News-Info-Alerts

To: ALL

From: Andi Wolos & Bob Necci

(POW-MIA InterNetwork)

Re: The USS Pueblo

Date: April 17, 2001

"USS Pueblo (AGER-2)
The USS Pueblo: Echoes Of North Korea
Apr 13, 2001
Scott Baron
Stars and Stripes Historian

The story seems vaguely familiar: A U.S. intelligence asset is seized under questionable circumstances by a foreign power. Its crew is removed and taken into custody. The secretary of state places it "in the category of an act of war" and the president orders the military to a heightened state of alert. Public opinion mounts for the government to "do something" as the two nations face off against each other.

We're not referring to the recent seizure of a U.S. EP-3E Aires II intelligence aircraft and its 24 crew members by the Chinese government after a mid-air collision forced its landing on Chinese territory. Nor are we talking about the recent novel "U.S.S. Seawolf" by Patrick Robinson in which a U.S. nuclear submarine, on an intelligence mission off the coast of China, becomes entangled with a Chinese destroyer and, disabled, is towed to the Chinese mainland with its crew detained as "guests" of the Chinese government.

The date was Jan. 23, 1968. Lyndon Johnson was a lame-duck president. The U.S. was heavily involved in Vietnam, and the Cold War was still on. The intelligence asset was the USS Pueblo (AGER-2), a former light cargo ship converted to a seagoing intelligence-gathering vessel equipped with state-of-the-art communication and encryption gear.

Brink of War

The Pueblo was in international waters when it was attacked and boarded by a foreign power--North Korea--and the resulting political confrontation brought the two nations to the brink of war, with President Johnson calling almost 15,000 reservists to active duty. It would take 11 months to bring the crew home. The Pueblo remains in North Korean hands to this day.

The Pueblo was issued orders for its first mission in December 1967, to "Determine the nature and extent of naval activity in the vicinity of North Korea (KORCOM) ports of Chongjin, Myang Do, and Wonsan." Additional tasks included monitoring and recording Korean coastal radar and surveillance of Soviet naval units in the Tsushima Straits.

On Jan. 5, 1968, the Pueblo sailed from Yokosuka to Sasebo, Japan. Cmdr. Lloyd Bucher was in charge of a crew of 83 officers and men, including civilian oceanographers. Under a joint program of between the National Security Agency and the Navy, the AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) ships were conceived as a Western equivalent of the Soviet "fishing trawlers" that operated so successfully off U.S. coasts collecting electronic and signal intelligence.

American intelligence was gathered mostly by submarines, aircraft and orbiting satellites, and it was felt that the AGER ships, under cover of oceanographic research, could remain inconspicuously on-station for extended periods.
On Dec. 11, the Pueblo left Sasebo and headed north through the Strait of Tsushima into the Sea of Japan. The weather was icy and severe, and the ship found itself battered by winter storms as it turned south; little real intelligence was gathered as it made its way toward Myang Do.

Subchaser, Trawlers

On Jan. 21, toward evening, a Soviet SO-1 type subchaser passed within 1,600 yards, but the Pueblo maintained radio silence. No ship-to-shore transmissions were heard, and the Pueblo crew assumed they had avoided detection. The following day, the Pueblo was approached by two North Korean trawlers which circled the ship, departed, then returned to circle the ship again.
On Jan. 22, the Pueblo tried to radio its first report, but disturbances in the ionosphere interfered and the transmissions were unsuccessful until 1000 hours on the following day. A second message was transmitted around noon.
Bucher was in the wardroom having lunch when the bridge called down to report the approach of another North Korean SO-1 subchaser, closing at 40 knots from eight miles away.

As it approached, it was obvious that the subchaser's crew was at battle stations. Initially, there had been little concern about the subchaser, as numerous vessels had passed the Pueblo. But the tension increased with the appearance of three North Korean torpedo boats in the northeast. And then the subchaser signaled the Pueblo to "Heave To Or I Will Fire." Soon another subchaser and an additional patrol boat arrived, and two MiG fighter jets did a low-level flyover.

Not Just Harassment

The Pueblo rechecked its position, confirming it was 15.8 miles from the nearest land, and signaled back, "I Am In International Waters." Then another transmission from the subchaser was monitored. It said: "According to present instructions, we will close down the radio, tie up the personnel, tow it and enter port at Wonsan. At present, we are on our way to boarding."

The crew of the Pueblo watched from the bridge as uniformed men armed with AK-47 rifles transferred from the subchaser to the deck of a patrol boat which began heading for the stern of the American ship.

The Pueblo mission's risk assessment had been listed as "minimal" despite unsuccessful efforts by the skipper to have it upgraded to "hazardous." Consequently, the Navy made no request for support from the 7th Fleet or the U.S. 5th Air Force.

The Pueblo was under the mistaken impression that help would be available if needed. And it was becoming increasingly apparent that this was not just harassment.

When the North Korean ships first approached, the Pueblo had been dead in the water. But aware of the North Koreans' intention to board, Bucher ordered the ship underway seaward. Its oceanographic equipment, still in the water, was being retracted as the ship pulled away.

The North Korean vessels cut across the Pueblo's bow, attempting to prevent her departure. The Pueblo reached a speed up to 12 knots before the subchaser that had signaled the "Heave To" message came alongside and opened fire with its 57mm guns. The patrol boats joined in, raking the Pueblo with machine-gun fire, damaging its radar mast and flying bridge and wounding Bucher and two others.

No 'Destruct' System

Meanwhile, in the "Sod Hut" (special operations detachment), they were working desperately to destroy classified material and equipment.

As early as January 1967, when Bucher had taken command of the Pueblo at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Wash., he had recommended that a destruction system be put in place for the ship's electric and cryptographic areas. But that had not been done, and the burning of sensitive documents filled the ship with smoke as technicians worked on machines with axes and sledgehammers and others dumped documents overboard.

But the volume of material was too great; as a result, a large amount of classified material and working equipment was confiscated intact, including the state-of-the-art KW-7 encoding machine. The equipment and data--along with codes supplied by U.S. Navy officer and spy John Walker--allowed the Soviets to compromise more than a million messages over the years.

Now, as the Pueblo took fire, its captain was faced with the decision of resisting or capitulating. The Pueblo was armed with only two 50-cal. machine guns which rested under frozen tarps. Despite numerous radio requests for assistance, none appeared.

Making his decision, Bucher ordered the Pueblo to stop, and the firing ceased. The subchaser signaled the Pueblo to follow, which it did, turning toward North Korea at 1/3 speed, then 2/3 speed before stopping again. The ships resumed firing and one crewman, Duane Hodges, was fatally wounded and several others injured.

Impatient with the delay, the North Koreans boarded the ship, herded the crew together and bound and blindfolded them, punching and kicking the men at any show of resistance. A Korean pilot steered the ship to the port of Wonson.
The crew, still tied and blindfolded, was transferred by bus and train to Pyongyang. Imprisoned in Compound 1, the crewmembers were beaten and abused into confessing that they had deliberately entered Korean waters.

Reserves Called Up

As the Koreans seized and held a U.S. naval ship, the American public expressed its outrage. On Jan. 25, Johnson called up the reserves. The crew of the Pueblo found themselves pawns in an international confrontation as the United States sent a naval task force to the Sea of Japan, and North Korea demanded an apology for an intrusion into its sovereign waters.
The next day, the United Nations Security Council met but was unable to formulate a resolution. The crew remained captive for 11 months, subject to brutal torture during interrogations designed to obtain confessions justifying the North Koreans' seizure of the Pueblo. They were at least partially successful.

Finally, on Dec. 23, 1968, 11 months to the day after their capture, the crew of the Pueblo walked across the "Bridge of No Return" on their way home to the United States.

But the story was far from over. A naval board of inquiry called on Jan. 20, 1969, at the naval amphibious base at Coronado, Calif., recommended a court-martial for Bucher--an option rejected by Navy Secretary John H. Chafee on May 6.

Despite the passage of more than 30 years, interest in the USS Pueblo continues. A play, "Pueblo," premiered in Washington, D.C., in February 1971, and a TV movie of the same name, starring Hal Holbrooke, was produced. Several crew members, including the captain, wrote books, and arguments persist to this day about the Code of Conduct, the meaning of "honor" and exactly where the Pueblo was when it was seized.

In May 1990, following an act of Congress, the "detainees"--as the Pentagon had classified Bucher and his crew because there had been no state of war between the U.S. and North Korea--were awarded the POW Medal by the Defense Department.
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