DFI
International—— Moscow Report
Page 1
Table of Contents
Summary 3
Background 3
Purpose 3
Documents of Particular Interest 4
Significant Findings 10
Photographs 14
Why Findings May Differ 15
Data Reference Point 16
A. Soviet Air Force Records Associated With
POW/MIAs 17
A.1. Soviet-era Archive Data Relating to POW/MIAs by Name 17
A.1.1. Sergeant Herbert D. Brown 18
A.l..2. “Colonel Shink” 18
A. 1.3. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney 18
A. 1.4 2nd Lt. “Flenk 20
A.l.5 1Lt. John Ellis 21
A.1.6. Maj. “Andrew Robert Makken” (Canadian) 22
A.1.7. Col. John Arnold 23
A.1.8 Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller 24
A. 1.9 Captain Harold Edward Fischer 25
A.1.10. “MacDonnal” 26
A.1.11. “Paul Niss” 26
B.
64th IAK and Other Soviet Archive Data Associated With POW/MIAs 27
B.1. Pilot of F-86 Shot Down September 2, 1951 27
B.2. Interrogation of two F-86 pilots, October 24, 1951 28
B.3. Interrogation of a Meteor pilot, December 1, 1951 29
BA. Interrogation of F-86 pilot captured, January 7, 1952 29
B.5. Eight bodies from one B-29 crash found, June 11, 1952 30
B.6. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 1,1952 31
B.7. Eight Americans captured from B-29, July 4,1952 31
B.8. 1 F-86 shot down July 4, 1952 32
B.9. Pilot of F-86 No.15/24001, July 20, 1952 33
B.10. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 22, 1952 33
B.11. Five bodies from one B-29 crash found, September 13, 1952 34
B.12. F-86 Pilot Shot Down, April 12, 1953 34
B.13. F-84 Shot Down April 12, 1953 36
B.14. - 24. Interrogation of 11 B-29 Crew Members 36
B.25-26. USAF BNR Cases from the July 4, 1952 B-29 Shoot Down 37
B.27. Col. Robert R. Martin 37
C. Soviet-era Archive Data on POW/MIA Who May
Have Died In Soviet Custody 37
C. 1 Charles E. McDonough 38
C.2 Captain Albert G. Tenney 39
D.
Information Obtained from Soviet Veterans Associated With POW/MlAs 39
D.1. Captain William D. Crone 39
D.2. Captain Charles E. McDonough 40
D.3. Major George A. Davis 41
DA. Lt. Austin W. Beetle 42
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Page 2D.5.
‘Van Paul” 43
F. Uncorrelated Information From Soviet Archives
43
F. Change of Casualty Status Recommendations
43
F. 1 Albert Gilbert Tenney 45
F.2. Deltis Fincher 46
F.3. William Crone 47
F.4. 1Lt. Paul E. Van Voorhis 47
F.5. 1Lt. Henry D. Weese 48
F.6. Airman 1Class Alvin D. Hart, Jr. 48
F.7. Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast 48
F.8. Ssgt. Richard L. Albright 48
F.9. 1Lt. Vance R. Frick 48
F.10. Five members of B-29 crew shot down September 13, 1952. 48
F.1 1. 1Lt. James Washington Wills Jr. 49
F.12. 1Lt. Lennard Owan Deluna 49
F.13. 1Lt. Robert F. Niemann 49
F. 14. Captain Charles E. McDonough 50
F.15. Col. John R. Lovell 53
F.16. Lt. Col. George A. Davis 53
F.17. Col. Robert R. Martin 54
F.18.. Lt. Laurence C. Layton 54
`F.19. 1Lt. Austin Beetle 54
G. Unreported USAF Losses In Chinese Territory
54
G. 1. Deceptive USAF Reporting on Location of Losses 55
(Loss Incident Maps - LARGE IMAGES)
H. Additional Research Required 62
Appendix A. 64th IAK operational summaries in Russian and English. 64
Appendix B. Documents obtained by DFI. 65
Appendix C. Photographs 68
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Summary
Background
An overview of the entire project is included in the Executive Summary.
Volume 1 covers DFI International’s archive research in Moscow.
From October 1993 until March 31, 1994, DFI International sustained a
modest archive research effort in Moscow. 1 This parallel research,
which was commissioned by DPMO to complement its support of the US-Russian
Joint Commission on POW/MlAs (USRJC), was also motivated by the lack of cooperation
from Russian authorities. 2
In accordance with DPMO's guidance, DFI's research was suspended on March
31, 1994 and all documents accumulated (ca. 200 pages) were turned over by DFI
to DPMO on March 17, April 7, and June 18, 1994.
In order to ensure the provenance of the data presented in this report,
information deriving from Soviet-era archives (documents) is presented in a
section separate from that based on information deriving from interviews with
Soviet Air Force veterans who served during the Korean War.
In accordance with the agreement between DFI and DPMO made at the final
project briefing on October 18, 1994, duplicate copies of records which have
already been given to DPMO are not included with this report. Archive materials
which have been submitted to DPMO are considered to be part of this final report
nonetheless. At the final project briefing on October 18, 1994, DPMO expressed
no interest in obtaining additional archive material (interrogation records,
Soviet military operational records, exploitation of POWs for propaganda purposes,
etc.) from Soviet-era archives in Russia.
Photographs which were obtained in Moscow from the Tass archives are included
at Appendix C. These photographs were provided in the original to DPMO on April
1, 1994.
Purpose
The purpose of the archive research in Russia was to continue to locate
previously classIfied files and other records in order to determine whether
information concerning American citizens in general and American POW/MIAs in
particular is stored in Soviet era archives located in Russia.
1. Though travel to Moscow was included in this project, DFI's principal
investigator was not permitted to visit Moscow as planned in December 1993.
According to the American Embassy Office in Berlin, the cable traffic said that
DFI's country clearance was denied by the head of Task Force Russia because
“the Department of Defense has an exclusive right to research” on
POW/MIA issues. DFI was asked by DPMO not to request country clearance for Moscow
for subsequent research visits.
2. DFI's research team in Moscow narrowly avoided severe punishment by Russian
authorities after DPMO made available to the Russian side of the USRJC documents
obtained by DFI.
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Documents
of Particular Interest
The results of DFI's research in Moscow were positive in a number of areas.
The Moscow research produced Soviet era documentation of great interest to
DPMO and the USRJC.
•
DFI obtained documents which the Russian side of the USRJC claims do not
exist in Soviet-era archives.
• DFI obtained complete copies of documents which had been heavily
and inexplicably redacted by the Russian side of the USRJC.
• DFI's research in Moscow demonstrated without question that the Russian
side of the USRJC was either withholding documents or incapable or unwilling
to locate in Soviet era archives.
The DFI
document collection includes records of particular interest to the American
side of the USRJC.
Documents located by DFI's archive research team in Moscow are considered
by DPMO and Joint Commission sources to be among the most significant obtained
to date. Among the many documents obtained by DFI from Soviet-era archives,
two documents and one record group attracted particular attention:
•
The so-called “262” document which is the final unit history of
the Soviet 64th Air Corps’ activities during the Korean War. 3
• Two complete documents from the Soviet archives were obtained which
pertain directly to Soviet reporting concerning the death of a USAF pilot
(current casualty status MIA) during the Korean War; and
• Approximately one hundred pages of handwritten daily logs of the
Soviet 64th Fighter Corps detailing combat operations in Korea.
Some of
DFI’ s documents were presented the Russian side or referred to at the
Tenth Plenum Session of the USRJC.
The DFI team in Moscow obtained daily operational summaries of the Soviet
64th Fighter Aviation Corps (IAK). Daily Operational Summary reports for the
Headquarters of the 64th IAK in Andung, China, which were obtained by DFI cover
the 24 hour periods shown in Table 1.
3. This document, which was used as Talking Point #1 at the Tenth Plenum,
is also referred to by the American side of the USRJC as Telegram No. 307717/Sh,
December 21, 1954. See Tenth Plenum, p.53 and p.82.
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5
The 64th IAK operational summaries obtained by DFI were all given to DPMO,
some as early as April 1994. Nearly three months after DFI delivered the 64th
IAK records to DPMO, the American side of the USRJC twice asked the Russian
side to provide daily operational records of the Soviet 64th IAK. During the
Ninth Plenum of the USRJC, June 1-3, 1994, Commission Member Dr. Trudy Peterson
asked the Russian side for “a copy of the daily reports of the 64th"
Air Corps. 4 Mr. Steven Pifer, Principal Deputy for Ambassador-at-Large
for NIS also asked the Russian side, “We request copies of all the daily
logs of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.” 5
The American view, that there are valuable data points in the daily operational
summaries, was not shared by the Russian side of the USRJC. Col. Alexander
S. Orlov claims to have examined files which he describes as, “basically
the day-to-day activities of the 64th. That is all." 6 Orlov,
who offered no details or any other information concerning the content of
these records, asserted these records are interesting, “but not for getting
names.” 7 This report shows that Orlov's claim is not accurate.
Col. Viktor V. Mukhin also attempted to downplay the significance of the
operational 64th IAK records, saying,
Regarding
these daily journals, the combat journals as they're called, they are summaries
of activities that occurred, like historical documents. I don't think that
there Will be much of interest in them. 8
The daily
operational summaries of the Soviet 64th IAK are, in contrast to the views of
Mukhin and Orlov, a rich source of information which can be used to resolve
the fates of American USAF personnel or to recommend a change of casualty status.
A sample from this group of records for the twenty-four hour period ending at
midnight, December 16, 1951, follows in Russian and English translation.
4. Ninth Plenum, p. 41.
5. Ninth Plenum, closing session, p.2.
6. Ninth Plenum, p.17.
7. Eighth Plenum, p. KW-10.
8. Ninth Plenum, p.41.
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6
Page 8
[TFR 263-1]
[This document handwritten in its entirety.] [Pages 2 and 3 of 4 are missing.]
No.
1227/k
280
Encrypted
Top Secret
To Moscow, Comrade S.M. Shepenko
Comrade P.F. Zhigarev
Copy to Peking, Comrade S.A. Krasovkij
Operational summary No. 0382. 64th IAK HQ, Antung.
Dated 16 Dec 51 2400. Map scale 500,000-1, 1941.
1. On 16 Dec 51, corps’ air assets on airfield stand-by intercepted
enemy aircraft during the day, providing air cover for targets in the Antung-Tabin-Anju
area.
82 combat sorties were flown totalling 68 hours and 53 minutes. Of these,
the 303rd lAD conducted 46 sorties totalling 37 hours 45 minutes and the 324th
lAD conducted 36 sorties totalling 31 hours 8 minutes.
Corps staff conducted one sortie and engaged enemy fighters once. There
were no enemy or friendly losses. A total of 449 shells were expended: 58
N-37's and 152 NS-23's by the 303rd lAD; 69 N-37's and 170 NS-23's by the
324th lAD.
Page 9
[TFR 263-2]
283
4.
Of the 324th lAD’s 54 MiG-15's, 11 are not combat ready (1 is undergoing
preventative maintenance; 5 require replacement engines; 2 need engine repairs;
and 3 are under repair). There are 79 fliers - 54 are combat ready, (of these,
4 are at HQ; 6 are unpaired) 19 are ill, and 6 are on R&R. There are 38
combat ready aircraft.
II.
1. Enemy aircraft did enter the Antung AAA zone of fire, thus the 92nd
AAAD did not fire.
2. On the night of 15-16 Dec 51 at 1925, one B-29 conducted reconnaissance
on the Tabin and Napsi airfields at an altitude of 6300m. At 1215 on 16 Dec
51, 2 F-86's flew across the AAA zone of fire at an altitude of 2000m. Units
of the 87th AAAD fired on all of the enemy aircraft. 66 88mm and 202 37mm
shells were expended. There were no enemy or friendly losses.
3. Fighting strength and the locations of the AAA units are unchanged.
III.
Interrogation of two American prisoners of war, F-86 pilots shot down
by Corps' pilots in dogfights on 24 Oct 51, has revealed
that the enemy has two pilots for each F-86 aircraft. This apparently is done
to increase the number of personnel receiving battle experience and to decrease
the workload of each flyer.
(Lobov)
[signature “Rolf Suslin”] (R. Suslin)
Original
17 Dec 51 [signature "Yataev"]
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Significant Findings
According to DPMO, most of the 200-plus pages of Soviet era archive
material submitted by DFI to DPMO had not been analyzed or assessed by DPMO
as of October 1994. In light of this, DFI reviewed the minutes of the Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth USRJC Plenum Sessions in order to assess the degree to which
data contained in archival material obtained in Moscow compare to positions
taken by the Russian side of the USRJC. In order to be comprehensive, documents
obtained during the current project, plus other documents obtained previously
from Soviet era archives and submitted to DPMO, are discussed or referred
to in this report.
Among the significant findings deriving from the comparison between
Soviet era documents and the record of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Plenum
Sessions are the following:
1.
Soviet records obtained by DFI contain information which is apparently
sufficient for a change of casualty recommendation for 29 Korean War POW/MIA
cases.
2.
Soviet Air Force records contradict the summary of Korean War shoot
downs summarized, allegedly from primary source material, and presented
as fact by the Russian side of the USRJC. 9
3.
The Russian side of the USRJC claims to be unable to locate information
in 64th IAK files concerning any USAF personnel on the USAF list of 187
MIA/POWs from the Korean War (AFM 200~25), 10 DFI's research
in 64th IAK files located information by name concerning at least one USAF
MIA from the 200—25 list and could link one other name from
the 200—25 list to Soviet records.
4.
Col. Alexander Orlov claims that Soviet forces involved in interrogating
American POW/MIAs in Korea, when reporting results of the interrogation
of American POWs in Korea, “we never listed source. We would just go
ahead and say, according to testimony provided by prisoners of war, the
following information was acquired.” 11 The records of the 64th
IAK demonstrate that Orlov's claim is incorrect.
5.
Many Soviet records, including the 64th IAK operational summaries, refer
by name to American POW/MIAs and to specific USAF aircraft registration
numbers. The fates of individuals may be determined from these primary source
data.
6.
Though Soviet reporting refers by name and date to many interrogations
of American POWs, records of these interrogations have not been provided
by the Russian side of the USRJC.
9. See TFR 180.
10. At the Ninth Plenum of the USRJC, Col. Orlov stated, “We have looked
at all the files regarding 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.” Col. Mukhin, when
asked by Congressman Johnson, “Nothing on the 187 names?” replied,
“No nothing.” Ninth Plenum, p.17.
11. Ninth Plenum, p.37.
Page 11
7.
Some of the interrogation records of American POW/MIAs during the Korean
War obtained by DFI were not provided by the Russian side of the USRJC to
the American side. The existence of these records contradicts statements
such as those by Cols. Mukhin and Orlov who explain the discrepancy between
the large number of USAF POWs who passed through a Soviet interrogation
point (262) and the small number of interrogation records provided (ca.
56). Mukhin and Orlov claim additional interrogation records do not exist
because they were never forwarded to headquarters. This is not true.
8.
Col. Orlov claims that the Russian side could only locate interrogation
records from 1952-1953 because this is when the interrogation process became
more “formalized.” 12 Yet the eleven page Soviet interrogation
of USAF Capt. Lawrence Bach, whose F-86 was shot down in December 1950,
has been in the public domain for over two years. This interrogation record,
which was circulated to the entire Soviet Politbureau, including Stalin,
resulted from an interrogation conducted “by a representative of Comrade
Mironov.” A four-page December 30 Soviet interrogation summary of further
interrogations of Bach was sent to Moscow on December 31, 1950. Orlov is
aware of the Bach interrogation, since it is included in a RAND report Orlov
referred to more than one half dozen times at the Tenth Plenum. 13
9.
At the Ninth Plenum, Col. Mukhin claimed, “I don't believe that
our military command structure allowed the MGB access to the [USAF] pilots
in China, or in Korea.... On the basis of documents, we have nothing at
all regarding this issue.” 14 At the Tenth Plenum, Mukhin dropped
all references to the lack of MGB activity on Chinese territory. Documents
obtained by DFI show that the Soviet command structure not only permitted
MGB access to USAF POW/MIAs, but in some cases requested MGB participation
in interrogations in China. This may explain the difference between Mukhin’s
beliefs expressed at the Ninth and Tenth Plenum sessions.
10.
Col. Mazurov claims “there are no documents which provide evidence
that recruitment attempts were made on American POWs” by Soviet forces.
The evidence that Soviet forces recruited ten US POWs in Vietnam and followed
up the contacts years later has been provided to DPMO twice. The evidence
that Army G2 uncovered over 20 American POWs who had been recruited for
“sabotage and espionage missions” while in captivity in Korea
was provided to TFR/DPMO two years ago. Air Force G2 and Army G2 were particularly
concerned about POWs “who might have received assignment by the Soviets
or Chinese Communists[.]” This evidence, which is contained in the
RAND report
12. Ninth Plenum, p.36.
13. The first page from Bach's interrogation record, which clearly shows
the December 1950 date, appears in POW/MIA Issues: Volume 1 (RAND, MR-351/
USDP, 1992), p.168. Orlov, who was compensated for an interview which appears
in the RAND volume, read from it at the Tenth Plenum session. In October 1994,
Orlov was negotiating the terms of compensation with the BBC for participation
in a documentary concerning Soviet involvement in the Korean War.
4. Ninth Plenum, p.35.
Page 12
referred
to by Orlov at the Tenth Plenum, clearly contradicts Col. Mazuroy’s
statement.
11.
Col. Vyacheslav P. Mazurov stated that as a result of an order signed
by Stalin in 1949 which banned Soviet intelligence operations, “the
proposal from the intelligence leadership to set up operations targeting
American POWs in Korea did not receive any support from our political circles....
Both the Koreans and Chinese refused to allow the Soviet intelligence service
to conduct these types of activities on the territory of Korea.” 15
The Soviet intelligence organizations did so anyway. As previously documented,
Soviet intelligence organs made efforts to recruit agents among prisoners
held in POW camps in North Korea. Soviet MVD specialists were summoned by
the Soviet armed forces to interrogate American POWs in China.
12.
Col. Mazurov asserts that George Blake said, “he knows of incidents
where the KGB worked with POWs.” Blake never said such a thing and
this statement does not appear in any report, including the one referred
to by Mazurov.
13.
Col. Mazurov asserts that the individuals on the 510 list “have
no connection with the foreign intelligence service. We did not deal with
these people.” 16 In fact, the KGB dealt with many of the people
on the 510 as a cover for talking with Blake. This has been thoroughly documented
elsewhere.
14.
Col. Mazurov claims that the names on the so-called 510 list were produced
by “more than one search group from my service,” and that the
list is complete. Yet the 510 list, allegedly derived from KGB files, does
not contain the name of George Blake, though Blake's office clerk and the
name of every other civilian captured with Blake is included. Mazurov should
be asked why the only person known by name to have had direct contact with
the KGB--indeed, Blake was recruited by the KGB while in a POW camp--is
missing from the 510. 17
15.
Mr. K.S. Nikishkin claims “there are no documents in the Navy files”
concerning the shoot down of the USAF RB-50 on July 29, 1953. 18
A July 1953 telegram from Admiral N. Kuznetsov, counter-signed by Rear-Admiral
Yakovlev, Director of Operations of the Navy General Staff, was sent to
the Navy Commander-in-Chief and to the USSR Minister of Defense Marshal
of the Soviet Union Comrade N.A. Bulganin. Another telegram was sent by
Admiral Kuznetsov to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade V. M. Molotov
on July 29, 1953. Another telegram was sent from Admiral Kuznetsov to Marshal
Bulganin on July 29. All of these telegrams concerned the shoot down of
the RB-50 on July 29, 1953. 19
15. Tenth Plenum, p.26.
16. Tenth Plenum, p.29.
17. Mazurov said that Blake was “the well-known British agent,”
when in fact Blake was a Soviet agent. Tenth Plenum, p.27.
18 . Ninth Plenum, p.18.
19. The telegrams cited here, which were all transferred to DPMO in the
original Russian and English translation in 1993, are not duplicated in this
report. According to Soviet intercepts of US Pacific Fleet communications, a
US SB-29 search plane "reported to base about locating B-50 wreck, a rescue
boat and seven men floating near the boat."
Page 13
16.
Col. Sergei Osipov asserted, in reference to the July 29, 1953 shoot
down of a USAF RB-50, “among those documents which have been discovered
to date there is no documentary evidence that there were any survivors in
the case.” 20 In fact, at least three reports from N. Kuznetsov,
Admiral of the Soviet Navy, to Marshal A. Bulganin, Minister of Defense
of the Soviet Union and V. M. Molotov, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs,
describe in great detail the downing of the RB-50. On July 29, 1953, Admiral
Kuznetsov reported to Minister Molotov, “The US SB-29 plane flew out
to the area of the proposed fall of the B-50 plane, and at 20:29 hours reported
to base about locating the B-50 wreckage, a rescue boat and seven men floating
near the boat.”
17.
Col. Orlov continues to assert that Soviet forces were forbidden to
have direct contact with American POWs during the Korean War. 21
Col. Orlov should be asked to explain why the Soviet officer, a Buryat Mongol
named Kolya Monkuyev who impersonated a Chinese, systematically interrogated
American POWs. Col. Orlov should be asked how his version of the ban on
direct contact squares with the testimony of Col. Valentin S. Golobov who
said, “According to Air Force traditions, the pilot who was shot down
meets the pilot who shot him down.” 22 How does this systematic,
direct contact fit into the alleged “no contact” policy?
18.
Col. Orlov claims there was no contact between “foreigners and
any of our people.” Orlov cites the experience at Poltava during World
War II as evidence of this policy. 23 Col. Orlov should be asked
to explain why the Soviet security services maintained surveillance of over
700 American servicemen at Poltava, with special attention given to Americans
with Russian, Jewish, or otherwise “suspicious” surnames. 24
19.
Col. Orlov said, “The Rand report cites General Lobov's remark
that 70 investigative groups had been created. Lobov didn't say investigative
groups, but search groups." 25 Orlov's observation is incorrect
on two counts. First, how would Orlov know what the now-deceased general
said in an interview where Orlov was not present? Second, the report in
question does not cite a “remark,” rather, it cites a telegram
that the commander of the 64th Air Corps, General Lobov, sent to Moscow
in l922. 26 In this telegram, Lobov referred to “search-
20. Tenth Plenum, p.119.
21. Tenth Plenum, passim and p.35.
22. Tenth Plenum, p.62.
23. Tenth Plenum, p.44.
24. The KGB surveillance list of over 700 American servicemen is included
in DFI's report on Ukraine.
25. Tenth Plenum, p.55.
26. Decoded Telegram Number 501817/sh (Top Secret), Lobov to Comrades A.
M. Vasilevskij, P. F. Kigarev, and S. A. Krasovskij, May 7, 1952. This telegram
is fully cited and the correct terminology used in the document referred to
by Orlov.
