Intelligence Summary and Situation Report Operation Lazarus

From James 'Bo' Gritz - 27 November 1982
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY AND SITUATION REPORT:

OPERATION LAZARUS

A. INTRODUCTION: This summary is compiled with the expressed intent of providing those persons with a need-to-know an overview of the personalities, places, and events within Southeast Asia comprising the current effort to resolve the POW/MIA issue evolving from the Vietnam War. OPERATION LAZARUS is designed specifically to liberate U.S.POWs being held captive against their will by communist forces in Southeast Asia and to return remains of those MIAs that become available for identification. This multifaceted mosaic, when collectively pieced together, knits a blueprint for accomplishing this bold and ambitious plan.

Intelligence has been gathered which pinpoints POW locations; targets have been selected based upon vulnerability, accessibility, willingness to commit, and experience; indigenous assets were filtered through a maze of test-challenges to weed out those with low potential. The results focus upon three distinct areas of effort: The primary is the liberation of U.S. POWs using Free Lao and Free Vietnamese forces guided by a small U.S. Ground Tactical Team, led by Bo Gritz, who is also the overall operation commander. The second effort is a finesse of U.S. POWs using Pathet Lao contacts to turn over Americans in return for sanctuary and/or rewards. The third effort seeks identifiable U.S. MIA remains from all sources.

This summary shall explore each of the areas identified so the reader may understand who, what, where, when, why, and most importantly HOW, OPERATION LAZARUS CAN succeed.

B. ASSUMPTIONS: It is assumed, due to the delicate diplomatic relations between the U.S. --- Thailand and Laos, the U.S. government cannot commit official assets until positive proof of U.S. POW presence is provided. It is assumed once such a determination has been made the U.S.G. will follow the President's stated policy to do whatever is required to return the POWs to U.S. control. The Thai government can only look the other way due to their policy of providing sanctuary for Free Lao and Vietnamese and Cambodian forces while appeasing their communist neighbors by not directly supporting guerrilla activity access to the Thai border. It is assumed the Free Guerrilla Forces can approach POW locations and access them by force, if desired. It is also assumed that the underground and auxiliary forces are adequate to support such a tactical operation and act as an evasion mechanism should aerial support be denied in evacuating POWs to safety once liberated.

It is assumed the U.S.G. will tacitly allow the operation. Careful planning has blended high technology, special operations experience and audacity with existing unconventional warfare potential in the local area into a precision intensive mission that can succeed if properly supported.

Finally, it is assumed that once liberation has been accomplished the U.S. G. will follow up with strong, positive initiatives that will resolve the POW/MIA issue with a final and accurate accounting. It is hoped that the U.S.G. will also continue to provide clandestine support to those dedicated indigenous groups that made the liberation possible.

C. U.S. POW SITUATION:

There appears to be several hundred live American POWs scattered throughout multiple locations along the Laos-Vietnam border within a target-belt approximately 150 miles long by 100 miles wide. Geographically, the majority of U.S.POWs are located from NAPE, LOC XAO, KHAM KHUET, in the north, through NHEMARRATH in the center, to SEPONE in the south. All are located along a major supply route or major routes of communication between Vietnam and Laos. The largest faction confirmed through numerous cross-checking is located at three closely positioned sites in the SEPONE area. One camp at PHU XUN MOUNTAIN has 80 Americans, as reported by the driver of a ration truck from Savanakhet, a mountain guerrilla chief, and two other sources with either firsthand or secondary knowledge. A second area has 35 isolated Americans, while the third has 5 Americans along with over 1,000 Free Lao and Vietnamese prisoners.

The POWs are reportedly in good health physically and performing time passing tasks such as gardening, teaching English to Lao communists, learning Lao and Vietnamese, and helping with general maintenance of facilities. While security is considerable in terms of manpower and material, the POWs are allowed contact with the local population. The guard force is primarily Pathet Lao, who live with their families near the POW camps. When asked by one Free Lao guerrilla if he would like to be led away to Thailand the POW replied yes, but didn't see how it was possible without armed assistance.

D. KEY INDIGENOUS PERSONALITIES (Free Lao -- Vietnamese):

1.GENERAL PHOUMI NOSAVAN: Former high official under U.S. Triparliment of Laos. Currently resides in Bangkok. Has a shadow government sketched out, but little key support from Thai officials or important deposed Lao officials. Has four military regions planned with small groups of refugee Lao residing in Thai camps to someday expand and occupy them. Announced Announced in a press conference on 10 November that he was now declaring declaring a Lao government in exile. Called for a marshaling of cabinet officers from a cross section of Lao groups but only a few signaled support. Requested a one billion dollar loan from Arab backed U.S. leaders; the loan is not likely to go through as their is dearth of collateral. Overall, PHOUMI does have loyal right wing groups along the Lao border with Thailand that support him and several isolated military strongholds within Laos, BUT he is an old and selfish fat man with little direct influence with the Thais or Lao. Understands most English.

a.PHOUMANO NOSAVAN: Son of PHOUMI and former Royal Lao C-47, T-28 pilot trained in Conus. He works for a French news service and lives with his father, wife and two children in Bangkok. He is also president of a firm dealing in Thai labor to work Mid-East contracts. He is even more selfish and devious than his father. When given money for refugee rice and clothing, he pocketed it and lied to his father about the amount. General Phoumi has made comment his son has a bad character and does not represent him. Phoumano is trying to obtain 100 million dollars for a Philippine fishing program which is a cover for his family desire for wealth. He makes no military-type decisions. Speaks good English.

b. LIEUTENANT CHAO ANOU: Phoumi leader in That Phanom. Has a village area inside Laos that is pro-Phoumi. Chao Anou is having problems with Thai requirements that all of his guerrilla forces and families move to a central location at Na Po for registration. It will drastically cut down on his cross-border operations. Only those Lao registered will be allowed food and shelter, others will be arrested. Registration will require several weeks during which his men will be incarcerated. His people are more at war with General Kham Bou's neutral forces, than with the communists. Understands no English. Independent river crossing operations.

c. LIEUTENANT SOM PHON: A Chao Anou subordinate that has great leadership potential. He is a tiger in the field. Commands a small squad-size force. Speaks no English, but is conversant in French. Lives in That Phanom with Chao Anou.

d. CAPTAIN THENE KHAN: Phoumi oriented mountain guerrilla leader from the Sepone area. Has no knowledge of the terrain between the Mekong River and Highway 13. Has local support and village stronghold in the Phu Xun area. Travels a route of 50 villages along Nhoung Khiet Luong, Seno, Dong Hen, Pha Lan, Muong Phin, Sepone line. Plans to cross the Mekong on 08 December and take a small armed group (2 AKs) to Pha Lan and Sepone. Reportedly killed seven Kham Bou neutralists this year and is aggressively sought by and fears Kham Bou. Depends upon auxiliary support for river crossing and guides to NKL area. Speaks no English.

2. GENERAL KHAM BOU: A self-made general subordinate to General Khong Le, who is a young paratroop captain who overthrew the tri-parliament in favor of total neutralism. Kham Bou must reside inside Laos since making a public news statement that it was his aim to retake 17 provinces back from Thailand for Laos. Kham Bou appears to have a larger following than Phoumi, probably because he is close to the Lao people. His stronghold encircles the NKL area which is tightly patrolled against VC, PL, and Phoumi forces. Kham Bou has indicated support for our operation since it will deal the VC communists a severe blow and might result in aid for his forces. His mentor, General Khong Le, is a world traveler, now negotiating both with the Chinese Reds and America for support. He resides in Paris. General Kham Bou understands some English. He appears to be the most powerful single Lao residing in the Far East.

a. CAPTAIN NOKEO KOUMANE: Crossing master for all official Free Lao in the area of NKP/That Phanom coordinated by Thai military. Does not go into Laos himself but has control over sizable paramilitary force commanded by his Lieutenant Sam Sene Thai. Resides in That Phanom. Speaks no English. Fears Kham Bou and responds to his requests for support.

b. LIEUTENANT SAM SENE THAI: Chief subordinate of Nokeo Koumane and a strong, intelligent leader that inspires confidence. Lives in That Phanom camp with Nokeo Koumane, but ventures into Laos and knows General Kham Bou. Has his own Guerrilla Warfare Operating Area in Pah Lan area to Don Hen area.

c. CAPTAIN TIAN THALA: Subordinate to General Kham Bou who is dependent upon Nokeo Koumane for river crossings. Knows PL driver who routinely makes food deliveries to Sepone. The driver has given Tian Thala details on the POW camp at Phu Xun to include the commander's name and various staff and job assignments. Tian Thala is an American-size Lao with good looks and a strong dedication to Kham Bou. His force is smaller than that of Nokeo Koumane, but Nokeo Koumane fears that Tian Thala will emerge his superior in the eyes of General Kham Bou. Tian Thala is single, understands very little English and French.

d. CAPTAIN ONG BOUN: An aggressive Kham Bou guerrilla leader who resides in the Muong Phin area. He has a brother-in-law who is a PL major assigned to the POW camp where 5 Americans and over a thousand Free Lao/VN are being held. Ong Boun destroyed a bridge along Highway 9 in October 1982 at the request of the Thais and has initiated several contacts with the PL/VC which have accounted for 20 plus KIA. A Free Vietnamese unit has now joined him after a skirmish south of Sepone. Ong Boun has now 80 armed men with weapons that include a 60mm mortar. He sent a runner to tell the U.S. team that he would be waiting for us until 05 January 1083, when he would return to Thailand. He, along with Tian Thala and Thene Kham and a ration driver, confirms the three POW locations at Sepone. Ong Boun speaks no English. A force of 40 will cross 12 December to destroy POL (petroleum, oil, lube) depot supporting Route 9 construction between Muong Phin and Pha Lan.

3. WARRIOR/MONK FA NGOUN: Moves around the border area from Nhong Kha Ubon. Has a son residing in Ban Xe Du between the Si Ban Fai river and Hoi Te Hao in Laos. He is allied with any group dedicated to fighting communism. He is conversant with both Phoumi and Kham Bou. He does not like Thene Kham and doesn't trust Phoumi. He was once aligned with General Vang Pao's chief subordinate. He requires three days notice before crossing from That Phanom for support. He plans his own river crossings and appears to be highly respected because of his clergy/soldier mix. He was married before entering monkhood and has a daughter in Mexico, and one in Paris. He speaks Vietnamese, French, Thai and Lao.

4. LOH THARAPHANT: A dynamic, intrepid, dedicated man willing to commit everything in his fight against communism. Loh worked for ten years with the OSI, providing intelligence and counterintelligence support for the NKP area. He is ethnic Vietnamese, born in Hanoi. He is no a Thai citizen and has resided with the Thai military. A daughter is 17. Loh is THE Thai representative for the Vietnam Liberation Front headquartered in Paris. He provides considerable information to the Thais and is sought out by the NKP government for help in countering Vietnamese inspired insurgency in the area. He teaches the Thai military Vietnamese. Loh is the single most important link in the indigenous chain. His energy is limitless and his full potential untested. He communicates with every resistance leader and has the respect of everyone who knows him. When this mission succeeds it will be due in no small measure to his dauntless efforts. He speaks all SEA languages, French and English. He is most cooperative with any U.S.G. request and possesses an understanding of our bureaucratic bungling. Loh should be recruited as a paid permanent agent for the U.S.G.. He is worth ten CIA operatives, JCRC, DIA, DAO reps.

a. THAO: An agent-handler of Vietnamese extraction that resides in Muk Da Han, Thailand. Thao maintains communications with other ethnic Vietnamese who work in Laos for the communists. Thao appears to be honest and earnest even though he tends to interpret his own intelligence at times instead of just reporting it as given to him. For example: Thao reported there were two "atomic bombs" stored in a military secured area of Savanakhet Air Base. When questioned further it was determined that there is a concrete bunker, wire enclosed and well guarded, that most likely contains some sort of sensitive munition. A PL colonel had told a Chinese family, residing in Savanakhet, that the Soviet Union had provided two special weapons that were intended for use against NKP and Muk Da Han areas in the event of hostilities and capable of destroying everything in between. Thao theorized that it must be an atomic bomb. Thao provides good detail and is willing to accept any degree of difficulty in providing photos of key facilities anywhere in Savanakhet to Seno area. Since there are two MIG bases, radio-radar installations involved, he should be used and tested. He should be registered as a U.S.G. agent under control of Loh. He speaks no English, fluent in Vietnamese and Thai, conversant in French.

b. GIANG: A mechanic of Vietnamese extraction who is not a Lao citizen living and working military assignments in Savanakhet and Seno. Has access to considerable technical and organizational information since, as a chief mechanic, many of the leaders and driver/operators confide in him. He has been the key to much of the OB information and statistics on equipment.

5. From the brief descriptions above it should be readily apparent why the communists occupy Laos. The Free Lao forces are so widely divided over personality differences they will not marshal their forces against a common enemy. PHOUMI is a cheat who receives money from stateside Lao to care for his people in refugee camps along the border. Investigation reveals that little if any arrives at the camps. General Vang Pao, highlands leader of Military Region 11, now lives in Montana and coordinates the United Lao Development Corporation, in the U.S. He has not set foot into Thailand or Laos since 1975. General Khong Le is highly respected, but like the others prefers to live apart from his people. Only General Kham Bou, by his own undoing, is forced to live in the interior of Laos.

The Thais are currently, more so now than ever before, tightening their grip on Free Lao movement across the border. After registration of all forces in Thailand no further Lao shall be permitted to enter. The Thais make a practice of confiscating any weapons and munitions that come into the country from Laos, only to be reissued for Thai directed activity in Laos. Free Lao are allowed, on a controlled basis, to cross into Laos against communist forces. The villages support the Free Lao passively, if not openly. The people dislike the Vietnamese occupation as it draws heavily upon their always short resources and is squelching out their religious practices. There is no shortage of manpower---only hardware and guidance. With a minimum effort, on the part of the U.S.G., a sizable Free Lao military force could be developed that would require Vietnam to either split its Cambodian oriented forces or be forced to withdraw from Laos. It could provide a land bridge for insertion of Free Vietnamese forces that want to return home and fight the communists. A force-multiplier provided by high technology and training could span the differences between Free Lao personalities and knit them into a tight weave that might work together, but would coordinate with Americans toward a liberated Laos.

Black or gray operations are not difficult using contract type arrangements with reliable personnel. The liberation of U.S. POWs will deal a heavy blow to the communists and focus world attention upon Laos; it should not wane before seeing Free Lao forces taking the initiative against the Vietnamese. PL forces could be expected to align themselves with a neutral element like Kham Bou.

E. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

1. RECOVERY AND IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS: Receive from any source remains that have supporting information; such as dog tags, ID cards, tail numbers, crash sights, etc., for shipment to the JCRC ID lab in Hawaii. Initial expenses will be paid up to a maximum of 2,000 Baht Thai, until positive ID established. Then a bonus of 8,000 B Thai, for a total of 10,000 Baht Thai ($444.00 U.S.). This program to be worked concurrently with the two POW liberation plans. Loh has a set en route, in and around this area near Sepone. Phoumi says that he has 30 sets that can be retrieved and delivered for a price. While distasteful to buy back our dead and in many cases remains of Asians, $444.00 U.S. is a small price to pay to resolve an MIA family's anguish regarding the fate of their loved one.

2. FINESSE OF U.S. POWS: There are three reports regarding instances wherein U.S.POWs have been approached by Free Lao and asked if they would like to return to the USA. In one case it was attempted unsuccessfully and in two instances the Americans refused because they didn't think it possible. In every case the Americans showed strong emotions in wanting to be returned. Phoumi has contact with PL authorities in the Nape-Lac Sao area that have access to from 6-to-8 POWs that could be brought to the border with Thailand and turned over. Phoumi has reportedly dispatched an agent to arrange just such a transfer. The PL would require either sanctuary, should the transfer become public knowledge, or remuneration for their effort. Ong Boun has access to 5 POWs through his brother-in-law, a PL major, in the Muong Phin area. It is possible that these men could be freed through finesse at the same time a forced liberation was being initiated Phu Xun. Sublieutenant Maha Ouphat, a Free Lao, operating in the Mahaxey/Si Ban Fi River with approximately 100 men, reported having contact with two U.S. POWs in the Nhemarrath area who were instructing the PL in English. They indicated a reluctance to go without assurance they could make it, fearing retribution from their captors should they fail.

All avenues of finesse should be explored and worked in conjunction with the forced liberation. Failing actual freeing of U.S.POWs through finesse, the ID and intelligence on numbers and locations can be used later in negotiations to resolve the POW issue.

3. FORCED LIBERATION: A small U.S. team, led by Bo Gritz, crosses the Mekong River with an armed contingent of Free Lao en route to Nhoung Khiet Long and liaison with General Kham Bou. General Kham Bou has already been informed of and has blessed the operation with his support, along with that of four area chiefs. In addition, Ong Boun has his 80 man unit plus 30 Free Vietnamese. How much actual armed support will be forthcoming remains to be seen, but 20 men from each area plus those to initially cross the Mekong River would provide a sizable force that could forcefully free POWs from Phu Xun.

If it appears feasible, a coordinated effort might be made to simultaneously hit all three locations. The POWs would then be withdrawn as rapidly as possible back through the protective village net while Free Lao forces provide diversionary action to cover movement. Those POWs unable to move to prepared landing zones for airlift to U.S. control could be secured in stay-behind locations provided by Free Lao auxiliary forces and village support. Airlift could best be accomplished through NKP Air Base and coordination with the Thais. Considering the path of flight will parallel two MIG bases (Seno and Savanakhet) either a Thai or a U.S.Naval fighter cap would be advised over the border. Straight line distance to Sepone is 125 miles. Helicopter turn around would probably be 2 1/2-to-3 hours. Without either a prestrike or fighter cap the lift birds will be extremely vulnerable to attack by MIG, HIND, and AAA. If no vertical lift is available the POWs will be moved or left in stay-behind modes through the chain of 48 friendly villages to the border. The Mekong River is a mile wide with very strong undercurrent. The POWs could not be expected to swim the distance with success. To remain on the far bank for any extended period of time would invite the massing of communist forces and recapture.

The POWs can probably be freed from any one location with a 60% chance of success. Multiple rescues reduce the success ratio by 20%. Vertical lift will provide a 70% chance return of all pickup; without vertical lift the attenuation is directly proportional to distance and time. If no assistance is given 10% of those freed can be expected to survive the movement to the Mekong River and subsequent unsupported crossing.

4. ALTERNATIVES: If the Executive Branch has a better plan for liberating U.S.POWs that plan should be made known ASAP to the field team so proper support may be rendered. The team can provide photographs, locations, numbers, enemy, weather, terrain data, LZ-DZ information, pathfinder operation in support of U.S.ground effort, route control, diversion, stay behind, auxiliary, underground operations, attack and control of limited objective hard points; guides, infiltration-exfiltration overland; target assessment and other on-order type missions.

The purpose of OPERATION LAZARUS is to liberate U.S. personnel being held against their will by the communists, not to add to the population of POWs. While bold, the plan of attack has been carefully balanced around the calculated risk. The risk is high, but if success was not equally high we would not risk our freedom and embarrassment to our country. OPERATION LAZARUS will succeed if the U.S. government will commit itself to getting these warriors out with the same zeal it committed them during the Vietnam War. Facing truth and reality will find the U.S. emerging a stronger nation while showing our military they are part of our society, not apart from it. The POWs went and did what others -----

(* At this point there is a page missing, it had Bo Gritz's signature on it but not much in the way of operational information.)

ANNEX A

INTELLIGENCE REPORT: Vang Chai. (Ethnic Lao with no ID-Thai
No particular party affiliation.
Resides in NKP -- contact LOH.

Vang Chai claims he has contact with a family, living in Thakhet, whose son is a guard at a camp containing over 30 U.S.POWs, located 2 kilometers from the Lao-Vietnam border on Route 8 ---running from Thakhet through Nhemarrath to Nape. He claims to have access to 3 photographs showing the POWs with Pathet Lao guards. He claims the prisoners can be rescued and brought to safety in Thailand. He has agreed to do the following:

1. 08 December he will go to the family in Thakhet with a letter from Bo Gritz to the POWs requesting ID info on each American present.
2. He will have the family give the letter, for delivery to the POWs, to their son, if he is due home on leave in the next few days, otherwise he will arrange for a messenger to deliver the letter and retrieve the 3 photographs. If the son is there or due shortly it will only be a matter of four-to-five days before we will have the results back from the POW camp. If the son is not at home it will be as much as 2 weeks before a messenger can secure permission to travel to the area and return.
3. Once we are convinced of an American presence, Vang Chai will form a group to arrange transfer of the POWs from PL to Free Lao hands and delivery to Thailand.

Vang Chai reports that a guard asked him to provide a THAI-ENGLISH dictionary so the guard force might communicate with the POWs. The photographs were taken January, 1981. Some of the POWs are old. The camp consists of structures made especially to house Americans and situated in the jungle. There are many mountains in the area and there may be more than 30 POWs, but agent 1 is certain of 30. The PL allow the POWs freedom of the local area unless there are reports of Free Lao activity, then they are closely guarded in the facility.

VANG CHAI SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE THE CONTACT WITH U.S. POWS AND RETURN OF CONFIRMING DETAILS; e.g., PHOTOS AND LETTER. HE SHOULD BE GIVEN THE WHEREWITHAL TO EITHER FINESSE THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE PL OR RESCUE THEM BY FORCE. APPROPRIATE REWARDS SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR EACH MILESTONE ACHIEVED. HE SHOULD BE REWARDED APPRECIATIVELY FOR ANY PHOTOS THAT SHOW IDENTIFIABLE AMERICANS IN CAPTIVITY. IF HIS INFORMATION IS TIMELY ENOUGH IT SHOULD BE RELAYED TO BO AT GENERAL KHAM BOU'S HQS FOR POSSIBLE IMMEDIATE ACTION FROM THERE. FOLLOW THIS ONE CLOSELY AS IT VERY WELL COULD BE THE MISSING "30" FROM VELVET HAMMER. VANG CHAI SHOULD BE GIVEN ASSURANCE THAT HE AND ANY OTHER FREE LAO WHO IS INSTRUMENTAL IN FREEING U.S.POWS WILL BE SPONSORED INTO THE UNITED STATES.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT: CHUE YANG
No particular party affiliation.
Resides in NKP area---contact LOH.

CHUE YANG, claims there are 2 U.S. POWs alive and being held in Kham Kheut, learning Vietnamese from a Lao instructor. The agent has a friend, residing in Thakhet, who is a friend of the teacher. He will go to Thakhet on 08 December and deliver a letter to the friend intended for the POWs. The friend will request travel to Kham Kheut and deliver the letter to the teacher who will forward it to the Americans. The friend will await the POWs reply and deliver same to Chue Yang at Thakhet. It will require only 3-to-4 days once the friend has permission to travel. It might be 10-to-14 days for permission to be travel to be granted by the PL.

Chue Yang claims he has been to Lak Sao, Nape, and Kham Khuet on Free Lao operations, adding there is a heavy concentration of both VC and PL in those areas. He claims Kham Kheut is a rice center and, therefore, heavily populated by soldiers. The VC have 6 stations around the Kham Kheut and 1 company in the village. The PL keep 100 soldiers there and the Village Popular Force has 100 men under arms.

Chue Yang claims when we are convinced the 2 Americans are at Kham Kheut he can arrange a finesse with the PL and have the two Americans brought to the Thai-Lao border by the PL. We would be expected to provide a suitable ransom, following delivery. The POWs would be moved across the river by boat.

Chue Yang is the agent who provided the MIA bones to SRI THAN. He is positive the bones are those of an American pilot, as the pilot was buried by 2 PL at the time of the crash and 1 of those 2 provided him with the pieces of bone from the forearm, jaw, and spine. He claims additional bones are available if absolutely necessary, but additional money would have to be paid as SRI THAN did not share in the 7,000 Baht reward. The PL who brought the bones to Chue Yang is now a sublieutenant. He confirms the location of the crash as Ban Na Hu, Laos, 08 kilometers east and 60 kilometers from the Vietnam border. He claimed the skull was burned in the crash, but teeth and other bones are recoverable.

Chue Yang is due to return on the 10th. of December from Thakhet with results of his efforts to pass the letter to the teacher's friend and an estimated time of reply.

Chue Yang claims seven years ago an American and Italian, both civilian, went to Ban Nam Thon, located midway Thakhet and Vientien. They were captured by PL and subsequently executed. Their bodies were cremated. Chue Yang claims he can retrieve the personal notes from the American which are in Thakhet and he will attempt to do so and return same on the 10th. of December.

NOTE: CHUE YANG SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE THE CONTACT CUT-OUT BETWEEN THE U.S. POWS AS A TOP PRIORITY AND SHOULD PROVIDE CONFIRMATION THROUGH THE RETURNED LETTER REQUESTING SIGNATURES AND OTHER PERSONAL INFO ON AMERICANS PRESENT. HE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK THE FINESSE AND BE REWARDED APPROPRIATELY AT EACH MILESTONE UNTIL THE POWS ARE DELIVERED. ASSURANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT HE AND THOSE INVOLVED WILL BE SPONSORED INTO THE UNITED STATES AS A RESULT OF THEIR SUCCESS. HE SHOULD FURTHER FOLLOW-UP ON THE MIA REMAINS OF BOTH THE PILOT AND EXECUTED AMERICAN.

The following appears on the backside of paper bearing photocopies of U.S. ID card and OSD badge:

We are here to bring you home ASAP, you can best help by writing the following info for each US type with you on the bottom of this letter: Name, SN, DOB, place of birth, family, pets, schools, friends, hobbies, signature.

Give your written answers to the man who gives you this, he will get them to us. You need do nothing else except keep the faith. Put your trust in whoever presents this signature.

See you soon.

James G. Gritz (signature)