CONFIDENTIAL
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20301
working papers 25 SEP 1985

C-109/DC

MEMORANDUM FOR BGEN SHUFELT (VO)

SUBJECT: The POW/MIA Issue (V)

1. (C) I was not at all pleased with the situation I found when I took over responsibility for the POW/MIA issue. The deeper I looked, the less professional the operation appeared. It appeared to be particularly sloppy in the late seventies, but it is by no means a squared-away operation today. As a professional intelligence officer with a significant portion of my career spent as an analyst, I found the following to be particular problems:

a. Case files were incomplete, sloppy (all mixed-up, loose papers, undated scribbled analyst notes, misfiled papers, etc.) and generally unprofessional.

b. There were no action logs in the cases or where there were logs, entries had not been made in long time.

c. Follow-up actions had not been pursued. In some cases, obvious follow-up actions were called for but were never taken and years had passed.

d. There was no tickler system to ensure that we followed up on our own tasking. Thus, we might have tasked imagery or tasked JCRC years ago, never got a response, and never followed up.

e. Efforts to recontact sources in the U.S. were perfunctory at best and normally amounted to merely trying to contact them by telephone rather than using local DoD or law enforcement agencies to track them down and then calling on them in person.

f. We had never employed some of the most basic analytic tools such as plotting all sightings on a map to look for patterns, concentrations, etc.

2. (C) Thus, there is a great element of truth in General Tighe's statements that we have done a sloppy job. I come to the same conclusion after having looked into the issue probably in somewhat more detail than General Tighe, but not for as long a period of time.

3. (C) With regard to the allegation of "a mindset to debunk", I must conclude that there is an element of truth to this as well, although probably not as much as has been publicly stated. In fairness to DC-2, a good measure of this is attributable simply to human nature. The analysts have seen so many fabrications for so long that their first subconscious reaction is "this is just more of the same garbage". And most of it is. But some may not be. Frustrating as it all is, they have got to run all the leads to the ground. They have not been doing this as faithfully as they should. Thus, the "mindset to debunk" charge and

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the "sloppy analysis" charge are closely related. The former causes the latter. The leadership of DC-2 (the O-6, Deputy, and senior analyst) must be the conscience of the organization to preclude this mindset taking hold and to closely monitor the work. This they definitely have not done well over the years.

4. (C) I am not persuaded that enough assets are being dedicated to this problem if it is the top priority problem we claim it is. In particular, I wonder if JCRC is adequately manned, whether we have enough polygraph operators available, etc. I would not be able to make a judgment on this without actually having visited JCRC and the camps, which I have not had an opportunity to do. I would encourage you to do this early in your time here so you can draw conclusions regarding the adequacy of our level of effort in the field. Without firsthand exposure, my observations in this area fall into the category of gut....feelings rather than researched opinions.

5. (C) A key area which requires attention is DIA's image...how we are perceived to be doing our job rather than (or in addition to) how we really are doing it. We need to portray an image of open-minded, objective professionals who take this business very seriously and are willing to talk to anyone who might be able to provide us information. This includes the Baileys, Garwoods, and the lunatic fringe.

6. (C) I see the most important thing we must do right now is to be cementing relationships on the HILL. We have not done as well there as we should. It is clear that Congressman Hendon will be using our files to discredit us (and he will have lots of ammunition there). We need to ensure that we have formed the necessary alliances with HPSCI and the Asian-Pacific Affairs committees, their staffers, and THEIR CHAIRMEN..that we receive support in our efforts to damage limit Congressman Hendon.

7. (C) I am afraid we are in for some troubled times. We have not done our job as well as we should have in days passed and we will not withstand scurtiny very well. Yet we will receive plenty of scrutiny in days to come. We must make all preparations to minimize the critism this scrutiny will bring. I have attached a list of action items which I believe are required to accomplish this. I have already tasked DC-2 in these areas, but close monitoring and some personal involvement will be called for. I stand by to help in any way I can.

Very respectfully,
(signature)
THOMAS A. BROOKS
Commodore, USN
Assistant Deputy Director
for Collection Managment

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ACTIONS TASKED TO DC-2 (NOT IN PRIORITY ORDER)

Get together with Tom Latimer of HPSCI and ultimately perhaps Congressman Hamilton to line up their support vis-a-vis Congressman Hendon. Do the same thing with the Asia/Pacific Affairs staff and personally with Congressmen, Solarz, Solomon, and Gilman.

Get together with Garwood ASAP to debrief him.

Establish a plot showing location of sightings by year. Maintain this current. Look for patterns.

Review the Yen Bai cases after talking to Garwood. There is a lot of information on Yen Bai in the files, much of which tends to substantiate what Garwood says.

Set up a periodic review process to ensure necessary action is being taken on all cases.

Set up a periodic precess to ensure necessary action is being taken on all cases.

Set up a tickler/follow-up system on imagery tasking to ensure that required imagery is collected and doesn't fall to the end of the queue or get cancelled.

Arrange another interview with So****. Record it if possible. Bring pictures, etc. for him to look at. Try to settle case. TV tape would be great.

Hire a returned POW as an analyst. (This gives Ann Mills Griffiths some problems and will have to be discussed with her.)

Put a reservist to work doing a study on the backgrounds/common denominators of the couple of dozen MIAs who were known to have been captured `alive' but who never showed up in the prison system.

Get an extra intel. clerk aboard (action pending-RS).

Get AOP help (action pending-RS).

Increase the use of polygraphs. All live sightings since `75 should be polygraphed. This will probably require additional polygraph assets. Look into how we can make these available.

Polygraph the source in jail in Denmark re his sighting at Yen Bai.

Seek sources of analytic support outside FBI.

VO travel to CIL, JCRC, and camps at earliest convenience.

Prepare unclassified precfs. of intelligence provided by Smith and McIntire.

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