisted men, were not to go home, then where were they to go? No other country expressed a willingness to accept large numbers of them simply because they would constitute a potential Bolshevik fifth column. (89) That concern is apparent from the documents printed in the Foreign Relations series of 1920-1922.

The precedents for tragedy were established. The ingredients of war, POWs, diplomacy, and threats would provide for an even greater tragedy in subsequent wars.

CHAPTER 2

The Agreement

In 1944 it was apparent that the Germans were losing the war. The Allies began their preparations for peace. Among the preparations made were those dealing with the prisoners of war. Both Allies and Axis had many prisoners and it was becoming apparent that the Allies were going to have to come to some agreement or protocol in order to facilitate the repatriation of Allied POWs.

Chapter II

Although before December 1941 the United States was not a participant in the European war, nor officially at least, contemplating declaring war on Germany or the Soviet Union, for reasons the protagonists found difficult to appreciate, the American Government was deeply concerned over the treatment accorded to German and Russian pws. It was, ostensibly, a humanitarian concern underlaid by the fear that Soviet mistreatment of German prisoners would cause Germany to retaliate against Soviet prisoners. It would not, US officials suspected, end there, for it could lead to mistreatment of British, French, and other Allied pows, some of whom quite possibly might one day be Americans. The government, whatever its underlying and unexpressed reasons, set out to persuade both Nazis and Soviets to treat their pows according to the humane terms agreed on in international conventions. For US diplomatic officials, this proved to be a frustrating enterprise. In addition, US fears were not shared by the British. (1)

On August 9, 1941, the US Ambassador Harriman informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull that he had received a note from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. It stated that the Soviet Union would observe the Hague Convention of 1907 regarding warfare on land, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 regarding chemical and bacteriological warfare, and the Geneva convention of 1929 regarding care for the wounded and sick of warring armies. The Soviet Government would, however, observe the agreements "with respect to Germany...only insofar as they are observed by Germany." (2) From the US point of view that left much to be desired.

On August 19, Hull asked Ambassador Steinhardt if the Soviets would observe either the 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention or the Geneva Convention of 1906. (3) On August 26 and on October 21, he repeated the query. (4) In the October 21 telegram Hull informed Steinhardt that the War Prisoners' Aid Committee of the Young Men's Christian Associations had requested State Department aid in securing Soviet permission to serve German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. Steinhardt replied that the Soviets had not responded to any of his queries. He had learned, however, that whenever American Red Cross representatives had attempted to discuss their adherence to Geneva with Soviet authorities, the Soviets noted that they found it unnecessary to adhere to the Geneva Convention. The Soviet Government said it was treating German prisoners much better than the German Government was treating Red Army personnel. Steinhardt observed that "the point of view was also expressed that the Soviet Government is unwilling to adhere to this convention because of its attitude toward Switzerland, whose failure to recognize the Soviet regime has long been resented."

Steinhardt also pointed out that the Soviets had refused permission to observe military operations to the British Military Mission, the British Military Attachés, and the American Military Attachés; they had also refused the American Red Cross limited supervision over its own supplies, much less freedom of observation or movement. Why, Steinhardt asked, did the YMCA think it would receive any different treatment? (5)

The Secretary of State evidently was of the opinion that perseverance would sway the Soviets. Accordingly, on November 7, Hull instructed Steinhardt to approach the Soviet government again. He pointed out the Geneva Convention was not being applied to Soviet prisoners in Germany because the Soviets were not a signatory of the Convention and the Nazis, therefore, felt there was "no obligation upon Germany to apply its provisions to Soviet prisoners under German control." Hull feared that if the situation continued, "the treatment not only of Soviet prisoners of war but of all other prisoners of war in Germany may become worse." Even though Hull knew the Soviet Union was "extremely reluctant because of the nature of its relations with the Swiss Government to adhere to the Prisoner of War Convention in the manner prescribed," he felt Soviet compliance would be the most effective step that could be taken "toward the humanitarian objective the Department has in mind." Steinhardt was to take up the matter with the appropriate Soviet authorities and urge them to consider the matter most seriously. The United States was prepared to act as "a friendly intermediary for the delivery to the Swiss Government of an act of adherence to the Convention by the Soviet Government." If this approach failed, then Steinhardt was to suggest that the Soviets conclude a reciprocal treaty between themselves and the Germans. Hull suggested the two use the first 88 Articles of the Geneva Convention as the basis for their reciprocity, and added that the US would be willing to act as intermediary in this also. (6)

On November 14, Hull ordered the US Ambassador to Great Britain to inform the British Government that the US had suggested to the Swedes that as the representatives of Soviet interests in Germany they do everything they could to convince the Soviets that a reciprocal treaty with the Germans would enable Sweden to act as the protecting power for Soviet pws just as it was already doing for the Belgians and the British. Hull hoped that the British Government would "communicate with the Soviet Government in this matter in view of the possibility of deterioration of the treatment of British prisoners in German hands" if conditions continued to deteriorate for Soviet prisoners. Hull also noted that the General Secretary of the International YMCA, Tracy Strong, had discussed this subject with Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States. Strong had informed Lord Halifax that there was a possibility of "a general deterioration of the treatment of prisoners of war arising from non-observance by the Soviet Government of the Geneva Convention." (7)

On November 12 the Swedish Government had ordered its representatives in the Soviet Union to discuss the matter with the Soviets. It also informed the US that it had approached the German Government in October on the same subject. The German Government replied that it had attempted to obtain just such a reciprocal agreement with the Soviets. In late July it had attempted to approach the Soviet Government through the Bulgarian Government. The Soviets claimed, however, that "no such proposal had been received from the Bulgarian Government and that the Soviet Government did not feel obliged to take the initiative." (8) The Soviets had informed the Germans that they had "no intention whatever of concluding any kind of convention with the German Government regarding prisoners of war, and made only the demand of the German Government that the internationally recognized provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war," particularly those in the Hague Convention of 1907 regarding the rules and usages of land warfare, "be precisely observed." (9)

The Germans responded to the Soviet demand that before "Germany could reach an agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the prisoners of war, the Soviet Government would have to change thoroughly its treatment of the German prisoners of war." The Soviet Government had stated, furthermore, that "in its relations with Germany in the matter of prisoners of war it merely wished reciprocal observance of the rules of land warfare and did not intend to conclude any other agreements." The final nail in the coffin for the prisoners was that although Ribbentrop, the OKW, and even Dr. Goebbels had urged Hitler to accept the Swedish proposals, Hitler had refused for two reasons. One was that he did not want German troops on the Eastern front to think that if captured they would be treated in "accordance with treaties." The second was "that the Russian Government, by comparing names could discover that not all Russian soldiers who had come into German hands were alive." (10) Neither the Soviets nor the Germans had any intention of treating the other's soldiers in accordance with any international treaty. Neither country showed the least concern over the welfare of its own captured soldiers.

Both countries continued, nevertheless, to use the prisoners for propaganda purposes. The Swedish Government felt that while both countries were interested "to a certain degree" in an agreement, "neither is generally willing to permit actual inspection of prisoner of war camps and...both will probably find further excuses as time goes on to avoid any definite agreement permitting such inspection." (11) When the Swedish Minister, Per Vilhelm Gustaf Assarsson, approached Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinski about the pw issue, Vyshinski complained about German "atrocities being inflicted...not only [on] Soviet prisoners of war but on Soviet civilians in the occupied areas." The Soviet Union could not possibly have any dealings with a state that committed such atrocities, and had already said that it would observe the Hague Convention of 1906. When Assarsson suggested that the Soviets issue a declaration regarding this stance, Vyshinski was noncommittal but said he would "refer it to his superiors for consideration." (12)

On November 25, the Soviets replied to the American note of November 13 on prisoners of war and expressed their gratitude for US efforts on behalf of Soviet prisoners. The Soviets disagreed, however, that the Germans mistreated Soviet prisoners simply because "the Soviet Union is not a participant of the Geneva Convention of 1929 and that Germany is not under obligation to apply the regulations of this convention to prisoners of war in Germany." The Soviets pointed out they had informed the Germans that they would observe the 1907 Hague Convention, but the Germans had systematically violated "all international treaties and agreements including those concerning the treatment of prisoners of war." The Soviet Government also desired to "direct the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the circumstances that Germany, which is a party to the Geneva Convention, is obliged regardless of whether the Soviet Union is also a party to the Convention completely to observe all rules and regulations of the Convention by virtue of Article 82 thereof, which establishes that in time of war if one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, the Convention's regulations will nevertheless remain as obligatory as between belligerents which are parties to this Convention." (13)

The Soviets also pointed out that the only reason they were not signatories of the Geneva Convention of 1929 was because of article 9, "which establishes the distribution of prisoners of war in the camps according to their race, which is in direct contradiction with Article 123 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Precisely on this basis, the Soviet Government cannot give its assent to the adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the Geneva Convention of 1929."

Thurston, the American Chargé in the Soviet Union who had received the note, inquired of Vyshinski if the Soviets were issuing a "formal and definitive refusal" to adhere to the Geneva Convention. Vyshinski agreed that was what the Soviet Government had intended. Thurston then suggested that the Soviet Government might wish to announce its willingness to apply articles 1-88 upon terms of reciprocity to prisoners of war in its control. Vyshinski said that he would report Thurston's suggestion, but that this would entail acceptance of Article 9, which the Soviets ostensibly found so offensive. (14)

The German and Soviet governments both found their own prisoners of war a major embarrassment. For their part the Germans had not expected the war to last very long in the East, and they certainly did not expect German soldiers to surrender to the Red Army in any appreciable numbers. (15) The Soviet Government could not help but be embarrassed by the numbers of Red Army personnel who surrendered without even firing a shot. Whole companies, to a man, surrendered to the Germans in hope of being able to fight the communists. (16) By the time the Soviets began to mention the plight of their prisoners, their motive was not so much a humanitarian concern as damage control. The fact was that the Soviets were embarrassed to admit that 2,053,000 Red Army personnel had been taken prisoner before November 1, 1941; by March 1, 1942, 3,600,000 had surrendered to the Germans. (17) Alfred Rosenberg, in a report to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), noted that on February 28, 1942, the Germans had taken "3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able to work fully. A large part of them has starved...." Translation of Document 081-PS, 1/1 /41 g.Ks, The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [OKW], Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76; Subject: Prisoners of War; from The Reich Ministry of the occupied Eastern Territories [Rosenberg], quoted in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. III, Office of US Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946 (Washington D.C., 1946), p. 117. Also the first major defection of Russian soldiers to the Germans occurred on August 22, 1941. Nikolai Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal, 1944-1947, (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 40

Some of these prisoners had been captured during battles, but others had surrendered because they saw the Germans as liberators and not conquerors. This was an admission the Soviet Government could not make, nor could it admit to the mounting losses. Either the Red Army was poorly led, poorly trained, and generally inadequate, or the German army was so overwhelmingly superior that it was all but irresistible. Stalin could never admit that millions of his soldiers hated living under communism so much they preferred to surrender to the hated Germans. (17) Prisoners were therefore traitors, and Soviet resources were not to be wasted on them. (18) At best, as prisoners of the Germans, they would be a drain on German resources . That is probably why the Soviets, other than for propaganda value, demanded that the Germans live up to the Geneva Convention of 1929 in their treatment of Soviet prisoners.

The Nazis for their part were faced with explaining how "sub human Slavs" could defeat "Aryan Supermen." A few prisoners could be explained away as having been taken while unconscious or wounded, but more than a few meant either cowardice on the part of the Germans or that the Slavic Soviet Army was as good as the Wehrmacht. (19) Both were unthinkable for the Nazis. Neither side, therefore, had any desire to have outside parties oversee how they were treating their prisoners or to admit how many of their nationals were prisoners of war. As the Swedes pointed out, neither the Germans nor the Soviets would consider allowing outside inspection of their prisoner of war camps. (20) The Germans had no intention of treating the "sub-human Slavs" humanely, but did not care to publicize it. (21) The Soviets had no intention of allowing any outside power to see the inside of a Soviet prison camp and learn how miserably their prisoners fared.

On November 25, the Soviet Government released a note to all the embassies in Moscow and also published it in the Soviet press. It described Germany's mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war and also its inhumane treatment of Soviet peasants in occupied territories. Soviet soldiers and peasants, the note stated, were being tortured with hot irons; eyes were gouged out; amputations "of legs, arms, ears, noses, and fingers, disemboweling and quartering by tanks [sic]." The note also stated that Soviet prisoners were also used as human shields, the sick and wounded were deprived of medical treatment, and all were being starved. Buried in the note, however, was an attempt by the Soviets to counteract revelations of Soviet personnel working for the Germans. The Soviets "alleged...that...Red Army prisoners are driven by threats and beatings to serve as wagon drivers, chauffeurs, and in other capacities to carry munitions to the front and as porters carrying munitions to firing positions." (22)

What was most important was not German atrocities or the starvation of Soviet prisoners, but the fact that Soviet prisoners were working for the Germans. If it were not already evident to the world it soon would be, because the Soviets were aware that these prisoners would be an effective propaganda tool for Germany. The Soviet Government therefore presented these prisoners as forced labor and not as willing participants. The truth was that they were not forced labor, for most had volunteered almost from the moment of capture or surrender. Despite Hitler's orders that the Ukrainians and the Russians were to be enslaved and Russia occupied, German front line commanders welcomed these hilfswillige (23) with open arms as there was a shortage of personnel on the front lines. Some "all-German" units contained up to 10 15% Russian pows, and many Russians were employed in paramilitary maintenance, supply, transport, engineer, and labor battalions. "Also in 1941, the Abwehr...began organizing several one- to two hundred-man companies of Russian scouts. These grew so rapidly that they soon lost their reconnaissance character and took on regular, antipartisan assignments." (24) This was a huge embarrassment to Stalin and the Soviet regime. Evidently, the significance of the November 25th note was either lost on the American government or it was politely ignored.

The United States continued to attempt to ameliorate conditions for Soviet prisoners. On December 9, Secretary of State Hull optimistically telegraphed Thurston that "Department is pleased to note that there appears in the final paragraph of your report [No. 1977, November 26, 1941,] ground to hope that means may eventually be found of obtaining the mutual application" of the Geneva Convention to both sets of pws. Hull referred to Thurston's suggestion that the Soviets make an "official declaration to the effect that the Soviet Government was prepared upon terms of reciprocity to apply to prisoners of war" the Geneva Convention using "some revision of phraseology" to avoid conflict with the Soviet Constitution over Article 9. Hull also hoped that the agreement "would include the guarantee established in Article 86 of that [Geneva] Convention for the effective application of its terms, namely the periodical inspection of the camps by the representatives of the protecting powers." Hull and the State Department considered Article 86 "of primary importance." Hull ordered Thurston to communicate to the Soviets the importance of the inspection of prisoner of war camps as integral to guaranteeing good treatment of the prisoners. (25)

Chargé Thurston responded on December 16. He asked if he was to continue working on the prisoner issue now that the US had entered the war. He told Hull that he had asked Vyshinski about the November 26 suggestion. Thurston had been surprised to learn that Vyshinski had considered the matter closed because of his government's stated objection to Article 9, but he would again "lay the suggestion before his Government and inform me of its suggestion [decision] [sic]." Thurston expected the compromise to be rejected again as would "the final alternative suggestion...in Department's 1199, November 7. 1941" of a bilateral agreement between the two belligerents based on the Geneva Convention. Thurston was of the opinion that the real problem was not Article 9, but the "fear that adherence to the Convention or acceptance of the suggestions would entail the inspection of prison camps in the Soviet Union." (26)

On December 23, Chargé Dickerson telegraphed Secretary Hull that he had called upon the Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office, Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin. Vyshinski had ordered him to inform the United States that the Soviet Government had issued its definitive response to Hull's suggestions on November 25. The Soviets reiterated that except for article 9 of the Geneva convention and certain other "very insignificant [points] to which the Soviet Government raises no objection, the Geneva Convention is identical to the Hague Convention." One of those "very insignificant points" was on site inspection of the prisoner camps, something that did not fail to pass the notice of the Secretary of State. (27)

On the same day Secretary Hull ordered Thurston to point out to the Soviets that the Hague Convention was "much more restricted in scope than...the Geneva Convention and that...the difference" lies in the obligatory inspection clause required by the Geneva Convention. Hull also assured Thurston that US participation in the war did not change his orders, and that the US Government "intends to apply the Geneva Prisoner of War and Red Cross Conventions, both of July 27, 1929, to all prisoners of war that it may take and, in so far as the provisions of the Prisoner of War convention are adaptable, to any enemy aliens that may be interned by this Government." Hull concluded by again insisting on on site inspections of pw camps. (28)

On December 24, 1941, Joseph C. Green, Chief of the Special Division, sent a memo to Assistant Secretary of State Long suggesting that he bring up the subject of pws, and the Geneva Convention with Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov. Green hoped that Long could persuade the Soviet Ambassador "to prevail upon his Government to apply the Geneva Convention or a regime similar thereto in all respects." (29) Ambassador Litvinov was no stranger to negotiations concerning pws but it is unlikely that he would have proved sympathetic in the matter. Evidently, from published documentation, the US finally concluded that the matter was, for the moment, a futile cause. On December 30, Assistant Sec. of State Long issued a memo indicating that the Sec of State agreed that it was "inopportune to pursue further at this time the question of the adoption by Russia of proposals to agree to the Geneva Convention." The US' continued efforts to get the Soviets to honor the Geneva Convention had failed; it was now felt that the United States "should refrain from any particular urging upon the Russian Government." (30)

It was not until May 29, 1942, when President Roosevelt personally inquired as to the treatment of Soviet pws, that the US again tried to find a way to help Soviet prisoners. At a meeting with Molotov and Litvinov at the White House, Roosevelt inquired of Molotov as to German treatment of Soviet pws. Molotov replied with the usual stories of cruelty, torture, starvation and general inhumane treatment. The Germans he said evidently felt that they did not have to abide by any rules while the Soviets were following the Hague Convention "to the best of their ability." When Roosevelt suggested that at the very least, there should be some way to exchange pw lists, Molotov replied that they would not give the Germans the "slightest pretext for claiming that they [the Germans] were observing any rules whatever, because the fact was, they were not doing so." (31) Molotov showed no interest in any suggestion for ameliorating conditions for Soviet pws. Harry Hopkins' notes on this meeting state that it was evident the State Department wanted the Soviets to adhere to the Geneva Convention, and that the inspection clause probably was the biggest sticking point for both Germany and the Soviet Union. "You don't have to know very much about Russia," Hopkins wrote, "or for that matter Germany, to know there isn't a snowball's chance in hell for either Russia or Germany to permit the International Red Cross really to inspect any prison camps." According to Hopkins, Molotov said that the Soviets would not give the Germans any diplomatic advantage by allowing them to claim they were living up to the Geneva Convention when in fact they were not doing so, and the Soviets knew the Germans would lie about it anyway. (32)

The Soviets were consistent, if not humane--their non-concern about prisoners was general, not specific. During 1943 the United States attempted to transship Red Cross parcels, medicines, and mail to pws of the Japanese. Soviet responses to American pleas for help are filled with the typical Soviet responses of agree and delay, agree and pass the buck, agree and fail to do it. (33) Nothing was done until Secretary of State Hull informed the Soviet Government that its failure to implement transhipment of supplies to prisoners was causing a serious backlash in America. According to Hull, the increased public pressure on the United States Government brought by the relatives and friends of the prisoners "is becoming politically embarrassing." Hull noted further that it was being "pointed out that since substantial shipments of lend-lease materials are being sent in American ships across the Pacific to the Soviet Union, it should be possible" to arrange with the Soviet Government for the shipment of the "comparatively modest amount of relief supplies" for transshipment to the prisoners. The US public failed to make the distinction "between the furnishing of lend-lease materials to Soviet Russia and the shipment of relief supplies to American prisoners of war...and the Government is finding it increasingly difficult to make this distinction clear in a way which will not reflect upon the Soviet Government's cooperative spirit." (34)

Evidently the implied threat to the Lend-Lease shipments, however vague, was enough to impel the Soviet Government to send a strong note of protest. It stated that the American public criticized the Soviet Government because of "insufficient or incorrect information [received by] sections of American public regarding actual position of Soviet Government in matter." Therefore it was quite "clear that the Soviet Government cannot assume responsibility for situation." Because the Soviets saw no direct connection between Lend-Lease and relief supplies they could see no "basis for the statement that American Government finds it embarrassing to explain distinction...in such a way as not to reflect upon cooperative spirit of Soviet Government." (35) At this time, nevertheless, the Soviets reluctantly began the actual business, albeit slowly, of gathering and readying relief supply shipments. (36) Unfortunately for the prisoners, the Japanese refused to accept the shipments. (37) Later, however, it would seem that the Soviets would view this understated (to the point of non-existent) threat to Lend-Lease as very real. (38)

Soviet non-concern over prisoners of war soon changed. In 1943 the Western Allies began to capture Russians in German uniform in North Africa, and during the invasion of Italy still more were captured. (39) The Soviets had feigned ignorance of Soviet soldiers serving in the German Army but, after the capture of these soldiers they could no longer pretend that any Soviets serving the Germans were doing so under duress. (40)

The Germans, through the Swiss, had threatened to retaliate against American and British prisoners in their control if the Soviets were returned to the Soviet Union. (41) The United States and British governments informed the Soviets that any Soviet in German uniform who claimed the protection of the Geneva Convention would not be repatriated to the Soviet Union, for the time being. (42) It became apparent that some type of agreement would have to be reached concerning the disposition of Soviets captured in German uniform and repatriation of respective citizens in general. (43)

On July 13, 1944, the Soviets issued a stern note concerning an alleged press conference held on July 9 in London by one of General Eisenhower's staff officers. At the press conference the officer had reputedly made an observation about Soviet soldiers serving in the German Army. The officer had characterized 90% of the soldiers as being anti-Nazi and only 10% as "pro-German and [having] joined the German Army at their own free will....[With] former officers of the Red Army, serving now as officers in the German Army, this percentage should be considered as somewhat higher." According to the Soviets, the officer had also stated that at the start of 1942 Russians who had gone over to the Germans had been "organized into separate battalions." The Soviet Government through Chargé A. Kapustin characterized the July 9 statement as containing "a number of improbable and evidently fictitious data...drawn...from German sources. Arises a lawful question, what common Allied interests could have prompted such a statement, defaming Soviet people and casting a shade on Soviet citizens in military service who found themselves in German captivity?" (44)

Secretary of War Stimson, in response to a query by Secretary of State Hull, assured him that not only had no such statement been made by anyone on General Eisenhower's staff but that those individuals who had been present had assured General Eisenhower that "no reference to Soviet Russia was made." The only stories that mentioned Soviets in German uniform had been "filed from Normandy by Associated Press and United Press war correspondents. These stories were passed by SHAEF censorship since security was not involved." Stimson would, however, "take further action on this matter" if the Soviets provided more information. (45) Wherever the information came from the story was essentially true and the first time it had become public knowledge. The Soviet government was exceedingly sensitive on the subject and demanded that those individuals captured in German uniform be segregated from the Germans and treated as Nazi prisoners. (46)

The question of what should be done with Soviets captured in German uniform remained a pressing one. On August 7, 1944, Chief of the Special War Problems Division James H. Keeley, Jr. informed Assistant Provost Marshal General Bryan that the State Department had decided to go along with the recommendations of the Combined Administrative Committee. Those recommendations were

^{1) Soviet personnel captured with German para-military units should be categorized as prisoners of war; 2) their treatment should be governed by the requirements of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929; 3) Soviet authorities should be offered an opportunity to take over such personnel as they find acceptable for incorporation into the Soviet forces; and 4) dealings with the Soviet authorities on this subject should be through military channels and any screening should be done in the United States or Great Britain and not in Normandy.}

Keeley added that the British wanted to know if the "practice followed by the United States Government in dealing with this problem diverges substantially from that outlined in the Foreign Office's telegrams." (47)

The Soviets demanded that any Soviets captured were to be separated from the German prisoners and accorded liberated personnel status. (48) This would eliminate their being able to claim protection under the 1929 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.

On September 9, 1944, Ambassador Gromyko informed the Secretary of State that Soviet citizens were among the pws Allied forces were capturing in Europe. Gromyko emphasized that the Soviet citizens were not there by choice but had been "taken by force" by the Germans. The Soviet Government, therefore, wanted its citizens "returned to the Soviet Union at the earliest opportunity." The Soviets insisted, furthermore, that the Allies aid and assist their repatriation officers who were attached to Allied HQ MTOUSA [Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army] as well as the members of the Military Mission of the Soviet Union who had "been entrusted with the task of repatriating the Soviet citizens mentioned." Gromyko also asked that the United States cooperate in the repatriation of Soviet citizens who had been sent to pw camps in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. The US should also provide transportation for the "repatriation of these Soviet citizens to the USSR." (49)

Gromyko also made repatriation a topic of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinus reported that Gromyko had broached the subject of Soviet citizens who had been captured in German uniform and brought to the United States as German pws. Gromyko wanted to know where these prisoners were, how many there were, and when more might arrive. (50) In response, on September 15 Hull wrote Gromyko that any "claimants to Allied nationality found among German prisoners taken by American forces" would continue to be treated according to the Geneva Convention as German prisoners of war, that this policy would continue in order to avoid German reprisals against American and British prisoners and any Soviets captured in German uniform who wished to be returned to Soviet control were so returned. Hull noted that such cases were to be handled not on a government to government level but "through military channels." He pointed out that this was at odds with what the British were doing. The British had taken up the case of "Soviet citizens or Russians captured in France...through diplomatic channel[s]."(51)

The United States State Department had informed the Soviets as early as December 13, 1943, that Soviets captured in German uniform would be accorded pw status unless they specifically requested return to Soviet control. This policy had been followed in order to decrease the risk of reprisals against American pws for forced repatriation. (52) The United States Government was aware that the British had approached the Soviets about a diplomatic solution to the growing repatriation problem. On September 16, Kirk informed the Secretary of State that an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Government concerning "repatriation of Soviet citizens now or in future held as prisoners of war in Mid East irrespective of whether the individuals desire to return to Russia or not." Kirk further pointed out that individuals would not even be questioned as to their "willingness to return" to the Soviet Union. The Mid-East command had received "instructions from London to implement this agreement and arrange as soon as possible for transfer of these persons to Tehran. Macmillian is apparently receiving instructions to this effect from Foreign Office." (53) The following day Kirk asked Hull if he were aware "of the nature of methods which may be applied in compelling those Russian prisoners of war, who under previous arrangements were given option of retaining prisoner of war status, to return to Russia, especially in view of fact that...some were taken by our forces and delivered to British under arrangement whereunder that option prevailed." The methods used included force. (54)

Despite the State Department's stand on repatriation and the Geneva Convention, the United States Government's position on repatriation of Soviets captured in German uniform changed to follow the British lead. The event which seems to presage the change in attitude was the rescue of US pws from Romania.

Most of the German pw camps which held American and British prisoners were located, for strategic reasons, in the east, primarily Poland and Eastern Germany. This was to curtail escape attempts on the part of the prisoners. Both the United States and Great Britain were aware that the Red Army would be liberating many of these camps. There was no way to ensure the safety or care of the prisoners. The United States and Great Britain had little confidence in the treatment that the Soviets would mete out to liberated prisoners. In addition there was no formal agreement as to how Allied pws would be returned to their respective countries. The Soviets had already issued veiled threats tying treatment and repatriation of Soviet pws to treatment and repatriation of US and GB prisoners.

In August King Michael of Romania permitted the United States to fly out Allied prisoners who had been held in Romania. On August 29, 1350 American fliers who had been held in various prison camps in Romania were rescued by the United States Air Crew Rescue Unit, when the Red Army was only days away. The Americans were under Frank Wisner, head of the OSS operations in southeastern Europe. The group was actually an OSS unit using the cover of rescue of pows in order to capture German intelligence records. When Gen. Donovan, head of the OSS, learned that King Michael's new government was willing to release the prisoners to the Allies, he contacted Ira C. Eaker, commanding general of the US 15th Air Force at Bari, Italy. It was decided that, despite continuing fighting between Romanian and Red Army forces as well as the presence of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe in the immediate Bucharest area, the rescue team would use Popesti Airfield. Twelve US B-17s removed the prisoners in hourly shifts until all were evacuated.

The team that rescued the prisoners had other duties: to "secure intelligence for the Air Force on the results of the bombings of Ploesti Refineries, and on future targets...[and] to secure general political military and economic intelligence from secret sources." (55) The evacuation of the pws was further enhanced by the detection "of an additional 350 airmen in Bulgaria...[who] were exfiltrated to Cairo....During [Operation] Gunn, therefore, about 1,700 American airmen were rescued...with the help of the Rumanians [sic] and without opposition from the Red Army." (56)

The removal of the prisoners by air and the intelligence operation were probably ambiguous enterprises as far as the Soviets were concerned. Donovan was most expedient in sharing with the Russians the wealth of information gleaned from the intelligence operations. However, the insertion of an intelligence team into a prisoner repatriation/rescue operation could not help but raise the suspicion in the minds of the Soviets that future repatriation teams would also be composed of intelligence agents, whether OSS or military. The rescue of the prisoners was to be a singular event, for the Soviets would not cooperate in such an enterprise again. They had not really had much say in the Romanian operation and thus were unable to stop it. In future operations, however, they would exercise considerable control. (57)

Secretary Hull was aware of this and it probably contributed to the change in US policy to which had Kirk referred. After Kirk's September 17 telegrams [Nos. 411 and 428 above], Hull ordered Ambassador Harriman to convey "the appreciation of the Government of the United States for the assistance rendered by Soviet military authorities in arranging for the evacuation of American prisoners of war....Special assistance...given in evacuation of American airmen...by General Burenin who was most cooperative." As Burenin's assistance consisted of not stopping or hindering the evacuation, it can only be assumed Hull's note was an attempt to placate the Soviets. (58) In addition, the change in American repatriation methods can only be a reflection of the realization that the Soviets were going to liberate several thousand of American and British prisoners as they advanced on Germany from the East. Failure of the Western Allies to repatriate Soviets could lead to Soviet non-repatriation of Allied prisoners of war.

The British government had evidently come to that conclusion earlier. On September 24, Harriman informed Hull that the British Ambassador in Moscow had received a copy of a telegram dated September 14 from the Foreign Office to Lord Moyne. Lord Moyne "was informed that so far as the Middle East was concerned all Soviet nationals held there as prisoners of war would be delivered to the Soviet authorities whether the individuals concerned desired to be repatriated or not." Harriman pointed out that this would have implications for American policy. He wanted to know the "exact nature of the policies established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Did this mean, asked Harriman, that the Combined Chiefs proposed "to have Russians taken as German prisoners delivered to the Soviet authorities against their will?" If that were so then what, he asked, "was the meaning of their statement that the purpose of their policy is to avoid risk of reprisals?" Finally Harriman wanted to know how the British Government would order its Middle East command to carry out forced repatriation. (59)

On September 26, Gore-Booth of the British Embassy transmitted to Bernard Gufler of the Special War Problems Division a memorandum prepared by British military authorities in Washington. The memo reported an agreement between British and Soviet negotiators had been reached. It said that the large numbers of Soviet prisoners being held would be released to the Soviets "contingent upon enlistment in the Russian forces in the United Kingdom." Since it was expected that the majority, if not all, would volunteer, no decision needed to be made as to repatriation unless "any substantial numbers refused to volunteer." The memo went on to say that the British government had been "influenced by the fact that when the Soviet overruns Germany they are almost certain to come across a number of our prisoners of war, whom, naturally, we want properly treated. It is felt very strongly in London that the treatment of our men in Germany will depend very largely upon the way in which the Russians are treated in the United Kingdom [emphasis added]." (60)

Secretary Hull was concerned about the different approaches to repatriation being taken. On October 6, he asked Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to clarify the problem of Soviet repatriation. Evidently, repatriation policy was not being set by the State Department but by Leahy's office. Hull wanted an "expression of [Leahy's] views concerning the matters referred to in the notes of the Soviet Ambassador" on non-consensual repatriation. Hull was also angry that policy was being formulated without his knowledge. He suggested "in view of the political complications involved in this problem...it might be useful if representatives of the Department of State might be included in whatever subcommittee of the Combined Administrative Committee you may set up to make recommendations on this matter." (61) The British Embassy informed Hull that the British military would suggest to the CCS that representatives of both the State Department and the British Embassy be included on the sub-committee dealing with the question of Soviet repatriation in order that the combined military agencies would not be "working without coordination with the diplomatic side." (62)

The British, voluntary repatriation having failed, were forced to embark upon total, forced repatriation. On October 7, they informed the US that "despite terms of Geneva convention it is not possible for a soldier captured by his own forces while he is serving (willingly or unwillingly) with enemy forces to claim protection of Convention vis-à-vis his own Government....[There fore] if such a man is captured by an Allied Force, the Allied Government has a right to deliver him unconditionally to his own Government without being held responsible for violation of Convention....In any event, Moscow Government has requested the men ...sent back to Soviet Union...and since these men will no longer be treated as prisoners, the Geneva Convention will no longer apply [emphasis added]." (63) On October 11, the British Embassy officially informed the State Department that the British were no longer treating any Soviet as a prisoner of war. (64) Charles Bohlen, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs requested a clarification of the new policy. Bernard Gufler of the special War Problems Division responded that the "adoption of this new policy towards the Soviets will result in the delivery to the Soviet authorities of persons hitherto withheld from them because they were unwilling to return to the Soviet Union." (65) There was, evidently, a split between the State Department and the CCS as to how repatriation should be handled. Bohlen, despite Gufler's response, told Alexander Kapustin that "all persons captured in enemy uniform were treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of that Convention" and any exception was made only when the individual himself made the distinction. (66)

The split in decision-making on pw repatriation had occurred some time before. The British had been carrying on diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets over repatriation as had the United States, evidently without notifying Hull. The CCS ordered General John R. Deane, head of the Military Mission to Moscow, to finalize negotiations on repatriation with the Soviets. On September 4, 1944, Harriman informed Secretary Hull that "on August 20 pursuant to instructions received by General Deane I addressed a letter to Molotov in which I submitted definite proposals regarding...working out of advanced plans for the prompt return of American or Soviet prisoners of war [and an] exchange of intelligence regarding the location of prisoner of war camps in hostile territory," the despatch of repatriation teams to the liberated territories, and collecting and transmitting to the appropriate governments the names of individuals "claiming Soviet or American nationality." Harriman also requested that the Soviets assist "with the planned evacuation to Istanbul of American prisoners of war who have been released in Bucharest." (67) Both Harriman and Deane claim in their respective memoirs that the idea for a repatriation agreement originated with Deane, despite the fact that Harriman specifically says that "pursuant to instructions received by Deane" on August 20, 1944, he had approached Molotov on August 30 concerning a prisoner of war repatriation agreement. (68) In addition, on January 28 Acting Sec of State Grew informed Harriman that "SHAEF is working out combined British-American text of agreement to be submitted to big three meeting...inform American representatives working on SHAEF draft that...before making any commitments on our behalf they await further instructions which...will be sent through joint [sic] Chiefs on January 29." (69)

Soviet nationals were scattered throughout the prison camps run by the Allies in the West. The Soviets demanded immediate access to all the camps and the right to interview any individual whom they said was a Soviet citizen. They also demanded that Red Army representatives be assigned to all Allied HQs so that they would have immediate access to any prisoners taken. Given the Soviet demands and the fact that many Western Allies' prisoners in Eastern European German pw camps were to be liberated by the Red Army, it was obvious that a written agreement spelling out in specific terms exactly what was to be done for and to pws liberated by each side was necessary. The US insisted that the agreement ostensibly be between military commands and not a government to government diplomatic treaty, for treaties were subject to review by the US Senate. (70)

General Deane was instructed to open negotiations. The agreement, however, had already been worked out between the US and the Soviets. When Deane submitted the document to the Soviets he reported that they accepted it without any revision other than minor rewordings, which surprised him. (71) It was signed by Deane and General Gryzlov at Yalta on February 11, 1945. The Soviets and the British signed a similar but separate agreement, and the Soviets and the French signed one some months later.

There was little doubt that the Soviets were tying the repatriation of American and British pws to that of the repatriation of all Soviet nationals. On January 2, 1945, Admiral Leahy, FDR's Chief of Staff, in response to a query from Sec. Stettinus regarding forcible repatriation noted that "also bearing on this matter is the request made by the Soviet Government to the American Ambassador in Moscow for negotiations there on a governmental level regarding the same subject, in connection with arrangements for the disposition of American personnel liberated by the Soviet forces...." (72)

Secretary of War Henry Stimson was also aware that the Soviets were threatening non-repatriation of Allied pws if the West did not repatriate all Soviets in their possession. In a memo "Problems of Our Relations With the Russians," he pointed out that though the Soviets "have already threatened to refuse to turn over to us American prisoners of war whom they may get possession of in German internment camps, [and have] claimed that this is a parallel situation with the other...it is not and the Russians have no earthly basis for withholding them from us" therefore he did not think that the US should allow such a threat to "interfere with our judgement in not giving up the Russians." (73) Both Stimson and former Secretary of State Hull were against forcible repatriation. (74) Admiral Leahy could not possibly have established a policy at odds with ranking Cabinet officers unless he was merely carrying out the orders of his Commander, FDR.

In addition the US could not take an opposite stand from the British. The British had already decided on forcible repatriation and it would have been a major break for the United States to oppose the British in this. The British had already reached an agreement with the Soviets concerning repatriation, the United States was expected to concur. The Joint Logistics Committee concluded that "it would not be advisable for the United States Government to proceed vis-a-vis the Soviet Government substantially differently than as agreed by the British Government." (75)

Hull and Stimson were not the only Cabinet officers to oppose forcible repatriation. Attorney General Frances Biddle demanded that forcible repatriation from American soil stop. (76) It was illegal as it was a violation of a treaty to which the United States was a party, the Geneva Convention. On February 3, 1945, Secretary Stettinus sent a telegram to the negotiators in Moscow. He pointed out that the Departments of War, State, and Justice were "convinced that the clear distinction should be preserved between former US or Soviet military personnel liberated while being held as pws by Germany and claimants to Soviet nationality captured by the US forces while collaborating with Germany in German formations in German uniforms." (77) Their views were disregarded by the negotiators because they had received their instructions from the President; only his authority could override three cabinet officers. (78)

General Deane had voiced fears that the Germans might carry out reprisals against American pws if the Soviets found in German uniform were forcibly repatriated. However, General George C. Marshall noted "the question of reprisals by Germans on U.S. POWs of Slavic origin, State Department believes the greater danger lies in the possibility of Soviet reprisals against such nationals in U.S. uniform if we exercise undue discrimination in determination of Soviet citizenship." (79) Secretary Stettinus responded to Acting Secretary of State Grew's concerns about the failure of the United States to apply the Geneva Convention to Soviets captured in German uniforms. He stated that "the consensus here [Yalta Conference] is that it would be unwise to include questions relative to the protection of the Geneva Convention and to Soviet citizens in the U.S. in an agreement that deals primarily with the exchange of prisoners liberated by the Allied armies as they march into Germany. With respect to 'claimants,' notwithstanding the danger of German retaliation, we believe there will be serious delays in the release of our prisoners of war unless we reach prompt agreement on this question." (80)

CHAPTER III

No agreement on all aspects of the repatriation of POWs had been reached when the principal participants gathered at Yalta in February, 1945. The British were pressuring Washington to accept the agreement they had reached with the Soviets. The British agreement was, however, really nothing but a more palatable version of the Soviet agreement worked out with the British some months before the meeting at Yalta. (1)

The British were becoming ever more concerned over the liberation of their POWs by the Red Army; considerations of international law were less important to them than the welfare of their POWs. In a letter to Secretary of State Stettinius, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden pointed out that the Red Army was already overrunning POW camps where large numbers of British and American POWs were held, and it was "really urgent to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft Agreement during ARGONAUT." He hoped to ask Molotov for a meeting of the "experts of the three parties concerned" as quickly as possible so they could agree "upon a satisfactory text." (2)

The major problem, as Eden saw it, was repatriation of Soviet personnel. He pointed out to Stettinius that "as SHAEF have already reported . . . the only real solution to the problem . . . is to repatriate them as soon as possible." It would help the British and U.S. Governments' positions substantially if the negotiators could "inform the Russians at a suitable moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens." Eden was aware that there was a split in the U.S. Government over the matter of forcible repatriation, and he urged Stettinius to make a decision. General Eisenhower had, Eden noted, again asked the CCS to "provide two ships to take 3,000 each from Marseilles, until the present large numbers have been cleared. No doubt," he added, "your experts have been examining the position in the light of General Eisenhower's telegram" and should be able to give him and the British Government an answer so they could go to the conference with a mutually satisfactory agreement. (3)

Eden's frustration was growing, for he knew that reaching an agreement with the Soviets on repatriation was critical for U.K. and U.S. POWs. At the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in October 1944, "Stalin had told Eden that he regarded the exchange of prisoners purely as one of reciprocity. If the West kept Soviet citizens back on the grounds, unacceptable to Stalin, that they did not want to return, the Soviet authorities would keep British and American prisoners as hostages." Eden's view was shared by nearly everyone in the Cabinet. War Minister P. J. Griggs remarked that "if the choice is between hardship to our men and death to Russians the choice is plain." (4) It was not that the British were unfeeling, but as realists they knew that an idealistic stance would be costly to British prisoners.

On February 7 the JCS approved the British text of the agreement. When General Marshall notified the State Department of the approval, Acting Secretary of State Grew wrote Stettinius, who was at Yalta, that although it was "not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, if it is the preliminary text included in JCS 1266," then it was unacceptable as it did not include those items about which the State Department had been adamant. Grew was primarily concerned that the agreement did not take into consideration those individuals who fell under the protection of the Geneva Convention, those who were no longer in the custody of the US, and those who were not citizens of the Soviet Union prior to June 1944 and who did not claim Soviet citizenship. (5) Stettinius was aware of the problem of Soviet repatriation of Allied POWs, but he believed it could be divorced from the repatriation of Soviet POWs and citizens. On January 3 he ordered Harriman to make sure that the negotiations being conducted in Moscow differentiated between "Americans found in German pw" camps and Soviets "found among German pws taken by the American forces." Under no circumstances was there to be a connection between the two, he insisted. Repatriation of one was not to be tied to repatriation of the other. (6) Stettinius also informed Harriman that "some difficulty has arisen here" as to whom the "Government is prepared to turn over to Soviet authorities for return to the Soviet Union.". (7) It is unlikely that Harriman communicated Stettinius' concerns to General Deane. The telegram was routed to Edward Page, who represented the State Dept at some of the negotiations, and not to Deane, who received his instructions independent of the Embassy. Under "Action taken," Minister Counselor George Kennan wrote "file." "File again" would have been more appropriate, as Stettinius had tried before to get the negotiators to address the issue. Ignoring the Secretary of State's orders on this constituted gross insubordination, something that could be done only if Roosevelt, through the Joint Chiefs Staff, was actually conducting the negotiations from the American side. (8)

On January 21, 1945, General Deane notified the War Department that the Soviet definition of "the word 'citizen' in this agreement includes those civilians forcibly removed from Russia for labor purposes, those Russians who were fighting with the German Army, and actual Soviet soldiers who were prisoners of war." The Soviets insisted that the agreement extend "also to citizens of the USSR who are located in the territory of the USA at the moment of the signing." (9)

Despite Grew's concerns, Stettinius caved in to the combined pressure at Yalta. On February 9 he notified Grew that although the points Grew mentioned were not covered in the agreement, he was of the opinion that "we can accept [it] without reservation." Stettinius added that "the consens