The Gaines Report

DIRECTOR'S PW/MIA TASK FORCE REPORT GAINE's REPORT

INDEX

1. INTRODUCTION

2. FINDINGS

3. RELATED ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Issue 1. - The DIA Strategy

b. Issue 2. - Mindset to Debunk

c. Issue 3. - Lack of Management

d. Issue 4. - Condition of Case Files

e. Issue 5. - Direct Exposure of PW Division Analysts to Outside Agencies and Individuals.

f. Issue 6. - Blurring of Analysis, Collection and Investigation.

g. Issue 7. - Collection Management

h. Issue 8. - Internal Organization of PW Division

i. Issue 9. - Realignment of Case Files

j. Issue 10. - Resolution of Case Files

k. Issue 11. - Reorientation of the JCRC

l. Issue 12. - International Assistance

m. Issue 13. - Garwood

n. Issue 14. - Vietnamese Disinformation Campaign

o. Issue 15. - Interagency Committee on Vietnam PW/MIA

p. Issue 16. - Standardized Polygraph Procedures

q. Issue 17. - ADP Deficiencies<----- MISSING from this report???

1. (U) INTRODUCTION:

a. (U) Pursuant to verbal instructions from the Director on 20 February 1986, the subject Task Force was formed and began active session as a group on 24 February 1986. Members of the Team were as follows: Kimball M. Gaines, Colonel, USAF, JSO; Franklin D. Mastro, Colonel, USA, ATSA; Joseph A. Schlatter, LtCol, USA, DB-2; William T. Mayall, Major, USAF, OCOCS; and Ms. Clara Harris, RSI-3A.

b. (U) Task Force Charter was to conduct a hardnosed objective examination of PW/MIA substantive issues and procedures and to report findings and recommendations to the Director within thirty days. In addition to discussions with supervisory and working level personnel within the PW Community Staff (Annex E) and with the National Security Agency Representative to DoD. Additionally, all active first-hand-live-sighting case files were reviewed by the Task Force as well as a representative number of previously closed cases. The results of prior IG reports, Congressional Investigations and in-house reviews concerning the PW Division were also studied. Additional perspective on how the PW Division conducted its business was gained by discussions with RADM Thomas A. Brooks, USN, previous Assistant Deputy Director for Collection Management, and for a short time responsible for the PW Division until it moved to VO.

2. (S/NF) FINDINGS:

a. (U) The Task Force review revealed serious shortcomings in every important area:attitudes, management, procedure, organization, and leadership. Paragraph 3 of this report is devoted to a detailed discussion of the 17 major issues which derived from these findings and which contain the recommended solutions which will turn the PW Division into an effective, disciplined and productive organization.

b. (U) Findings are as follows:

(5) (C) The data base is a wasteland, neither structored nor maintained to support analysts adequately in all areas. Automated file structure is sorely out-of-date and no management action has been taken to obtain assistance with this problem. One intelligence technician is responsible for data base maintenance but she is emcumbered with an outmoded file system, overwhelmed by the volume of material, and has not been provided assistance from readily-available DIA customer service elements. The data base structure, maintenance, design, and upgrade have received little management attention. The data base, of course, is the central foundation for the entire DIA PW effort and why a recognized problem of such importance (and management admits to the "recognition") had gone unsolved simply boggles the mind. The Task Force solution to enforce attention to the problem is reflected in the paragraph 3 issue on reorganization wherein data base if raised to the level of a Branch. The overall condition of the data base if one of the main reasons the Task Force does not have complete confidence in the conclusions resulting from the PW Division analytic process.

(6) (U) The existence of shoddy case-files is not new and others have pointed this out, the latest official mention being a flag-rank memo to VO as late as September 1985. There has been a sporadic effort to throw people at the problem, such as Reservists and as late as the first part of March, two O-6s and tow GS-15s, from elswhere in YO; however, the solution does not lend itself to the ad hoc method of doing business which is so characteristic of PW Division. Detailed treatment of the case-file problem is contained in paragraph 3.

(7) (S/NF) Outside the mainstream, is the only way to describe the collection effort and one telling proof of the pudding is the fact that it took outsiders, IC Staff members and Col Childress of the NSC staff, to include PW/MIA EEI in the National HUMINT Collection Plan, Indo China, and to raise the priority of collection from five to three in the National Intelligence Topics (NITS). None of this initiative originated from the PW MIA Division.

(8) (U) By their own admission, there is not enough "analysis" being done by the PW analysts. There is somehow never enough time for it because of "other priorities" although they think it would be a really good thing to do if they could. In fact, the Chief of the Analysis Branch feels that there is probably enough information on hand already to allow a definitive judgment on the live POW issue in North Vietnam, but they just can't get around to doing it. When a case is being worked, however, it is plainly evident that the emphasis is on the investigative side of the question in most cases, where the focus rests on debunking the source more than it does on analysis of the information itself. It should be noted with trepidation that there are some 600 hearsay reports of LIVE sightings backlogged in the Division which have not had any evaluation. And there is no actual proof that this class of report has any less potential for yielding some usable information than do the first-hand sighting reports. The implications of this are obvious to the casual observer, but do not seem to be appreciated by the experts.

(9) (U) The Task Force also felt strongly about the personnel shortages, organizational deficiencies and ADP deficiencies and has devoted considerable attention in paragraph 3 to the solution of those problems.

(10) (U) The ultimate bottom line to this entire review is the absence of leadership. Every condition uncovered and detailed in this report attests to that fact. This Division is not an organized effort and it is certainly not a model thqt deserves emulation, the reports by the House Task Force and the D8 March 1985 Examination notwithstanding. It is the judgement of the Task Force that in its present condition, the PW/MIA Division cannot provide the Director, DIA with the proper level and quality of support. Furthermore, given the existing discrepancies in the functional areas, the Task Force has no confidence that the current analytical process has adequately addressed all relevant factors and has drawn totally reliable conclusions.

3. (U) RELATED ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. (U) From the major handicaps identified in the previous section, the Task Force distilled a family of related major issues and recommendations. What follows represents both an aggregation of problems into solvable entities and a formulation of new initiatives which will improve the way DIA deals with the POW problem. These issues are indexed below, followed by the respective detailed discussions on succeeding pages:

Issue # 1 - THE DIA STRATEGY

DISCUSSION:

(U) The present Administration has made the PW/MIA issue a top national priority, has taken a strong public stand, and has developed a ten-point strategy to guide the U.S. approach to resolution of the question. Since the Defense Intelligence Agency is a major, and now visible, actor in this effort, it is only proper that DIA adopt a strategy of its won with respect to the contribution it makes. With the overall objectives of taking the DIA out of the reactive mode and putting it on the offensive, the following three-point strategy is prepared:

A. Present Facts Fairly and Objectively to Public, Media, Congress.

B. Actively Involve the Entire National Intelligence Apparatus:

C. Improve the DIA PW/MIA Effort by Implementing the Recommendations of this Task Force, the most critical of which are:

Issue # 2. - MINDSET TO DEBUNK

DISCUSSION:

There exists a mindset to debunk. The perception is one held by external elements, and has worked against DIA's interests. Within PW/MIA Division, it has evolved over time as an investigative technique, whereby intense effort is initially focused on veracity of sources with a view toward discrediting them. This penchant had overridden the seeking of the corroborative data necessary to support the "sighting." Reinforcing the mindset is the investigative audit trail which has confirmed an inordinate number of originally promising sources to be fabricators. Thus time and money have been saved in those investigations skewed toward debunking. Unfortunately, the mindset now permeates the Division in other than investigative matters, and it appeared during the review period that just about any new idea on the PW/MIA issue is met with a negative response. Even more unfortunate is the fact that the analysts involved are not even consciously aware of their negative approach. This is not a newly developed attitude, as review established that ADM Tuttle, a former supervisor, had noted it during his tenure though 1981, but was not able to reverse it before reassignment. It appears to be a matter better handled by positive leadership within the Division, rather than external sources. In the main, sources who volunteer information have no ulterior motive, especially those already relocated to the US. Sources were very young when they observed the event; others were in dire straits as a result of the war; and, in many cases, the "sighting" was a fleeting one. Therefore, sources should not be badgered when they come forward to volunteer information they do not recall well, in view of the long time interval involved; otherwise word gets around the refugee community and information dries up. The Task Force review was not able to confirm that the outcome of any particular case has so far been effected by negative mindset. However, it should be noted that the existence of this sort of bias not only detracts from the DIA image, it also can insidiously reduce the objectivity of analysis.

RECOMMENDATION:

Can best be controlled, neutralized and eliminated by recognition and close attention by the Division Chief.

Issue # 3. - LACK OF MANAGEMENT

DISCUSSION:

(C) The Task Force addressed this issue from the standpoint of the five traditional pillars of management, -- namely plan, organize, direct, control, and coordinate. Each element is flawed with one of the contributing factors being that the managers of the organization, by their own admission and confirmed by the Task Force review, do not manage. They function instead as ad hoc action officers. Not surprisingly, planning is almost non-existent. Missing is the realization that everything pertaining to the PW/MIA's must originate within the Division. Some Division personnel know that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning; National Intelligence Collection Plans; Defense Wide Intelligence Plan, etc. exist but they do not see them as tools to be employed in resolving the problem. There is no appreciation for a two-year time frame of resolution, as specified by the SRV.

(C) The POW Division is short of personnel and needs to be augmented as described elsewhere in this report. All aspects of ADP are deficient, to include training of technicians. Similarly, analysts have not been given the requisite six week DIA Training Program; hence, were handicapped.

(C) Direction is by exception. Everyone does his individual effort, according to self-imposed priorities and procedures. (One GS-12, judged to be ineffective by fellow workers, simply kept his own schedule and was available only intermittently.) There are no enumerated goals or objectives (SOPs, mission statements) upon which any direction is based. Functions are carried out on an ad hoc basis.

(C) Control emanates from VO to the staff section and then blurs. Within the element there is little formal control -- from receipt of tasking through the execution phase. Operations are totally decentralized to include formal presentations to members of Congress. During this review, one GS-14 was humiliated by a Congressman, who terminated the session by throwing the former's papers on the floor and verbally admonishing him. There was no one present to back up the staff officer. Supervisors, acting as analysts, are not controlling actions.

(C) Coordination is informal and ad hoc like the rest of the effort. Memorandums for Record are not kept on significant actions being handled via telephone. Even collection coordination is informal, with the exception of messages to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). Emphasis on humanitarian considerations, at the expense of intelligence collection remains a deficiency as cited by the DIA IG in 1983. There is insufficient coordination with OSD/ISA.

(C) As a general comment, most of the discrepancies in the POW Division can be traced to this lack-of-management as well as a strongly entrenched attitude that they can do no wrong, even in the face of evidence to the contrary. This attitude has also been abetted by the Congressional review of May 1983 through June 1984 and the DO review of March 1985, both of which essentially white-washed the whole operation. Good initiatives originating-- ---------

Issue # 4. - CONDITION OF CASE FILES

DISCUSSION:

(U) Members of the Task Force reviewed 63 VO-PW case files. It is the finding of the Task Force that case files, in general, are not complete and, in some cases, not well-maintained. Specifically:

RECOMMENDATION:

Issue # 6. - BLURRING OF ANALYSIS, COLLECTION AND INVESTIGATION.

(U) DISCUSSION:

The Task Force appreciates the need for overlap in various portions of the intelligence cycle. However, review revealed a blurring of analysis collection and investigtion at the expense of analysis.

Operating predominantly on an ad hoc basis, the Divisioin opens, investigates, analyzes, and closes cases, thus validating its own efforts. Organization structure cannot, nor was ever, intended to support all these functions so each is denigrated. Analysis, the most critically needed function, had the greatest shortfall. Despite investigative effort, cases remain backlogged just as they were when the DIA IG conducted his 1983 inspection of VO-PW. The push is on "first-hand live sightings" but a backlog of approximately 600 hearsay live sighting reports has accumulated which is not justifiable in view of the high priority assigned to his effort. Over 784 manhours overtime in 1985 failed to reduce this backlog.

In his 12 March 1986 testimony to Congress, the Director stated: "No budgetary constraints are imposed on research, interviews and investigative follow-up associated with DIA's pursuit of PW/MIA information." The intent of this statement was to emphasis DIA's dedication to US Government efforts to resolve the PW/MIA issue. However, the perception by the PW/MIA Division that there are no limitations on travel and contact funds encourages investigative efforts that could be carried out by investigative agencies more efficiently and with-out taking DIA analysts away from their analytical tasks. VO-PW analysts carry no credentials nor are they trained investigators. Case files are not investigative files and are not complete analytic files. Instead, they are working files.

The Division characterizes its investigative activities as collection, but the Division operator, in general, is outside the mainstream of DIA and Intelligence Community collection effort. While the Division believes it is conducting a vigorous collection effort, that effort is largelyh focussed on investigating the wherabouts and the veracity of sources. Thus, the Division's management believes that it is collecting extensively when, in fact, the collection effort is not well-planned, executed, or managed and is not taking full advantage of all collection assets.

The PW/MIA Division requires a well-defined mission statement as well as numerous SOPs. Division personnel are operating under a myriad of mission statements -- all outdated. The 1983 IG report had a statement of mission enclosed, as did several outdated DIA functions and mission publications. Unfortunately, the current DIA mission and functions publication left the PW Division (VO-PW) out altogether. Similarly, repeated inspections, including the IG, have cited the failure to have an SOP. This deficiency still exists---

Issue # 7. - COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

(S/NF) DISCUSSION:

VO-PW collection management is uneven and, as a result, the ad hoc nature of the collection management effort is detrimental to analytical efforts. VO-PW does not appear to function in the mainstream of the DIA collection system.

In the area of HUMINT collection, a comprehensive Continuing Intelligence Requirement (CIR) was issued in October 1985. However, there is no record of tailored tasking guidance, collection emphasis messages, or other actions taken to follow-up the October 1985 CIR.

In the area of SIGINT collection, the current requirements in support of PW/MIA collection are integrated into the National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL) for Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian political collection.

While VO-PW IMINT requirements are now current, the requirements have not been reviewed as part of the recent COMIREX-directed Intelligence Problem (IP) review. In fact, VO-PW personnel had never been tasked to complete an IP review. Furthermore, VO-PW personnel had never developed tasking for KH-9 missions.

Within the past few weeks, Mr. Robert Destatte, VO-PW, has received assistance from DC-4 and DC-7 collection managers in putting together and issuing coordinated collection requirements. Mr. Destatte has made initial steps toward a fairly complete overhaul of the VO-PW collection posture. However, as with many other projects in the office, higher priority ad-hoc requirements have pushed his efforts in the collection area to a lower priority.

The primary source of VO-PW's information are refugee interviews by personnel from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). When reports are received, there is frequently need for follow-up questions. There is normally a time delay of several days or weeks before follow-up questions are transmitted to JCRC. If JCRC interviewers had better collection guidance, much follow-up would be done on the spot. (e.g. If a refugee claimes to have been in a certain relocation camp, the interviewer should have analysts questions relative to that camp.)

Currently, DAOs are required to report PW/MIA information by message, not by IIR. As a result, DAOs do not get IIR credit for PW/MIA reporting.

By being out of the mainstream of the DIA collection system, there are several sources (primarily IIUMINT) that are not being exploited fully by the Division. Collection requirements are not normally levied on DOMEX assets, 500th MI Group, and DIA Liaison Officers, thus another available group of assets are going unutilized.

RECOMMENDATION:

Issue # 8. - INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF VO-PW

(CONF/WNINTEL) DISCUSSION:

The organizatoin of VO-PW cripples mission accomplishment. Specific problem areas that are part of the overall issue of organization are discussed below.

- Inadequate supervision and management. VO-PW has two subordinate branches:

VO-PW1, External Relations, and VO-PW2, Collection and Analysis Branch. Each of these branches is headed by a GS-14 who has considerable analytical and/or operational responsibilities in addition to the supervisory and managerial responsibilities required of a branch chief.

This situation is a major contributor to many of the other problems within VO-PW. Supervisors should have no analytical, collection, or operational responsibilities other than SUPERVISING and MANAGING activities of their branches in those areas. There is little, if any, time available for managers/supervisores to detach themselves from the operations of their branches and analyze how their branches are operating; they are too involved in what their branches are doing, or are doing it themselves.

- No Clear Distinction Between Analysis, Collection, and Investigation.

Analysts within VO-PW2, Collection and Analysis Branch, perform both collection and analysis. Some analysts, particularly those with language capability, are more deeply involved in collection than are others. In the case of the branch chief and two of the analysts with excellent language capabilities, much of their time is spent in telephone interviews with sources. Investigative activities consume an inordinate amount of time that should be spent on analysis and/or collection.

In this regard, VO-PW requires its own limited collection and interview capability for selected sources of information (Vietnamese refugees) who must be interviewed by Vietnamese linguists who are also familiar with information on VO-PW files. Thus, the continued use of VO-PW personnel) as active collectors and interviewers is important to the operation of the office.

- InSufficient Administrative and Clerical Support. The administrative and _________________________________________________ clerical support to VO-PW is insufficient and this situation is a major shortcoming. A newly-hired secretary is quickly becoming proficient in supporting the Division but is completely overloaded by typing demands. At the time of the team's review of VO-PW, there were at least 48 finished reports, 25 collection emphasis messages, and 11 case evaluations along with a two-inch stack of other items awaiting typing. For several days, nothing except material for the Director's upcoming Congressional testimony was typed. A major backlog exists in two areas: final evaluations of sighting reports and filing of data on the Vietnamese prison/reeducation camp system. At present, there are 179 resolved first-hand sighting cases for which the analyst has written an evaluation, but the evaluations are awaiting editing and typing. Some of these date back to 1981. In the other area, refugees have been reinterviewed for specific knowledge on the prison/reeducation camp system and over one hundred reports have been received, some with information on several camps. These reports have been read but have never been files in the appropriate camp folder. On 17 March, an Army Reserve NCO was assigned to VO-PW and given the task of filing these reports.

The office has a minimal system of keeping track of taskings. There does not seem to be a clear system of logging incoming requirements (suspended or open-ended), assigning them to an individual for action, and tracking their completion.

A single Air Force Master Sergeant serves as administrative NCO but her many other duties and the lack of any other administrative personnel serve to make administration within VO-PW an ad hoc affair.

- Insufficient Intelligence Technician Support. VO-PW currently is authorized ______________________________________________ and has present two intelligence technicians (one newly-hired and not trained) who support six analysts and, when all current vacancies are filled, will support twelve analysts. Two intelligence technicians cannot support the six analysts adequately and will fall far short of being able to support a full contingent of analysts. As an example ofthe impact of insufficient intelligence technician support, one analyst has over 75 reports that need to be entered into the automated data base. The shortage of intelligence technicians -- combined with insufficient ADP equipment and training --- has led to this situation and will perpetuate it.

- Inadequate Planning. There is virtually No planning done in VO-PW. The ____________________ Division should anticipate Congressional testimony, media features, and other events requiring VO-PW action. The Division should also develop initiative studies and producst as part of a coherent production plan.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the PW Division be reorganized along the three key functional areas where management focus is mot critical. These are: Data Base and Collection Management, Analysis, and Collation and Planning. The propsed ideal reorganization into three branches is shown below as TAB A and requires an increase of 9 personnel from the current 25 presently authorized. A reorganization with minimal personnel increases is at TAB B and represents an incremental fix to the malorganization that currently exists, while additional and more extensive manpower authorizations for the ideal organization are established. Comparative manning breakouts are at TAB C.

The proposed TAB A organization, in contrast to that presently in force, will impose order on the numerous functions of the Divisioin and result in an orderly flow if information and products while allowing a disciplined approach to problems that arise.

Even adoption of the minimal augmentation TAB B organization would be a positive step, however, full benefit would not be realized until the military managers, extra typists and intel techs as outlined in the TAB A organization are on hand.

Issue # 9. - REALIGNMENT OF PW/MIA DIVISION WITHIN DIA

(U) DISCUSSION:

The PW/MIA Division, currently assigned to VO, has been located previously in DC, DI, and DB. The issue of WHERE the PW/MIA Division is within DIA is vital to the Agency because of three considerations: First, the location of the Division is a visible indicator of the importance DIA places on the PW/MIA issue. Second, many requests requiring PW/MIA Division action are high-priority requiring rapid response and should not be slowed by layers of bureaucracy. Finally, the position of the Division determines the "clout" it will have within and outside the Agency.

In previous years, the PW/MIA Division was reduced to five personnel and Division personnel state that a previous Director "planned to close us up." If such a situation developled again, it would suggest strongly that DIA does not place high priority on the PW/MIA issue.

The PW/MIA Division has little "clout" within DIA and this fact has had certain specific detrimental impacts on the Division. As an example, the Division is woefully behind the rest of the Agency in analyst training, ADP equipment, and word processors.

Currently, the PW/MIA issue is of high national visibility and priority. However, we much anticipate that some future Administration, if not the current one toward the end of its term, will lower either or both the priority and the visibility of the issue. At that point, the DIA mission in the PW/MIA area should become less visible.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Issue #10. - RESOLUTION OF CASE FILES

(C) There are currently approximately 60 unresolved live sighting cases of Americans in a POW-type environment. At least 17 of those cases are viable candidates for closure.

(C) DISCUSSION:

The PW/MIA Division should reduce the live sighting cases to a legitimate bottom line number. An inordinate number of unresolved cases leaves the impression that many of the open cases contain credible evidence when, in fact, they do not. In cases where the source's evidence is weak, credibility is doubtful, probability of reinterview is small and/or requests for a follow-up collection effort have proved fruitless, the case should be closed. Case # 1270 illustrates this point. All attempts to follow-up and verify the source's information have proved fruitless. Efforts to reinterview the source have proved impossible. This case should be closed.

(C) RECOMMENDATION:

The Interagency Intelligence Committee provides a logical vehicle for conducting periodic inprocess reviews of case actions of the PW/MIA Division. This group permits a formalized external assessment of the Division's analytical process and the review of decisions concerning the status of PW/MIA Division decision. That authority should rest with an external agency. No one organization should have the ability to open, investigate, evaluate and close a case file. The Interagency Intelligence Committee is the logical oversight body to perform this function and the Chairman should be enjoined to add this duty to the Committee's charter and institute the necessary mechanism to make it work.

Issue # 11. - REORIENTATION OF JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC)

(C) DISCUSSION:

Relations between JCRC and the PW/MIA are excellent and, in effect, constitute a joint investigative effort. Coordination with JCRC involved staff visits, message traffic and telephone. JCRC appreciates the high priority on this matter and reacts accordingly. The Task Force did not talk to JCRC representatives directly, hence our comments are predicated on-input from PW/MIA Division.

As acknowledged by CIA during Task Force coordination, DoD has a wealth of background and expertise on refugee screening and exploitation (e.g. Soviet emigres, Cuban emigres, etc.) Coordination needs to be effected with JCRC to ensure that this expertise is being brought to bear on the problem of exploitation. Other matters need to be covered with JCRC. For example, the PW/MIA Division perceived JCRC's charter as limited to background questions to refugees concerning "sightings." Their concern is that more detailed exploitation will be adversely regarded by the host government, and JCRC could lose its charter. This is naive. Once the host government allows access to the refugee assuredly it considers that exploitation will be complete. There have been detrimental effects from this conservative policy, namely, indepth questions do not get directed to sources; sources disappear before being reinterviewed as the y move on throught the refugee stream; and essential information on other than live sightings is not collected. Case files reviewed reflected invariably that reinterviews were the norm rather than the exception. This is wrong. Sufficient data should be elicited in the initial education camps though SEA; biographics; PW enclosures and other areas. These areas should be exploited in the initial interview rather than focus only on the live sighting questoins. Significantly, there are other intelligence initiatives which may be supported as an ancillary effort, provided JCRC is reoriented, or augmented by other DoD personnel. One commonly accepted tool in refugee screening is the Knowledgeability Brief (KB). A sample is attached in Annex C. Consideration should be given to making KB's routine tool in the screening process.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the POW-Division meet with JCRC to review collection guidance and planning, adequacy of resources, and policy matters. Specific recommendations will result subsequently. (This kind of meeting was also suggested earlier in the Commodore Brook's memo of 25 Sept.1985 (Annex B).

Issue # 12. - INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

(C) DISCUSSION:

Since our 10 point national strategy is apparently working and impacting internationally, demarches to other countries on PW/MIA's may be in order. It is a matter that merits discussion in the INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE. For example, the French (based on the past outstanding record of French intelligence, the Surete National) pass information which would clarify or resolve some of our "sightings" or lead to new initiatives. PW/MIA Division case files that are curretly "open" include numbers 1909, 1943, 1757, 0974, 1025, 3115, 3713, 0950 and 0953 which could probably be resolved with French help. Other "open" cases such as 1792 (Australia), 0712 (possibly Sweden), 1169 (China), and 2582 (Canada) might be resolved by assistance from countries indicated. Analysts advised that both Canada and Australia are problem countries in which to run down leads. Since Canade is our largest economic trading partner, pressure could be exerted accordingly. Concerning France, perhaps our recent assistance in Chad would warm the climate for information on Indo China? In an effort to leave "no stone unturned" international assistance should be sought through Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION:

POW Division take the initiative in gaining State Department assistance.

Issue # 13. - GARWOOD

(CONF) DISCUSSION:

Garwood had placement and access in SRV. No other American source meets this qualification. Therefore, his past track record of character defects must be shunted aside and exploitation should proceed on a positive note. Analysts speculate that approximately 130 of their reported "live sightings" involve Garwood. Now is the chance to check this out and not only clear up some live sightings --- but also run an audit trail on the Division analytical capability. For example, consider Yen Bai, a case that remains perplexing. Garwood was at Yen Bai from 1975 - 1979, working as a low lever member of the staff. (Assuredly he knows whether or not there were 1000 PW's held there as previously reported.) He traveled to various SRV camps repairing generators, so he should be able to retrace his routes on maps and be questioned re area knowledge. He must know personalities, both SRV and American PW's. Garwood represents the best source available to date in this imprecise initiative, and fortunately DIA appears to be embarked on a positive dialogue with him.

RECOMMENDATION:

Supervisors must optimize plans for Garwood's cooperation and availability. Planning should include consideration of hiring him as a consultant.

Issue # 14. - VIETNAMESE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

(CONF) Determine if there is a concerted effort on the part of any foreign government, or outside agency, to run a coordinated disinformation campaign.

(C) DISCUSSION:

Several organizations involved in the PW/MIA issue believe there is a disinformation campaign being conducted by the SRV and other outside agencies to undermine th US Government's PW/MIA effort. This belief often influences the amount of credibility VO-PW places in reports received pertaining to PW information. DIA has been at the forefront in alleging a disinformation campaign. The Task Force, however, was not able to confirm or refute its existance, but positive evidence appears to be tenuous and linked primarily to dog tags. Counterintelligence (OS-1) advises that it has attempted to get the military departments involved in the matter, with little success. Perhaps DB analysis could be brought to bear on this issue. DB has the wherewithall and expertise as evidenced by their past track record.

RECOMMENDATION:

Issue # 15. - INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM PW/MIAs

(CONF) DISCUSSION:

DIA retains responsibility for the PW/MIA initiative, a fact totally appreciated among the national intelligence agencies. Implicit for DIA is the need to drive the national system to resolution of this matter within two years. The Task Force review involved coordination with the Intelligence Community Staff, CIA and NSA wherein the need surfaced to formalize out relations on this matter to a greater extent. The Interagency Committee is a firm step in this direction. DIA must not let it lanquich; as it assuredly will do if not pushed. A second step is a radical overhaul of the PW/MIA Task Force suggestion, the IC Staff has agreed to update the National Human Intelligence Collection Plan on IndoChina promulgated in November 1982. Update will start withing two months and a new plan can be forthcoming in the summer of 1986. The IC Staff will consider a separate plan pertaining exclusively to PW/MIA's if priority warrants; and it will be up to the PW/MIA Division to provide the impetus. CIA reiterated that it knows the high priority assigned full time to the Division in DIA. CIA emphasized that DIA must make in-house fixes, after which the feasibility of assigning a CIA analyst can be examined. Continuing coordination in the Interagency Committee would facilitate this. Additionally, suitable topics for the Committee would include such matters as the following:

RECOMMENDATION:

Energize the Interagency Committee. Make it a player in the effort. Amend charter of Committee responsibilities as required, and especially fix responsibility for adjudication of POW case files.

Issue # 16. - STANDARDIZED POLYGRAPH PROCEDURES

(U) DISCUSSION:

There are no procedutes outlined for the administration of polygraphs either to sources who claim to have first-hand live sighting information or to those individuals who claim to possess hard evidence of Americans still held in captivity. The failure to have a standardized procedure lends credence to the argument of those who claim that DIA administers polygraphs only when it is in its own interest to do so. The 17 Ly Nam De Street case is an example.The source in question was polygraphed twice because his veracity was in question. Yet the sources who refuted the prime sighting testimony were not polygraphed, thus giving rise to allegations that DIA only uses the polygraph to support its own contentions.

RECOMMENDATION:

Set up a standardized procedure where all individuals claiming to have first-hand live sighting information and those individuals claiming to possess hard evidence of Americans in captivity will be polygraphed as a matter of course. Although the polygraph is not a panacea, its consistent use in high priority cases is not ony useful as an investigative tool, but also from the standpoint of appearances.

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