AII POW-MIA - POW/MIA Research Project 5

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the Russian side should be asked to support its position by providing information on the location of Niemann at the time of death and the disposition of remains. [See map at G.1.]

F.14. Captain Charles E. McDonough
The McDonough case, indeed the fate of each crew member of the RB-45, is both unresolved and littered with contradictory evidence. 88

There are at least two “authoritative” locations for the RB-45 crash site:

1) Near the Yalu River (CILHI data, map grid 6332-IV, Col. Orlov from March 2, 1994); and

2) Near Andung, China (Soviet records and Col. Orlov's reports).

There are three conflicting versions of when McDonough was last seen alive:

1) “Died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site,” according to “ A. Orlov.” 89

2) “Died en route,” according to Soviet reporting to Moscow on December 18, 1950;

3) “On the night of December 16, 1950 we were both taken from the cell... Major McDonough was placed on an ox cart, and I was told by the interpreter that he was being taken to a hospital for medical attention. Since that night I have never seen or heard anything of Major McDonough, and I feel reasonably certain that he passed away or was killed,” according to Captain Shawe.

There are four conflicting versions of whose custody McDonough was in when he died.

1. Repatriated POW Shawe reported McDonough was taken away on a ox cart by an unspecified captor.

2. Col. Orlov has said repeatedly that McDonough was in Chinese custody and all information in Soviet records was provided by Chinese forces.

3. Soviet records indicate that McDonough was in Soviet custody at least part of the time between the shoot down (December 4) and the day he was last seen alive (December 16 or 17).

4. Soviet Air Force veterans report that McDonough was in North Korean custody with a Soviet political officer as an escort when he died.

To support its version of events, the Russian side of the Joint Commission presented two documents concerning the McDonough case, a handwritten note and one document which “had been cut from complete documents and taped together on a single sheet of paper.” 90

88. On what evidence, for example, did Belov base his conclusions that the crew of the RB-45 “bailed out on parachutes?” Is it solely from McDonough's interrogation, or are there other reports?
89. TFR 217-1, entitled “Last names of American fliers mentioned in documents of the 64th IAK [Fighter Aviation Corps], citing TsAMO, f.5, op 918795, d. 120, 559, 574.
90. TFR-242-2. DFI previously obtained and sent to DPMO complete copies of both documents. The Russian cut-and-paste job was a significant distortion of the content and format of the original documents. The Russian side summarized and redacted these documents to conceal, among other things, the fact McDonough lived for at least two weeks following the crash of his aircraft. Col. Alexander Orlov provided the American side of the USRJC a handwritten document (TFR-217-1), a summary allegedly derived from documents of the 64th IAK, which inaccurately and deceptively states that McDonough "died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site."

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The Russian interpretation of the documents is either less than competent or deliberately deceptive.

Col. Orlov passed to the American side a handwritten note concerning McDonough which the American side considered to be disingenuous. Orlov wrote that McDonough “died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site” giving the false impression that McDonough died on the same day as the crash. 91 DPMO noted, “It is likely that Orlov was trying, in his note, to present the information in a more positive light than did the original documents.”

The Russian version of why two documents had been cut apart and pasted into one does not withstand careful scrutiny. Orlov asserted that the portions of the two documents redacted by the Russians “is a report that contains other things. We gave all that pertains to POWs.” 92 This statement was not entirely true.

• The cut- and-paste version of the two documents prepared by the Russian side deleted the date of the second document (December 18)

• Orlov's note gives the misleading impression that McDonough died while being “evacuated” from the crash site when in fact McDonough died nearly two weeks after the crash. In that time McDonough had been interrogated by Russian forces, transported from China to North Korea, and apparently died while being transported to an unknown destination by the North Koreans with a Soviet political officer escort.

Col. Orlov insists the “Chinese did the interrogation” and shared the information with Soviet forces. The facts suggest, in contrast, that there was direct Soviet involvement with McDonough.

• Soviet reporting states clearly that McDonough was interrogated by “Kuznetsov” and the interrogation of McDonough was attested to by Major Kozlov, Senior Intelligence officer of Unit 54892.

• Soviet Air Force veterans report that McDonough was interrogated by deputy regimental political officer Fironov.

• Orlov's claim that the Chinese but not the Soviets interrogated McDonough is supposedly supported by the fact that Krasovski signed the second telegram. Orlov asserts that in his role as chief military advisor to the Chinese, Krasovski would have been informed about the McDonough interrogation. This does not withstand scrutiny.

91. TFR-217-1.
92. Eighth Plenum, p. KW-9.
93. TFR-242-2.

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• The cut and paste document provided by Orlov does not show the name of the Soviet officer who signed the report concerning McDonough's interrogation. In fact, the report to Moscow on the content of the interrogation was signed by Belov, the commander of the 64th IAK. Krasovski, the liaison to China, did not report on the interrogation, Belov did. The interrogation and report of it were all conducted by Soviet forces and transmitted within Soviet channels. There is no evidence of Chinese involvement in any of this material.

• As the commander of the 64th IAK, Belov had no liaison functions with the Chinese. Belov is reporting information derived from Soviet efforts. This is why the interrogation of McDonough was conducted by Unit 54892 and attested to by Major Kozlov. Orlov deleted Belov's name in an attempt to conceal this fact. 94

In response to Congressman Sam Johnson's direct question concerning the McDonough case, “This was early in the war. Did you have units there then?” Orlov responded only, “It crashed in Andung.“ 95

Four issues must be resolved before McDonough's casualty status is changed to KIA (BNR). 1) The possibility cannot be excluded, for example, that “died en route” is a Soviet euphemism. 96 2) If “died en route” is not a euphemism, however, and if it is true that Captain McDonough indeed died on December 18, 1950 in Soviet custody en route, then the Russian side of the Joint Commission should be given the task to account for the disposition, including the burial location, of Captain McDonough's remains. 97 3) If Col. Orlov's statement is correct, that McDonough died while being evacuated from the RB-45 crash site, on what basis is this conclusion drawn? How does Orlov reconcile this version to the report from Krasovkii to Batitskii, “the pilot... died en route”? 4) if the Soviet forces buried or witnessed the disposition of Captain McDonough's body in North Korea, as Soviet veterans report, then the location of the last known area where McDonough was seen alive by Soviet forces should be obtained from the Russian side of the USRJC.

In addition, US records suggest McDonough may not be a BNR case. In 1955, according to the opinion of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations General G. B. Erskine, "There is reason to believe Major McDonough's body is included among those which have been recovered by our Graves Registration units...”

94. Subsequent DFI research uncovered Soviet documents which show the channels of communication used by Soviet forces to send interrogation records to Moscow. Documents were included in the Soviet diplomatic courier pouch to Beijing and forwarded from there to Moscow. Thus the evidence shows Krasovskii's message concerning McDonough's alleged death was based on reporting obtained from Soviet forces, not Chinese.
95. Eighth Plenum, p. KW-2-3.
96. There is a precedent for this type of euphemistic Soviet-ese. After World War II, the Chief of NKVD Camp No. 188 was instructed by the Chief of the NKVD USSR Directorate for POWs and Internees, “In your wire reports about prisoner movements the word ‘died’ from now on should be substituted with the word ‘loaded.”’ Paul M. Cole, POW/MIA Issues: Volume 2, World War II and the Early Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, MR-351/2-USDP, 1993), p.24.
97. If, as reported in Soviet documents, the RB-45 crashed in China, it remains to be explained how McDonough made it to Sinuiju, North Korea where he was last seen alive.

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Erskine considered the McDonough case to be one “with serious domestic public relations implications.” 98 Further research is required into this report by General Erskine.

Recommendation: According to family members, McDonough's casualty status was changed from MIA to KIA on the basis of repatriate testimony in 1954. McDonough is still carried by CILHI as MIA. In the absence of independent confirmation of the fact of death or additional evidence which corroborates the alleged fact of death in the Soviet archive documents, the grounds are insufficient to maintain a KIA (BNR) casualty status for Captain Charles McDonough. In light of information from Soviet archives which clearly shows direct Soviet involvement in the interrogation and transport of McDonough, facts the Russian side of the USRJC have attempted to blur or conceal, Captain McDonough's casualty status be changed from KIA (BNR) (or MIA if CILHI's data are accurate) to POW/BNR. The burden of proof in this case and the responsibility to account for the remains of McDonough lie with the Russian side of the USRJC. [See map at G.1.]

F.15. Col. John R. Lovell
Recommendation: According to the next of kin of Colonel John R. Lovell, a passenger on McDonough's RB-45, Lovell ‘was declared Killed in Action in 1954.” There is no evidence showing the basis on which Lovell's casualty status was changed from MIA to KlA. Further interviews with the participants in the shoot down and collection of the wreckage of the RB-45 should be made. Pending the outcome of these interviews, and given the degree of contradiction in Soviet records and the lack of direct evidence of death, Lovell's casualty status should be changed from KIA (BNR) to MIA (BNR). [See related case at C.1, D.2, F.14, and map at G.1.]

F.16. Lt. Col. George A. Davis
Recommendation: Thus far there is no direct evidence from the archives of the 64th IAK which confirms information from Corps Commander Georgii Lobov, for example, that Davis was killed in the crash of his F-86. The authoritative source F-86 Sabre does not provide evidence which supports the fact of death either. USAF records show that there is a possibility that Davis managed to eject in time to save himself. It is clear that Soviet search teams located the crash site and recovered personal effects from Davis. Thus the Russian side of the USRJC should have access to archive material which will demonstrate whether Davis was captured alive or was found dead. In light of the fact that Davis, if captured, would have been of great interest to Soviet intelligence military specialists, George Davis's casualty status should be changed from MIA to POW (BNR). [See D.3.

98. Letter from General G. B. Erskine (Secret) to Mr. Waiter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, October 1, 1955. 611.95a24/10-155. The “domestic public relations implications” referred to may have been the fact that McDonough's RB-45 was shot down in Chinese airspace while conducting strategic bombing reconnaissance for the Strategic Air Command. [See map at G.1.]

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F’.17. Col. Robert R. Martin
Recommendation: Unless there are grounds for doubting the credibility of Shytkov's report that Col. Martin was captured in July 1950, Robert R. Martin's casualty status should be changed from KIA (BNR) to POW (BNR). [See B.27.]

F.18. Lt. Laurence C. Layton
Recommendation: In light of the evidence in Soviet documents that Soviet forces were searching for Lt. Layton, and in light of the fact that Layton was known to be alive and well on the ground following his bailout, the possibility cannot be excluded that Lt. Layton was captured alive by Soviet, Chinese, or Korean forces. The recommendation to change Lt. Layton's casualty status from MIA to POW (BNR) is consistent with Air Force Manual 200-25. [See B.1.]

F.19. 1Lt. Austin Beetle
Recommendation: The circumstances of loss for Lt. Beetle are clearly consistent with a KIA (BNR) casualty status, Beetle's records should be changed from MIA to KIA (BNR). [See D. 4.]

G. Unreported USAF Losses In Chinese Territory
American F-86 pilots had a variety of incentives to violate Chinese airspace and to conceal, to the extent possible, the true nature of this activity. Two reasons suffice for the purpose of the purpose of this report. First, USAF rules of engagement banned combat sorties across the Yalu River into China except in the case of "hot pursuit." Dolphin Overton III, the first USAF F-86 pilot to be caught after making an unauthorized sortie over the Yalu, was grounded, sent home and threatened with a general court martial in order to compel him to resign from the Air Force. The only jet ace in Marine Corps history, Lt. Cil. John Bolt, wrote, "If you were north of the river, it was at the risk of your professional career if you got caught." 99 As Fischer noted, in order to avoid Overton's fate, F-86 pilots simply selected a location or a village south of the Yalu if one needed to report where a MiG or an F-86 had been shot down. This was, according to Fischer, "strictly CYA."

Second, F-86 pilots such as Air Force Ace HArold Fischer note today that one was compelled to cross the Yalu in search of Soviet MiGs simply because "that's where they were." According to Lt. Col. Bolt, "The Chinese were yelling and screaming about the 'pirates' that were coming over there, but that's where the actions was." Bolt described how the desire to fight MiGs overwhelmed even the most disciplined defenders of USAF policy. Summarizing direct first-person interviews with many F-86 veterans of the Korean War, F-86 Sabre reported, "throughout the war, Sabre pilots crossed the forbidden Yalu to engage MiGs on their own turf, ignoring rules, politics, and direct orders telling them to stay out of Chinese airspace. At the 51st FIW, Gabreski. Jones, Mahurin, Major William

99. "Time Flies: The Oral History of Lt. Col. John F. Bolt, USMC (Ret.), "Foundation, Fall 1993, p.99.

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Whisner, and others adopted a hot-pursuit policy, flying what they called Maple Special incursions into China when circumstance gave them a shot at a fleeing MiG pilot. These border crossings were kept secret from most other pilots.” 100

^{These
cross-border missions were an invitation to trouble. Lt. Bill Ginther came
back from a mission with revealing gun camera film. He had attacked a MiG
over Manchuria and, trying to escape, the MiG pilot had dived to earth, pulling
out just in time to pass along the runway at the crowded Antung airfield.
Ginther began firing at the MiG while flying so low that the gun camera film,
as Mahurin described it, showed ‘row after row of MiGs lined up on either
side of the runway,’ so that ‘it appeared that the F-86 was flying
even below the tops of the MiG tails. While enemy technicians stood on the
MiGs watching, Ginther shot down his MiG, got out of the place, coaxed his
Sabre home--and burned his film.}101

Capt. Ivan C. Kincheloe, for example, recorded one of his MiG kills in the vicinity of Mukden, about 60 miles (97 km) north of the Yalu.

Thus it is understandable that the majority of USAF losses over Chinese territory are not reported or reflected as such in US casualty records. US records are a unreliable source and offer little insight into these losses. In cases where USAF reconnaissance aircraft entered Chinese airspace on classified missions approved by the relevant USAF and FEAF authorities, documentation which accurately describes the true nature of operations of this type would hive been generated by SAC and FEAF during the Korean War. In the case of unauthorized combat operations in China, however, the only extant USAF records associated with these missions do not accurately describe these missions.

G.1. Deceptive USAF reporting on Location of Losses
As shown in Section A of this volume, USAF personnel who had direct knowledge of unauthorized combat incursions into Chinese airspace during the Korean War left an incomplete record concerning the location of the loss of US aircraft in cases where the aircraft was lost on Chinese territory. In some of these cases, Soviet Air Force records are a useful source of information as to the true location of crash sites.

The following four maps show the contrast between crash locations in USAF records and the location of the Arnold (January 13, 1953), Heller (January 23, 1953), and McDonough (December 4, 1950), and Niemann (April 12, 1953) incidents as recorded in Soviet records or reported by Soviet Air Force veterans. These four incidents were selected to illustrate that the same discrepancy occurs in F-86 repat, F-86 BNR, B-29, and RB-45 cases.

100. F-86 Sabre p 130.
101. F-86 Sabre, p.130.