AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD POW/MIAS

By the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Republican Staff

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Claiborne Pell Rhode Island Chairmen:Jesse Helms, North Carolina
Joseph R. Biden Jr. DelewareRichard G. Lugar, Indiana
Paul S. Sarbanes, MarylandNancy L. Kassebaum, Kansas
Alan Cranston, CaliforniaLarry Pressler, South Dakota
Christopher J.Dodd, ConnecticutFrank H. Murkowski, Alaska
John F. Kerry, MassachusettsMitch McConnell, Kentucky
Paul Simon, IllinoisHank Brown, Colorado
Terry Sandore, North CarolinaOrrin G. Hatch, Utah
Daniel P. Moynihan, New YorkCharles S. Robb, Virginia

Geryld B. Christianson Staff Director
James P. Lucier Minority Staff Director

UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC 20510-6225

May 23, 1991

Dear Colleague:
On October 29, I released an interim report prepared by the Minority Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations based upon an on-going investigation of the POW/MIA issue. That investigation has continued. It was not, and was never intended to be, a search for specific POW/MIAs.

Such an effort would be beyond the scope of the resources available to the Minority. Rather it was an attempt to ascertain whether the agencies of the U.S. government responsible for POW/MIAs were doing the job they were supposed to do--that is, to find any POW/MIAs who might still be alive.

The interim conclusions are very disturbing. After examining hundreds of documents relating to the raw intelligence, and interviewing many families and friends of POW/MIAs, the Minority Staff concluded that, despite public pronouncements to the contrary, the real, internal policy of the U.S. government was to act upon the presumption that all MIAs were dead.

As a result, the Minority Staff found, any evidence that suggested an MIA might be alive was uniformly and arbitrarily rejected, and all efforts were directed towards finding and identifying remains of dead personnel, even though the U.S.government's techniques of identification were inadequate and deeply flawed.

These conclusions, although welcomed by the families and friends of POW/MIAs who had direct experience with the U.S.government's POW establishment were hotly rejected by that establishment.

However, on February 12 the Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW/MIA) resigned. Colonel Millard A. Peck, a man who had accepted the position with high motives and a sense of deep dedication, felt that he could no longer fulfill the demands of duty, honor, and integrity under the policies which he was asked to implement.

In a detailed and forthright letter, which did not become public until May, Colonel Peck confirmed that a "cover-up" has been in progress. He spoke of a "mindset to debunk." He said that there was no effort to pursue "live sightings." He stated that "any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago." Lastly, he criticized the U.S. government's treatment of the families and friends of POW/MIAs.

The entire text of Colonel Peck's letter appears in the current report.

The fact that Colonel Peck's conclusions were so similar to the conclusions of the Minority Staff is a matter of regret, rather than a vindication. I had hoped that the Minority Staff investigators would be able to alter their preliminary findings, because the implications of a deliberate effort by the U.S. government to deceive the American people is a matter that all of us would prefer to believe unthinkable.

However, as the Minority Staff pursued its investigations, it became clear that the U.S> experience with the Vietnam POW/MIAs in not unique in history. Echoes of similar experiences in dealing with other, and earlier Communist regimes on the subject of POW/MIAs came up with increasing frequency. Although substantial portions of the current report had already been prepared, I directed the staff to track down the historical precedents. I felt that these precedents were absolutely necessary to an understanding of the present problems, even though it necessarily delayed the release of the report.

Of course, this fundamental historical research required a massive undertaking to find the original documents, most of them formerly classified, in the National Archives and in the issuing agencies. Accordingly, readers will find in this report something which has never before been attempted: An historical analysis of the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs in the hands of the Bolshevik regime after World War I, the Soviet regime after World War II, the North Korean regime after the Korean War, and the Vietnamese regime after the Vietnam War.

In each case, the same dismaying scenario appears: On the Communist side, the regimes denied holding U.S. prisoners, contrary to many credible reports, while in fact they were holding the U.S. POW/MIA as slave laborers and as reserve bargaining chips to get diplomatic recognition and financial assistance. On the U.S. side, our government downplayed or denied the reports of POW/MIAs, and failed to take adequate steps to prove or disprove the reports, while elements in our government pursued policies intended to make diplomatic recognition and financial support of the revolutionary regimes possible.

I find this evidence convincing; doubters should examine the cables and classified memoranda cited in Part I which tell the full story. Part II examines anecdotal evidence which the Minority Staff has chosen to illustrate the massive problems with the U.S. government's handling of the POW/MIA issue--problems which were only suggested in the Interim Report.

While investigation into the present problems continues, it is evident from the work already done by the Minority Staff that more time and more resources need to be devoted to the work. Senator Bob Smith (R-New Hampshire), a long-time stalwart in the ranks of those dedicated to the POW/MIA cause, has introduced S.Res. 82, to establish a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. S.Res. 82 has already attracted wide bipartisan support, and deserves the support of every Senator.

This report has required many hundreds of hours of work, not only from the Minority Staff, but from many dedicated persons who shared their experiences and research with the Minority Staff. I would be especially remiss were I not to mention Dr. Harvey Andrews, Thomas Ashworth, John M.G. Brown, and Mark Sauter of CBS affiliate, KIRO-TV, Seattle, Washington. Needless to say, the conclusions are those of the Minority Staff, and not necessarily of those of Messrs. Andrews, Ashworth, Brown, and Sauter.

Sincerely,

JESSE HELMS: jl

CONTENTS

PART I
PROLOGUE TO PART I _ i
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE _ 1 - 1
THE AEF AND WORLD WAR I _ 2 - 1
WORLD WAR II _ 3 - 1
THE KOREAN WAR _ 4 - 1
THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR _ 5 - 1

PART II
PROLOGUE TO PART II _ i
LIVE SIGHTINGS _ 6 - 1
"BLACK" OPERATIONS _ 7 - 1
ACCOUNTIBILITY _ 8 - 1
THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE _ 9 - 1
EPILOGUE _ 10 - 1

PROLOGUE TO PART I

Throughout this century, the United States, as a nation, has anguished over the plight of American prisoners of war, both known and missing. The emotional ordeal of the families, the debt which the nation owes to those who have put their lives on the line for their countries, and the human dignity of each and every single soldier, or sailor, or airman ought to have an incalculable bearing on our national policies and our honor.

On the record, the U.S. government has professed to give these concerns "the highest national priority." Off the record, this priority vanishes. Instead, other considerations emerge: Grand visions of a foreign policy of peace and reconciliation; desire for a new economic order of trade and investment'; idological imperatives to downplay the hostility of antagonistic systems; and the natural tendency of the bureaucracy to eliminate its workload by filing cases marked "closed" instead of finding the people.

Last October, the Minority Staff published an Interim Report based on hundreds of interviews and reviews of raw intelligence data in DOD files. The Interim Report suggested that DOD was more interested in manipulation and managing the issue that in finding living POWs listed as missing. But as the investigation proceeded, the weight of evidence of failure--a failure of the U.S. Government to meet its sacred trust--became overpowering.

Was it really possible that officials in the Executive Branch charged with the solution of POW/MIA issues could have failed so miserably to respond to the needs of the American people? Was it simply that the emotions of the POW/MIA- concerned community were making an objective appraisal of DOD's work impossible?

The resignation of the director of DOD Special Office for POW/MIA Matters, Col. Millard A. Peck, submitted on February 12, but made public only last month, offered unexpected and extraordinary support for the findings of the Interim Report. (Col.Peck's resignation will be treated in detail later in this report.) But the question remained: Was it credible that such a failure could occur? To answer that question, it was necessary to turn to history.

THE GULF WAR

The Gulf War is not yet history, but the brief span of fighting provided several examples of the inability of the U.S. Government to cope with the problems of accounting for the missing-examples which are still fresh from the newspapers.

Inaccurate battle casualty reporting resulted in the next-of-kin of Daniel J.Stamaris and Troy A. Dunlap being officially notified by DOD that the soldiers had been Killed in Action (KIA); in fact, these men were slightly wounded or taken prisoner by the enemy. Several other soldiers-Major Rhonda Cornum for example---were taken prisoner by the enemy but were not listed as POW or MIA or KIA; their subsequent release by the Iraqis came as a surprise to the American public and the national media.

Bue the most bizarre case was that of SPC.Melissa Rathbun-Nealy. SPC Rathbun-Nealy and SPCDavid Lockett were co-drivers of a HET (Heavy Equipment Transport), captured by Iraqi soldiers after their HET and another one bacame separated from a convoy. As the two vehicles proceeded north, they came under enemy fire. The second vehicle managed to escape, but Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were surrounded and captured.

After her capture by Iraqi forces, Rathbun-Nealy's duty status was initially listed as "unknown," then changed to "missing." However, she was never listed as "missing in action" (MIA) or "Prisoner of War" (POW). It should be noted that "missing," under U.S. Army regulations, is quite distinct from MIA. "Missing" is reserved for personnel unaccounted for in non-combat operations. From the Army's point of view, the convoy was a non-combat operation, even though it was under heavy enemy fire. Therefore, Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were never listed as MIA or POW, even though the Army had information that they had been captured under fire. This distinction is an important illustration of how DOD uses technical distinctions to avoid a finding of POW/MIA.

In a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Leo Rathbun, Lt. Colonel J.G.Cole, Chief POW/MIA Affairs, demonstrates how DOD, even in real-time cases, fails to follow up obvious leads or to ask obvious questions. In the narrative that follows, it should be kept in mind that Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett must have been an astonishing pair of prisoners to the Iraqi mindset because Rathbun-Nealy is a white Caucasian female, and Lockett is an African-American male. Since Major Cornum was the only other U.S. female prisoner, it should not have been hard in Iraq to seek out a pair of prisoners fitting the description of a white female and a black male.

Colonel Cole wrote:

At approximately 3 pm, (January 30, 1991) just north of Khafji, the convoy dorve by a Saudi M-60 tank that had recently received extensive battle damage and was partially blocking the road. The occupants of the second HET then heard two explosions and the sound of debris striking their vehicle, observed what they preceived to be enemy troops ahead near the archway into town, and immediately initiated a U-turn along the road. At this time they estimated that they wre 100-150 meters behind the lead vehicle, which was continuing north. After completing the turn, the crew looked back and saw that the other HET [driven by Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett] had tried to turn about, but had become stuck. Melissa and SPC Lockett were observed to be still in their vehicle as the enemy troops approached. There was no indication that they attempted to return fire or flee.

Last seen being surrounded by enemy troops, Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were listed as "missing." But DOD had more information as well. Colonel Cole wrote further:

There were no signs of fighting or blook, but personal gear had been scattered around the area, and weapons were missing. As the Marines were searching around the vehicle shouting for the soldiers, they were confronted by several Iraqi foot soldiers at the HET and an armored personnel carrier approximately 50 meters north, headed in their direction. No shots were exchanged by the Marines who departed the area and called in attack helicopter support which destroyed the APC withing 30 meters of the HET...The Marines returned to the area the following morning where they collected some of the personal equipment and found the vehicle running but found no trace of Melissa or SPC Lockett....During the battle in and around Khafji several Iraqi soldiers were captured.

One would assume that the capture of Iraqi solders in the area would have given the opportunity to find out positively whether or not the pair had been captured. And indeed the Iraqi solders gave such information:

Following interrogation of the enemy prisoners of war by Saudi forces, two reports were received. One concerned information provided by an Iraqi lieutenant who said he had witnessed the capture of an American male and female. He further stated that both had been injured and that the white female had sustained an injury to her arm. The second report received from Saudi forces concerned two other Iraqi prisoners of war from a captured patrol who indicated they had seen a white female and a black male near the city of Bashrah, Kuwait [not far from the site of the abandoned HET.]

To the lay observer, this sounds like a good "live-sighting" report, based on circumstances that almost exactly dovetail with the circumstances of the missing soldiers. But when Mr.Leo Rathbun asked Colonel Cole why his daughter was not listed as MIA, Cole replied that the Iraqi officer could not make "a positive identification"---as though there were hundreds of pairs of white females and black male soldiers captured in the area.

Colonel cole explained further that the U.S. interrogators had no current picture of SPC Rathbun-Nealy to show the Iraqi officer (although, of course her picture was appearing in every newspaper in the Western World.) Had they thought of it, no doubt DOD would have demanded that the Iraqi witnesses produce the fingerprints of the captured pair before accepting the live-sighting report as genuine.

Because there was no "positive identification" Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett could not be listed as POW/MIA. Had there been an extended war and extended negotiations to secure the return of prisoners, the name of neither one would have appeated on any list of POW/MIAs being sought. They were listed only as "missing", that is, unaccounted for but no known to be in enemy hands. Had a difficult negotiation been required to secure a return of listed POW/MIAs, Iraq need never have returned Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett because they were not on the list. Fortunately. the war was so brief and so powerful that all prisoners were returned without question.

The case of SPC Rathbun-Nealy and SPC Lockett is a vived illustration to keep in mind when considering the bureaucratic mindset that refuses to go outside of artificial restrictions in order to find real people. If the case had been prolonged, if the report had come months or even years later, if the vivid memories of the event had gathered dust in DOD files, the same facts would have rung true.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE U.S. POWS IN COMMUNIST CUSTODY

The war that Americans call the Vietnam War is really, from the stand-point of history, the Second Indochina War. The French have the dubious distinction of having fought the First Indochina War--a most important fact to know in order to understand that the Communist Vietnamese act out of an acquired experience of warfare with Western countries. Moreover, the Vietnamese, as Communists, have had the additional benefit of the experience of other Communist regimes in dealing with the United States and European powers. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that the problems which the United States has had in dealing with prisoners of war and the missing in action are not the result of chance, but of historic Communist policy.

Indeed, history reveals that policy. In the years after World Wars I and II, the Soviet regime, and later their North Korean cohorts, held American soldiers and citizens captive in the aftermath of these wars. A 1954 New York Times article gives some insight into Communist attitudes towards POWs. In January, 1954, three Americans, two held by the Soviets and one by the Chinese Communists, were repatriated. The New York Times reported:

All three confirm that the Soviet bloc and Chinese Communists are holding in their jails and slave camps many foreigners, including soldiers, civilians, women and children...according to State Department figures, the total number of Americans held by the Soviets and their European staellites exceeds 5,000...Many of these Americans, like many Europeans, were residents in the iron curtain countries caught by the Communist tide; others were deported from German war prisoner camps; some, like Cox were simply kidnapped.

The fact is that Soviet and Asian Communist regimes view POW/MIAs, living or dead, not as a problem of humanitarian concern but as leverage for political bargaining, as an involuntary source of technical assistance, and as forced labor. There is, therefore, no compelling reason in Communist logic to return POWs, or their remains, so long as political and economic goals have not been met. The logic of the Vietnamese position requires them to conceal, to dissimulate, to titillate, and to dole out actual information grudgingly, piece by piece, but always in return for very practical results.

This perverse thinking is shocking to Americans who are straight forward and honest in interpersonal dealings. Yet we should instead be surprised if this were not the case. Indeed, the policy began with Lenin. From the time of the Bolshevik treatment of POWs from the American (The Other Russians, The New York Times, January 5, 1954.) Expeditionary Force in World War I, to the Soviet treatment of POWs in World War II, to the North Korean actions in the Korean War, and finally in the First and Second Indochina Wars--POWs including MIAs, were used by Communist regimes as cynical bargaining tools in contravention of international law.

In 1973, the Vietnamese used POWs in an attempt to blackmail the United States into providing nearly $5 billion in so-called "reparations." Both the United States and Vietnam asserted in that year that "Operation Homecoming" was bringing home all known prisoners. The Vietnamese believed that they had a deal--a dirty deal, to be sure, in which prisoners would be exchanged for cold cash. It was a deal brokered by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger via a secret hand-carried letter. It would be perfectly consistent with the historical Communist policy to hold back prisoners against their will, and even the remains of the dead, to exchange for dollars at a later date. The evidence of this investigation, therefore, must be weighed against the probabilities of the historical background.

Most of this information is not well-known by the American public; however, all of it is based on open-source material, including official U.S. Government documents that have been declassified and collected from official agencies through Freedom of Information Act requests and through research from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

THE AEF AND WORLD WAR I

U.S. problems in accounting for POW/MIAs did not suddenly emerge in the Second Indochina War; in fact, the basic Communist tactics were already evident at the birth of the Soviet Union in the Bolshevik Revolution.

Today, most Americans have forgotten that there were two main fronts during World War I--the Western Front, which was the center of Allied attention, and which today still receives the most focus; and the Eastern Front, which occurred when the Bolshevik Regime signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans and withdrew Russian forces from participation with the Allies. Thereupon, the Allies grew apprehensive about the Gernam threat to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, and sent the Allied Expeditionary Force to Siberia to protect the rear.

As a result of the fighting against Soveit Bolshevik forces around Arhcangel in 1918-1919, there were many casualties, and eyewitness accounts of hundreds of U.S> and British and French personnel who disappeared. Nevertheless, official cables from the U.S. military attache at Archangel cited much lower numbers than the eyewitness reports of missing personnel. The U.S. government policy concerning these and others in the two categoreis of missing in action (MIA) and killed in action, body not recovered (KIA-BNR) from the American Expeditionary Force in Russia, as detailed in a November, 1930 memorandum from the U.S. Acting Assistance Chief of Staff, G-1, stated the following:

An administrative determination has been placed on each of their records that they were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing.

In other words, all of the men who were MIA were determined to be KIA-BNR on the date they were reported as missing.

Public outcry over this practice resulted in the formation of the 1929 VFW/U.S. Graves Registration Expedition, which was able to identify or account for 86 sets of remains. MAny others were never identified. However, given the technical and scientific limitations of forensics in 1929, the amount of time elapsed and the number of nationalities involved, some of the remains may have been misidentified.

Memorandum "To: Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject: Alleged confinement of American Officers and Soldiers in Russian prisons, " November 12, 1930.

In 1921, the New York Times reported that:

...the American prisoners held by the Soviet Government of Russia have been told by the Bolsheviks that they are held because the United States government has not made vigorous demands for their release...

It is widely known that the Bolsheviks held many American POWs and other U.S. citizens against their will. In fact, the new Soviet Government attempted to barter U.S. Pows held in their prisons for U.S. diplomatic recognition and trade relations with thier regime. The United States refused, even though the Soviets had at one time threatened"...that Americans held by the Soviet government would be put to death..."

President Harding's Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, in response to the Soviet demand for recognition and trade relations in return for U.S. prisoners for U.S. prisoners, said that:

- the United States will not consider any suggestions of any character from that government until the Americans now held as prisoners are permitted to leave the country.

But several months later the United States concluded the Riga Agreement with the Soviet government to provide humanitarian aid to starving Russian children. The Riga Agreement had specific requirements that the Soviet authorities must release all Americans detained in Russia to facilitate their departure. The U.S.Government was expecting 20 prisoners to be released; but U.S. authorities were surprised when 100 Americans were released.

In fact, not all American prisoners held by the Soviets were released. The Soviets held some back, presumably for leverage in any future negotiations with the United States. However, in 1933, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized the Soviet government, these prisoners were not released, and other than the apparent recovery of 19 sets of remains, no satisfactory accounting of the MIA/POWs that were held by the Soviets was made by the United States.

Since an administrative determination had been placed on each of their records that they were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing, as far as the United States government and laws of the United States were concerned, these men were legally dead. Other than to a small number of U.S.government officials with access to the intelligence about these men in Soviet concentration camps and prisons, these men were legally, and otherwise generally considered to be no longer alive.

One such intelligence document dated November 20, 1930 cites an affidavit taken by the U.S. Justice Department of Alexander Grube, a Latvian-American, who was identified taken as a "Russian seaman." He had been imprisoned in the Soviet gulag, including in the infamous Lubianka Prison, where he states he saw four American Army officers and 15 American soldiers and civilians. Grube further warned the U.S.government that any inquiry made to Soviet officials of specific individuals will result in their immediate execution.

This episode in the history of World War I illustrates succinctly the major porblems which still affect attempts to account for and ensure the repatriation of U.S. military personnel captured by Communist regimes in the aftermath of World War II, the Korean War, and the Second Indochina War. 1) The bureaucratic and legal assertion by the U.S.Government that the men who were MIA were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing or sometime thereafter;2) the attempts by the Communist regime to use prisoners as barter for economic and diplomatic benefits;3) the dissimulation and lies of the Communist regime about the existence and location of prisoners;4) the on-again, off-again return of remains; and 5) where there is no clear military victory over the Communist enemy, the vulnerability of U.S. POW/MIAs who are at the mercy of the reluctance of the enemy and the U.S. government to pursue a clear, open policy for their repatriation.

"captives'release Repeatedly Sought," The New York Times, April 18. 1921 Herbert Hoover, Herber Hoover, An American Epic Volume III, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, (chicago: Henry Regnery Compant, 1961), pp.427-433

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND THE EASTERN FRONT

During World War I (1914-1918), military personnel captured by Germany and the Central Powers on the Western Front were returned home when the U.S., British, or Western European allies liberated the POW camps, or after the capitulation of Germany and its allies in November, 1918. An accurate, detailed accounting of these POWs in Europe was possible because the United States, as a member of the Allied Forces, was the victor. Victory afforded American officials complete access to the German records of American POWs and the territory in which they were imprisoned.

However, Russian prisoners who were still held in Central Powers prison camps presented a problem for the Allies after their victory. At the beginning of the war, Russian forces fought with the Allies. But after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks withdrew Russian troops from the fighting after signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers in March, 1918. Some of the Russians held in German camps had Bolshevik sympathies, while others did not. The Allies hoped to sort out the Bolshevik soldiers, and recruit the anti-Bolsheviks to fight against the new regime in Russia. According to a War Department cable:

It is believed that a period of one or two months would suffice to discover which of the soldiers could be used for the work in question and which ones would be too thouroughly imbued with bolsehvist [sic] ideas to be trusted. The former could then be sent to the Ukraine and the latter left in concentration camps.

However, once defeated, the Germans could no longer manage the camps, and attempted to turn the Russian POWs loose, letting them head east for the Russian border. But Allied Commissioners were still afraid of turning them loose for fear that the Russians would join the Red Army, and in February, 1919, the Allies took control of these German camps.

December 17, 1918 War Department cable No.1272, Military Intelligence, Subject: RUSSIAN PRISONERS ARRIVING IN FRANCE FROM GERMANY

France, in particular, did not want any liberated Russian POWs from Germany "to go into the interior of France, possibly on account of the Bolshevist [sic] danger." In fact, when the Germans released the Russian prisoners of war, 50,000 of them:

- found their war to France. They expected a warm wlecome from their former allies; they were interned without delay.

The Allies also were apparently concerned about American, British, and French POW/MIAs who might still be held prisoner as a result of combat with the Bolshevik Red Army in northern Russia, and may have wanted the Russian prisoners for bargaining leverage.

After Bres-Litovsk took the Bolshevik forces out of the war, German and Austro-Hungarian forces were free to move into the Ukraine and Baltic states. The German action was perceived by Allied forces as a threat to the northern Russian ports of Murmansk and Archangel, where tone of Allied war material were still stored. Further, the U.S. government wanted to provide for the safe evacuation of Czechoslovak forces who had been fighting with Russia against the Central Powers.

The group of soldiers numbered over 5,000 volunteers and draftees, mostly from Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The troops were placed under British command, and, in violation of their stated mission, were used in combat operations in support of the British and French plans to secure that part of Russia from the Germans and the Red Army.

A report from Colonel J.A.Ruggles, the U.S. military attache in Archangel dated November 25, 1918, lists casualties divided into categories such as Killed in Action (KIA), Missing in Action (MIA), etc. These were casualties from the 339th. U.S.Infantry Regiment which had been sent to Archangel in the late summer and early fall of 1918 to serve under British command.

During the winter of 1918, after a series of poorly planned and executed Allied military operations, the Red Army finally prevailed on the field over the heavily outnumbered Allied forces. There were a few spring and early summer victories for the Allies, but in the summer of 1919 Allied forces began to withdraw from Archangel. The 339th. Regiment returned to the United States via Europe in the summer of 1919. By the spring of 1920, all U.S. and allied troops were out of Soviet territory. During their withdrawal, British forces seized a number of Russian Bolsheviks as hostages to trade for British POWs and MIAs who were still held by the Bolsheviks, and made room for about 5,000 White Russian emigrants who wanted to leave their homeland before the Red Army overran the territory. When Archangel was finally taken by the Bolshevik forces, 30,000 citizens were executed by the Cheka forces.

See report ofthe UMCA Service with Fighting Men, William Howard Taft,et,al. eds. Associated Press, N.Y. 1922 pp.320-322. "It was exceedingly difficult for these Allied authorities to decide just what should be done with these men. They were a menace to Germany as they were; if they were returned to Russia, they might join the Red forces." War Department cable No.1272, December 17, 1918. Service With Fighting Men, pp.320-322. See telegram to the War Department, Military Intelligence Branch, no. 2045-221, November 26, 1919
Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin. George Kennan, Boston: Little and Brown and Company, 1960)
The Cheka was the all-russian Extraordinary Commision to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage, the Bolshevik's secret police; it was the fore-runner of the GPU, the State Political Directorate, which in turn preceeded NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which became the KGB, the Committee for State Security.
Two company I officers, 1st. Lieutenants Dwight Fistler, and Albert May, met with Bolshevik officers in an attempt to secure the release of captured Allied servicemen. They recorded the meeting:

"We had 500 Russian prisoners. They had seven of ours. We were worried about hundreds of missing from our ranks and arranged a truce to effect an exchange...Negotiation was difficult. Interpreters were not very efficient. But the Reds learned what we were up for, and haggled. The end was, they traded us two of the seven Americans for the 500 Russian soldiers, and we had to toss in a round of cigarettes to seal the bargain. We never did learn what had become of the missing."

Telegram No.221, "To: Military Intelligence, From:Archangel, U.S.War Department," April 14, 1919.

HUNDREDS WERE MISSING FROM OUR RANKS

It is difficult to accept the official U.S. accounting of U.S. casualties of the 1918-1919 Northern Russia Expedition, particularly because all men who were MIAs were officially determined to be KIA-BNR on the date they were reported as missing. According to several accounts, several hundred U.S., French, and British soldiers were left unaccounted for during the fighting in Northern Russia. Indeed, the official history of the Expedition states there were "hundreds missing from our ranks." However, official cables from the U.S. military attache at Archangel cited approximately 70 MIAs, exluding French, and British missing personnel.

Negotiations with the Bolsheviks for the repatriation of the missing failed. Col.Ruggles stated:
Negotiations with the Bolsheviks for the repatriation of prisoners have been terminated by orders from General Pershing, after having been delayed, although under discussion from both sides, through failure of the Bolshevik commander to obtain authority from Moscow.

In fact, the Bolsheviks wanted diplomatic recognition in return for the release of Allied POWs; at the suggestion of the U.S. Secretary of State, the U.S. Secretary of War reminded the U.S. Military Attache at Archangel of this fact in a May 12, 1919 letter: "the United States has not recognized the Bolshevik regime as a government either de facto or de jure." The negotiations never resumed."

Throughout the summer and fall of 1991, 3,315 replacements were sent to Siberia to rotate out many of the original U.S. troops. The 1919 and 1921 reports of the Secretary of War records the casualties for the Archangel fighting and Siberian expedition as follows:

Killed in Action...........137 (including 28 presumed killed)
Died of wounds ........... 43
Died of disease ...........122
Died of accidental causes.. 46
Suicide .................. 5
Total deaths ...........353

The totals listed above from the combined 1919 and 1921 official annual reports of the Secretary of War conceal the fact that out of the 144 combat deaths of American soldiers officially reported in 1919 in Northern Russia, 127 of those deaths, or 88% of those official combat death figures were made up of some 70 MIAs declared dead, and another 57 soldiers who were declared KIA-BNR. One historian makes note that ten U.S. POWs from the Archangel Expedition were repatriated through Finland and Sweden but does not provide any figures on total POWs, MIAs, or KIA-BNR from the fighting in Northern Russia.

This fact was left out of the official Secretary of War report on U.S. casualty figures from combat in Northern Russia. The vast majority of these missing men never received a proper accounting. Further, the practice of the Secretary of War of lumping the MIA and the KIA-BNR figures together as those killed in action necessarily calls into question the general credibility of these official figures.

LUBIANKA PRISON

In fact, there is evidence that some of these men were actually alive and held in prisone and concentration camps in Russia by the Communists. A November 12, 1930 memorandum which detailed an affidavit taken by the U.S. Justice Department from a "Russian seaman" stated:

He arrived March 1, 1927 in Lubianka Prison at Moscow where he saw four (4) American Army Officers and fifteen (15) American soldiers who had been there since 1919...that he subsequently was transferred to Solovetz island Prison where he met many American soldiers and civilians, and names two of them as Mr.Martin or Marten and Mr.G. Heinainkruk, both of whom he thinks are American Army Officers sent to the Island from Vladivostok. He also mentions one Roy Molner whom he states had been a sergeant in the U.S. Army at Archangel from which place he had been sent as a prisoner.

An internal U.S. government letter which evaluates the information provided by the Russian seaman states:

I have looked into this question and find that at least one case that has an important bearing on it, namely the case of William J. Martin, Company A, 339th. infantry, which regiment served in Archangel or North Russian Expedition. Under date of March 14, 1921 we made a determination showing: `Was killed in action January 19,1919. This determination was no doubt predicated on the unexplained absence of the soldier for about two years [until the KIA-BNR determination was made].' I also found another case which may possible be involved, it is that of Lindsay Retherford, up in my mind because of the mention by the Russian sailor of Alfred Lindsay. Lindsay Retherford was reported missing and a similar determination [KIA-BNR] was made in his case.

see a May 12, 1919 letter in the files of the Committee to the Acting Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk, from the U.S.Secretary of War: "I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter (NE-M), dated April 28, 1919, regarding the negotiations with Bolshevik government in Russia for the exchange of Allied prisoners, referred to in cablegram No.230 from the Military Attache, Archangel, Russia. In accordance with your suggestion, a cablegram was sent to the Military Attache on May 1, reminging him that the United States has not recognized the Bolshevik regime as a government either de facto or de jure. Annual report of the Secretary of War, 1919, Office of the Chief Military History, Washignton, p.25. Telegram No.2045-297 From: Archangel, To: Military Intelligence, Feb.4, 1919.

War Department memorandum, "To: Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject Alleged confinement of American Officers and Soldiers in Russian Prisons," November 12, 1930

See U.S. government letter, "To: Mr. Huckleberry evaluating the affidavit taken by the U.S.Justice Department," November 8, 1930. See Benjamin D. Rhodes, The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia, 1918-1919. Captives Release Repeatedly Sought, The New York Times, April 18, 1921. Herbert Hoover, p.428

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS HOLDING AMERICANS

Three years later, in 1933, the United States recognized the Bolshevik government. In 1934, 19 sets of remains were reported as "identified" by the U.S. Graves Registration. In the separate 1929 VFW/Graves Expedition 86 remains of the 127 missing or KIA-BNR from battles fought by the American Expeditionary Force at Archangel were claimed to have been identified. This left 41 unaccounted for from the Archangel post. Further, it is likely that of the 86 remains "identified", a number of these "identifications" stretched the capacity of forensic science at that time.

Refugees from Russia fleeing into Europe during the late 1920s continued to report that a number of Americans were still held by the Soviet government in forced labor camps. It is noteworthy that some of the U.S. troops sent to Archangel were themselves U.S. immigrants from Eastern Europe, or the sons of U.S. immigrants from Eastern Europe who had been drafted into the American Army. It has been speculated that the Soviets kept them because of their national origins, or the national origins of their families.

The U.S.Government did not publicly admit that U.S. military personnel remained in the custody of the Red Army in Russia upon the return of the American Expeditionary Force in Russia. However, on April 18, 1921, the New York Times reported:

It has been demonstrated that the Soviet [government] is holding Americans in the hope that the United States will agree to recognize the Soviet [government] or enter into trade relations with it or release communists from prison in this country.

Three months later, President Harding responded to an appeal from Moscow for "bread and medicine" for the "children and the sick." He intructed a member of his staff, Herbert Hoover, to cable a reply to Moscow that the American Relief Administration would

- undertake relief for one million Russian children and provide some medical supplies for their hospitals...but subject to certain conditions.

August 20, 1921, a formal agreement between Soviet Union and the United States, the "Riga Agreement," was concluded. Among the conditions for U.S. aid to the Soviets was the following:

The Soviet Authorities having previously agreed as the absolute sine qua non of any assistance on the part of the American people to release all Americans detained in Russia and to facilitate the departure from Russia of all Americans so desiring, the A.R.A. [American Relief Administration] reserves the right to suspend temporarily or terminate all of its relief work in Russia in case of failure on the part of the Soviet Authorities to fully comply with this PRIMARY condition.....[emphasis added.]

The United States government expected the repatriation of approximately 20 U.S. citizens but, in fact, more than 100 Americans were repatriated as a result of this agreement.

As Herbert Hoover wrote in his autobiography:

The provision for release of American prisoners was suggested by Secretary Hughes, who informed me the Department knew that there were about twenty of them. More than a hundred American prisoners in Russian dungeons were released on Sept. 1, 1921.

Even so, reports continued to be received by the Department of State that more Americans were still held in Russia. The discrepancy between official information in the hands of the U.S. government --- 20 Americans held, and the actual number of more than one hundred released --- gave the U.S. Government its first taste of negotiating for Americans held against their will by Communists.