77 Page Report Notes 13 - 27
(13) There were only three of the RB-45Cs in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO); they arrived at Yokota on 29 September 1950. By November and December they were flying along the North Korean-Manchurian border on a daily basis. ALthough the RB-45C could outrun MiGs, it had little maneuverability at altitude. Soviet ground controllers could have prepositioned MiGs for intercept. As shown in the interrogations of Major McDonough provided by the Russians, the Soviets were interested in the B-47 as well.
(14) TFR 34-46 is a list of Soviet intelligence collection requirements in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO) dated 6 February 1951 and includes the following items
7.Through interrogation of prisoner pilots, ascertain the morale of flight personnel, intensity of aircraft flights by type (heavy, medium bombers, fighters), personnel, deployment, turn-around time and the tactical nature of the 6002nd, 6140th, 6131st, 6147th tactical support wings, quantity of B-45 jet-engined bombers and F-84 jet fighters, and to which units they are attached and deployed.
(15) Air Force Manual 200-25, Missing in Action -- Korea, 16 January 1961, p.11.
(16) Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Colonel Bushuyev, 16 September 1992, Moscow.
(17) Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Col. Georgii Plotnikov (ret) and Col. Valentin Sozinov (ret), 30 March 1992, Moscow.
(18) Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Col. Georgii Plotnikov (ret) and Col. Valentin Sozinov (ret), 30 March 1992, Moscow.
(19) Task Force Russia Interview with Colonel Bud Mauhurin, November 1992; Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Col. Georgii Plotnikov and Col. Valentin Sozinov, 30 March 1992, Moscow.
(20) Air Force Manual 200 -25, Missing In Action Korea, 16 January 1961. This document is the Air Force element of the so-called "389" List," developed after the Korean War, which is a list of 389 missing in action cases. The nature of the loss in each was such that the United States Government believed the Communist side should have knowledge of them. AFM 200-25 then represents an exhaustive review of all available information at the time on each of the Air Force's 187 losses. Included in each case is the testimony of U.S. personnel who had any information on the circumstances of loss. In none of these did a repatriated pilot report contact with the MIAs. The Joint Commission Support Branch is now interviewing repatriated F-86 pilots to recreate that data base and ascertain if any pertinent information was omitted.
(21) OSI Special Report (Office of Special Investigations), The Inspector General, Headquarters USAF, "USAF Prisoners of War in Korea," 1 July 1954, p.13. The study states: "On one occasion all B-29 crew members were taken from camp and interrogated on all phases of their B-29 training, equipment, tactics, organization, etc. Thus it appeared that these interrogations were prompted by intelligence requirements which were sent down to the camps from higher Chinese headquarters." Since only the Soviet Union was capable of defense against the B-29 and was at that time intensely interesed in defense against US strategic bombers, it is certain that this intelligence requirement was initiated by the Soviets. This intelligence requirement probably was behind the interrogations described by Sgt. Oldewage. A separate line of investigation into B-29 crewmen who may have been transferred to the Soviet Union is in preparation.
(22) Joint Commission Support Branch, Interview with Retired Colonel Edwin L. Heller, 23 August 1993. Heller stated that he had been badly wounded in the loss of his aircraft and spent his two years of captivity under Chinese hospitalization and underwent four major operations.
(23) Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Vladimir M. Roschin, 18 February 1991, Moscow.
(24) Joint Commission Support Branch, Interview with Retired Colonel Harold E. Fischer, 23 August 1993.
(25) Korean War POW Transfers to the Soviet Union: Eyewitnesses (RT: 18:35), prepared by Task Force Russia, April 1993.
(26) Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with General Georgii A. Lobov, 18 December 1991, Moscow.
(27) Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, World War II, Korean War, and Early Cold War MIA-POW Issues (Draft) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 1993 ) p. 593.