POW/MIA Research Project:
Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Berlin
Volume 1: Moscow

CONTINUED - Pt. II

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Photographs
 DFI's research team searched Tass records for photographs relating to POW/MIAs. On April 21, 1994, DFI forwarded to DPMO the original of 23 photographs obtained from Tass photo archives. These photographs clearly show American POW/MIAs from

27. The American side of the USRJC has also referred incorrectly to “70 search groups,” rather than 70 servicemen. Ninth Plenum, p.29.
28. Tenth Plenum, p.70.
29. Tenth Plenum, p.79.
3O. TFR 76-37.
31. Tenth Plenum, p.85.
32. TFR 148-3 and TFR 148-8.
33. Tenth Plenum, p.91.

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the Korean and Vietnam Wars. (Photos of POW/MlAs were also obtained by the Ukraine research team. See Volume 2 of this report.)

The provenance of these photographs, which was once in doubt, is now clearly established to be Russian. Two photographs located in the Tass archives appeared in Life magazine on May 11, 1953 in a story entitled, “Secret Photos from the Red Korea of 1950 -- Some GIs Not On Exchange List.” One of the Life photographs was clear taken seconds after one of the photos located in the Tass archives. The Life editors reported,

Copies of these photographs are attached to the end of this report in Appendix C.

Why Findings May Differ
 An important question is why DFI's findings differ so greatly from those of the USRJC. The answer appears to lie in the difference between archival research conducted by official and private researchers. The content of the records obtained by Secretary Baker, some of the material acquired by private researchers and an unknown portion of the documents produced by the Joint Commission have been made available to the public either in full or in summaries. With the exception of President Boris Yeltsin's remarkable letter to the U.S. Senate in June 1992 regarding POW/MIA affairs, the Russian government has taken public positions on POW/MIA issues based on the documents obtained by the Russian side of the Joint Commission.

The position of the Russian side of the USRJC may derive from the documentation which Joint Commission researchers located in Soviet era archives. (President Yeltsin's June 1992 letter on POW/MIAs, in contrast, was not supported by any primary source evidence from Soviet era archives.) Since the Joint Commission was established as a high-level government-to-government effort, it follows that Commission researchers in Moscow would focus their research effort on high-level Soviet era documentation.

This type of Soviet documentation may not contain the evidence American authorities need in order to resolve Korean War POW/MIA issues. At a high level, U.S. government documents often contain little operational information. One could reasonably conclude that similar events occurred in the Soviet bureaucracy in the 1950s.

Another factor may explain why the DFI documents contain details that are not found in material obtained by Secretary Baker or located by Joint Commission researchers. In the United States, the Department of State is the government agency that most closely follows the National Archive rules with respect to marking documents for archival

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purposes. The three copies of documents prepared for top political leadership (President, Vice President, Secretary of State) are usually clean when submitted to the principal decisionmakers, e.g., the documents routinely have no distribution lists or routing instructions. Markings for archival purposes are added to this type of State Department document only after these documents have been read by the designees. If Soviet archivists followed similar steps, this would explain the absence of routing sheets and distribution lists on any high-level Soviet era documents provided to Secretary Baker and the Joint Commission.

The archive research that produced the records attached to this report focused on operational files at a relatively low level within the Soviet bureaucracy. Thus one finds on these documents the registration marks and classification markings, routing slips and distribution lists intact. (Some of these marks have been redacted much in the same way documents from the U.S. National Archives are sanitized for public release.) If the Joint Commission's researchers focused on searching high-level records, this could explain why detailed information contained in the records obtained by DFI through its research team in Moscow contain information that, in some cases, contradicts the position taken by the Russian leadership. Perhaps the structure of the USRJC, which is a Presidential commission, is too formal for the type of archival research required.

This background may explain why the documents submitted with this report contradict the position taken by the Russian side of the USRJC that, among other things, Soviet forces in Korea in general and Soviet intelligence services in particular had no direct or systematic contact with American POW/MIAs.

Data Reference Point
 Whenever possible, CILHI data are used in this report, particularly for current casualty status. Thus the rank of an individual MIA when lost usually differs from the rank in current CILHI records due to the fact MIAs were often promoted in abstentia.

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A. Soviet Air Force Records Associated With POW/MIAs
 Soviet archives contain information which is related directly, in some cases by name, to American POW/MIA cases from the Korean War. In other cases, information from Soviet sources pertaining to USAF aircraft losses may be related to specific individuals by correlating the Soviet information with USAF records. Two facts which derive from the analysis of Soviet Air Force records deserve particular attention:

First, some USAF casualty records (293 files) contain information concerning the location of crash sites which was not reported completely or, in some cases, accurately by eyewitnesses. The purpose of the incomplete reporting was, according to Korean War veterans, to conceal the fact that USAF pilots made unauthorized combat flights into the territory of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Evidence concerning the presence of USAF combat and reconnaissance aircraft in PRC airspace presented in this report derives, in part, from Soviet and American veterans of the Korean War. Documentation from primary source Soviet Air Force records is included in this analysis. 34

Second, there is a one hour time difference in Soviet and American reporting. When reading American records, subtract one hour to match Soviet records. When reading Soviet records, add one hour to match American records. 35

A.1. Soviet-era Archive Data Relating to POW/MIAs by Name
 The daily operational summaries and telegrams from the Korean combat theater to Moscow prepared by the Soviet 64th Fighter Corp include references to American POW/MIAs by name. This section examines the Soviet information in order to determine whether Soviet reporting is accurate. If Soviet reporting which refers to American POW/MIAs by name is accurate, then this suggests that other Soviet records which are not as explicit contain accurate information as well.

The names found in the Soviet records, shown as they appear in the original text, are the following:

34. Telegram No. 481/k from Suslin in Andung, China to Comrades S. M. Shtenenko and P. F. Zhigarev in Moscow and Comrade S. A. Krasovsij in Beijing (Top Secret), April 9, 1952. “The enemy air force, in separate pairs and groups of four F-86s, systematically violates the border of the People's Republic of China and tries to attack our planes reaching the area of the airfields. According to preliminary data, five F-86s were shot down over Chinese territory by units of the corps. Of those, two F-86s were found in the region ten kilometers north-northeast of Chandyan'khehkou. The pilots perished, one F-86 made a landing south of the island of Sin-to and sank, the remains are being searched for.”
35. The time difference is most likely explained by the fact USAF operations in Korea were recorded in Tokyo, Japan time (Zulu plus nine hours) while the Soviet times were recorded in Mukden, China time (Zulu plus eight, or one hour behind Tokyo time).

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A.1.1. Sergeant Herbert D. Brown
 A September 23, 1951 telegram from Arkov to Zakharov 36 details an interrogation of Sergeant Herbert D. Brown, 307th Bomber Wing, who was taken prisoner in the region of Anchou.

According to DPMO's Korean War specialist, Sergeant Herbert D. Brown's status is POW/repatriated.

Conclusion: The telegram, though brief, is further indication of the Soviet system for extracting intelligence from American POWs in Korea.


A.1.2. “Colonel Shink”
 In Operational Summary No.00132 of the Headquarters of the 64th IAK in Andung for the 24 hour period ending May 11, 1952, the Soviet command reported to Moscow that information had been obtained from the diary of Capt. Albert Tenney, an F-86 pilot shot down and killed on May 3, 1952. General Lobov reported that Tenney “wrote in his log that Colonel Shink was shot down on 1 May. On that day the enemy was engaged by the 821st lAP.”

Neither DPMO nor CILHI was able to match the case of “Colonel Shink” with an American POW/MIA. “Shink” may be a reference to a USAF pilot named Shinz or Shanks who, after being shot down in MiG alley on May 1, spent thirty days on the island of Sojoson-man until he was rescued and returned to US military control. 37

Conclusion: The Russian side of the Joint Commission should provide the American side with Tenney's diary in order to determine the original English language spelling of “Shink.”


A.1.3. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney
 The handwritten daily Operational Summary of the Soviet 64th Fighter Corps for the 24 hour period ending at 2400, May 3, 1952, which was signed by General Lobov and sent to Shtemenko and Zhigarev in Moscow, contains direct evidence concerning Captain Albert Tenney. The information in the Soviet document is consistent with the USAF data concerning the time of the incident, but does not support the USAF version of the crash location. According to the records of the 256th FAR of the 64th Air Corps,

36. Deciphered Telegram No. 502763/sh.
37. Roland Parks recalled the name and the incident in a conversation on October 18, 1994 with Paul M. Cole. He pointed out that the incident is included in Clay Blair's book, Beyond Courage.

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The information obtained by DFI from Soviet archives concerning Captain Tenney was confirmed by Joint Commission documentation, viz., TFR 76-37 and TFR 76-38, obtained by the American side of the Joint Commission from its Russian counterpart on December 21, l992. 39 TFR 76-37 and TFR 76-38 state that Tenney, shot down while attacking the Myaogou air base, was found dead after the crash of his F-86E. Soviet records are unclear as to the precise location of the crash of Tenney's F-86E.

According to the USAF casualty file, Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney (A0803490 16th Fighter Intercept Squadron 5lst Fighter Intercept Group) was a member of a two plane flight of F-86 aircraft which departed Suwon Air Base, South Korea, on the afternoon of May 3, 1952, to perform a combat fighter sweep mission. 40 While making a high-speed descent over North Korea, the flight was attacked by enemy aircraft. During the engagement that followed, Captain Tenney's aircraft (F-86E, No. 50-652) was seen by the flight leader, Captain William R. “Nuts” Nowadnick (USMC), to dive away from an enemy MiG and execute evasive maneuvers, according to element leader Nowadnick, at a low altitude. Captain Tenney was informed of his low altitude and instructed to pull up. Immediately thereafter, according to the “complete and accurate” details of the crash as reported by wingman Nowadnick, Tenney leveled the wings of his F-86 which then struck the surface of the water in a low-angle high-speed glide approximately three miles off shore near the mouth of the Yalu River.

The USAF estimated the time of the crash to be 1730 hours. Enemy aircraft forced the leader to leave the area and prior to his departure he did not see Captain Tenney abandon the F-86 or the aircraft sink beneath the water. Later in the day, search aircraft

38. According to Nowadnick, this reference “must be of me and Tenney. We were the only ones to launch as a pair. The others launched in fours.” Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 28, 1994.
39. TFR 76-37/8, signed by Lt. Col. Tashchan, Chief of Intelligence Unit P/P 54892, is an inventory of the personal effects removed from Tenney's body. The document is entitled, Op. No. 2, Documents from the F-86 flier Captain Gilbert Tenney shot down on 3 May 1952 in the area of Myaogou Airfield (flier died). The effects included identification cards, a photograph, and a 62 page diary. Captain Nowadnick stated, “I can't imagine anyone would take all of that stuff with him. I just can't believe it. There's no reason to believe anyone would do something like that. This is weird.” Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 19, 1994.
40. Tenney, who was not a regular 51st squadron pilot, was apparently flying in order to maintain his certification or to accumulate enough flight. time to earn combat pay.

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returned to the scene of the crash landing. North Korean surface craft were observed in the vicinity, but no traces of Captain Tenney or his aircraft were found. 41 In 1953, the Secretary of the Air Force approved a recommendation from the director of USAF personnel that, in light of the fact that Tenney's plane had not been seen to disintegrate or sink, a possibility existed that favorable conditions prevailed whereby Captain Tenney survived and was rescued by North Korean surface craft seen in the area. USAF casualty affairs concluded on April 23, 1953 that Captain Tenney “will be continued in a missing in action status following the expiration of 12 months’ absence.” Tenney's casualty status has not changed since this determination was made.

Conclusion: There is a substantial discrepancy between Soviet and USAF records as to the location of the crash of Captain Tenney's aircraft. The Russian side of the USRJC has also presented inconsistent accounts of the Tenney shoot down. Captain Tenney's casualty record, including contemporary and subsequent statements by Captain William R. Nowadnick does not support the fact that Captain Tenney was lost on Chinese territory. 42 Thus the Russian side of the USRJC should account for their own report that Captain Tenney died “at Myaogou airfield” following, according to the Russian side of the USRJC, “transit through an interrogation point.” 43 The Russian side of the USRJC has therefore suggested there is direct evidence proving that Tenney survived the crash of his F-86, was found alive by Soviet forces, transported alive to an interrogation point, then onward to the Chinese mainland where Tenney, according to Russian sources, allegedly died. As noted, however, the Russian side has contradicted itself on this case thus it is impossible to reconcile the Tenney incident without additional information. [See further discussion of this case at C.2 and F.1.]


A. 1.4 2nd Lt. “Flenk”
 In Operational Summary No. 00173 from the 64th IAK Headquarters in Andung, the Soviet command reported on June 21, 1952, “At 1555 hours, Senior Lt. Chistyanov's group engaged four F-86s in the Singisyu region at an altitude of 7,000-8,000 meters... The enemy did not actively engage in battle and dove away toward the sea when under attack from our fighters. Two pilots fired upon the enemy. Senior Lt. Shishov shot down

41. At the Ninth Plenary and Working Group session of the USRJC, Pavel Antonovich Koval’skii testified, “I was assigned as an engineer-designer with the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI). At the end of 1951, or in the beginning of 1952, an F-86 Sabre, that was in good shape, arrived at TsAGI. It looked almost brand new.... We were given the mission of providing detailed drawings of the F-86, so that a similar aircraft could be reconstructed. We were puzzled by the fact that the aircraft was intact, and only the presence of sand in the wheel wells and fuselage, were we able to deduce that the aircraft had landed on the beach..... It must have been a wheels-up forced landing. There was no damage to the fuselage and there was no evident battle damage to the aircraft.”
42. Captain William R. Nowadnick said, “My statement then was true and accurate. If I were to go into China, I would not have gone there with a pilot whose capabilities I didn't know. Tenney went into the water. That is a fact. I made a couple of circles after the plane hit. Tenney was still in the cockpit. The canopy was still on.” Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 19, 1994.
43. A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through and Interrogation Point.

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one F-86. The pilot of the downed plane, 2Lt. Flenk of the 4th Air Group, was taken prisoner by our Korean comrades.”

Information from the casualty records division of the Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) states, “1Lt. Vance R. Frick sighted four MiGs on a westerly heading, 36,000 feet altitude, six miles southeast of Uiju. The friendly flight attempted to close on the enemies in a right climbing turn which lowered their airspeed as the MIGs led them into the sun. As the friendlies were in this maneuver two MIGs attacked them from the four o'clock position high, causing the friendlies to break to the right. During this turn, Lt. Frick called, ‘This is Green 2. They are shooting at me, get them off.’ Lt. [William E.] Marsh had looked just prior to this and saw Lt. Frick in his four o'clock position and two MIGs were passing right in front of Lt. Marsh's plane, so he dove in a roll into the MIGs. As the MIGs passed under the flight and leveled off, Lt. Marsh found himself on the tall of one of the MIGs. Lt. Marsh tried to close on the MiG in a climb and fired a short burst observing hits on the left wing and smoke from the left side. Lt. Marsh was not given credit for a damage as he had no witness and gun camera film was not satisfactory for an assessment. No further transmission was heard from Lt. Frick. Lt. Marsh observed an F-86 spinning down three miles south of Uiju, trailing white smoke. Lt. Frick is listed as Missing in Action.”

The USAF Casualty Office reported to DPMO that F-86 pilot 1Lt. Vance R. Frick, shot down and captured on June 21, 1952, was repatriated on September 6, 1953. 44

A 18-page interrogation protocol for “Vance R. Frick,” shot down on June 21, 1952, was obtained by DPMO from Russian sources.

Conclusion: U.S. and Soviet records describe the shoot down of 1Lt. Vance Frick. No explanation has been found to reconcile the contradiction between the CILHI and USAF Casualty Office versions of 1Lt. Frick's current casualty status.


A.1.5 1Lt. John Ellis
 According to Operational Summary No. 00202 from the 64th Headquarters, Andung from July 20, 1952, between 1604-1620 hours the 415th lAP, flying at 8,000-10,000 meters over the Sinuiju and Sakusyu area in two squadrons and one single pair, engaged a total of 20 F-86s in separate groups of two, four and eight. Eight pilots fired on the enemy. According to the pilots and gun camera data, Sr. Lt. Lepikov shot down one F-86. A search party was sent out to look for the downed aircraft.

Later in Operational Summary No. 00202, the Soviet command reported that the pilot of one of the F-86s shot down that day, “1Lt. John Ellis of the 336th Air Squadron, 4th Air Group, was taken prisoner.”

USAF casualty records state that 1Lt. John C. Ellis Jr., 336th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 4th Fighter-Interceptor Group, flew on July 20,1952 with a group of four F- 86’s led by Major John Kozey Jr. Major Kozey sighted two MiG's six miles south of the

44. The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union, (Unclassified report labeled “Working Papers” subsequent to its submission to the Russian side of the USRJC), (Department of Defense: Joint Commission Support Branch, Research and Analysis Division, DPMO, August 25, 1993), p.68.

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Sui Ho Dam at 24,000 feet. Four more MiG's were sighted above these two at approximately 33,000 feet. Major Kozey closed on the right wing of the enemy aircraft but was forced to break off the attack when several MiG's began to fire on his flight. Major Kozey claimed one MiG-15's damaged.

1Lt. John G. Ellis Jr., was flying No. 4 man in Major Kozey’s flight who was lost during this engagement. During this engagement, Lt. Ellis called to say he was “O.K.” and was at 7 o'clock behind the No. 3 man, Major Lewis Green. Major Green checked Ellis's position, stated that Ellis had lagged behind somewhat, but had flown a variable position during the entire flight. As Major Kozey began to fire on the MiG, Major Green checked to the rear and called “Clear” to Major Kozey. At this time Major Green asked 1Lt. Ellis his position. Two such calls were made but no answer received. 2Lt. Ellis, according to USAF casualty data, was not seen or heard from until the end of the war.

Conclusion: The Soviet and U.S. records describe the same engagement. 1Lt. Ellis was captured by Soviet forces (as in the case of Major MacKenzie discussed at A.l.6.), with the assistance of Soviet forces, or at least the capture of Lt. Ellis was made known the same day as it occurred to Soviet forces. 1Lt. Ellis's casualty status, according to USAF data, is POW/RMC.


A.1.6. Maj. “Andrew Robert Makken” (Canadian)
 In Operational Summary No. 00341 from the Headquarters of the 64th IAK in Andung to Moscow on December 6, 1952, an addendum to Operational Report No. 00340 for December 5, 1952 is included. The addendum reads, “On 5 December, our fighters shot down the leader of a group of four from the 51st Air Group made up of Canadian VVS trainees. The commander of the squadron, Major Andrew Robert Makken, parachuted and landed in the area of Supkhuni near the 51st anti-aircraft battery. Prior to the approach by our personnel, Maj. Makken opened fire with a pistol. He surrendered after we retaliated. He was turned over to the Chinese authorities.”

A Canadian F86 pilot, Squadron Leader Andrew Robert MacKenzie, 39th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, was shot down on December 5, 1952. MacKenzie, the most publicized Canadian POW of the Korean War, was held as a political prisoner in China until 1955. MacKenzie's casualty record states, “Lost while on combat mission over NK. Sq. leader MACKENZIE was last seen at XE 4767 (6135- III),” near Uiju, North Korea. MacKenzie claimed, upon repatriation, that he had been

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shot down by an F-86. 45 A board of inquiry examined MacKenzie's claim after the Korean War, but the results of this inquiry are not known. 46

Conclusion: 1) The Soviet version and UN version are consistent with the capture of Squadron Leader Andrew Robert MacKenzie, a Canadian F-86 pilot who lives in Canada today. 2) The MacKenzie case confirms the direct participation of Soviet forces in the pursuit and capture of UNC air crews. MacKenzie's casualty status is POW/repatriated.


A.1.7. Col. John Arnold
Operational Summary No. 0013 from the Headquarters of the 64~ IAK to Moscow from January 13, 1953, reported,

At 2150 hours, one 535th lAP MiG-15's, piloted by Senior Lt. Khablev, was vectored to an enemy bomber by the RTS. Near Taegwon, the Corps Command Post's RTS ‘periscopes’ vectored him, from the rear, to the enemy aircraft which was at 6,500 meters and heading toward Uiju. At 2210, the enemy aircraft was again spotted by search lights at 7,000 meters. Having closed to 600 meters on the 0/4-1/4 quarter, he fired one long burst, causing the enemy plane to burst into flames. After turning left, he got back on the burning plane's tail and opened fire a second time at 300-500 meters on the 0/4-1/4 with three long bursts and expended all of his ammunition. The RB-29. covered in flames, sharply descended earthward, and crashed in Chinese territory near Ulumbej (30 km north of Andung).... Of the 14 crew members, 11 were taken prisoner by Chinese comrades and three were dead. Amongst the prisoners was Col. Arnold who identified himself as the commander of the 581st Air Wing of the 13th Air Army based in the Philippines. The RB-29 was from the 91st Strategic Intelligence Squadron. 47

The USAF version of events notes the aircraft, RB-29 (No. 44-62217), departed Yakota AB, Honshu, Japan at 1720, January 12, 1953 on a “Classified Psychological Warfare Leaflet Mission to North Korea.” The flight plan was intended to bring the aircraft out of North Korea near Cholsan south of Sinuiju on the northwest coastline. USAF records state the RB-29 transmitted a “May Day” call at 2316 hours on January 12 and disappeared from friendly radar scopes at XE6050 48, on North Korean territory.

Conclusion: The Soviet and USAF descriptions are of the same incident. The last recorded radio transmission from the RB-29 differs from the time of the last attack by the Soviet MiG by six minutes. The discrepancy lies in whether the RB-29 was in Chinese

45. Col. Fischer, who was in a Chinese prison with MacKenzie, stated, “Andy told me of his last mission. They had made an attack on some aircraft and were pulling away when he was hit. His aircraft began an uncontrollable roll since evidently his hydraulic controls had been damaged. There was only one thing he could do and that was to bail out. He pulled the handles on the ejection seat and as he separated from the seat and pulled the rip cord, an F-86 went by him. He was convinced that an F-86 had shot him down and although he tried to view this objectively, he was nevertheless a little bitter about the incident, which he had every right to be.” Fischer fax to Paul M. Cole, July 11, 1994.
46. The Director of Air Intelligence for the USAF reported on February 29, 1952, “Two sightings were made during the month which indicate that the enemy has put an F-86 aircraft into operation in Korea.” FEAF Air Intelligence Summary, February 29, 1952, (Secret), SS-U-87. The Russian side of the USRJC confirmed in June 1994 that a copy of the F-86 was constructed in the Soviet Union based on an intact F- 86 captured in late 1951 or early 1952.
47. Underscored in original.
48. U5AF casualty data reports that Orlov's RB-29 was lost over map sheet no. 6134-I, in other words on North Korean territory well south of the Yalu River.

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airspace when it crashed. The USAF report on the downing of the RB-29 is consistent with the established pattern of deception in USAF records concerning flight activities over Chinese territory. In addition, crew members of the RB-29 who recalled being moved from North Korea to China said the transport occurred while the American prisoners were covered in order to block their vision. 49 Thus the Soviet description of where the RB-29 crashed would be more consistent with the subsequent Chinese action. 50 Col. Arnold's casualty status is POW/repatriated. [See related case at D.5.]


A.1.8 Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller
 Operational Summary No. 0023 from the Headquarters of the 64th IAK for January 23, 1953, notes,

Col. Harold Fischer, who shot down the MiG-15's that shot down Heller, said after reviewing the Soviet version of events, “This tracks. It makes sense. I shot down the MiG that got Ed. I didn't know what happened to Ed. He just disappeared.” 52

USAF casualty data state, “Lt. Heller was last seen at XB3252 (6134-4), at about 40,000 feet.” Col. Heller was quoted indirectly by DPMO investigators as stating he “did not know if he was shot down over Chinese or North Korean territory” because he “became disoriented during the conduct of air-to-air combat.” Heller disputes DPMO's summary of his remarks. 53

49. Two crew members, Brown and Kiba, have made this observation. See Wallace L. Brown, The Endless Hours: My Two and a Half Years As A Prisoner of the Chinese Communists (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961), pp. 30-33. See also Steve Kiba's comments in Paul M. Cole, POW/MIA Issues: Volume I, The Korean War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-351/1-USDP, 1992), p.203.
50. The survivors of the RB-29 crash were held as political prisoners in China until 1955.
51. Kuandian is approximately 60 kilometers north of the Yalu River in China.
52. Fischer discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 8, 1994.
53. Fellow F-86 ace Col. Harold Fischer noted in reference to Heller's claim of “disorientation,” “It's just not so. Ed flew way up into China routinely, usually for reconnaissance. He only recently told me just how far he was really up there. You get disoriented in clouds. You don't get disoriented that far into China during combat.” Fischer discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 7, 1994. Col. Heller stated in response to the DPMO summary of his remarks, “A commanding officer of a fighter unit who doesn't know north from south, even without a compass, is a son of a bitch.” Fax from Col. Fischer to Paul M. Cole, citing “a direct quote [Ed] said I could pass on to you.” July 11, 1994. Col. Heller said, “That's a bunch of baloney. I don't remember telling anyone I was disoriented. I was north of the river, I just didn't know how far.” Telephone conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 12, 1994.

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The Moscow Report Continued

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