Tighe Task Force Review of DIA PW/MIA Analysis Center

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20301
27 May 1986

TO: Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Review of DIA's PW/MIA Analysis Center

1. Enclosed is the report of the Task Force examination of DIA's PW/MIA Analysis Center. The foreward, conclusions, recommendations, and epilogue sections of the report are unclassified. The rest of the report is classified - can be sanitized if you desire, as your security experts deem proper. My colleagues have asked that I note their unanimous support for the entire report; conclusions and recommendations.

2. The undersigned have spent hundreds of hours reviewing the files of the DIA PW/MIA Analysis Center over the past weeks; speaking with DIA officials and analysts regarding DIA's handling of the JCS directed mission to account for those American Military personnel missing in action.

3. You told us to look for coverup. We found none. We departed from the narrow charter given us only when, as you directed, we felt it useful to this investigation. Ours was certainly not as detailed a look as it could have been. We believe, however, our insights, similar to those available to you from your independent DIA investigation before our arrival, should be taken most seriously by you and the United States Government and that our recomendations be quickly implemented.

4. Yours are inherited problems. We salute the vigor with which you sought to correct them early in your tenure. Your obligation, and ours, however, to the comrades waiting to be brought home is light in comparison with its importance.

(signed) by the following:

Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)

John S. Murray
Major General, USA (Ret.)

Lester E. McGee, Jr.
Colonel, USA (Ret.)

Roberta Carper Maynard

John Francis McCreary

Arthur G. Klos

TO: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT: Tighe Task Force Report

Lt. General Tighe asked that we serve as a Review Panel to go over the findings of his Task Force review of DIA's PW/MIA Analysis Center performance.

We have completed our review of the report, support its conclusions and urge that you implement those of its recommendations which you have not already brought about, as quickly as possible.

The findings of this report must not be forgotten. This issue, brining American Military personnel home from Southeast Asia (dead or alive) as quickly as possible, must be acted upon with greatest vigor by all those U.S. Government officials responsible. We urge you to get on with support of the issue without delay.

Signed by the following:

Russell E. Dougherty
General USAF (Ret.)

John Peter Flynn
Lieutenant General USAF (Ret.)

Robert C. Kingston
General USAF (Ret.)

Lyman Kirkpatrick

(Not present at the time)
Henry Ross Perot

Robinson Risner
Brig. General USAF (Ret.)

TO: Senior Review Panel

General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF (Ret.)
Lieutenant General John P. Flynn, USAF (Ret.)
General Robert C. Kingston, USA (Ret.)
Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
Mr. H. Ross Perot
Brigadier General Robinson Risner, USAF (Ret.)

SUBJECT: Tighe Task Force Review of DIA PW/MIA Analysis Center

1. Attached is the report of a lengthy and detailed examination of the files and activities of the DIA PW/MIA Analysis Center to determine whether or not it has met its obligations as regards analysis and evaluation of Intelligence since September 1981.

2. We ask that you review it, agree or disagree with the way it was conducted and its conclusions and recommendations and convey your judgments to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency with those of the Task Force. The findings are not all that improtant; the issue is vitally important. You are eminently qualified to judge the necessity for action.

enclosure a/s

Specifically General Perroots asked me to:
1. "Review all of the current case files and handling of those files, looking for any indication of impropriety or "COVER-UP."

2. "Evaluate the evidence regarding unaccounted for U.S. Military personnel in Southeast Asia and provide evaluation of DIA conclusions, and:

3. "Focus on Live-Sighting reports in terms of quality of information, follow-up, intelligence collection, analysis and evaluation and disposition.

4. "Recommend action as appropriate."*

(2) As evidence grew that not all American military men alive at war's end were brought home from Southeast Asia, my successors at the helm of DIA, placed greater and greater personnel and other resources in the hands of the DIA element charged with investigation and analysis of the PW/MIA issue. Organizational element was moved ever higher in the organizational structure to assure as few layers of bureaucracy as practical between the PW/MIA element and the Director of DIA.

* The Director of DIA further insisted that my investigation go anywhere my findings take it. The group has tried to stay within its written charter.

Page (2A) It is true that DIA personnel and resources have increased over the years. However, this increase was a result of heightened national interest and Reagan Administration priorities, not a result of increased evidence of American PWs.

As a result of the steadily growning number of reports (Live-Sighting Reports), which DIA received, the increasing U.S. awareness of the issue resulting from the President's personal commitment, continual organizational re-alignment of the PW/MIA element, floods of "Freedom of Information" requests from media and public, and greater requirements to brief members of congress, etc., the burdens of the dedicated and extremely hard-working personnel of the PW/MIA center overwhelmed them.

(2) Under the best of circumstances, these DIA personnel could but grow frustrated and depressed as a hostile Hanoi played cat and mouse with the U.S. public on this matter, releasing a few bodily remains of dead Americans to the U.S. from time to time, from a large number they are known to possess,

(3) stringing U.S. Congressmen and other official American delegations along while it ghoulishly dragged its official feet. For this reason, some DIA analysts in the past tended to treat some "Live-Sighting" reports as hoaxes or self-seeking lies, when source bonafides could not be established.

(4) Over the years the percieved mission of the PW/MIA center at DIA has changed, officially and unofficially, from analysis of the intelligence flowing into DIA on this issue, to "Resolving the Issue" whereby doubt is cast on the veracity of the intelligence.

The modus operandi of the PW/MIA center evolved toward undue emphasis in establishing source bonafides, at the expense of analyzing from every angle, information provided by these sources. Thus, DIA analysts measured the worth of intelligence reports on Live POWs still held in Southeast Asia as "Resolved."

(2) The description of the personnel of the PW/MIA center as "frustrated and depressed" is personal opinion and is inaccurate.

(3) Reports are not considered hoaxes and self-seeking lies. In fact, each report is considered reliable unless proven otherwise.

(4) The DIA mission has never been resolution of the PW/MIA issue. Our mission is to provide intelligence support to U.S. Government policymakers and decisionmakers.

"Correlated to individual(s) accounted for," or false information, or "unresolved" meaning "we haven't yet proved these intelligence reports valid. Director DIA has fixed this and a new analytical approach has been implemented. An example of the effort is one case where four years were spent trying to prove that a re-education camp, which was a key part of one live sighting report, did not exist. (This to disprove the report), only to find that the camp DID indeed exist. During the intervening years, the report was not analyzed for its contribution to the overall issue. Currently, cases are no longer identified as "Open," "Closed," "Resolved," "Unresolved," etc. Instead information is reviewed and compared with data base holdings. Additional collection is conducted when necessary. Analysis focuses on who or what a source saw. Cases are categorized as: (A) Currently held American PW, (B) Former American PW, (C) American Non-PW, (D) Non-American, (E) Caucasian and (F) Miscellaneous.

Our investigation has certainly not been all-inclusive nor has it venture far beyond its charter. It has found no evidence that anyone in DIA (or anywhere else in the U.S. Government) intentionally covered up anything about the PW/MIA issue. General Perroots had begun to completely turn around the operation and procedures of the PW/MIA analysis center before this task force started its work. His special investigation, headed by Col. Gaines, had discovered many of the faults this task force reports.

(5) Our investigation reveals that the greatest problem associated with this issue was the lack of professional analysis of the intelligence available. It will take a great deal of time and far more personnel and resources than currently committed to build an adequate and professional work force. One only has to visit the "Rabbit Warren" clutter and crowding of the current DIA PW/MIA Center to determine how inadequate the environment is for a "Priority One" effort. The files are far from the quality one has a right to expect. That Congressional, inspector general, and intelligence community investigation of these files could have found them in acceptable shape of the effort going well is a mystery.

5. While the spaces were cramped this was due to the fact that additional man-power was added without a commensurate immediate workspace expansion. DIA has now completed a workspace expansion project for the office which has greatly improved the work environment.

The Charter of Gen.Perroots was planned so that a report would be prepared by a task force of investigators followed by a senior review panel, to review their work. The task force: The chairman elected the members of the task force on the basis of integrity, excellence of knowledge of the intelligence process and knowledge of Vietnam, to assure the most expeditious handling of this problem. Under the Chairmanship of Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF (Ret.). The task force consisted of:

Maj. General John S. Murray, USA (Ret.)
Chief of U.S. Military interest in Vietnam for the Secretary of Defense
(1972-74). Responsible for coordination with JCRC and Vietnamese forces in retrieval of U.S. MIA remains. (Lawyer).

Colonel Lester E. McGee, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Staff director, Army intelligence specialist, (worked on original cincpac files on PW/MIA's in preparation for "Operation Homecoming") and former battalion commander in Vietnam.

Arthur G. Klos
Vice assistant Deputy Director of Security and Counterintelligence, Defense intelligence agency. (DIA's Top securty and counterintelligence expert.)

John Francis McCreary
Senior warning specialist, U.S. National strategic warning staff and far east area specialist, Defense intelligence agency. (Lawyer).

Roberta Carper Maynard
Former Navy personnel officer, DIA management specialist, defense intelligence agency.

The Review Panel: The group of distinguished American leaders, which Gen. Tighe asked to review the findings of the task force include:

Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA (Ret.)
Former inspector General. CIA & Brown university professor; former President association of Former Intelligence officers. (AF10).

General Russell Dougherty, USAF (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command; Executive Director, Air Force Association. Lawyer.

General Bob Kingston, USA (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command, Former Commander Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

Brig. Gen. Robbie Risner, USAF (Ret.)
Distinguished Air Force Fighter pilot; former POW in Hanoi.

Mr. Ross Perot.
Chairman, Electronic Data Systems; graduate, U.S. Naval Academy.

Lt. Gen. John Peter Flynn, USAF (Ret.)
A distinguished Air Force fighter pilot; former leader of U.S. POW's in Hanoi. Former inspector General U.S. Air Force.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: So that the Task Force would have the benefit of unquestioned technical support, I asked that the director, DIA authorize outside expertise as follows:

Polygraph: Dr. Chris Gugas, PHD. Prominent polygraph expert. Director, "Professional Security Consultants", Los Angeles, Ca.

Signal Intelligence: Maj. Gen. John Morrison, USAF (Ret.), Former Chief N.F.I.B., Signal committee.

Vietnam Intelligence: Hoang Ly, former Chief of Vietnam Air Force intelligence and E.D.S. employee.

Photo Interpretation: Mr.Dino Brugioni, skilled photo interpretation specialist. CIA (Ret.)

The JCS issued a 1983 memorandum (SM-718-83) assigning the U.S. Air Force as executive agent for the development of military wartime escape and evasion tactics.

In that directive, the director of DIA is required to:

(5) Develop, maintain and disseminate intelligence from all sources:

(A). On U.S. personnel missing in action (MIA), PW, and other selected personnel.

(B). On the location, description and identification of PW camps and detention areas and on the procedures and techniques used by hostile forces in the treatment, handling and confinement of PWs." (Apendix I) Clearly, this charter for wartime support is inadequate to the responsiblility for DIA and the military services today, it is meant to support escape and evasion, not determine location and postwar extraction of those left behind after the war ended. The limits of the DIA's PW/MIA function is apparently not clear to the public nor the congress or even within the Department of Defense. The intelligence enclosure, vast as it is, is clearly confined. DIA does not have sweeping authority in the PW/MIA issue.

(6) The fundamental fence over which the DIA cannot leap was no better enunciated than by the director of the DIA, Lieutenant General James A. Williams, on 8 August 1984, in testimony before the subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs:

6. DIA is responsible for the analysis of information and has collection tasking tasking authority for the intelligence community. This mission maybe be misunderstood, particularly in the public arena.

"The Committee asked a question concerning what action the U.S. government would take to effect the release of an American if confirmed to be in captivity in Southeast Asia. I submit, Mr.Chariman, that any answer to that question is beyond the purview of DIA. Our chapter is to provide the military intelligence upon which decision makers develop U.S. government policy. We are the information an intelligence analysts, not the policymakers."

The DIA published a comprehensive mission and functions regulation, DIAR 15-4, dated 31 January 1986. This covers more adequately the mission of DIA for PW/MIA analysis but again, under the umbrella of evasion and escape. ( APPENDIX II.)

(7) It is important to this high priority effort that JCS issue a comprehensive directive assigning DIA all the mission for PW/MIA's it is expected to perform and that the director of DIA then issue a separate, distinct directive covering this mission alone to assure that all appropriate personnel understand, and precisely and completely accomplish the results intended.

The previous organizational chart of the DIA directorate of operations, plans, and training (VO), showed the special office for PW/MIA as part of its organization but, did not include the activities of that office, nor did it mention PW/MIA in its narrative mission statement, casting doubt that this activity enjoyed high priority in the directorate. In May of 1986, a new organizational change corrected this administrative oversight.

7. No more JCS directives are necessary. DIA has re-written its own mission statement for this issue and the re-written statement is being staffed for coordination.

A: Status Quo and Status Quo Ante:

As the PW/MIA issue has grown in importance to the people of the United States at Presidential urging and a laudable increase in attention by the current administration, the director of DIA assigned increased manning to handle the workload. Unfortunately, the awareness and demand for information and representation outstriped the unit's ability to do its primary job of data base maintenance, investigation and analysis. Analysis, the most important function assigned and the function essential to bringing LIVE Americans home, was close to a halt. It has been re-energized.

(8) If the PW/MIA center of DIA is to progress as its new chief Col.Kimball Gaines is determined it shall, it must be divested of its responsibility to serve more than the intelligence analysis function. Outside agencies and organizations outside the intelligence community must NOT be directly involved in the evaluation of files and reports or have access to them. Liaison with outside organizations must be considered a "policy" process and handled separately by other DIA and DOD elements, operating outside the center.

Only DIA personnel assigned to the PW/MIA center for the specific functions assigned by the JCS memorandum should have access to its files. There is no way the Director of DIA can properly manage his resources if outside organizations are intimately involved in the investigative and analytic functions of DIA. Representatives of the CIA, NSA and the State Department's bureau of intelligence research should be assigned to assist in analysis at DIA.

8. It is imperative that the PW office continue liaison with other government agencies. It is the lifeline of our organization.

Especially important for the priority approach to this issue which the president has every right to expect, is the proper scoping of the tasking ahead. In the considered view of this task force, the PW/MIA element will require support if it is properly to analyze the mass of data presently on hand and the backlog of intelligence not yet examined.

No longer should the analyst be all thingsto all men--typist, investigator, polygraph assistant, and manager.

We believe the immense volume of retired data, currently stored in Suitland, Md. Retired Records vaults, should be brought back to the PW/MIA center and integrated into a computerized data base.

A review of the PW/MIA center files and work products provides another criteria, a posterior of what management and workers judged to be their task. Although there are pitfalls in drawing too many conclusions from work product, at least it reveals how the mission was translated into specific intelligence tasks.

The case files leave much to be desired. Overclassification, duplicate and triplitcate papers, undated, unsigned and anonymously written memos abound. No regulations, no suspense list nor synopsis of outstanding inquires. There is a total absence of rigorous, standard, disciplined, professional and administrative procedures.

The long delays in the investigation and the evaluation process caused by lack of typists is inexcusable. If analysis is to occupy the highest priority in the future, then all of the supporting data and resources will have to be available for the analyst.

B: The Analysts Approach:

(9) The TTF notes that the routine approach to each source has been in one direction. Always the doubt: "He's probably wrong," never the inference: "He May be Right." The Verdict of folk wisdon is ignored, that is "Where there's Smoke there's Fire."

9. This assertion is not correct. Analysis is conducted on the assumption that live Americans may be held. The fact that, from time to time, fabricated or less than accurate reports are recieved and analyzed as such does not mean that all reports are perceived negatively.

C: Balancing the Evidence:

It is important to recognize the standard understanding of evidence. Seeking evidence is a two-way discipline. Two ways in which we prove or disprove a fact are indications that show the positive existence of MIA's must be as carefully examined and balanced against the indicators that disclose the negative: the non-existence of MIA's. Among the case files there appears a dominant emphasis on the negative. No accent on the positive. Balance of examination of the evidence is not apparent.

D: Understanding Intelligence/Methods

Clues of this fundamental misunderstanding of intelligence are reinforced by copies of briefings and memos in the "Case" files. The PW/MIA center has mixed intelligence operations with intelligence analysis to the virtual exclusion of analysis. Intelligence has always relied on doubtful sources for information that separately might have enormous relevance to plans, policies and interests. The separation of collection from analysis acts as surety that disreputable persons and advanced technology neither obscure nor exaggerate the value of information for national security.

These principles, the philosophy bred of experience underlying them, the dangers in their violation were not reflected in the activities of the PW/MIA center. This is eloquent testimony to the continuing vitality and validity of the principles. Excessive concentration on source evaluation has frustrated assessment of the substantive content of the reports.

E: Reliance on Stale Data:

(10) The PW/MIA center is a single source operation. Most every file begins with a JCRC interview or features one. The most common follow up task is to ask JCRC to seek the answers to more questions from the same source, most often about information that is sometimes a decade old. This pointless waste of time is sometimes supplemented by a review of OLD method information.

10. The characterization of DIA analysis as relying on "stale date" only is a distortion. Reporting must be evaluated initially in terms of contemporary reporting i.e., 1979 reporting first must be compared with 1979 information. Refugees are not the only source of information. The national intelligence community has as a highest priority, the collection of information on this issue, using all means of collection.

(11) To establish the existence of places and camps, these taskings mainly have relevance in a source evaluation program. They are only marginally useful in an investigation of the plausibility of intelligence generally, and much less in a search for th present, likely location of persons described from a distant memory. Use of method in the jungle during the war was not very effective, a retrospective search for a village could hardly be more profitable. Yet it is to the credit of the photo interpreters that some have been identified.

The PW/MIA element simply lacked a concept for working with so-called unresolved cases except to try routinely to brand them as fabrications. This trend has been reversed and analysis is proceeding in a positive mode.

11. The PW/MIA office does not engage in activities that are a "pointless waste of time." Requests for information, either original or follow-up, are carefully reviewed by several levels of analysts and managers to insure that precious collection resources are not being squandered on unnecessary collection. In most cases, follow-up collection is requested to further a source's knowledge as revealed by the initial report--a standard analytic-collection interface.

F: Collection:

Intelligence information concerning the sighting of live Americans in IndoChina is received by the PW/MIA center primarily in the form of knowledgeability briefs (KB's) from a single source, refugees interrogated by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC element located in Thailand). Ther is a body of reporting, albeit small, from CIA, Defense attaches, the Department of State, Joint volunteer agencies, the league of families, members of congress and concerned citizens and citizen groups, this information receives the same attention as that from the JCRC.

Based on the quality and scope of information provided by the JCRC, it is clearly evident that the JCRC needs better collection guidance as well as a data base to provide the basis for more detailed interviews at first opportunity. These outstanding personnel need help.

In the past JCRC was directed to home in on source's bonafides. Initial interviews were followed up with extensive requests for source biographic data, corroboration of information provided from other source and on occasions requests for polygraph examination to determine source veracity, etc. Now the effort is in developing and analyzing the substantive information elicited and more positive resluts will be forthcoming.

1. Dearth of Sources and EEI's:

The dearth of any other source reporting is puzzling at best. Until recently, there were no EEI's in the National Humint Collection plan (NHCP).

In March 1985, DIA published a continuing intelligence requirement data derived from data which established EEI concerning American PW/MIA's being detained in Indochina and government policies and leadership attitudes Vis-a-Vis the PW/MIA problem. Subsequently, a more detailed DoD method/data was published in October 1985 with internal guidance to the effect that addressees would receive tailored guidance pertinent to the requirement by separate DoD HUMINT tasking message from the appropriate DIA-attach geographical/functional Division.

This tailored guidance was initially promulgated in November 1985 and still continues.

(12) The record is unclear as to the existence of any continuing MT tasking requirements. There appears to be a current tasking which includes 21 method targets, but the rationale for the targets is absent from the files. Method' has been used in the past for the purpose of proving the veracity of a source rather than an attempt to locate PW/MIA's. Method would be reviewed in connection with determining a source's recollection of a particular area, thereby using method to establish the veracity of the source, not to locate PW/MIA's.

A review of the files gives a clear indication that the PW/MIA collection management activities have been, at best, undertaken on an ad-hoc basis resulting in a detrimental effect on the analytical efforts of the element. All evidence indicates that there has been no disciplined, coherent, all-source intelligence management plan or approach which actively engages the entire National intelligence community. It is quite evident that the PW/MIA center has been operating outside the mainstream of the DIA intelligence collection management system.

In recognition of this shortcoming, Lt. General Perroots has already implemented corrective-action.

12. Method tasking in support of PW/MIA analysis is done with a combination of standing and ad hoc problem sets including point and broad area search targets. The standing problem sets are continuing coverage over known and suspected target areas. Ad-hoc coverage is frequently used in response to incoming reporting and in response to analytic findings. The single purpose of method collection is to provide the method component of an all-source collection effort to find live Americans.

2. Absence of All-Source Collection:

(13) There is little hope that any meaningful analysis can be accomplished without meaningful collection activities directed against the PW/MIA target. An information strategy should be developed first. Than an all-source collection plan devoted solely to PW/MIA subjects could be prepared in collaboration with the responsible DIA staff elements. Based on this collection plan, current and continuing collection requirements documents should be prepared and validated within the proper intelligence community structure in order to bring all national intelligence collection assets to bear on the target. Additionally, expanded KB's, tailored to the PW/MIA issue, should be prepared and forwarded to the JCRC.

13. All source collection is, and has been, in place. An all-source collection plan is being coordinated that will more formally involve the entire National Intelligence community. Over 100 specific taskings on individual EEI have been issued since March 1986 over and above standing requirements.

3. Interdisciplinary Study:

All penal systems in the world are derived from a handful of models, patterns of treatment, movement, subordination and so on, tend to be borrowed. Vietnam's appears to derive from the French or Soviet model modified by Asian traditions. In establishing the context of a sighting, credibility of the sighting and the investigation would be enhanced in the event that observed behaviors fit the pattern of known penal practices in the Soviet Union, China or elsewhere.

4. Prison System Study:

(14) The PW/MIA center has provided no assurance or evidence that it has investigated other penal systems to help its investigation of Vietnamese or Laotian handling of prisoners. There is some reasonable prospect that these communist authorities follow advice given by pact security and police advisors. This Task Force observed that the PW/MIA center's isolation and compartmentation resulted in a denial of other useful experience within the intelligence community concerning the investigation and monitoring of penal systems in hostile environments. At a minimum the interagency studies of prison labor on the Soviet Siberian pipeline might have afforded some benefit. If those or other sources were consulted, the files do not show it.

In a related dimension, the sheer volume and complexity of reporting and data ought to have led management or analysts to seek the help of operations researchers, statisticians and methodologists. These functional specialists might have helped clarify the analytic problems and materially facilitated and abetted the processing of reports which the PW/MIA center never seems to have surmounted.

14. The Tighe Task Force implies that the PW/MIA center has been lax regarding prison systems. This is unfair, and unfortunate, because it is one area wherein DIA excels. The PW/MIA center has not studied prison labor on the Soviet Siberian pipeline or made a study of penal systems in general, however it has constructed paradigms of the Vietnamese prison complex. This was fundamental to analysis, and has enabled DIA, through all source intelligence collection, to stay current on the Vietnamese prison system during and after the war; to focus on U.S. prisoners, Vietnamese military and civilian prisoners; and to accrue biographic data on Vietnamese personnel managing the prison system. The PW/MIA center has on file recurring studies and method reports on confirmed and possible camps. The PW/MIA center is the recognized authority within the U.S. intelligence community on Southeast Asian prison systems.

5. Wartime POW System:

(15) Captured enemy documents and interrogation of returned POW's offer the reconstruction and visualization of the current tri-country (Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia) prisoner complex. This structure and system can serve both to corroborate the validity, and detect the mechanics of a covert system designed to mask the existence of the MIA hiding places. Ironically, many were constructed by the U.S. Data is available which shows that eight hundred sixty-two (862) landing zones and fire support bases were constructed by the U.S. in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The vast network of enemy underground tunnels, hospitals, command posts and living quarters has to be exposed. Thousands have (16)lived there underground.

15. Previous comment on page 11 applies.. (comment 14).

16.The Tighe task force comments on the wartime PW system is an assortment of miscellaneous statements mixing partial descriptions of the Vietnamese systems for U.S. PWs, ARVN PWs, and civil and political prison systems. This section reflects a serious misunderstanding of the Vietnamese prison system on the part of the Tighe Task Force.

There is no evidence of a DIA effort to reconstruct the current PW/MIA system in Southeast Asia, the assumption being that this in-country communist complex, dominated by the Vietnamese, is a formidable apparatus for disguising motives and reality.

During the war, in the North and South, captured Americans were generally placed in a different prison world. Just as they were dominately in a different military service, and categorized according to enlisted and officer status.

Sixty-seven percent of the Americans captured in the South were enlisted Army and Marine Corps personnel. Five or six Americans were placed in small mobile camps of about 25 prisoners (mostly ARVN). The "Camp" was continuously on the move. Prisoners were held in caves, bamboo huts, cages or underground systems and chained at night. About 30 percent did not survive captivity. The prisoners were constantly shifted.

Ninety-eight percent of the captured Americans in the North were Navy and Air Force officers. Those who came home usually were held within a formal prison system, roughly from a period of a few weeks to as long as four years. Many were held in solitary confinement. Solitary was usually a concrete cell, 8' x 8', with bare boards, a peep-holed door and a small window. Three and four man cells were also common as well as larger barrack-type cells.

In Laos, the use of caves was common. Cambodia was similar. Many current reports continue to refer to caves as POW camps in Laos. Caves are ample and the cheapest kind of concealment. The standard operating procedures and structure for the north Vietnamese prison system divided the prisoners of war camp system into three categories:

A: Middle line POW camps.
B: Rear POW camps.
c: State production camps.

The middle line camps engaged in an initial indoctrination of 20 days to one month during which there was selection of those who would join the NVA, "Liberation Army." From here, sergeants and above were located to the rear POW camps. The rear POW camps engaged in long-range reindoctrination.

The State production camps were in the nature of state farms to generate food, such as rice, manioc and livestock. A production quota was established. Routine switching of prisoners between POW camps was incorporated as part of the system.

With the advent of the communist success and with the war over, it is reasonable to assume that the small cell, mobile POW units quickly disappeared in favor of the designed system augmented by the gulags called "Re-education Camps."

It is assumed that both the quick and the delayed purging of converts and recognized politicially different prisoners created in a rapid decline in the imprisoned population, and with it, especially since there is no longer an exodus of U.S. inmates, an improvement in the system's capability to control and hide what's going on.

A vast tunnel system, caves, and triple canopy jungle (reduced 15 percent by herbicides 15 years ago), is now back to its old protective state of covering the scenery method. This growing means to hide MIAs,' aided by the old process of shifting POW's from one place to another indicates that an up-to-date snapshot, analysis, and current evaluation of how the POW system operates is in order to help prove or disprove the existence of whereabouts of Live U.S. MIAs.

Close examination of the present prisoner complex will map and bridge the road from hypothesis to proof or disproof. One thing is clear, under the communist system and in the primitive, mountainous and jungle country designed by nature and by war for over a quarter of a century to protect against revelation of men and their movements, it is not at all difficult to do so. Secrecy, mystery and the unknown are not just features of the southeast Asia communist regimes, they are endemically fashionable.

6. File Confusion:

The organization of the "Live Sighting" reports reflects the fundamental outlook on the intelligence job. All files are source files, and all data is sorted by source of origin. The task force concludes that PW/MIA center personnel considered their major intelligence task to be reviewing sources of information. During this review, this M.O. was reversed and positive fixes are in place.

7. Semantic Confusion:

(17) There is some confusion, however, as to just what the terms mentioned above mean. Analysis as used by the PW/MIA center is "Source Evaluation." The outcome of the analytical work is always a determination about the source. Even when the source observations are corroborated, the result is simply a determination that the source is a "good" source.

Conversely, when the evaluation technique is applied in an attempt to invalidate a story, only the source is degraded in some respect, not necessarily the story: The accuracy of the information is never put to the analytic test. In other words, the source evaluation process will only reveal what is already known, it does not uncover new leads, source evaluation never does, because the quality of the source only emerges with reference to what is known.

Past analytical process and organization of the PW/MIA center files simply could not readily discover new information about people still in Southeast Asia, and it is important that this was acknowledged and corrective action instituted.

In summary, the PW/MIA center of DIA must be shorn of all but those functions directly involved in the analytic function. Significant increases in personnel experienced in the analytic, administrative, and ADP fields must be assigned (initially on 180-day temporary duty tours, if necessary). Significant additional floor space must be furnished. The job will get bigger, it won't go away.

17. There is no semantic confusion in DIA analysis. Analysis focuses on the information to determine if that information pertains to an unaccounted for American. Analysts use data from all sources as appropriate. The focus is not on the source and sources are not classified as "good" or "bad". This passage is a rehash of the charge that DIA emphasizes source bona fides over information.

This task force is sensitive to the charge of "second guessing" the people who have worked this project during the past dozen years. Indeed, hindsight is only one kind of wisdom.

What has prompted a close scrutiny of the quality of analysis is a category of unresolved "cases" in which the eyewitness sighting cannot be discounted nor corroborated by known events, persons or techniques used by VO-PW. This task force has encountered several of these, with various dates of information. This category includes sightings in Laos wherein the non-Asians are engaged in economic activity,plowing, mining or construction and under Vietnamese control.

(18) Faced with no further analysis of these sightings, we examined the analytical questions that PW/MIA analysts posed to themselves. These reveal the analysts' understanding of their analytical tasks and point toward the appropriate strategies for problem solving.

18. The Tighe Group description of the shortcoming's in the analytic process is somewhat exaggerated. In a more balanced form, the shortcomings in the past analytical process did include overemphasis on source reliability to the point that little was done with the information until the reliability question was settled. This was often a lengthy process and in some cases was taken to the extreme. This stemmed more from a zeal to be correct than any personal biases against refugee credibility. Whether this ever resulted in lost opportunity is impossible to answer at this late date. Prior to the Tighe review, however, a new analytic proces was implemented which emphasizes analysis of the refugee information based on its own merits and relegates source reliability to a subordinate but still important position in the analytic process.

The questions most often raised are:

Is the Source reliable?
Who else saw the source of knows him?
Is the location a genuine camp, prison or known confinement site?
Can the source pass a [sanitized] test?
Why didn't the source come forward sooner?
Does the sighting information correspond to known events?

As analytic tasks, these questions have several features in common. First, most are YES or NO questions. This means the problem is deterministic, one for which there is only a single correct answer. It is precisely the same task as solving arithmetic problems.

Secondly, all the questions relate primarily to the source of information rather than its substance --- a point already made. Thirdly, the questions most often are answered by consulting known data bases. This means the problem is simplistic -- the correct answer is obtained by consulting a fact book or authority.

These questions and solution strategies are appropriate for evaluating sources, but do not begin to approach the substantive analytical issues, much less exhaust the potential intelligence value of the sighting reports. Analytical questions are only the threshold for applying additional analytical strategies to the substance of the information. More sophisticated, subtle and substantive analysis must be informed by such questions, but not prevented by their answers. Improved procedures have already been implemented.

(19) Our review has uncovered a repeated pattern of premature mental closure. The files show a tendency by the analyst to make up his mind about the value of a report before his own inquiries are satisfied. Comments by the analysts and notes in the files suggest this practice is heavily influenced by a bias that all refugee reports are suspect unless proven otherwise. This form of cry-wolf bias pervades the so-called "Resolved" and "Unresolved". Consequently, the credibility of PW/MIA Center's judgement that a refugee account is a fabrication must be considered low.

A lack of basic evidentiary skills is illustrated plainly in the PW/MIA Center's failure to analyze the substance of a report.

19. This passage is repetitious of previous passages that the analytical effort is directed at proving a source to be a liar. This assertion is simply not true. Exhaustive efforts are made to determine exactly who or what a source observed. Making such a determination requires that a myriad of possibilities be examined, thus hypotheses testing of the source reporting must be conducted. The fact that an analyst develops alternate explanations for a sighting does not mean the source's veracity is being questioned. A report is determined to be a fabrication only after extensive research and attempts to give the source the benefit of the doubt.

Evidently the analysts have no criteria for judging the probity or credibility of information, independent of its source. This poses serious problems when dealing with sources whose motivations are suspect.

But a bad source can bespeak an illuminating truth. Judas erred and pronounced it with his rope.

The files reflect few judgments about clarity, specificity, or amounts of details. Few correlations in place, time, activity and no hypotheses as to the real substance behind a sighting or other report. These are basic evidentiary tasks.

The most common manipulation of data is to cumulate and match reports. The sighting of a downed pilot in Northern Vietnam whose identity was confirmed, illustrated one application of this technique. A sighting of a person of similar physical characteristics in Southern Vietnam was judged to be a Mongolian! Yet, another sighting was ultimately assessed to be a known criminal. As reflected in the record the analytical process is mostly counting and matching. Cumulative matching of this type is a simplistic use of evidence.

We cannot determine the truth behind the two discounted sightings, but the data is sufficient for more skilled analysis and investigation, although the sources may be unsavory. The PW/MIA records contain no audit trail that forecloses further study. Passage of time probably makes these specific sightings cold and stale, nevertheless, the results would be the same applying this technique to a new sighting report, the "Case" would be "Resolved" as a fabrication or otherwise explained away.

In other instances, investigative leads just are not pursued...places are not located, persons not identified, activities not validated quickly. These results are products of a failure caused by decomposition or evidence. Without breaking a story apart and reassembling it, the analyst has no way to make judgements about the accuracy, revelance and weight of evidence even from a reliable source. The PW/MIA center stopped one investigation when a polygraph reported "partial deception." But the focus of the lie was not narrowed, fact never separated from fabrication and failure to recognize that the lie detector is an anxiety index. And the back-up word of an expert on its use that the odds of a "Truthful defendant will fail the control question in a test are about 1 in 2. I.E.. roughly 3 times worse than odds in Russian roulette."

The inferencing processes reflected in the files are flawed by various biases. In the case of the sighting of a caucasian dubbed a known criminal, several undisputed allegations by the source strongly undercut PW/MIA center's "Resolution" of the "Case." The analyst's conclusion was founded on circumstantial evidence that was not directly nor necessarily relevant at all. Moreover,the source flatly denied seeing the person the PW/MIA center concluded he saw. In our judgement, the PW/MIA center's conclusion was one of several possibilities. Actually the weakest of them.

Other forms of bias are strongly evident in the files. One is congnitive, i.e. referring to the working of the mind. The processes of seeing linkages between fact and allegation, and of constructing higher level hypotheses by combining evidence do not seem to get off the ground. Congnitive bias would inevitably lead to verification of events already known by application of simplistic analytical strategies.

A more basic problem is the bias in expectations that refugees are not reliable reporters unless proven to be so. This contradicts the assertion by PW/MIA center personnel that."We treat all reports as valid unless discounted." We found precisely the opposite approach to be the truth over and over. One refugee declined to continue helping the PW/MIA center when it persisted in questioning his veracity despite his having passed two polygraph and one hypnosis test, thus, the passing or not passing of a polygraph test, either way, is used against belief in the source. Laboring under such a bias, no analyst could treat the evidence fairly. Yet refugee accounts are the major data base.

For the benefit of the users of this report, the review task force provides below its views on the analytic task. The PW/MIA center should be clear that its largest analytical question is whether Americans remain alive in Southeast Asia against their will.

This is the object, framework and yardstick for weighing all reports on this topic. No one knows the answer to the question for sure, hence it is automatically a moderately random type of problem. Additionally, despite the PW/MIA center's list of MIAs and other resources, there is sufficient vagueness in the information so as to make this a severly random problem. No one knows the answer, and there may be many answers.

The formulation of the question, as noted above, specifies the main solution strategy, though other strategies may be used in combination to support the main line or lines of argument. In moderately random problems, facts and data lists are of modest value compared to judgment. The main analytic task it to generate projections with alternative solutions and attached probabilities. Probability and utility techniques in support of decision theory are also appropriate instruments and methods. What this means is that the PW/MIA center's problem-solving strategy does not fit the problem, which means, no solution can possible result.

These norms and techniques, taught both at intelligence schools and in most reputable local universities,compel the development of a battery of analytical, tools and data bases for POW/MIA analysis, which do not now exist. Models of the Vietnamese and Laotian penal systems should be deivised, incorporating the structure of confinement as a system, movement patterns, treatment patterns, personalities, camp routines, subordination and command and control. In several Laotian sightings, alleged Americans were observed used as a harnessed team to pull a plow. Other stories recounted Americans who were kept to perform technical chores, keep machinery running and so forth. These and numerous other details enable data base development and solid audit trails. They are not just interesting by-products of the research effort, they make it possible. They are the tools of the intelligence trade for random problems.

Every sighting should have some context of linkages and relationships, command and control,communications and so on, in which the sighting event fits or does not. People, do not live in a vacuum. Even if a source admits to a fabrication, whatever that means to a person from Southeast Asia, analysis of the information should verify the lie by showing no plausible context for the story. Failure to build context risks that the source's admission of guilt is no more or less truthful than his story itself. And it's the story that is the object of the investigation.

There is a curious contradiction in the organization and structure of the JCRC, which has become the prime information gathering entity on the PW/MIA issue. When the JCRC was established, its substantial headquarters and all its personnel were located and operated in Southeast Asia. Its commander was a widely respected, highly decorated combat General who breathed grid coordinates. The national interest at the time was not as intense nor frustrated over the PW/MIA issue. Now, as the nation escalates its interest, the JCRC organization and structure declines.

(20) The JCRC has only 14 personnel. Its headquarters is located in Hawaii. It is now commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. Eleven of his members are stationed in Hawaii, only 3 of them are stationed in data.

Collection of information from refugees wanes as congressional and public frustration rises. As the intensity of boiling point inquires and allegations increases on the PW/MIA issue and as the president announces the highest priority, the field support inexplicably drops. Although the 3 JCRC personnel in data perform magnificiently, nonetheless they are a tiny net in a sea of potential information.

20. This is not an accurate or objective assessment of the JCRC and its role in carrying out NSC and humanitarian tasks. JCRC has received detailed collection guidance and increased manpower since this was written. It is not an intelligence collection agency, and has no plans to convert to same. It has a four part mission of which PW/MIA interviews remains but one portion. It is only one of a number of agencies that can access refugees in the camps and after resettlement.

To gain cohesiveness, incorporate various skills, intensify case review and elevate decision making, the DIA has recently established an "Interagency Review Committee on Vietnam PW/MIAs." The committee is currently chaired by Brigadier General James W. Shufelt, USA, Deputy director for operations, plans and training, defense intelligence agency. This Interagency review committee is a needed mechanism and DIA should be complimented for its creation, however, it has weaknesses. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative is a surrogate of CINCPAC and the JCRC. But the relatively low rank of the officer now attending, however talented his is, assures that the joint chiefs of staff impact on the process will be less than optimal. Further more, it is noted that the missions and functions of the interagency committee (DIAR 15-4) lay down a requirement for flag rank or senior executive service level representatives from the National Foreign Intelligence representation. Unless the agencies involved show greater interest in this DIA initiative, it too shall pass as an effective element of the process.

There are those who would define cover-up differently than we have. Nonetheless, whatever definition is chosen it is certain that this task force has found no evidence whatsoever that any American involved in the PW/MIA effort has tried to cover-up any facet of this painful business. That's the first important finding of this task force.

"Cover-up", in the sense of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there is intent to commit a crime,is not evident. There are no indications of individual liability in a civil cast in tort (as in negligence or fraud) that can be established by a preponderance of the evidence, as well.

As for DIA itself, there are serious indications that at best it has not fulfilled its promise to congressional oversight committees that it "vigorously pursues each and every report which could help resolve these issues" (8 August 1984 Hearings).

A: The Polygraph:

(21) The intelligence and legal professions have long ago developed the major criteria for source evaluation. The PW/MIA center evidently developed its own shorthand approach, applying technology as a substitute for critical analysis. The use of technology, the polygraph, by the center has been without sufficient sensitivity to its limitations. One witness was even subjected to hypnosis, after having passed a simplistic polygraph test.

21. The statement on substitution of technology for critical analysis is fallacious. The use of the polygraph on firsthand live sighting sources has been quite limited. A total of 47 of those sources have been polygraphed from a total of 893 sources or 5 percent. There is nothing simplistic about a polygraph test and, furthermore, the results of a polygraph test are not, under DoD rules considered conclusive evidence of anything, and may not be used as a solid basis for decisions. The polygraph is merely an adjunct to investigation. Additionally, technical methods of assisting debriefings i.e.polygraph, hypnosis are only done with the express consent of the subject. In the case of hypnosis cited by Tighe the implication of coercion by his use of the word "subjected" is just not true. The source agreed to respond under hypnosis in order to acquire additional information that might have been buried in his subconscious.

Evidence presented to the task force indicates the use of leading questions in the polygraph, cultural barriers in translation and understanding and not apparent awareness of the frailties of the test. For example, the PW/MIA center does not seem capable of coping with a source whose observations were not confirmed by known events, but who passed the technology test, i.e. proved to be a good source.

(22) The general assumption on polygraphs is wrong. Refusal to be polygraphed is not an indication of unreliability. (See Appendix V.) We are told also that a good liar can regularly pass the polygraph.

Our Secretary of State has publicly refused a polygraph. That does not make him suspect as to his veracity. The same exculpation entitlement goes to Laotain peasants, ex-Arvn soldiers, and Khmer peddlers.

22. A distorted portrayal of handling of hearsay evidence. New analytical approach requires that hearsay sightings receive the same attention as so called firsthand sightings. Lesser attention given hearsay reports in the past was due primarily to limited resources which had to focus on first hand live sightings.

B: Hearsay Evidence:

This review task force has been unable to find evidence that the PW/MIA center has a method for follwoing up such information other than to have to re-interview the same source or thers who might have known the person. This technique, in the cultural environment of Southeast Asia, has invariably, consistently and predictably resulted in the discrediting of the source. Consequently one tendsto doubt every resolution of a case labeled as a fabrication. We find most of these judgments without meaning, and untrustworthy. Similarly minimal attempts to resolve hearsay information are undertaken. As far as the PW/MIA center is concerned, source evaluation techniques are irrelevant to hearsay because a hearsay report is already impeached. This approach, which explaing the enormous volume of unprocessed hearsay reports, is a gross, if not irresponsible distortion of the meaning of evidentiary classifications and the intelligence processes of dealing with information.

American courts, not known for allowing suspect evidence to be admitted, have long accepted hearsay evidence under conditions supporting its reliability. The U.S. legal system has a long list of exceptions to the hearsay rule that survive in adversary proceedings. It need not be said that the courts are founded on the principles of avoiding bias and ensuring fairness.

C: Unresolved Cases:

As a part of the review process, the task force examined a representative sample of "unresolved cases" currently being processed in the PW/MIA center, using worksheets developed by the task force. Each member conducted an independent analysis of each file. This consisted of not only an evaluation of the information itself, but also of the PW/MIA center's conclusions. A mathematical procedure was applied to determine which of the reports, in the collective judgment of the task force, were the more believable. Members of the Task Force were virtually unanimous in their conlusions.

D: Cluster Analysis:

A review was undertaken of selected geographical areas in which several sightings had been reported over a period of time. Each panel member conducted a separate analysis of these areas to determine what if any correlation there was in these sightings. In some areas the results were inconclusive. In other areas a high correlation was discovered and led panel members to believe that in these areas a strong possibility exists that the sighting have validity.

E: Source Motivation:

Some of the sources obviously engaged in a misconceived attempt to finagle their way into America's good graces, and capitalize on the known U.S. compassion for its missing servicemen and the frustration over an accounting.

While some sources are inventive, self-serving and consequently untrustworthy others are eyewitnesses, military officers and peasants without ulterior movtives and in enough numbers to make one uneasy about discounting testimony that smacks of an authenticity that could satisfy a grand jury.

For the record we note that not all refugees are sincere, not all resistance fighters are fighters at all, and all sorts of charlatans, frauds, pirates and bandits have emerged to extort funds or other benefits based on PW/MIAs information. Even so, not all of the information is bad, despite the unsavory sources, the brazenness of the worst makes them easy to spot.

F: Quality of Sources and Information:

The refugee community that has provided the bulk of the eyewitness reports strikes us as possibly the finest human intelligence data base in the U.S. Post World War II experience.

In our review we measured their power of observation by the clarity and detail of the accounts. Their memory was also judged against correspondence of the account to real places, persons and events. Despite the passage of time, the accounts contained sufficient details to establish high degree of plausibility and frequently correlate to known places or events.

(23) Other features of the sources bear mentioning. Most know what they saw, eventhough POW/MIA analysts concluded the opposite. We found sources who easily distinguished American caucasians from Russians or Germans and especially from FAIR-SKINNED ASIANS. In one "resolved" case; that of a sighting of (sanitized) a returned PW, the account was outstandinly accurate despite the passage of 20 years.

Those sources understand the importance of what they have observed, most often tell consistent stories in major part and leave themselves vulnerable to all sorts of independent checks of their story. This is singular in itself, and highly prohibitive.

23. The assertion that sources easily distinguish Americans is not supported by evidence. The PW/MIA Special Office has several cases in which an individual, later proven to be Eurasian, French or other non-American was identified by several sources as an American.

(24) We are not alone in reaching our findings, in 1983 and 84 testimonies before Congress, both Admiral Paulson and General Williams testified that 92 to 97 percent of the refugee accounts were truthful. This testimony constitutes a sensitivity check on the accuracy and reliability of this data source. It establishes a probability and a presumption that at least 92 of every 100 refugee sightings will be truthful, regardless of motive or other circumstance.

24. The Tighe Task Force statement quoting General Williams is a complete misrepresentation of the facts. The testimony cited refers to statements regarding polygraphs of sources of live sightings which are resolved and correlated to accounted for individuals. Admiral Paulson said that in 92 percent of these correlated cases, polygraphs were not used. In General Williams' 1984 testimony he clearly states that 17 percent of the live sighting reports had been demonstrated to be false. At no time was it said that 92 to 97 percent of the entire body of refugee accounts were accurate. In fact, 62 percent of the first-hand refugee reports can be termed truthful, having been correlated to living returnees, individuals whose remains have been returned, and a small number of individuals who remained behind for a short time after the fall of South Vietnam.

(25) Putting this datum to the test, we found evidence of a presumption of mendacity in every "case" file. Fully, 50 percent of the "Resolved Cases" were found by DIA to be fabrications, and another 25 percent were cases of mistaken identification, 75 percent of the observations were judged to be inaccurate, unreliable or untruthful.This contradicts the testimony by DIA's flag officers. Additionally, it is suspect because 20 percent of the flawed sightings subsequently proved to be accurate. In one case, DIA judged a sighting to be a fabrication, only to learn the person sighted actually emerged from Laos to freedom. Before the DIA really began its investigation, another refugee account was similarly dismissed on the basis of vagueness about his claim to have been employed by an agency of the U.S. government subsequently, the refugee's account was verified. The "case" is now "unresolved."

Independent of the source, the reported information is noteworthy for its precision, clarity or detail, and volume. There are sufficient facts to provide four or five research leads in most of the sightings. We are aware of no other intelligence data base that has a 97 percent record of accuracy. The intelligence value of this information is enormous and mostly unexploited.

The "Mortician" case represents highly incontrovertible evidence. Between this case and those without merit are many good cases and cases with scintillas of evidence. Just enough to spark suspicion that there is something to them. Putting these in-between cases in target priority may help to hit a few "Bull's Eyes."

25. This paragraph is replete with serious factual errors. The statistics cited in the Tighe Task Force report are not correct. The correct statistics are: Firsthand live sighting reports 893 since 1975 83% resolved --- 554 individual previously accounted for (62%) 191 fabricators (21%), 17% unresolved, 90 prisoner situation, 58 non-prisoner situation total 148. Thus, only 21 percent of the sighting reports representing 25 percent of the resolved cases are judged to be fabrications, not "...50 percent of the 'resolved cases" as stated in the Tighe Task Force report.

There is no basis for the statement that "20 percent of the flawed sightings subsequently proved to be accurate."

Citing a case in which an individual was freed from Laos before DIA began its investigation is an absolute "cheap shot" on the part of the Tighe Task Force. A Greek citizen was arrested by the Lao in September 1983 and released in May 1984. DIA did not receive the report until August 1985. Obviously, DIA's investigation could not begin until after the report was received...which was 15 months after the individual was released.

G. Misinformation---Deception:

Many live sighting reports are obviously the product of organized deception. Particularly blatant are reports...many with remarkable similarity, which originate from so-called "Resistance" groups. Generally speaking, these stem from attempts to get U.S. support for groups which genuinely struggle to turnover southeast asian regimes. Others may well be the product of groups controlled by the SRV government in Hanoi...seeking to extend the pain and suffering of Americans for their participation in war against them and, by constant extension and withdrawal of the proverbial "carrot" assure that eventually the U.S. will pay the maximum for the return of the U.S. missing, alive or dead, from Southeast Asia. None of these reports should be allowed to obscure genuinely obvious reports of those who continue to sight live, alleged captive U.S. military personnel in Southeast Asia.

Subtle shams and schemes are at work including one involving Dog Tags and bits of remains. Petty Vietnamese officials seem to be in complicity with local thugs and crooks, but we found no other evidence linking such scams to the government of Vietnam. There are many reasons for Hanoi to not engage in this activity, even though it might condone and permit it. Nonetheless, the official national attempt at extortion of the U.S. could hardly be supressed as guidance for enterprising scoundrels throughout the country, who would take their entrepreneurial cue from the party line. Such a phenomenon has occurred in other parts of the communist world. These are the dogs of war at their predictable worst.

The PW/MIA professional staff has demonstrated a high degre of initiative, dedication and integrity. Their backgrounds are varied and have brought academic wealth to DIA to include ten master and bachelor degrees with majors.

(26) in Physical Education, Business Administration, Psychology, Languages, Political Science, and History. Four former military personnel have brought years of experience to the staff in such areas as collection of Intelligence from Human resources, interviewing, intelligence advisor in Vietnam, research and analysis, and an intelligence staff assignment. They have added to their knowledge by taking job-related courses offered by DIA and external agencies. This is the good news. The bad news is taht this talent is misplaced, or they need to be educated for this current placement. It is noticeable that qualifications in the fields of intelligence analysis and research are prominently lacking. To compound the obvious lack of analytical capabilities, not training program exists in DIA for personnel to develop this needed requirement.

26. When the Tighe Task Force began their review in April 1986, the PW/MIA staff consisted of 18 personnel. There are presently 28 and additional personnel are being considered. Analytical capabitlities are being enhanced by formal training being considered. Analytical capabilities are being enhanced by formal training primarily at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center. In sum, training, augmentation, organizational and functional realignment will result in an upgraded analytical capability.

(27) The current duties indicate that three of the twelve professional staffers are designated as supervisors. In addition to their supervisory responsibilities, they perform administrative tasks, prepare correspondence, provide support to nine external offices, and support the research effort.

27. The figures cited on analytical personnel are not correct. Fifteen professional analysts are involved in research and analysis, freedom of information acts requests, Congressional support and external relations, with two of the fourteen acting supervisors, mentors and teachers.

Seven staffers are involved in research, analysis, and the preparation of reports. In addition, their responsibilities include intelligence support to Congress, Congressinal staffers, Department of State, the Military services, NSA, OSD (ISA), and provide the responses to Freedom of Information requests. One analyst serves as the PW/MIA Liaison officer as well as a writer/editor. To support the ADP files and to prepare the Division's annual budget, one analyst is designated to manage these functions. Further,he is also responsible for developing long range PW/MIA intelligence collection plans and policies and compiles analytical data on PW/MIA's. This is an impossible collection of responsibilities, if one seriously expects useful results.

As a result of the division of labor, more than half of the PW/MIA center personnels worktime is spent in other than intelligence work. (See Evaluation following.)

Staff: 1 Division Chief
12 Professional staff members
4 Non-professional staff members

(28) Personnel w/background experience in Intelligence analysis, Clerical personnel & analysts without intelligence background: 4 professional, 4 non-professional, 7 ??? Total 4. 1 professional record incomplete, with no qualifications listed, and no job description.

Percentage of hours on intelligence analysis vice liaison, etc. (Based on a 40 hour week) estimated on the basis of job description/qualificiation record of 11 intelligence research specialists.

Liaison (external agencies, supervision, FOIA, writing, translation) 225-hours (85) = 440 Hours (100%) Intelligence Analysis, 185 hours (42%)

Estimating that about 40% of the time in a given week is spent on intelligence analysis, 60% spent on liason and other associated duties. The term intelligence analysis is used to summarize the time spent on reviewing and evaluating the information.

28. The information presented on this page does not reflect the additional personnel already in place at the time of the Tighe task force report.

In verifying leads contained in the PW/MIA center data base, files of the DIA counterintelligence (CI) Division indicate that on occasion it has been requested to make "Name Checks" with national-level intelligence an investigative agencies of suspected fabricators of PW/MIA information or persons believed to be involved with the Vietnamese intelligence services.

In November, 1985, the PW/MIA center proposed a number of initiatives for increased counterintelligence support, including assignment fulltime of counterintelligence officers to the center to concentrate on an alleged mis-information campaign by hostile intelligence services.

In March 185, at the direction of the director, DIA, and in an effort to provide dedicated counterintelligence staff assistance to the PW/MIA center, the office of security appointed three counterintelligence personnel to "Research the operations of the PW/MIA center, examine existing policies and procedures, review the management of the files and records, assess operations security and source-control measures, evaluate overall operational effectiveness from a counterintelligence viewpoint." Owing to other more demanding priorities, this staff assistance was never fully provided and no measurable support was rendered to the PW/MIA center.

In an effort to be responsive to the counterintelligence needs of the center the counterintelligence division developed a new program/budget initiative for FY88 entitled "CI Support to PW/MIA." The proposal called for two civilian intelligence operations specialists to provide support to DIA's effort to identify hostile intelligence involvement in disinformation relating to PW/MIAs. The justification for this initiative was based on instructions from the director, DIA, that the counterintelligence division provide sustained staff assistance to the PW/MIA center. This initiative was listed by the counterintelligence division as "Priority Number Three" in a list of eleven new initiatives for FY88. The Chief,office of security reordered the priorities before submission to the DIA senior review board (SRB), support to PW/MIA was changed to "Priority 10" in the list of eleven projects.

Records of the results of the senior review board's deliberations reflect that only eight of the counterintelligence initiativews were approved for submission to the director, DIA. Among the three proposals not approved by the board was "CI Support to PW/MIA." Therefore, even though the director, DIA, instructed the counterintelligence division to provide dedicated support to PW/MIA activities, for reasons still unknown this was disapproved by the senior review board.

The current counterintelligence support capability of one civilian and one military officer part-time, using about ten percent of available time, will most likely continue. The PW/MIA effort will continue to lack adequate counterintelligence support to PW/MIA related staff actions, investigations and operations. As stated in the counterintelligence division's project justifications, "no counteringelligence analysis of outstanding PW/MIA cases will be possible, thus operational or investigative leads may be overlooked or opportunities to exploit such leads may be lost."

A. Substantive Observations:

Although live sightings through 1985 continue flowing into DIA, the evidence is compelling that at least between 1975 and 1979, American Military personnel were held in captivity in Laos by Vietnamese troops. In reaching this judgment we have looked at the sources and their information and made correlations with other known events, persons and information about Vietnamese behavior.

29. In DIA's judgement the statement of "compelling" evidence is not supported by the weight of information.

B. Farm Labor:

(30) Our samples are hardly comprehensive, but we place important weight on refugee observations of Americans tilling rice fields, pulling plows in harness and doing construction work or mining. These activities reflect Vietnamese directives on handling prisoners that date as far back as 1968. The aim of the directives is to lighten the burden of prisoner sustenance on the people by putting the prisoners to work. These activities were specifically mentioned.

Another correlation is the observed practice of keeping prisoners in caves in Laos. The refugee reports we read are strikingly reflective of circumstances and practices known to be followed in Laos by the Vietnamese. There is a threshold of presumption of credibility to the reporting we have seen based on these correlations. (See Apendix IV.)

30. Debriefings of returned PWs, do not support, in any way, the assertion that U.S. PWs were used for labor, agricultural or otherwise.

C. Captive Mobility:

In our observations the guards have almost always been Vietnaemse (sometimes overseeing Laotian guards). The most suspicious sightings are those that claim the Laotians are holding prisoners. The activities in our samples support a strong inference that the Vietnamese are in control and are treating the people they held at the time of the sightings as they treated them elsewhere. The activities are not random, but purposeful. Moreover, the evidence suggests the possibility of deliberate movements back and forth between Vietnam and Laos. These are tentative conclusions, but are not addressed in any studies of the problem available to the review task force.

D. Dodging Design:

At the least, these are not likely to prove productive in discovering any persons or remains the Vietnamese have not approved beforehand. Additionally, there is a strong implication that the Laotian camp system is a separate system under Vietnamese control.

E. Stale Leads:

(31) We cannot judge whether people alive in 1979 remain alive. If so, they certainly remain in custody. A failure in pursuit of the information has clearly, in some cases, resulted in stale information, leads and cold trails. But we judge that Amerians were held alive against their will as late as 1979, and credible reports with dates of observation as late as 1984 continue to come in to DIA.

31. Contrast Tighe's current statement on live Americans being held against their will as late as 1979 with his sworn testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 25, 1981 "Based on detailed research efforts utilizing reported information, confirmed data, and all intelligence collection disciplines, we simply cannot professionally say, frustrating as it may be, that we know in fact that Americans are being held against their will there. "The current DIA position has not changed from that which Tighe testified to in June 1981.

F. Vietnam...Lower Probability:

As to Vietnam, our analysis supports a somewhat lower but comparable conclusion. One refugee account of a sighting contained numerous correlations to the real world events that year when China invaded Northern Vietnam.

(32) Vietnamese treatment of prisoners observed by this source was consistent with its defensive measures throughout the north. The time precisely accurate as well. Our sample was limited so we are unable to make further findings about this eyewitness account. If these persons remain alive, they are in custody.

32. A "lower but comparable conclusion" is meaningless. Additionally, the refugee account given here, while correct on the widely known fact fact of the Chinese invasion, was demonstrably incorrect on other factors which are key to credibility of the story. DIA has evaluated this story as a fabrication. The statement on limited sample is a gross understatement. Of the total firsthand live sightings 893, the Tighe group only examined 43 or 5 percent. The Vietnamese portion of the total report population is 87 percent, but Tighe only looked at 3 percent. The Lao portion of the total report population is 9 percent, and Tighe looked at a total of 2 percent. Based on this technique of fact gathering the best that can be said about any of Tighe's conclusions based on refugee reports is that they are of questionable validity. The worst that can be said is that opinions held by the Tighe group on the presence of live PWs in Southeast Asia could not legitimately have been formed from the data in the case files they reviewed.

G. "Blood Debt" Impetus:

(33) The evidence is clear that Vietnam controls the handling of this issue. We know that Vietnam holds the remains of some 400 Americans in the Hanoi area. Statistical probabilities make it highly likely that other such stories may exist as well.

33. DIA analysts are fully cognizant of terminology used by the Vietnamese to describe various categories of prisoners and of the implication of these categories. No member of the Tighe Task Force ever discussed this matter with DIA analysts. DIA analysts are not aware of directives that make reference to a "Blood Debt" in context of American PWs.

What is implied is that there is more here and that the ultimate Vietnamese trump has yet to be played. At the present pace of development on this issue, it will be quite a time before it is revealed.

We have seen some evidence that the Vietnamese have the kinds of deceptive classifications and categorizations that have frustrated past U.S. searches for its MIA's in all the wars this century. We find no testing of Vietnamese definitions of POW, War Criminal, Traitor, and so on in the work we have observed. We find special directives for handling those who owe a "Blood Debt" but no attention to what this term means.

H. Opportunities:

Our research reveals serious and longstanding gaps in intelligence. They include investigation of the camp system in Laos, exploratin of alternative categories of incarceration and reconstruction of the complete structure of imprisonment. The centralization and purposefulness of Vietnamese actions provides many targets for analysis that have direct bearing on the likely fate of Americans missing in Southeast Asia.

(34) We also suggest that there are collection opportunities not genuinely explored. The U.S. presence in Vietnam appears NIL. The (sanitized) have sources that they have simply not tapped to help this search. Businessmen from many parts of the world are also in frequent contact with Vietnam. (sanitized) journalists appear to have substantial freedom of movement in the SRV. No collection strategy has been drawn up to tap these sources. The camps are linked horizontally and vertically by communications systems that should at least be investigated for collection. With more time and study, we believe that ever more potential sources could be developed.

34. All-source collection activities are in place and do exploit the opportunities specified here. Furthermore method collection intitiatives are underway.

Ours has been a reasonably comprehensive study of the intelligence, the mechanisms and the issues connected with the U.S. prisoners of war and missing in action in southeast. We have examined, for example, numerous eyewitness reports from refugees, but barely looked at second and third party reports except to get a flavor the their content. We read public testimony and policy statements, but have not had access to nor requested sensitive policy papers that might exist. Our forays into information from years prior to 1981 have been occasioned by a perceived need to add context and texture to our review of later events and reports.

As requested, we have applied rigorous professional standards in reviewing a random sample of report types sufficient in number and detail to support a judgment on the charge of "cover-up". We judge tere is no coverup by the U.S. Government, the Intelligence community, nor the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Our process of reaching this judgment took us down many avenues of investigation that touched on most of the important substantive and procedural issues in some fashion, including systemic vulnerabilities. What we found, both sad and encouraging, is of grave importance to the continuing U.S. effort to HEAL this open wound in America's public consciousness.

(35) There is information, even in our limited sample, which establishes the strong possibility of American prisoners of war being held in Laos and Vietnam. This judgment is based on a category of eyewitness reports which the best U.S. analytic efforts have been unable to disprove; allegations by defectors and escapees of Vietnam's intent to hold some prisoners as bargaining chips with the U.S.; and "signals" in the refugee community probably originating with the Vietnamese intelligence services that Hanoi is carrying out its stated intention to blackmail the U.S. Ours is a collective judgment of the entire body of evidence we reviewed.

35. The assertion that Vietnam holds U.S. prisoners as bargaining chips continues to lose validity with the passage of time and the failure of the Vietnamese to use these "chips." In fact, the Vietnamese proved themselves to be astute observers and manipulators of U.S. public opinion. They must know that to continue to hold U.S. personnel would be viewed by the American public as a barbaric act and would insure that Vietnam would receive nothing of value from the U.S.

36. The DIA judgement cannot mirror the judgment presented here. An exhaustive analyis of information collected during and after the war has not developed evidence of Americans remaining in captivity in Southeast Asia.

A longstanding lapse in diligent intelligence work has produced serious gaps in our knowledge about Vietnam's and others behavior relative to prisoners of war. Prominent among them is the absence of any analytical treatment of Vietnamese-controlled confinement facilitiees or camps in Laos. Additionally, U.S. intelligence evidently has no compilation of "decrees" and "directives" concerning prisoners and no thorough knowledge of the structure of confinement. The fact of Cuban, North Korean, Chinese and Soviet involvement with U. S. Prisoners is known, including at interrogation sessions, but not the nature of this involvement, nor its extent. This sample could be much larger.

(37) As a source of intelligence information, the refugee community is distinctive. By any measurement the refugees have remarkable powers of observation and memory. Eyewitnesses understand the significance of their observations and the importance of subtle differences in detail,behavior and confinement conditions. As a body, their reporting accuracy may exceed that of any comparable human source data base of which this task force is aware.

37. There is nothing distinctive about the Southeast Asian refugee reports. DIA has had extensive experience in the debriefing of thousands of refugees and the same limitations apply irrespective of ethinic origin.

At the same time, the refugee and resistance groups in Southeast Asia include a voluble and visible charlatan element. Motives are suspect, mixed with outrageous extortion attempts, bargaining information for favors, funds and perks. We consider these and other self-help groups troublesome but typical of the backwash of warfare. Unsavory characters and self-serving motives in no way obscure the overall quality of information coming from the refugee community, a fact confirmed in testimony by intelligence authorities repeatedly. Moreover, such conditions do not impede the application of additional intelligence collection and analytical techniques to the pursuit of information about Americans still in southeast Asia and in custody.

The Vietnamese intelligence services, possibly with Soviet advice, are using the refugee community and sympathetic groups to manipulate american perceptions and keep the issue prominent.

The DIA PW/MIA center must try toget out of public relations, legal research, congressional liaison, and public-organizational liaison activities. The distraction and pressure of these additional duties have imposed enormous costs in time and money: dissipated talent and energy in non-productive pursuits; diverted personnel and management from the primary job of analysis; and eroded morale. Successive directors of DIA have urged they be relieved of these collateral duties so as to concentrate exclusively on intelligence analysis. The present director of DIA, Lieutenant General Perroots, persists in seeking a way out of this maze, so far to no avail.

General Perroots has inherited a PW/MIA organizatin charged with developing and maintaining the data base and providing support in determining the fate of Americans still missing in Southeast Asia, but is heir to a fairly empty legacy. Among the more glaring problems have been a misunderstanding of the mission by mid-level managers and working analysts, aggravated by poorly written mission statements; poor executive oversight; staff obstruction of extensive intent; organizational changes; the absence for more than four years of professional analysis of the substantive intelligence data; poorly trained analysts; inadequate space, personnel and equipment support.

We credit Lieutenant General Perroots for placing his highest priority in word and deed on a thorough review of this issue before this task force began it's work. Change and improvement will take a long time. General Perroots' subordinates, rear Admiral Tom Brooks and Colonel Kimball Gaines, deserve respect and commendation for conducting critical reviews of this intelligence effort. We applaud their findings and their efforts to correct the many faults that their and our reviews have uncovered.

We hope that current dedication and re-orientation of the entire PW/MIA staff back to analysis will persist beyond the incumbents at DIA.

Dated: 27 May 1986

1. We have found no evidence of "cover-up" by DIA.

2. It is self-evident that a large number of MIAs may never be properly accounted for. Therefore, false hope should not be offered to those seeking a total accounting of PW/MIA's.

3. DIA holds information that establishes the strong possibility of American prisoners of war being held in LAOS and Vietnam.

4. The Socialist republic of Vietnam holds a large number of remains, some 400 at least, of U.S. military personnel solely for continued bargaining power.

5. As the DIA task force found earlier, major improvements in procedures and resources are required for the DIA PW/MIA center to evaluate information properly.

6. Until the recent reorganization of the DIA PW/MIA center, DIA had no coherent approach for handling the collection, analysis, evaluation and disposition of information concerning PW/MIAs; no disciplined, coherent collection management plan and no rigorous, disciplined methodical analysis and evaluation of information. Although it is too early to judge the potential success of the new DIA initiatives, they appear to be on the right track.

7. The primary data base by the DIA PW/MIA center consists of refugee reports. The collection priority is low. U.S. intelligence organizatins rely on data/information/intelligence voluntarily passed to them by refugees.

8. Before the recent reorganization of the DIA PW/MIA center, there were longstanding administrative deficiencies, lack of qualified personnel, little analytical expertise, severe lack of ADP support, inadequate working space, external demands on personnel and lack of dynamic management.

9. The hardworking, dedicated personnel of the DIA PW/MIA center were burdened by and frustrated with the flood of evidence and tended toward disposal rather than analysis.

10. The specialized training requirements for the analyst must be accorded the highest priority.

11. Many personnel assigned to the PW/MIA center work at tasks unrelated to analysis.

12. The DIA PW/MIA center is organizationally misplaced and probably will perform better directly under the director, defense intelligence agency.

13. The JCRC forward field organization is woefully undermanned.

14. The government handling of the PW/MIA issue is constantly harassed by phonies and profiteers. Efforts by private mercenaries continue to hazard the successful prosecution of this issue and indeed, probably jeopardize the lives of Americans.

15. Studies are in being to bring up-to-date the picture of the PW/MIA complex in Southeast Asian countries in the post-war environment.

16. The DIA is now fulfilling its own missin as described in DIA regulation 15-4, particularly as to the identification of PW camps and locations, initiating and levying requirements on appropriate agencies, determining intelligence gaps and tasking positive action to close such gaps.

1. Disseminate the unclassified portions of the report by this task force to all appropriate organizations and individual parties to dispel reports of deliberate "cover-up."

2. Assure that the complete overhaul of the activities of the DIA PW/MIA center continues, including: