THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY’S APPRAISAL OF
SINO- SOVIET RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959

by Mark Kramer

Open Footnotes

In early September 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed the head of the Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a detailed background report on China for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of September and early October to take part in ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory in China. The Soviet leader’s trip, as Gromyko was well aware, was also intended to alleviate a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing—a rift that had not yet flared up in public. Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to travel to China because he had numerous other commitments at around the same time; but after discussing the matter with his colleagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided that face-to-face negotiations with Mao Zedong and other top Chinese officials would be the only way to “clear the atmosphere” and restore a “sense of friendship between our peoples.”1

Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30-page survey of “The Political, Economic, and International Standing of the PRC” (Report No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the same day that Khrushchev began a highly publicized visit to the United States. The Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 September, just a day before he was due to leave for China. On his way back from the United States, he was given a copy of Zimyanin’s report. That copy is now housed in the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD).2 The final section of Zimyanin’s report, which focuses on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the most interesting portion of the document, is translated here in full except for a few extraneous passages at the beginning and end.3 Zimyanin’s appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations is intriguing not only because of its substance, but also because of the light it sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. Both points will be briefly taken up in this introduction, which is divided into two main parts. The first part will discuss the content of the Foreign Ministry’s report, highlighting items of particular interest as well as several important lacunae. The second part will consider how Zimyanin’s assessment contributed to, and was affected by, changes under way in Soviet policy-making toward China. Those changes, as explained below, temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Ministry and therefore gave increased prominence to Zimyanin’s report.

Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations

In both substance and tone, Zimyanin’s analysis of Soviet relations with China reflected the burgeoning unease among Soviet officials. Although his view of the relationship was still distinctly favorable overall, he was quick to point out many areas of incipient conflict between the two countries. His report suggested that a full-fledged rift could be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent differences were bound to cause growing acrimony and recriminations unless appropriate steps were taken. In citing a litany of disagreements about key ideological and practical questions, the report drew a causal link between internal political conditions in China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, a theme emphasized by many Western analysts as well.4 Although Zimyanin concluded the document on an upbeat note—claiming that “relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year”—his analysis left little doubt that existing tensions between Moscow and Beijing could eventually take a sharp turn for the worse.

Four specific points about the document are worth highlighting. First, the report acknowledged that friction between the two Communist states had been present, to some degree, since the very start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin did not imply that China had been merely a “reluctant and suspicious ally” of Moscow in the early 1950s, he emphasized that the Soviet Union under Stalin had “violated the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People’s Republic” and had “kept the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR.”5 No doubt, these criticisms were motivated in part by the then-prevailing line of de-Stalinization, but Zimyanin provided concrete examples of “negative” actions on Moscow’s part between 1950 and 1953 that had “impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.”6

His views on this matter, interestingly enough, were very similar to conclusions reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and Beijing to project an image of monolithic unity (an image, incidentally, that was not far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time could sense that negotiations leading to the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will between the two countries. According to a secret background report, Mao was “highly dissatisfied with [Moscow’s] attempted exactions on China,” and Zhou Enlai said he “would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] demands as presented.”7 Although Soviet and Chinese officials did their best to conceal any further hints of bilateral discord over the next few years, word continued to filter into Washington about “strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia”—the same strain and difficulties that Zimyanin noted.8

By tracing the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict back to the Stalin period, Zimyanin’s report was quite different from the public statements made later on by officials in both Moscow and Beijing, who averred that the split had begun when the two sides disagreed about Khrushchev’s secret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956.9 Until recently, the large majority of Western (and Russian) scholars had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in which to pinpoint the origins of the dispute.10 It is now clear, both from Zimyanin’s report and from other new evidence (see below), that tensions actually had begun emerging much earlier. This is not to say that the whole Sino-Soviet rift, especially the bitter confrontation of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, but the reality is usually more complex. Far from being a “reluctant and suspicious ally” of the Soviet Union during the first half of the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet experience and to forge close, comprehensive ties with Moscow in the name of socialist internationalism. Even so, the latest memoirs and archival revelations, including Zimyanin’s report, leave little doubt that the seeds of a conflict between Moscow and Beijing were present, at least in some fashion, as early as 1950-53.

Second, while giving due emphasis to problems that arose during the Stalin era, Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th Soviet Party Congress and by the “Hundred Flowers” campaign in China. Zimyanin claimed that the Chinese leadership had “fully supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences” after the 20th Party Congress, but he conceded that Beijing’s assessment of Stalin was considerably “different from our own” and that the Congress had prompted “the Chinese friends . . . to express critical comments about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations.” Even more damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He cited a wide range of “hostile statements” and “denunciations of the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship” that had surfaced in China. “The airing of these types of statements,” he wrote, “can in no way be justified.” The report expressed particular concern about a number of territorial demands that had been raised against the Soviet Union.11

Third, as one might expect, Zimyanin devoted considerable attention to the Sino-Soviet ideological quarrels that began to surface during the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the form of disagreements about the establishment of “people’s communes,” the role of material versus ideological incentives, the nature of the transition to socialism and Communism, and other aspects of Marxism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter disputes erupted over territorial demands and questions of global strategy (not to mention a clash of personalities between Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had not yet come to dominate the relationship in September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideological differences that were particularly salient at the time. His report provides further evidence that ideological aspects of the conflict must be taken seriously on their own merits, rather than being seen as a mere smokescreen for geopolitical or other concerns.

Finally, there are a few conspicuous omissions in Zimyanin’s assessment, which are worth briefly explicating here because they provide a better context for understanding the document: • Stalin’s relationship with Mao. Although Zimyanin discussed problems in Sino-Soviet relations that arose during the Stalin era, he did not explicitly refer to the way Stalin behaved when Mao visited the Soviet Union for nearly two-and-a-half months beginning in December 1949. This omission is unfortunate because even a few brief comments might have helped clarify what has been a matter of great confusion. First-hand accounts of the Stalin-Mao relationship by former Soviet and Chinese officials offer sharply conflicting interpretations. One of the most jaundiced descriptions of the way Stalin treated Mao can be found in Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs:

Stalin would sometimes not lay eyes on [the Chinese leader] for days at a time—and since Stalin neither saw Mao nor ordered anyone else to entertain him, no one dared to go see him. We began hearing rumors that Mao was very unhappy because he was being kept under lock and key and everyone was ignoring him. Mao let it be known that if the situation continued, he would leave. . . . In this way, Stalin sowed the seeds of hostility and anti-Soviet, anti-Russian sentiment in China.12

A similar appraisal of Stalin’s demeanor was offered by Andrei Gromyko, who claimed in his memoirs that when Stalin hosted a special dinner for Mao in February 1950, the atmosphere was “oppressive” and the two leaders “seemed personally to have nothing in common that would enable them to establish the necessary rapport.”13 Because Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s observations fit so well with everything that is known about Stalin’s general behavior, their accounts have been widely accepted in the West.

More recently, though, a very different picture of the Stalin-Mao relationship has emerged from testimony by Nikolai Fedorenko, a former diplomat at the Soviet embassy in China who served as an interpreter for Stalin, and by Shi Zhe, a former official in the Chinese foreign ministry who interpreted for Mao. Both men were present during all the high-level Sino-Soviet meetings in 1949-1950.14 Although Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that several points of contention had surfaced between Stalin and Mao, they both emphasized that the relationship overall was amicable. Fedorenko specifically took issue with Khrushchev’s account:

Later on it was claimed that Stalin had not received Mao Zedong for nearly a month, and in general had not displayed appropriate courtesy toward the Chinese leader. These reports created a false impression of the host and his guest. In actual fact, everything happened quite differently. Judging from what I saw first-hand, the behavior of the two leaders and the overall atmosphere were totally different from subsequent depictions. . . . From the very first meeting, Stalin invariably displayed the utmost courtesy toward his Chinese counterpart. . . . Throughout the talks with Mao Zedong, Stalin was equable, restrained, and attentive to his guest. His thoughts never wandered and were always completely focused on the conversation.

Likewise, Shi Zhe noted that “Stalin was visibly moved [when he met the Chinese leader] and continuously dispensed compliments to Chairman Mao.” Shi dismissed rumors in the West that “Stalin had put Chairman Mao under house arrest” during a particularly tense stage in the negotiations leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance.

Even with the benefit of new evidence, it is difficult to sort out the discrepancies between these accounts. So far, transcripts of only the first two private meetings between Mao and Stalin—on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950—are available.15 Both transcripts shed a good deal of light on the Stalin-Mao relationship (not least by confirming how long the interval was between meetings), but they do not, and indeed cannot, convey a full sense of Stalin’s behavior toward Mao. Gestures, facial expressions, and even some unflattering comments are apt to be omitted from these stenographic reports either deliberately or inadvertently, just as there are crucial gaps in numerous other East-bloc documents.16 The two transcripts also do not reveal anything about unpleasant incidents that may have occurred outside the formal talks. Although retrospective accounts by aides to Stalin and Mao who took part in the meetings can be helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs must be used with extreme caution, especially when they are published long after the events they describe. Khrushchev’s recollections were compiled more than 15 years after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko’s, Fedorenko’s, and Shi’s accounts were written nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the memoir-writers relied on notes and documents from the period they were discussing and depicted events as faithfully as they could, the passage of so many years is bound to cause certain failings of memory.17

Two important factors might lead one to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko’s version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than to Khrushchev’s. First, Fedorenko and Shi participated in all the private talks between Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and Gromyko were present at only the public meetings.18 Second, it is conceivable that Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin’s behavior in an unduly negative light. (Khrushchev may have done this sub-consciously, or he may have been seeking to lay the “blame” on Stalin for the subsequent rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Stalin. One could therefore make a prima facie case on behalf of Fedorenko’s account. On the other hand, most of the latest evidence tends to support Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s versions, rather than Fedorenko’s. One of the most trusted aides to Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, who remained a staunch defender of the Soviet dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that when the Chinese delegation came to Moscow in December 1949, Mao had to wait many days or even weeks after his initial perfunctory meeting with Stalin until the Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him again.19 This corresponds precisely to what Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. Khrushchev’s account is further strengthened by the recollections of General Ivan Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military officer who served as Stalin’s personal envoy to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev recounted the tribulations and rudeness that Mao had experienced during his visit:

Mao was met [on 16 December] by Bulganin and Molotov, who brusquely turned down his invitation to join him for a meal, saying that it would be contrary to protocol. For the same reason, they declined Mao’s invitation to ride with him to his assigned dacha. . . . Mao was clearly upset by the cool reception. That same day, Stalin received Mao Zedong, but they held no confidential talks of the sort that Mao had wanted. After that, Mao spent numerous boring days at the dacha. Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan stopped by to see him, but had only very brief official conversations. I was in touch with Mao and saw him every day, and I was aware that he was upset and apprehensive.20

Kovalev also noted that in late December, Mao asked him to convey a formal request to Stalin for another private meeting, indicating that “the resolution of all matters, including the question of [Mao’s] spare time and medical treatment, [would] be left entirely to your [i.e., Stalin’s] discretion.”21 According to Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and “as before, Mao remained practically in isolation.” Even when Mao “retaliated by refusing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador to China,” it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev emphasized that it was “not until Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow at the end of January 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more successfully.” All this amply corroborates what Khrushchev wrote.

Khrushchev’s depiction of the Stalin-Mao relationship is also borne out by newly declassified testimony from another key source, namely Mao himself. In a private meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about the “ugly atmosphere” he had confronted in Moscow in 1950 and about the “profound distrust and suspicion” that Stalin had shown toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Mao also recalled the “insulting” treatment he had suffered after his preliminary discussions with Stalin:

From then on, Stalin sought to avoid me. I tried, for my part, to phone Stalin’s apartment, but was told that he was not home and that I should meet with Mikoyan instead. I was offended by all this, and so I decided that I would not do anything more and would simply spend my time resting at the dacha. Then I had an unpleasant conversation with Kovalev and Fedorenko, who suggested that I go for a trip around the country. I flatly rejected this proposal and said that I might as well just “go on sleeping at my dacha.”22

Mao revealed these “problems and difficulties” to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech at the CCP’s Chengdu conference in March 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight years earlier:

In 1950, Stalin and I argued with each other in Moscow for two months about our mutual defense treaty, about the Chungchang railroad, about joint economic ventures, and about our boundary lines. Our attitudes were such that when he offered a proposal which was unacceptable to me, I would resist it; but when he insisted on it, I would give in. I did so for the sake of socialism.23

Mao noted with particular distaste that he had allowed Stalin to get away with treating Manchuria and Xinjiang as mere “colonies” of the Soviet Union—a point mentioned by Zimyanin as well.24 At Chengdu and in numerous other speeches before closed CCP gatherings, Mao repeatedly condemned Stalin’s “serious mistakes” and “shortcomings,” a practice that suggests long pent-up feelings of animosity toward the late Soviet dictator.25

Furthermore, even some of the comments in Fedorenko’s and Shi’s own articles imply—if only inadvertently—that the relationship between Stalin and Mao was not really so cordial after all. Both Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that a residue of tension still plagued Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1950s because of Stalin’s refusal during the Chinese civil war to provide greater support for the Communist rebels.26 This tension inevitably caused personal strains between the two leaders, as Mao himself observed during his March 1956 meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in one of his secret speeches two years later at the Chengdu conference:

The victory of the Chinese revolution was against Stalin’s wishes.... When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake. We made no protest.27

Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into a “sullen” mood during the 1949-50 meetings whenever Mao was being deliberately “evasive.” This was particularly evident, according to Shi, when negotiations on the treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to “gauge Chairman Mao’s intentions.” Shi added that the testy exchanges between the two leaders prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcastically that Stalin was wont to “blame the Chinese for all the mistakes” in bilateral relations. Similarly, Fedorenko alluded to Stalin’s extreme suspiciousness during the talks, as reflected in the Soviet dictator’s incessant complaints about “conspiracies,” “plots,” and “illegal murmurs.” This behavior, too, suggests that Stalin may not have been quite as hospitable as Fedorenko initially implied. Despite the wealth of new evidence, there are still many unresolved questions about the nature of Stalin’s relationship with Mao. Further scrutiny of the emerging documentation and first-hand accounts will be essential to set the record straight.

Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s recollections seem to be corroborated by the latest disclosures, but Fedorenko’s and Shi’s accounts must be taken seriously, at least for now. Zimyanin’s analysis, with its strong criticism of Soviet policy during the early 1950s, is more compatible with Khrushchev’s version than with Fedorenko’s, but the report provides no conclusive evidence one way or the other.

• The crises in Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956. During the standoff between the Soviet Union and Poland in October 1956, Chinese officials generally supported the defiant Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and urged the Soviet Union to forgo military intervention in Poland. Ultimately, Khrushchev did accept a peaceful settlement with Gomulka. Senior Chinese officials also initially counseled against an invasion of Hungary when they traveled to Moscow on October 30 for emergency consultations. By that point, Khrushchev and his colleagues were no longer confident that “the Hungarian working class” could “regain control of the situation and suppress the uprising on its own,” but they agreed for the time being to desist from further intervention in Hungary.28 Less than 24 hours later, however, the Soviet authorities reversed their decision and voted in favor of a large-scale invasion.29 When Mao Zedong was informed of this last-minute change, he immediately and strongly endorsed the Soviet decision, not least because Imre Nagy had announced on November 1 (the day after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade) that Hungary was pulling out of the Warsaw Pact and establishing itself as a neutral state.

China subsequently became the most vocal supporter of the invasion and even publicly welcomed the execution of Imre Nagy in June 1958, but the whole episode, as Chinese officials later confirmed, had a jarring effect in Beijing. Zimyanin prominently cited the Soviet declaration of 30 October 1956 in his report, but he made no mention of the turmoil that had given rise to the declaration or of the actions that followed.

• Sino-Soviet policies in the Third World. In the late 1950s, Chinese leaders began vigorously championing—and, where possible, actively promoting—“wars of national liberation” and “anti-imperialist struggles” in the developing world.30 This strategy mirrored the growing radicalization of China’s domestic politics at the time. It also flowed naturally from Mao’s view, first enunciated in November 1957, that “the East Wind is now stronger than the West Wind.” Recent Soviet breakthroughs with long-range nuclear missiles, according to Mao, would deter Western countries from responding to Communist-backed guerrilla movements. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautious—at least rhetorically—than their Chinese counterparts, not least because they were aware that the East-West military balance had not improved as much as most Chinese officials assumed. Soviet leaders periodically warned that local Third World conflicts could escalate to a highly destructive global war if the superpowers directly intervened on opposing sides. In terms of actual policy, however, the difference between Soviet and Chinese approaches was relatively small.31 If only for logistical reasons, it was the Soviet Union, not China, that had been the primary arms supplier to Communist insurgents in numerous Third World countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaya, South Vietnam, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Cuba).32 Moreover, Chinese leaders, for all their seeming belligerence, were often hesitant about translating rhetoric into concrete policy. In private discussions with Soviet officials, senior Chinese representatives argued that “reasonable caution” was needed even when “conditions were ripe for the spread of progressive ideas in certain [Third World] countries.”33

Despite the underlying similarities between Chinese and Soviet policies, the two Communist states were bound to disagree at times. This was evident in July 1958 when a leftist coup against Iraq’s pro-Western government sparked a brief but intense crisis in the Middle East, leading to U.S. and British troop landings in Lebanon and Jordan. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials urged the Soviet Union to take a firm stand against “American imperialist aggression” in the Middle East, a task that China itself could not perform because of its lack of power-projection capabilities. Contrary to Beijing’s wishes, however, Soviet leaders quickly decided there was little to be gained by risking a direct East-West confrontation.34 Rather than sending “volunteers” to the Middle East or extending an overt military guarantee to the new Iraqi regime (as urged by Beijing), the Soviet Union relied mainly on diplomacy and called for a special UN-sponsored meeting to resolve the situation. Although the peak of the crisis had subsided (and Sino-Soviet differences on this score had seemingly waned) by the time Khrushchev arrived in China at the end of July 1958, the ongoing tensions in the Middle East were a prominent topic of discussion during his visit.35 The resulting exchanges may have been partly responsible for the bolder stance that the Soviet Union took during the Quemoy Islands crisis a few weeks later (see below).

Judging from numerous documents prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department in 1958 and early 1959, there is no doubt Zimyanin was aware that Chinese leaders had been disappointed by Soviet policy during the first ten days of the 1958 Middle Eastern crisis, when it still appeared that U.S. and British forces might try to restore a pro-Western government in Iraq. The initial phase of the crisis marked one of the first times that Soviet and Chinese policies in the Third World had diverged, albeit only temporarily.36 It is odd, therefore, that Zimyanin’s briefing report for Khrushchev barely mentioned the crisis and gave no intimation that Beijing and Moscow had been at odds about the best way to handle it.

• Lessons derived from the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. Shortly before Khrushchev’s trip to Beijing in July-August 1958, the Chinese Communist Party’s Military Affairs Committee (which had been meeting in an extraordinary two-month session since 27 May 1958) approved Mao’s plans for a major operation in late August to recapture China’s small offshore islands. The aim of the operation was to weaken or even undermine the Guomintang (Chinese Nationalist) government in Taiwan by exposing its inability to defend against an attack from the mainland.37 Khrushchev was not explicitly informed of the proposed undertaking during his visit to Beijing, but he was told in general terms that a military operation was being planned to “bring Taiwan back under China’s jurisdiction.”38 The Soviet leader welcomed the news and offered both political and military backing for China’s efforts. In the first few weeks of August the Soviet Union transferred long-range artillery, amphibious equipment, air-to-air missiles, and combat aircraft to China in the expectation that those weapons would facilitate a “decisive move against the Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] regime.”39 Soviet military advisers also were sent to China to help supervise—and, if necessary, take part in—the upcoming operation.

Although Chinese and Soviet leaders assumed (or at least hoped) that the action would not provoke a direct military response from the United States, this assumption proved erroneous from the very start. After the Chinese army launched a heavy artillery bombardment of the Quemoy Islands on August 23 and Chinese patrol boats were sent to blockade Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist ,resupply efforts, the United States responded by deploying a huge naval contingent to the Taiwan Straits. Simultaneously, top U.S. officials, including President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, publicly reaffirmed their commitment to protect Taiwan against Chinese incursions and to counter any naval threats in the Taiwan Straits.40 The strongest warning to this effect came on September 4, three days before heavily armed U.S. ships began escorting Taiwanese vessels on resupply missions to Quemoy. U.S. ,naval aircraft also were called into action to support the Taiwanese ,air force as it established control of the region’s airspace. In a rapid ,series of air battles, Taiwanese pilots flying U.S.-made fighters routed their Chinese opponents, casting serious doubt on the quality ,of China’s air crews and Soviet-made MiGs.41 These humiliating defeats forced Mao and several of his top military commanders onto the defensive during subsequent intra-party debates.42

The unexpectedly forceful U.S. response posed a dilemma for Chinese and Soviet leaders.43 On September 5, Mao privately acknowledged to the PRC’s Supreme State Conference that he “simply had not anticipated how roiled and turbulent the world would become” if China “fired a few rounds of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu.”44 Confronted by the threat of U.S. military retaliation, Mao abandoned any hopes he may have had at the time of seizing the offshore islands or, perhaps, attacking Taiwan.45 Although Chinese artillery units continued in September and early October to shell U.S.-escorted convoys as they landed with resupplies in Quemoy, these actions were coupled with efforts to defuse the crisis by diplomatic means. Most notably, on September 6, Zhou Enlai proposed a resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and on October 6 the Chinese government announced a provisional cease-fire, effectively bringing the crisis to an end. The continued bombardment of Quemoy had posed some risk that wider hostilities would break out, but Chinese leaders were careful throughout the crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Mao’s retreat came as a disappointment to some of his colleagues because of his earlier claims that the United States was merely a “paper tiger.” At a meeting of senior Chinese officials in late November (several weeks after the crisis had been defused), Mao even found it necessary to rebuke the “many people both inside and outside the Party who do not understand the paper tiger problem.”46

Soviet leaders, for their part, were convinced until late September that the PRC’s effort to get rid of Jiang Jieshi was still on track. When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko flew secretly to Beijing shortly after the crisis began, he found that Mao was still expressing hope of “responding with force against force.”47 After hearing back from Gromyko, Khrushchev followed up on his earlier pledge to support the Chinese operation. On September 7, while U.S. ships were embarking on their first escort missions, the Soviet leader issued a public warning that any attack against mainland China would be deemed an attack against the Soviet Union as well.48 This warning was followed two weeks later by a declaration that any use of nuclear weapons against China would be grounds for a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. Many Western analysts have claimed that these two Soviet statements were largely cosmetic, and that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric only when he believed there was no longer any danger of war. New evidence does not bear out this long-standing view. A week after Khrushchev issued his initial warning, he met secretly with the Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, and gave every indication that he still expected and hoped that China would proceed with its “decisive” military action against Taiwan.49 Although Khrushchev clearly wanted to avoid a war with the United States, the failure of U.S. aircraft carriers to attack mainland China after Chinese artillery units resumed their bombardment of Quemoy gave the Soviet leader ,reason to believe (or at least hope) that U.S. forces would not follow through on their commitment to defend Taiwan. Later on, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had felt betrayed when he finally realized in late September/early October that Mao had decided to bail out of the operation.50

To that extent, the Quemoy crisis ended up sparking discord between Soviet and Chinese officials, but for a much different reason from what has usually been suggested. Most Western analysts have argued that Chinese leaders were dismayed when the Soviet Union allegedly provided only lukewarm military backing for the probe against Taiwan.51 New evidence suggests that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union did everything it had promised to do in support of the Chinese operation, and that it was China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to follow through.52 This outcome explains why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned once, was determined not to let it happen again. From then on he emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These different views became a sore point in Sino-Soviet relations, as was evident during Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in the autumn of 1959.53 Zimyanin’s brief discussion of Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does not mention the frustration that Soviet leaders felt and the lasting impact this had on Khrushchev’s approach to the Taiwan issue.

• Soviet assistance to China’s nuclear weapons program. When Chinese leaders formally decided in January 1955 to pursue an independent nuclear weapons program, they did so in the expectation that they would receive elaborate advice and backing from Moscow. Between January 1955 and December 1956 the Soviet Union and China concluded four preliminary agreements on bilateral cooperation in uranium mining, nuclear research, and uranium enrichment, and these were followed in October 1957 by the signing of a New Defense Technology Agreement (NDTA), which provided for broad Soviet assistance to China in the development of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.54 Soon thereafter, Soviet nuclear weapons scientists and engineers were dispatched to China, sensitive information was transferred, equipment was sold for uranium processing and enrichment, and preparations were made to ship a prototype nuclear bomb to the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute for training and instruction purposes. In addition, a group of high-ranking Soviet military specialists were sent to help the Chinese establish new regiments for nuclear-capable SS-1 (8A11) and SS-2 (8Zh38) tactical missiles.55 The Soviet officers not only gave detailed advice on the technology and operational uses of the missiles, but also helped find suitable locations for SS-1/SS-2 test ranges and deployment fields. Similar cooperative arrangements were established for naval delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union provided China with technical data, designs, components, and production equipment for liquid-fueled R-11FM submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the naval version of the SS-1B.56 Although the R-11FM had a maximum range of just 162 kilometers and could be fired only from the surface, it was the most advanced Soviet SLBM at the time.

Despite the initial success of these efforts, Soviet leaders decided by early 1958 that it would be inadvisable, in light of Beijing’s territorial claims against the Soviet Union, to fulfill the pledge undertaken in the NDTA to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to the PRC.57 Chinese officials were not informed of this decision until nearly a year and a half later, and in the meantime mutual recriminations occurred behind the scenes when the promised shipment repeatedly failed to materialize. Khrushchev tried to alleviate the burgeoning tension when he traveled to Beijing at the end of July 1958, but his trip proved of little avail in this respect and tensions continued to increase. Finally, in a secret letter dated 20 June 1959, Soviet leaders formally notified their Chinese counterparts that no prototype bombs or detailed technical blueprints would be provided. The letter infuriated the Chinese, but Khrushchev and his colleagues were willing to pay that price at a time when, in their view, Sino-Soviet “relations were steadily deteriorating” and the NDTA was “already coming unraveled.”58 Curiously, the letter did not yet cause officials in Beijing to give up all hope of obtaining further assistance from Moscow on nuclear arms. At the summit in October 1959, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai formally requested Soviet aid in the development and production of nuclear-powered strategic submarines and longer-range, solid-fueled SLBMs. Khrushchev immediately turned down both proposals, thus dashing any lingering expectations that Mao and Zhou still had of pursuing new forms of nuclear-weapons cooperation or of at least reviving the NDTA.59

The Soviet Foreign Ministry had not been involved in the implementation of the NDTA, but senior ministry officials most likely were aware that nuclear assistance was being provided to China. (After all, the Foreign Ministry had been the initial contact point for Chinese leaders in mid-1957 when they sought to open negotiations for the agreement.) Hence, it is surprising that Zimyanin did not bring up this matter at all, apart from two oblique references to “questions of defense cooperation.”

• Differences about Soviet efforts to seek improved ties with the United States. Starting in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union pursued a line of “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. Chinese leaders, by contrast, wanted to step up the confrontation between the Communist world and the capitalist world and to avoid any hint of compromise. Chinese leaders even claimed that they were willing, in extremis, to risk a global nuclear war in the “struggle against imperialism.” To be sure, the connection between rhetoric and concrete policy was often tenuous; in 1958, China quickly backed down when confronted by a massive U.S. naval force in the Taiwan Straits. Nevertheless, even after that humiliating retreat, officials in Beijing continued to insist that “if the imperialists launch an all-out war,” it inevitably would result in “victory” for the Communist states and “inspire hundreds of millions of people to turn to socialism.” Mao’s seeming indifference to the potential consequences of nuclear war chastened Soviet leaders, who were concerned that the Soviet Union might be drawn into a large-scale conflict against its will.60 Soviet officials like Zimyanin were fully cognizant of these divergent outlooks (and the high-level concern they had provoked in Moscow), so it is odd that he made no more than an oblique reference to the matter.

Nor did Zimyanin mention the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing about the value of East-West arms control. Chinese officials were deeply suspicious of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the late 1950s aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Chinese leaders feared that their country, too, would come under pressure to sign a test ban treaty (even though they had taken no part in the negotiations), and that this would effectively end China’s hopes of becoming a nuclear power.61 The inception of a U.S.-Soviet test moratorium in the spring of 1958, coupled with the Soviet letter of 20 June 1959 (which explicitly cited the test ban negotiations as a reason not to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to China), intensified Beijing’s concerns that arms control talks were antithetical to China’s nuclear ambitions.62 Zimyanin was well aware of these differences, but chose not to bring them up.

• China’s deepening confrontation with India. Sino-Indian relations had been harmonious for several years after the Communists took power in Beijing, but the relationship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as a result of differences over Tibet and the disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the Himalayas.63 In the spring of 1959 China crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and deployed many thousands of extra troops on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with great apprehension in neighboring India. Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian border dispute heated up, leading to a serious incident in late August 1959, when Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a contested border post at Longju. Although each side blamed the other for the incident, the clash apparently was motivated in part by the Chinese authorities’ desire to take a firm stand against India before Khrushchev arrived in Beijing.

As recriminations between India and China escalated, Chinese officials secretly urged “the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries to exploit all possible opportunities” to “conduct propaganda measures against India” and “expose the subversive role of imperialist and reactionary Tibetan forces” armed and supported by India.64 These pleas were of no avail. Instead of rallying to China’s defense, the Soviet Union scrupulously avoided taking sides during the skirmishes, and released a statement on 9 September 1959 expressing hope that China and India would soon resolve the matter “in the spirit of their traditional friendship.”65 Chinese officials were shown the TASS statement before it went out, and they did their best to persuade Moscow not to release it; but far from helping matters, Beijing’s latest remonstrations merely induced Soviet leaders to issue the statement a day earlier than planned, without any amendments.66 Mao and his colleagues were so dismayed by the Soviet Union’s refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a dispute with a non-Communist state that they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow on September 13 claiming that “the TASS statement has revealed to the whole world the divergence of views between China and the Soviet Union regarding the incident on the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that has literally brought joy and jubilation to the Indian bourgeoisie and to American and British imperialism.”67 The irritation and sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two days later when Soviet and Indian leaders signed a much-publicized agreement that provided for subsidized credits to India of some $385 million over five years.

These events were still under way—and tensions along the Sino-Indian border were still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his report, so it was probably too early for him to gauge the significance of Moscow’s decision to remain neutral.68 Even so, it is odd that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up having such a deleterious effect on Khrushchev’s visit.69

Zimyanin’s Report and Soviet Policy-Making

The submission of Zimyanin’s report to Khrushchev was one of several indicators of a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy-making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the 1950s the Soviet Union’s dealings with the PRC, as with other Communist states, had been handled mainly along party-to-party lines. A special CPSU Central Committee department, known after February 1957 as the Department for Ties with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries, was responsible for keeping track of developments in East-bloc countries and for managing relations with those countries on a day-to-day basis.70 (Matters requiring high-level decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded from Soviet policy-making toward China. On some issues, such as the effort to gain a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, the MFA was the only important actor involved. Also, the foreign minister himself at times played a key role, notably in the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold secret negotiations with Mao about “issues of war and peace, the international situation, and the policy of American imperialism.”71 Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign Ministry’s input was limited. Apart from standard diplomatic support, the MFA had contributed relatively little during Khrushchev’s two previous visits to China (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as well as his visits to most other Communist states. The bulk of the preparations had been handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Central Committee departments and by Khrushchev’s own staff.

In that respect, the September 1959 trip to China was quite different. The MFA ended up with a dominant role in the preparations for the trip, thanks in part to a deliberate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater say for the Foreign Ministry in policy toward China.72 When Gromyko first asked Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on China, the foreign minister knew that he would soon be accompanying Khrushchev on a two-week visit to the United States, a task that would enable him to bolster the Foreign Ministry’s standing (as well as his own influence) on other issues, especially Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in between Khrushchev’s two visits in late September was so limited, briefings for the China trip had to occur almost entirely on the plane. Gromyko was aware that the other senior members of the Soviet “party-government delegation,” led by Mikhail Suslov, were scheduled to depart for China on September 26-27, while Khrushchev and Gromyko were still in the United States. Hence, the foreign minister knew he would be the only top official accompanying Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the 29th and 30th.73 (Gromyko, of course, also intended to make good use of his privileged access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and flight back from, the United States.74)

Under those circumstances, the Foreign Ministry’s report on China, prepared by Zimyanin, became the main briefing material for Khrushchev, along with a short update (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent personnel changes in the Chinese military High Command.75 What is more, Zimyanin (who was a member of the MFA Collegium as well as head of the ministry’s Far Eastern department) and a number of other senior MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing to provide on-site advice and support, something that had not happened during Khrushchev’s earlier visits to China.76 Although the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and a few other CC department heads also traveled to China as advisers, the Foreign Ministry’s role during the visit was far more salient than in the past. (This was reflected in Gromyko’s own role as well; among other things, he was the only Soviet official besides Suslov who took part in all of Khrushchev’s talks with Mao and Zhou Enlai.77) Hence, Zimyanin’s report proved highly influential.

As things worked out, however, the MFA’s expanded role had little effect one way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. The trip in September-October 1959 left crucial differences unresolved, and the two sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet Union quietly began pulling some of its key military technicians out of China.78 Tensions increased rapidly over the next several months, culminating in the publication of a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birthday.79 The statement, entitled “Long Live Leninism!” removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.80 Soon thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, where Khrushchev sought to rebut the comments expressed at the WFTU meeting and to retaliate for China’s decision to provide other delegates with copies of a confidential letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP leadership. The top Chinese official in Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.81

Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet Union withdrew all its remaining military technicians and advisers from China in July and August 1960, and simultaneously began recalling its thousands of non-military personnel, causing disarray in many of China’s largest economic and technical projects and scientific research programs.82 Although Soviet and Chinese officials managed to gloss over the dispute at a “world conference” of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960, the polemics and recriminations soon resumed, with ever greater stridency. Subsequently, as news of the conflict spread throughout the world, Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional attempts to reconcile their differences; but the split, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes of restoring a semblance of unity in the international Communist movement were dashed.

The downward spiral of Sino-Soviet relations after Khrushchev’s visit in 1959 tended to rigidify Soviet policy-making. Senior ideological officials from the CPSU, especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail Suslov, ended up handling most of the Soviet Union’s polemical exchanges and other dealings with China. Throughout the late 1950s (and even well into 1960) Suslov had been the chief proponent within the Soviet leadership of a conciliatory posture toward China; but as attitudes on both sides steadily hardened and the split became irreparable, Suslov embraced the anti-Chinese line with a vengeance, in part to compensate for his earlier, more accommodating stance. Oleg Rakhmanin, a senior official and expert on China in the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries, also gained an increasing role in policy toward the PRC.83 Rakhmanin’s expertise and aggressive anti-Maoist stance gave Soviet leaders precisely what they needed as the split widened, and the result was an even more confrontational policy toward Beijing.

Foreign Ministry employees were not necessarily any more favorably disposed toward China than senior party officials were, but the demand for input from the MFA tended to decline as bilateral tensions grew. Although Soviet diplomats in China still had important liaison and information-gathering roles, the expertise of the MFA’s Far Eastern department was largely eclipsed during the 1960s. Zimyanin left the department as early as February 1960, having been appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Subsequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin served briefly as a deputy foreign minister and then gained prominence within the CPSU in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief of Pravda (from 1965 to 1976), as a full Central Committee member (from 1966 on), and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC Secretary, beginning in 1976. Like Zimyanin, the new head of the Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appointment, but aside from that one distinction, Tugarinov was an obscure official whose tenure at the department lasted only until August 1963. His successor, N. G. Sudarikov, was not yet even a member of the MFA Collegium when he became head of the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of the department’s waning influence. (Sudarikov was not appointed to the Collegium until November 1964, some 15 months after he took over the Far Eastern department and a month after Khrushchev’s ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the Foreign Ministry’s role in policy-making toward China remained well short of what it had been in September 1959.

The MFA’s diminished impact on Sino-Soviet relations was largely unchanged until mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department was bifurcated, and the ministry’s senior expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed in charge of the new “First Far Eastern” department.84 That department, under Kapitsa’s highly visible direction for well over a decade (until he was promoted to be a deputy foreign minister in December 1982), was responsible for China, Korea, and Mongolia, while the “Second Far Eastern” department handled Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines.85 Even after separate departments were established, however, the continued hostility between China and the Soviet Union left the MFA’s First Far Eastern department with a relatively modest role in policy-making, in part because the department overlapped so much with the sections on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries. Not until the 1980s, when relations between Moscow and Beijing finally began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry regain extensive influence over policy toward China. That trend was under way as early as 1982, but it gathered much greater momentum after 1986, as Eduard Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, the MFA had acquired a dominant role in policy-making toward China.

The status of the Foreign Ministry on this issue was never quite as prominent during Andrei Gromyko’s long tenure as foreign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA’s influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin’s report thus symbolized a high point for the ministry vis-a-vis China in the pre-Gorbachev era.

The translation of Zimyanin’s report follows below

Soviet-Chinese Relations

The victory of the people’s revolution in China and the ,establishment of the Chinese People’s Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries.

When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People’s Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock companies, and to set the rate of ,exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.86

Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate ,everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.87 Over time, the above-mentioned agreements were annulled ,or revised if they did not accord with the spirit of fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting ,relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on relations with Japan.88 In addition, a communique and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou- Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth.89

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. ,It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Communist Party of ,China Central Committee] fully supported the CPSU’s measures to ,eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences. It is worth ,noting, however, that the CPC CC, while not speaking about this directly, took a position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin.90 A bit later the Chinese comrades reexamined their evaluation of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in Mao Zedong’s pronouncements when he was visiting Moscow.91 For example, he said: “. . . Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now have the same view as the CPSU.” In a number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. Stalin. Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a campaign was launched ,in China to combat dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to “let a hundred flowers bloom.”92 In connection with this the Chinese press began, with increasing frequency, to express criticism of specific conditions and of works by Soviet authors in the fields of philosophy, natural history, literature, and art. This inevitably gave strong impetus to hostile statements by rightist forces who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality. They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers.93 In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR. The airing of these types of statements during the struggle against rightists can in no way be justified, even if one takes account of the tactical aims of our friends, who were seeking to unmask the rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against them for all their statements. It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crushing the rightist elements, did not offer any open condemnation of statements expressed by them about so-called “territorial claims on the USSR.”

The Soviet government’s declaration of 30 October 1956 [endorsing the principle of equality in relations between the Soviet Union and other communist countries—ed.] was received with great satisfaction in China.94 In January 1957 a government delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.95 The Declaration emphasized the complete unity of the USSR and PRC as an important factor in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched claims about a “struggle between the CPSU and CPC for the right to leadership of world Communism.” In accordance with the Declaration, the Soviet Union devised and implemented concrete measures aimed at the further development of Soviet-Chinese friendship and cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual interest, and complete trust. In 1957 a series of consultations took place between the CPSU CC and the CPC CC on common, concrete matters pertaining to the international situation and the Communist movement. The Chinese friends actively participated in the preparations and conduct of the Moscow conference of officials from Communist and workers’ parties in November 1957.96 While the Chinese delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong spoke approvingly about the positive experience of such consultations and the constant readiness of the Chinese comrades to undertake a joint review of these and other matters.97

The steps to reorganize the management of the national economy in the USSR were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the June [1957] and other plenary sessions of the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press did not feature an official commentary or reactions to the decisions of these sessions. After details about the activity of the Anti-Party faction had been explained to the CPC CC, the friends began to speak more resolutely about these matters. “If Molotov’s line had prevailed within the CPSU,” Mao declared in Moscow, “that would have been dangerous not only for the USSR, but for other socialist countries as well.”98

Taking account of the divisive activity of revisionists and the surge of imperialist propaganda, which tried to use several ideological campaigns in China in 1957—and, in particular, the campaign to “let a hundred flowers bloom” as well as the publication of a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among the People”—to provoke a schism in relations between the Soviet Union and PRC, the leadership of the CPC CC and the government of the PRC emphasized the close unity of the socialist camp and the leading role of the CPSU among Communist and workers’ parties. Mao Zedong stated this very definitively in his speech to Chinese students attending Moscow State University (November 1957), and he spoke about it at length with officials from Yugoslavia and also during meetings that PRC government delegations had with delegations from Poland and other countries of the socialist camp.99 In 1959 the CPC CC, having reexamined the proposal of the CPSU CC to clarify its formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again affirmed that this formula must be preserved in the future.

The durability of Soviet-Chinese relations and the role of Soviet-Chinese friendship gained new strength as the international situation deteriorated in the Middle East and also in connection with the provocations by the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the summer of 1958. The most important political event that year in Soviet-Chinese relations, which had an enormously positive influence on the development of the whole international situation, was the July-August meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong.100 During an exchange of views they considered a number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chinese relations and, in particular, questions of military cooperation.101 The speech by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his statement that an attack on the PRC would be regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union itself, was fervently greeted with expressions of gratitude and approval in China.102 The government of the PRC displayed great satisfaction at our assurance about our readiness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation for a nuclear strike against China.103 In turn, the Chinese government declared that the PRC will come to the assistance of the USSR in any part of the globe if an attack is carried out against it.

The letter from Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, and a variety of reports from the CPSU CC—about the provision of assistance to the PRC to continue strengthening its defense capability, about a reduction in the number of Soviet specialists in the PRC and the elimination of the network of Soviet “adviser-consultants,” about the CPSU CC’s views of the Yugoslav Communist League’s draft program, and about other matters—had important political benefits. The results of the CPSU’s 21st Congress provided a great boost to the practical activity of the CPC in overseeing socialist construction in the country.104 It is worth noting that after the publication of the theses of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev at the CPSU’s 21st Congress and during the proceedings of the Congress, the Chinese friends, while giving a generally positive evaluation of the achievements of socialist construction in the USSR, made almost no mention of the theoretical portions of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev and said that those portions related only to the practice of socialist and Communist construction in the USSR.105

In a similar vein, the provisions adopted at the Second Session of the CPC’s 8th Congress (May 1958) regarding a struggle against “blind faith” and regarding the need to foster sentiments of national pride among the people, as well as some preliminary success in implementing the “Great Leap Forward,” caused a number of cadre workers in the PRC to take on airs.106 They began excessively emphasizing China’s uniqueness and displaying a guarded attitude toward Soviet experience and the recommendations of Soviet specialists.107 Some began declaring that the Soviet Union had stayed too long at the socialist stage of development, while China was moving valiantly ahead toward Communism. The Chinese press quite actively featured criticism of the socialist principles implemented in the USSR for the distribution of material goods in accordance with one’s labor, for the compensation of labor on a job-by-job basis, and so forth. Some authors essentially argued that communes were incompatible with kolkhozes.108

Later on, after studying materials from the Congress and after numerous mistakes arose during the establishment of the peasant communes and during the implementation of the “Great Leap Forward,” the CPC began to display a more proper understanding of matters considered by the 21st Congress, such as the question of the significance of creating a material-technical base and increasing the productivity of labor for the construction of socialism, the question of the role of the principle of material incentives and labor distribution under socialism, and other questions.

The CPSU’s position in offering a principled explanation of a number of Marxist-Leninist precepts and laws of the building of socialism and Communism, which were ignored in China during the implementation of the “Great Leap Forward” and the establishment of communes (see the report and speech by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Congress and the speeches that followed), helped the Chinese comrades to evaluate the situation correctly and to begin rectifying the mistakes and shortcomings that had arisen. The statement by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev about the permanent foundations of Soviet-Chinese friendship swept the rug out from under imperialist and Yugoslav revisionist propaganda, which was intended to sow mistrust between our countries and provoke a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations.

An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations over the past decade confirms that relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year. These relations are a decisive factor in the further growth of the might and cohesion of the world socialist camp and in the consolidation of world peace and the security of nations.

Mark Kramer, a scholar at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University

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Second Taiwan Straits Crisis Background:

Taiwan Straits Crisis 1958: Four MIAs Sacrificed to Secrecy

Historical Overview - Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960

The Federation of American Scientists - Quemoy and Matsu Islands Defense

The USSR Foreign Ministry's ppraisal Of Sino- Soviet Relations On The Eve Of The Split,
September 1959 by Mark Kramer

A Conversation with Mao, 1959 - From the Cold War International History Project