News-Info-Alerts

To: ALL

From: Andi Wolos & Bob Necci

(POW-MIA InterNetwork)

Re: New Books

Date: October 31, 2000

Two new books are available -

The Patriot's Way
by Joseph M. Corrigan
Paperback - 283 pages 1 edition (June 19, 2000)
Xlibris Corporation; ISBN: 0738819034 ;
Dimensions (in inches): 0.73 x 8.52 x 5.55
Other Editions: Hardcover
$18.00

"FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Joseph M. Corrigan Telephone: 631-981-4977 E-mail: jmcorrigan@usa.net BUSH AND GORE CHALLENGED ON PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION ISSUE! Suffolk County, New York. With a little more than a month remaining before Election Day both national candidates for President- George W. Bush and Al Gore have been taken to task by Joseph M. Corrigan. 62% of the American people believe Americans are still being held against their will in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. 84% of American Vietnam Veterans believe the same! Joseph M. Corrigan demanded both candidates address this concern and reject the Senate Select Committee Final Report on POW/MIA as a farce. "For the U.S. Government to say they have no evidence is not the same as saying no evidence exists" says Corrigan and there is plenty. Numerous people were not called to testify before the Senate Select Committee that would have proved a different finding, Corrigan added. This is an international problem involving many nations such as Belgium, British Dutch, French and Asian nationals as well. Corrigan says the United Nations must also recognize the issue of servicemen not returned to their homelands as a humanitarian concern that can no longer be overlooked. Joseph M. Corrigan is the author of "The Patriot's Way- Everything You Need To Know About The POW/MIA Issue." He issued his challenge for the candidates to address the issue & reject the Final Report because there has been no mention of it at all during the campaign thus far by either candidate. "

Shadow Flights
by Curtis Peebles
Hardcover - 368 pages 1 edition (November 1, 2000)
Presidio Pr; ISBN: 0891417001
$27.95

"Chapter 1
Early Covert Overflights

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent.
Winston S. Churchill, March 5, 1946

The beginnings of the early covert overflights of the USSR date to the period immediately following the end of World War II. Among many U.S. military leaders, there was a realization that the A-bomb had fundamentally changed the nature of warfare. These included the Army Air Forces (AAF) commander, General of the Army H. H. ìHapî Arnold. In November 1945, he warned Secretary of War Robert Patterson that in the future, U.S. leaders would require ìcontinuous knowledge of potential enemies,î including all aspects of their ìpolitical, social, industrial, scientific and military life,î if the United States were to have advanced ìwarning of impending danger.î General Arnold advised that this could not be acquired using traditional methods, such as air attachÈs. How this might be done, however, he did not say.

Richard S. Leghorn and the Birth of Cold War Reconnaissance
The first to articulate a vision of how the intelligence demands of this new postwar era might be met was Richard S. Leghorn. He had graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1939 with a degree in physics and a reserve commission as an army second lieutenant. In late 1940, Leghorn accepted an active-duty assignment at the Aeronautical Photographic Laboratory at Wright Field. Arriving in March 1941, Leghorn began working with such optical scientists and engineers as James G. Baker, Amrom Katz, Richard Philbrick, and Duncan Macdonald. Leghorn remained at the Aeronautical Photographic Laboratory until late 1942, when he received orders to report for pilot training.
In April 1943, Leghorn was assigned as commander of the 30th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron. He and the unit arrived in England in January 1944 and began flying missions over northern France, photographing German forces, transport networks, and communications facilities, in preparation for the D-day invasion. After the landings on June 6, 1944, Leghornís unit flew in support of the U.S. First Army as it advanced through France, during the Battle of the Bulge at yearís end, and finally for its drive into Germany during the spring of 1945.
In the fall of 1945, Leghorn, now a reserve lieutenant colonel, was offered the position of deputy commander of Task Unit 1.52, which was assigned to photograph the Crossroads A-bomb tests. Leghorn returned to active duty and was again working with his former colleagues from the Aeronautical Photographic Laboratory days. During the long trip from the staging base at Roswell Army Air Field to Kwajalein, Leghorn read a copy of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Europe), which examined the results and lessons of the air campaign against Nazi Germany.
Leghorn was struck by the conclusions reached by the studyís authors. They noted, for example, that ìin the field of strategic intelligence, there was an important need for further and more accurate information, especially before and during the early phases of the war.î The reportís conclusions ended with a look to a dark future: ìThe combination of the atomic bomb with remote-control projectiles of ocean-spanning range stands as a possibility which is awesome and frightful to contemplate.î
Leghorn continued to mull over the report, as well as his own experiences with photoreconnaissance, after reaching Kwajalein. The missions that he and his squadron had flown before D day had been able to monitor the activities of German forces, and Leghorn became convinced that high-altitude reconnaissance could detect in advance any threatening moves by a foreign power. Leghorn saw the power of the A-bomb during the Crossroads tests. Capital ships were sunk or were reduced to ìradioactive ovens.î Leghornís ideas about what he now called ìpre-D-day photographyî were crystallized in conversations with the other optical scientists that lasted long into the evening.
What would be required was a whole new philosophy of reconnaissance that would look for warning indicators, force levels, and an enemyís capability to launch an attack rather than traditional targeting and damage assessment. In the nightly discussions in the makeshift officersí club, Leghorn argued that this was the only way to protect the United States against an atomic Pearl Harbor. One of the earliest converts to Leghornís ideas was Dr. Duncan Macdonald, would had been named head of the new Boston University Optical Research Laboratory (BUORL). It was also Macdonald who gave Leghorn the chance to present his ideas to an influential audience as keynote speaker at the December 13, 1946, dedication of BUORL.
Before representatives from the major film and camera companies, as well as senior AAF officers, Leghorn described his vision of pre-D-day photography. He began by saying that although efforts were under way to create an international political structure to ensure peace, ìshould an adequate political structure not be established, or if a suitable one is formed which should break down at any time in the future, then military intelligence becomes the most important guardian of our national security.î
Having seen the Crossroads tests, Leghorn understood how the power of atomic weapons had changed the ways in which wars would be fought. He continued: ìThe nature of atomic warfare is such that once attacks are launched against us, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to recover from them and counterattack successfully. Therefore, it obviously becomes essential that we have prior knowledge of the possibility of an attack, for defensive actions against it must be taken before it is launched. Military intelligence is the agency for providing this information, and our national security rests upon its effectiveness, next to a sound international political structure.î
Leghorn then noted: ìAerial reconnaissance, as one of the principal information collecting agencies of military intelligence, can play an exceedingly important role in this period prior to the outbreak of hostilities. This situation is particularly true in the case of potential enemies of a totalitarian, police-state nature where the acquisition of information by the older means of military intelligence is more successfully blocked.î These nations were unlikely to give permission for an overflight, however, and without this authorization such a flight ìwould be considered an act of military aggression.î Leghorn found it unfortunate that although ìpeacetime spying is considered a normal function between nation-states, military aerial reconnaissanceówhich is simply another method of spyingóis given more weight as an act of military aggression.î
Because any peacetime overflights of police states would have to be done covertly, Leghorn added: ìIt is extraordinarily important that means of long-range aerial reconnaissance be devised which cannot be detected. . . . The accomplishment of this objective is not as technically difficult as it might at first appear. Extremely long-range aircraft, capable of flying at very high altitudes, are currently on the drawing boards. . . . Effective means of camouflaging them at high altitudes against visual observations are well known. It is not inconceivable to think that means of preventing telltale reflections of other electro-magnetic wavelengths, particularly of radar frequency, can be developed. With such a tool at hand, information can be secured of a potential enemyís mining of radioactive materials and his plantsónecessarily largeófor the production of fissionable products, as well as a variety of other essential data. . . .î
In his one-hour speech, Leghorn outlined the future basis of Cold War reconnaissance: the regular monitoring of an adversaryís military forces to detect any threat of attack. These missions were to be made as an act of national policy, by a specially designed, very-high-altitude aircraft able to escape detection. But his vision was ahead of its time.
As the Cold War was beginning, there was little time or money for Leghornís vision of a new kind of reconnaissance. The most pressing intelligence requirement at the time was to assemble target lists for the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The primary source of this information was the Library of Congress. The Air Force Directorate of Intelligence realized that the library contained ìopen source materialî on Soviet cities, industry, and terrain, and Project Treasure Island was begun in 1948 to make use of these resources. Western companies that had built industrial complexes in the USSR during the 1930s were another source of information on the precise locations, layout, and production capability for the original plants.
This open information was combined with captured Nazi intelligence reports and the archive of German aerial photos of the western USSR. Dubbed the ìGXî photos, they provided coverage of Soviet cities, industrial areas, shipyards, and military bases. For Soviet Central Asia and Siberia, the air force and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) relied on maps prepared by Mil-Geo, the geographic section of the German Wehrmacht. These maps, which showed rail lines, cities, and natural features such as rivers, were the most accurate then available.
A window into postwar Soviet activities came from interviews of German exñprisoners of war (POWs) who had been held in the USSR, then returned to occupied Germany. Captured German soldiers had been used as forced labor in the USSR for years after the end of the war. The POWs had worked on repairing damage and on new construction projects such as dams and factories. Despite Soviet security precautions, some POWs were misassigned to work on sensitive projects. The Soviet atomic facilities, for example, were all built by forced labor. As the POWs were moved around the USSR to work on different projects, they picked up information on Soviet industry, power and communications, urban areas, military bases, and military activities such as missile and aircraft development. This material was combined to produce the Industrial Register, a listing of all known facilities in the Soviet Union.
The situation in Europe and the Far East was becoming increasingly dangerous during this period. The economic collapse of Western Europe in early 1947 caused the United States to propose the Marshall Plan. The Soviets saw this as posing the threat of a unified Western Europe and endangering what they saw as their fragile control of Eastern Europe. In early July 1947, the USSR rejected the Marshall Plan and, over the next few months, imposed one-party Stalinist police states on the nations of Eastern Europe. By the spring of 1948, the Soviets were deeply concerned about Western policy over occupied Germany. In an effort to prevent the Western powers from establishing a West German state, the Soviet cut off all road, rail, and canal traffic on June 23, 1948, between the Western occupation zones and the divided city of Berlin, which was deep inside the Soviet-controlled zone. In response to this Berlin Blockade, an airlift began into the city. With the threat of World War III now hanging over Berlin, the first U.S. covert overflights were begun.

Initial Postwar Covert Overflights
The U.S. Far East Air Forces (FEAF) was the first to undertake postwar covert overflights. They started in the spring of 1949, at the direction of the FEAF commander, in response to the Berlin Blockade. Two lieutenants with the 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron stationed at Yokota, Japan, were selected to make ìcarefully controlled, highly classified reconnaissance flightsî to monitor the Soviet Air Force in the Far East. One of the pilots was 1st Lt. Bryce Poe II. The RF-80As used for the flights were modified with special long-range tip tanks, which added weight and drag. The missions were initially flown against the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, then later against the Soviet mainland.
Poe and the other pilot were instructed that if the coast was clear (literally), they would dart into Soviet airspace, cover their targets, then run for home. Poe made his first overflight on May 10, 1949, taking off from Misawa, Japan, and overflying the Kurile Islands. His first overflight of the Soviet mainland was carried out on March 10, 1950, and covered Vladivostok.
Poe recalled later that ìall Soviet target areas had many military airfields with numerous aircraft.î A few of the airfields were covered with stored P-39s and P-63sóparked nose to tailówhich had been supplied under Lend Lease during World War II. Poe noted, however, that there were still plenty of the later-model Soviet La-9 and La-11 fighters.
Although the RF-80As had the advantage of surprise, they were frequently chased by these Soviet fighters. Poe recalled: ìAlthough piston-engined, the La-11 had more than enough performance to catch our attention when they attempted interception and we had clumsy extra long range tip tanks on our RF-80As.î The results of the flights were sometimes unexpected. In one case, an intelligence source reported a missile standing vertically on a launch pad. An RF-80A mission was flown to photograph the suspected missile site. When the film was developed, the ìmissileî proved to be a large statue of Lenin.
These overflights were accomplished in the face of major technical and logistical shortcomings. The cameras, which were originally designed for use in piston-engine reconnaissance aircraft, could not provide the overlap needed for stereo images at the RF-80Aís higher speeds. Spare parts were in short supply, so cannibalization of air and ground equipment was commonplace, as was ìmoonlight requisitionî among units. Because of the shortages and disruptions, it was difficult to estimate unit readiness or make schedules. For military personnel and their families, strikes by U.S. longshoremen meant that food was in short supply. They had to get by on Australian bully beef, Japanese white fish, and ìwithered boxes of wartime rations.î
During this period, U.S.ñSoviet relations, as well as the political and military situation in Europe and the Far East, continued a downward spiral. The Soviet effort to force the West to accept its conditions for a settlement of German issues had failed. The Berlin Blockade was lifted on May 11, 1949, with the Soviet efforts ending in complete failure. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established, and the Federal Republic of Germany was formally established. The Soviets responded by creating the German Democratic Republic in their occupation zone. The division of Berlin, of Germany, and of Europe itself was now formalized.
By this time, the military situation had also changed. On September 23, a brief statement was issued by the White House: ìWe have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the USSR.î The arms race was now joined. Fallout from the ìJoe-1î test, which was collected by U.S. Air Force and British Royal Air Force (RAF) weather planes, indicated that the Soviet A-bomb was a copy of the U.S. design. The shock wave from the test was detected. This sonic data indicated that the test had taken place near Semipalatinsk, in Soviet Central Asia. On October 1, 1949, the Peopleís Republic of China was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung. Mainland China had fallen to the communists, and the remaining Nationalist Chinese forces under Chiang Kai-shek had fled to Taiwan. Stalin was now more confident of Soviet power and less fearful of any Western response to Soviet military actions. He decided to take action in Korea.
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean Army, backed by tanks provided by the USSR, attacked South Korea. The attack, which came as a complete surprise, drove the poorly equipped South Korean Army, as well as U.S. units sent from Japan, into a headlong retreat. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. reconnaissance pilots were warned to stay well clear of Soviet or Chinese airspace. Poe and the other pilot found themselves operating under two sets of rules. Coverage of the Yalu River bridges had to be flown at a right angle to the Chinese border. To photograph the Antung airfield, an RF-80A pilot had to raise the airplaneís wing, fly at slow speed, and aim the camera at an oblique angle across the Chinese border.
In August 1950, Poe was recalled to Yokota for ten days to fly the special missions against Soviet airfields. He said that his orders ìseemed diametrically opposed to the importance of what I was charged to do. I could go for broke on relatively benign non-combat intelligence gathering missions, but on combat sorties in war was forced to do things that reduced success and increased risk.î Poe flew out of Misawa against targets in the Kuriles, Sakhalin, and the Vladivostok area. He recalled later: ìWith the exception of one new airfield, I found little change in either the numbers and types or dispersal of threat aircraft. Intercept attempts were a bit more aggressive, but not difficult to avoid.î The missions completed, Poe returned to his squadron and ìreverted to the more difficult efforts to stay legal and still get useful photographs.î
The initial defeats suffered by the United States and South Korea sparked fears of a wider war. As a result, U.S. covert overflights were expanded. On July 28, 1950, a month after the North Korean attack began, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requesting permission to cover areas of the Chinese coast. The memo noted: ìIt is considered vital that we obtain advance knowledge of Communist intentions to launch an amphibious assault against Taiwan. Existing sources of information do not ensure that we will obtain the advance knowledge required to defeat such an attack. . . . It is doubtful, however, that information of an imminent attack may be obtained except through photographic reconnaissance.î The memo concluded: ìIt is recommended that the necessary political clearance be obtained and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be authorized to direct the Commander in Chief, Far East, to conduct periodic photographic reconnaissance flights over the coastal areas of China south of the 32nd parallel of latitude . . .î
President Truman submitted the request to the National Security Council (NSC) for consideration. By August 2, representatives of the Defense and State Departments had reached agreement on the overflight proposal. Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked that the JCS require the Commander in Chief, Far East, to conduct the reconnaissance missions ìto the maximum extent possibleî outside Chinese territorial waters, even though Acheson said that he realized ìthat this limitation will be difficult to apply.î He continued: ìIt is important, however, to avoid giving the authorities on the mainland any impression that the United States is making a serious attempt to penetrate the mainland by U.S. military aircraft.î
To avoid this misimpression, Acheson recommended that the overflights be restricted to coastal areas and not include targets deep inland, ìwhere there would be no doubt about a serious infringement.î He noted that it would be ìdesirableî that the overflights be made ìby fast single planes which, while authorized to defend themselves, would attempt to evade attack whenever possible.î Reconnaissance by formations of aircraft over the mainland ìwould create most serious political problemsî and subject the U.S. government ìto charges which it would be exceedingly difficult to meet.î
The NSC met to discuss the proposed missions on August 3, and its members gave their approval. The missions against China were flown within a matter of weeks. President Trumanís August 25 intelligence briefing noted: ìAerial reconnaissance has not detected any significantly large concentrations of landing vessels in ports opposite Taiwan.î This one sentence indicated that the Chinese were not planning a seaborne attack and showed the potential of covert aerial reconnaissance.
The air force was also looking toward future overflights. In the fall of 1950, Col. William A. Adams, director of intelligence at SAC headquarters, sent a draft study to Maj. Gen. C. P. Cabell, director of air force intelligence, on possible overflight routes of the USSR. The study envisioned four flights by RB-45C reconnaissance aircraft. The first three would be made from West Germany and cover the Murmansk area in the northwest USSRówhich was the closest point to the U.S. East Coastóas well as the Leningrad-Moscow areas. The fourth overflight would take off from Japan and cover the Chukotski Peninsula, opposite Alaska.
A review of the study noted that there was no question about the need for the information, the availability of the means for undertaking the missions, or the value of the flights. The three missions out of West Germany would update the GX photos and provide new target information as well as data on Soviet air defenses. The fourth mission was considered even more valuable, because there was no existing coverage of this area. The review noted, however, that the missions could not be made without detection and risk of the loss of the aircraft and crew.
The review also noted the political problems that the flights would entail: ìBecause of the political implications that are bound to result, the Air Force is not in a position to authorize such missions without reference to the Secretaries of Defense and State. If our past experience with the Department of State on matters of this type still is a criterion, our chances of getting approval on this plan at this time are believed to be zero. It is therefore recommended that no action be taken on the attached proposal for RB-45 reconnaissance over the USSR until there is more favorable political thinking towards such proposals.î
General Cabell made an informal reply to Colonel Adamsís study on October 5, 1950: ìMy forecast is that it would not get by either the A.F. front office, the JCS, Defense, or State.î Cabell did not feel like going on record as urging its accomplishment. He continued: ìIf SAC wants formally to request it anyhow, I would recommend against it, and unless SAC specifically requested otherwise, I would not forward it.î He ended by noting: ìAll this is entirely aside from the desirability for SAC Recon to perfect the capability, [sic] looking forward to a day when it becomes either more essential or less objectionable.î
Despite General Cabellís rejection of the RB-45 study, air force intelligence continued to look at ways of making deep overflights without the political entanglements that manned aircraft involved. This could be done using unmanned vehicles, but the problems then became technical and involved the time required to overcome them. The Snark cruise missile could be fitted with cameras and an inertial guidance system, but it would not be ready until 1953. A reconnaissance satellite was considered an even longer-term prospect. The only near-term possibility seemed to be camera-carrying balloons that could drift across the USSR, then be recovered once they reached friendly airspace.
Balloon reconnaissance had originally been considered in the fall of 1949 but was abandoned due to lack of funds and doubts about the ideaís feasibility. In July 1950, however, C. B. Moore of General Mills had made four test flights of camera-carrying balloons; the flights had proven highly successful. By September, the concept gained the backing of both the Panel of Strategic Air Committee and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. They believed that the hardware was available, and only minor modifications were now required. The panels estimated that the reconnaissance balloons could be operational in late 1951.
On October 9, only four days after he had rejected the SAC study of RB-45C overflights of the USSR, General Cabell requested that Maj. Gen. Donald L. Putt, director of research and development, start a project to develop the necessary balloons and camera systems. The approval was given on November 6. The initial test programs was given the code name Gopher, and fabrication of the test vehicles was given the highest possible national priority ratingó1-A.
By late 1950, U.S. and South Korean forces had reversed the tide of war; they had destroyed the North Korean Army, driven north of the thirty-eighth parallel, which had been the dividing line, and were close to the Chinese border. Poe was once more ordered to Japan for special missions. The other pilot had been killed in action, and there was no one else who was cleared to know about the missions. Poe did all of the flight planning. He was told what information was needed, then he selected the targets and worked out the flight routes, the camera equipment used, and the altitudes and times. He flew the missions, going right down the Soviet runways. He found that, despite the continuing war in Korea, the only change was a further step-up in the reaction of Soviet air defenses. As a precaution, an F-80C fighter met the RF-80A about halfway home to ìscrape offî any persistent La-11 that might try to follow the reconnaissance airplane. ìThe escort was never needed,î Poe recalled, ìbut it was nice to have it appear on the horizon.î
After the RF-80A landed, a warrant officer developed the film. Poe interpreted the photos, then hand-carried the photo materials to the three other people authorized to know about the overflights: Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the FEAF commander, and his deputy for operations (DO). Until Poe briefed them, even they did not know what targets the special missions had covered. It was an extraordinary degree of responsibility for a junior officer. When Poe thanked the DO for giving him this latitude, the DO quoted Gen. George S. Patton: ìDonít tell people what to do, tell them what you want done and let them amaze you with their ingenuity.î As Poeís tour neared its end, his squadron commander began flying some of the USSR overflights. After Poe rotated home in January 1951, the commander and others continued the missions.
The RF-80A was short on both speed and range, but the more advanced RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft was still more than a year away from making its first test flight. To expand the covert overflights, a single F-84 Thunderjet was secretly modified. The aircraft, normally used for close air support in Korea, was fitted with a single K-39 camera and a 36-inch focal length lens. On February 11, 1951, the F-84 made an overflight of Vladivostok at 39,000 feet, without incident.
By this time, the political climate regarding a more extensive overflight effort had changed. Unwilling to accept U.S. forces on their doorstep, the Chinese had intervened in the Korean War. The massive attack had shattered the U.S. and South Korean forces, drove them south, and raised the possibility of an expanded war.

Spitfires Over China
The atmosphere following the Chinese attack bordered on panic. The sudden collapse of U.S. and South Korean forces before the Chinese onslaught, combined with intelligence on the positions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, caused many U.S. political and military leaders to believe that a Soviet land attack in Western Europe and an air attack against the continental United States was a serious possibility.
President Truman responded by declaring a state of national emergency, reinstating wartime presidential powers, calling National Guard units to active service, and bringing Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower out of retirement and naming him as Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in Europe, in charge of NATO forces. The JCS reviewed existing war plans and notified U.S. commanders of the possibility of global war. The JCS chairman, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, directed that a study be made of how overflights might be used to detect preparations for an attack by the Soviets. These would not be the quick dashes made previously but rather flights deep into the interior of the USSR.
In late December 1950, air force vice chief of staff Gen. Nathan Twining briefed President Truman on overflight plans. Two months before, daytime overflights of the USSR by manned aircraft were judged too risky. Now, the possibility of a nuclear attack on the United States made such flights critical. Twining recalled later that the JCS wanted to use the new B-47B, which was just entering production. The aircraft would be modified with a camera capsule in the bomb bay. Two overflight routes were proposed over the Soviet Far East: one to cover the northern shore of Siberia and the other taking the southern route, over the coastline nearer Japan. After reviewing the plans, Truman signed papers approving the two overflights.
On January 4, 1951, air force headquarters assigned the overflight mission to a B-47B scheduled for delivery in the spring of 1951. Although the original plan was for two aircraft, only the fourth-production B-47B was modified. Identified as Project WIRAC, the B-47B, serial number 49-2645, was to be delivered on April 25, 1951. In addition to the camera capsule, the B-47B was also fitted with special compass and autopilot equipment as well as a high-latitude directional gyro system. The pilot selected for the overflights was Col. Richard C. Neeley, a B-47 test pilot.
The British were also now involved with the U.S. overflight program. President Trumanís remarks to a reporter on November 30 seemed to indicate that the United States was considering the use of A-bombs in Korea, at the discretion of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In response, the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, flew to Washington, D.C. He arrived on December 4, having already been assured that Truman was not actively considering using nuclear weapons and that any decision would be in the presidentís hands, not MacArthurís. Prime Minister Attlee stressed that a limited war against China would leave Europe open to a Soviet attack.
It was at this time, or soon after, that Truman and Attlee secretly agreed to divide worldwide responsibility for overflight activities and to undertake a joint reconnaissance program against the western USSR. The United States would supply the RB-45Cs as well as train the RAF crews who would make the actual overflights. It is not known whether Truman gave further assurances about the use of nuclear weapons in Korea, but it is thought likely.
The Truman-Attlee agreement was soon put into effect, with great subtlety. Just before Christmas 1950, RAF flight lieutenant Edward C. Powles was told that he was to be the officer commanding the No. 81 (PR) Squadron Detachment at RAF Kai Tak, Hong Kong, which operated a pair of Spitfire PR Mk.19 photoreconnaissance aircraft. Two F-52 cameras were mounted in the Spitfire, each with a 36-inch lens.
For the first two weeks after Powles arrived, he had no orders or ìterms of referenceî as to what his duties were. Then in mid-January 1951, an RAF photointerpreter came into his office, laid a map on the desk, and asked if Powles could fly reconnaissance missions over several of the Chinese islands in the area. They discussed the scale of the photos needed, and Powles said he would be glad to oblige. He now knew what his job was. Powles wrote later: ìNo mention was made of authorization to carry out these flights over the Chinese islands, and I presumed that they had been approved by higher authority. Otherwise I would not be asked to do them, and there would be no need to have PR aircraft at Kai Tak.î
Powles made his first overflight of China on January 16, 1951. By the end of the month, he had completed three more overflights, which were followed by another four in February. The flights had all been made at 30,000 feet. Powles was then asked if he could take low-level oblique photos of an airfield on the Chinese mainland. He made six such flights in March and April.
In mid-May, Powles was summoned to air headquarters on Hong Kong Island. There he was given a briefing by a Captain Black, chief of U.S. naval intelligence, a U.S. Navy admiral, two American civilians, and an RAF group captain. They asked Powles to cover Yulin Harbor, the dock areas, and the airfield on Hainan Island. They added that they had no authority to authorize Powles to make an overflight of China, and if he agreed he would be on his own. Under no circumstances was Powles to fly lower than 30,000 feet. If he did make the flight, Powles was told, a U.S. Navy destroyer would be positioned off Hainan Island and an RAF Sunderland flying boat would also be on hand.
Powles told the group that he would have to make careful plans for the mission, because it was close to the range limit of the Spitfire PR Mk.19, and he would have to calculate the number and length of the passes needed to cover the target area. He said he did not want to make a direct flight from Hong Kong to Yulin and back, and he wanted to change his call sign once clear of Hong Kong. The timing of the overflight would depend on the weather forecast, which was not reliable in the Hainan Island area. Powles was told that the destroyer and the Sunderland would require twenty-four-hoursí advance notice to be in position.
Powles worked out the basic flight plan, then discussed it with Captain Black. They agreed on the U.S. Navy call signs, procedures, and radio frequencies. All that was now required was good weather. On the morning of May 21, the forecast looked favorable, and Powles notified Captain Black that he would make the overflight the next morning.
At 10:00 a.m. on May 22, 1951, Powles took off from Kai Tak, then turned southeast for fifty miles. As he climbed to 30,000 feet, he could see two-tenths cloud cover to the west, over the Chinese mainland, but the sky was clear over the Pacific. He turned to the southwest and headed to a point fifty miles from Hainan Island, where the U.S. destroyer was waiting. As he flew, he could see clouds building up to the west, then a heavy layer of clouds at 20,000 feet over the northern end of Hainan Island. The weather was deteriorating.
Five minutes before reaching the next turning point, Powles, using an American accent and call sign, radioed for a weather check. This was the signal to the destroyer and Sunderland that he had reached the area and was about to head for the island. Powles then turned and flew forty miles to the west-northwest, where the Spitfire was to head north. Powles was about ten miles from Hainan Island when he saw a thin cloud deck over the coastline. The base of the clouds was at 28,000 feet. Although Powles knew that he should not, under any circumstances, fly as low as this, the weather and lighting conditions were otherwise good. He decided to make the overflight at 27,000 feet, just below the cloud base. The lower altitude would mean that three passes were needed rather than the two originally planned. Powles turned away from the island as he marked the three flight lines on his map and changed the interval setting on the camera control.
Powles then turned back toward Yulin Harbor, spotted the turning point to begin the first photo run, and rolled out on the proper heading. With the cameras turned on and the camera control lights flashing in the proper sequence, Powles kept watch for any Chinese aircraft, but he saw none. Reaching the end of the first flight track, Powles rolled the Spitfire on its port wing to check that he had covered the area, then set up for the second flight line. He lined up on a prominent landmark about one third of the way along his planned track. With the second flight line completed, Powles felt that he had completely covered the harbor and dock areas.
He spotted the airfield, which was farther from the harbor than he expected. He decided to make the last run directly across the field. About halfway through the third run, he saw sunlight glinting off two aircraft approaching from the north in a direct intercept course toward him. He completed the run, then pushed forward the prop pitch and throttle lever and climbed into the clouds. Now hidden from any Chinese aircraft, Powles turned off the cameras, leveled out, and turned toward a point about fifty miles from Hainan Island. When he reached the area, he radioed a fictional U.S. aircraft with weather data; this was the signal that he had completed the overflight and was heading back to Hong Kong. Both the destroyer and the Sunderland acknowledged the message.
Although Powles had completed the overflight, a greater challenge now presented itself. The original flight plan allowed a twenty-minute fuel reserve on arrival back at Hong Kong. Because of the time spent making the third photo run, even a direct route would leave only five minutes of fuel. As Powles flew back, he slowly descended to 22,000 feet, the Spitfireís best-range altitude. He soon entered the clouds that he had seen on the trip out and saw ice forming on the wing leading edges. He knew he did not have the fuel to climb above the icing, so he descended to 15,000 feet, cutting the fuel margin even thinner. The buildup of ice stopped, but it did not clear off until he left the clouds.
By the time Powles reached Hong Kong, he had less than five gallons of fuel left. He radioed the Kai Tak tower to ask for an emergency landing on runway 31. This was refused, because there were twelve- to seventeen-knot crosswinds. He was cleared to land on runway 07, which was short and whose buildings and mountains at its far end prevented an overrun. As Powles began his approach, the fuel gauge needle was bouncing on empty. He turned onto the runway heading and lowered the landing gear. Before he could extend the flaps, however, the engine quit for lack of fuel. The Spitfire touched down on the grass, then bounced onto the runway and came to a stop. Total flight time was three hours and thirty minutes.
By the end of 1951, Powles had completed sixty-three missions over China. He had been given only special briefings for four of the overflights. Each time, he was reminded that he had no authorization for the missions and was on his own. Most of the overflights were made at 30,000 feet. Whenever Powles saw aircraft or contrails heading toward his Spitfire, he would begin to climb and turn toward the coast. Once he was sure they were not trying to intercept him, he would return to the previous course.
Powles continued to make overflight missions in the spring of 1952, despite some disquieting rumors. He had heard that an air vice marshal newly assigned to Singapore had seen some of the photos of China and begun asking who had authorized the missions. Subsequent word on the grapevine was that he had convened a court of inquiry to identify the officer responsible.
Powles expected to be ordered to Singapore to face a possible court-martial. Every time his phone rang, he thought it would be the bad news. When he got a call in early June 1952 from air force chief marshal Bonham-Carter, he immediately thought that he was in trouble. But the caller said, ìCongratulations! Her Majesty the Queen has graciously awarded you the Air Force Cross.î Powles told him he must have the wrong number, but the caller assured Powles that he was being given the award. Powles was also invited to lunch and was sent on a weekís leave with his wife and son.
Later in June, Powles went to Singapore to be congratulated by senior RAF and U.S. Navy officers and high-ranking civilians. Amid the praise heaped on him, he did not recall any of them mentioning the area he had photographed. Indeed, the Air Force Cross commendation read, ìIn addition to his photographic reconnaissance duties he has undertaken meteorological reconnaissance flights in weather unfit for photography and a number of special and, on occasion, long and arduous flights in connection with ferrying operations.î The reconnaissance flights were mentioned almost in passing.
By September 1952, virtually all the important intelligence targets along the Chinese coast from about 400 miles southwest of Hong Kong to 160 miles to the northeast had been photographed. Also covered were specific areas up to 100 miles inside the mainland. Powlesís final total was 107 reconnaissance missions. Additional overflights of the Chinese coastal islands were made by the other pilots attached to the unit. These were authorized by Powles, but he always preferred to make the long-range flights himself. These required that Powles fly the Spitfire beyond its design limits. Two overflights of Hainan Island ended with dead stick landings at Kai Tak, and on two other missions he did not have enough fuel to taxi back to the flight line after landing.

The RAF Special-Duty Flight: RB-45Cs Over the USSR
Although Powlesís overflights of China were the first fruits of the Truman-Attlee overflight agreement, these were only the start of a much larger effort. In early 1951, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the air force chief of staff, offered the loan of four RB-45Cs (three mission aircraft and one spare) to the RAF. They would make simultaneous night overflights of the western USSR to obtain radarscope photographs of target areas.
In the event of war, SAC and the RAFís Bomber Command would attack at night or in bad weatheróusing radar to navigate and hit their targetsóto minimize losses. Aerial photos would be used to create ìsynthetic radar predictionsî of how target areas would appear on the radarscopes. Because the GX photos were seven to eight years old, the predictions might not be valid. What was needed were up-to-date radarscope photos of long-range air force bases, industrial and military facilities, and Soviet cities.
Air chief marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane, the vice chief of air staff, was given operational responsibility for the overflights. In June 1951, he asked squadron leader H. B. ìMickyî Martin, who had flown during World War II with the No. 617 Squadron (better known as the Dambusters), to set up and lead a ìspecial duty flight.î Martin was apparently told only that they would be doing some special flying. In turn, Martin saw Rex Sanders, then a flight lieutenant at the Air Ministry who was responsible for navigator training. Martin asked Sanders, who had flown thirty-three bombing missions over Europe in World War II, to recommend a good navigator. Sanders realized that whatever he would be doing, it would be interesting, so he said, ìWell, I nominate myself.î Martin accepted his offer.
On July 12, 1951, Martin and Sanders went to RAF Sculthorpe to look over the U.S. Air Force RB-45Cs that had been assigned to the base a few months before. These were brand-new aircraft. The first flight of an RB-45C had been made only in April 1950, and the first had been delivered to the air force in June 1950. In order for the aircraft and its reconnaissance capabilities to be tested under wartime conditions, three RB-45Cs were sent to Japan in late September 1950. With the introduction of MiG-15s two months later, the three RB-45Cs had to carry much of the reconnaissance burden, because the RB-29s were no longer able to operate with impunity.
One of the RB-45Cs was lost over North Korea on December 4, 1950. Aboard the aircraft were the pilot, Capt. Charles McDonough, two other crewmen, and Col. John R. Lovell, a senior air force intelligence officer. A cable sent on December 17, 1950, to Marshal Stepan Krasovsky, chief of the Soviet general staff, reported, ìAn aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km to the east of Antung. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to the earth burned up completely. The crew bailed out on parachutes. The pilot Captain Charles McDonough was taken prisoner. . . . The captive himself was burned and is in a critical condition.î A follow-up cable the next day reported that Captain McDonough had died. None of the other crewmen returned.
By the spring of 1951, it was apparent that the RB-45C lacked the performance capability to compete with the MiG-15. On April 9, 1951, one of the RB-45Cs barely survived a series of fighter attacks. As a result, the FEAF required that RB-45Cs flying missions over northwestern Korea (better known as MiG Alley) have fighter escorts. At the same time, RB-45Cs were also making covert overflights of Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. In contrast to the rough handling the aircraft faced in North Korean skies, these overflights were without mishap.
One such RB-45C overflight, designated Project 51, was made on October 9, 1951. The plane took off from Yokota Air Base at 10:30 a.m. to cover the southern end of Sakhalin Island. The RB-45C flew at 18,000 feet and was able to cover all its targets using both the aircraftís cameras and the radarscope photography. No flak or fighters were encountered, and the aircraft landed without incident at Yokota at 2:40 p.m., after a flight of four hours and ten minutes.
Whereas the overflight operations went smoothly, the situation in northwestern Korea had deteriorated. On November 9, 1951, exactly a month after the Sakhalin Island overflight, another RB-45C was nearly shot down over MiG Alley. As a result, FEAF ordered a halt to daylight RB-45C flights over northwestern Korea.
The RB-45C overflights of mainland China, Sakhalin Island, the Kamchatka Peninsula, and Vladivostok, although few in number, eventually went to nighttime missions for radarscope photos. One of the two remaining RB-45Cs was painted all black so it would not be spotted by radar-guided searchlights. Threats to these overflights came from both sides. On two occasions, an RB-45C was detected by navy carriers operating off the west coast of Korea. It was identified as an Il-28, a Soviet-built jet bomber; U.S. Navy fighters chased after it, without success. The RB-45C overflights continued to be made until April 1953 without any further losses.
As these events were unfolding, the full complement for the RAF overflights was assembled. Each RB-45C required a crew of three: the pilot, copilot, and navigator. In addition to the nine crewmen, a doctor was assigned to the special-duty flight. They were not volunteers (other than Sanders) but rather had been assigned to the unit. Because the crewmen would be flying the RB-45C at altitudes in excess of 40,000 feet, they underwent special medical exams. During the tests, squadron leader Martin was found to have a lung condition that prevented him from flying the mission. A new commander was needed.
In July 1951, squadron leader John Crampton was ordered by the commander in chief of Bomber Command to take charge of the special-duty flight and prepare to head for the United States for conversion training. Crampton had flown Whitley and Halifax bombers during World War II, then Meteor and Vampire jet fighters after the war. Crampton had a reputation for an upright manner and for the way he drove his Maserati.
Crampton and the other crewmen left RAF Sculthorpe aboard a C-97 Stratofreighter on August 3, 1951, heading for Barksdale Air Force Base. Here they spent ten days with a B-45 squadron to become familiar with the aircraft, then were flown to Langley Air Force Base, where they were introduced to the RB-45C version. On September 2, they went to Lockbourne Air Force Base, the home of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS), and began a short but complete RB-45C conversion course. During the training, one of the RAF pilots made a heavy night landing, which damaged the RB-45C beyond repair. The pilot and other crewmen were not hurt, however.
As a result of the accident, the base commander, Crampton, and the RAF pilot were flown to SAC headquarters to be interviewed by Gen. Curtis LeMay. Crampton recalled later that General LeMay ìdid not like people who broke his aircraft, and left us in no doubt of the fact.î General LeMayís anger was directed primarily at the RAF pilot, who was soon sent home. Crampton later learned that the pilot had a reputation at his previous unit of being a ìprangerî (RAF slang for a pilot who made hard landings), and his assignment to the special-duty flight had been to get rid of him. His replacement was an RAF pilot who was already on an exchange tour with an air force B-45 squadron.
Although the members of the special-duty flight were undergoing training, senior RAF and U.S. Air Force officials were not sure of their future. A letter from air chief marshal Cochrane to Gen. Nathan L. Twining expressed concern that Atlee would not give his approval. Cochrane said, ìWe have not yet obtained the political agreement which will be necessary if the full project is to be undertaken.î Within the air force, only Vandenberg, Twining, LeMay, and Gen. Thomas D. White knew about the plan. This caused some problems, however. Only thirty-three RB-45Cs had been built, and they were in heavy demand. Major General Roger M. Ramey, air staff director of operations, objected to loaning the aircraft to the British. General Twining had to smooth things over. British participation in the joint overflight program was increasingly important, because the early American plans were running into trouble.
The B-47B selected for the Soviet Far East overflights had, by this time, been delivered and test flown. In late July 1951, Colonel Neeley and his crew flew to Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. While the crew waited for clear weather over Siberia and the final authorization, Boeing technical representatives worked on the B-47B. On August 15, while the Boeing personnel were practicing a single-point refueling of the tanks over the airplaneís bomb bay, a float valve stuck, causing the fuel to spill out an overflow vent and onto a wing. The fuel ran down onto a power cart and was ignited by an electrical spark. The B-47B burst into flames and was totally destroyed. Colonel Neeley was awakened from a nap in the barracks by a phone call saying that his airplane was burning on the ramp. He ran outside and saw a column of smoke and flames rising in the distance.
The charred wreckage of the airplane was still smoldering on the ramp when the orders to make the overflight finally arrived. Colonel Neeley responded by sending a message to SAC headquarters reporting the loss of the B-47B. The reply from SAC was quick in coming and to the point: ìFix responsibility and court-martial!î Because the airplane had been destroyed due to a mechanical failure, there was no court-martial. It would be another year, however, before another attempt could be made.
The ambitious plans for balloon reconnaissance had also run into problems. The relationship between the air force and General Mills was becoming increasingly strained. In a progress report, C. B. Moore wrote that the air force wished General Mills to deliver more than they thought they could, and more than they had proposed to undertake, and was planning military operations on that basis. Its requirements, Moore continued, had become unrealistic, such as the ability to launch the balloons in twenty-five-knot winds. Moore also complained that the air force did not trust General Millsís judgment and was providing no support. It had taken a month to get a statement of priority from the air force on Project Gopher, and a request for radio frequencies was still unanswered after nearly four months of letters, visits, and telephone calls. The original plan had envisioned operational flights being under way by the end of 1951. The reality was that little progress had been made on Project Gopher. A conference was held by air force representatives to discuss the situation. In their view, the delay was due to several factors. The first was delivery of defective polyethylene to General Mills in early 1951. This caused the balloons to fail after launch, which required a prolonged investigation. Primary blame was put on the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) for failing ìto push vigorously and to coordinate properly the development of this project.î
Development of Project Gopher on a crash basis still had air force support. A request was made for trial balloon flights across the United States, and it was suggested that work on the midair recovery system not be allowed to lag behind that of the vehicle itself. Despite the continued support, by late 1951 it was clear that balloon reconnaissance was not the near-term possibility that had been foreseen a year before.
At the same time, the fortunes of the special-duty flight were beginning to change. In October 1951, the British electorate gave a parliamentary majority to the Conservative Party, resulting in Winston S. Churchill becoming prime minister. As Englandís wartime leader, Churchill was deeply involved with intelligence operations. He understood their importance and their risks.
The special-duty flight completed the training by early December 1951 and was assigned to RAF Sculthorpe as an additional flight with the U.S. RB-45C squadron based there. The nine RAF crewmen, Crampton recalled, ìraised eyebrows, which we were unable to lower.î This eased when Lt. Col. Marion C. ìHakî Mixson was assigned as their liaison officer and handled many of the questions. The RAF crewmen still had no idea of what they were doing. Crampton recalled that he thought the project was to evaluate the air force ìflying boomî refueling system against the RAFís probe and drogue. Flight sargent Bob Anstee thought the project was an assessment of the RB-45C for possible RAF use. They were now flying practice missions over England and Western Europe with the RB-45Cs. These were both day and night missions, with mixed RAF and U.S. Air Force crews, and used cameras and the radarscopes.
Early in 1952, Crampton and Sanders were ordered to Bomber Command headquarters at High Wycombe for their briefing on the overflights. Crampton confessed to ìsome apprehensionî when the charts were unrolled. The three separate routes went from Sculthorpe to the Baltic States, the Moscow area, and central southern USSR. The three missions would take off in rapid succession, then refuel from tankers to the north of Denmark. The RB-45Cs would climb at maximum continuous power, at about Mach 0.68, to the highest altitude that the temperature of the night would permit. They would cover targets throughout the western USSR. Timing was critical, they were told, because ground signal intelligence (SIGINT) stations would be listening for the Soviet response to the deep penetrations, and there were certain diversionary exercises planned to keep the Soviets clear of the routes. If the RB-45Cs were attacked, the crews would use an emergency OMG (O My God) radio frequency to report the situation.
Crampton was relieved to finally know what they would be doing, but he was concerned about how to break the news to the other crewmen. His concerns were soon justified. Anstee was shocked when he learned of the mission. ìOh my God, what have they let us in for?î Anstee said. ìWhy? Why us? Why did we get lumbered with it?î One of the other pilots refused to fly the mission and returned to his original unit. Crampton was afraid that ìhe might well entertain his chumsî with this ìextraordinary tale,î thus compromising the missionís security. As with the pilot who washed out of training, he was replaced with another RAF pilot who was flying an exchange tour with a B-45 squadron in the United States.
Before the deep overflights were made, a test mission was flown by Cramptonís crew on the night of March 21, 1952. This was a half-hour flight through the Berlin corridor at high altitude, to determine the Sovietís reaction. The SIGINT ground stations monitored radio and radar activities, but nothing was noted, and final preparations were started for the overflights.
The three primary aircraft and the spare were to be stripped of all U.S. Air Force markings and repainted with RAF roundels. Crampton assumed that if one of the RB-45Cs was lost, the United States could point to the markings and disavow any knowledge of the airplane; the RAF could say that it did not have any RB-45Cs in service. Cramptonís security worries were increased by the ploy, however. To get the airplanes ready in time, two had to be sent to nearby RAF West Raynham. A hangar was cleared out, and several mystified airmen used gallons of paint stripper to remove the markings.
The missions were scheduled for the night of April 17ñ18, 1952. As ìcover,î each of the three crews had to endure no less than three preflight briefings: the real one for the overflights, another for their Sculthorpe cover story, and a third that they would give to Soviet interrogators should they be shot down. If captured, the crews were to say that they had been on a weather flight. For the southern route it was over the Black Sea; for the two northern routes it was the Gulf of Bothnia. Each plane had a complete set of false maps and plots to back up the cover story. Crampton later called the cover story ìa gross professional insult to my crew and myself, but an acceptable one if dire need arose.î Anstee wondered how well this would work if the Soviets found the equipment aboard the aircraft.
In late afternoon, the three RAF RB-45Cs took off and headed east toward their tankers. All three airplanes were successfully refueled, taking every pound that the tanks could carry. The three crews doused their airplanesí lights and, now hidden by the night, turned toward their courses over the USSR. Crampton had selected the longest route, across the southern USSR, for himself. As they flew along, everything was going well. Sanders reported that he was getting good radar plots, and he periodically requested course changes to the next target. The copilot, Sgt. Bill Lindsay, reported that the aircraft systems were working normally and, most important, they were on the right side of the fuel consumption curve. The middle route, near Moscow, was flown by the crew of flight lieutenant Gordon Cremer, flight sargent Bob Anstee, and Sgt. Don Greenslade. The northern route, over the Baltic States, was flown by the crew of flight lieutenants Bill Blair and John Hill and flight sargent Joe Acklam.
Cramptonís most significant memory of the flight was the ìapparent wildernessî over which they were flying. There were no lights on the ground or any signs of human habitation. Anstee recalled that there were many lights visible on the ground as they left Copenhagen after refueling, but over the USSR it was ìone large black hole with odd lights here and there.î This changed as they approached Moscow. Anstee continued: ìWhen you do see lights they really stand out. . . . once we came up south of Moscow itself you could see all the lights. Moscowís a big place and lit up so you do get a good reference point from that.î
Crampton and his crew continued their flight across the southern USSR. The RB-45C maintained a slow climb at about Mach 0.68 to 36,000 feet, following the briefed route and covering the targets. There was no visible reaction from Soviet air defenses. Crampton said later: ìIt was all so quiet as to be distinctly eerie.î Finally, the three aircraft made the turn for home, covering more targets before reaching friendly airspace. Due to the length of their flight, Crampton had to refuel from a tanker a second time before flying back to Sculthorpe.
The only real problem with the overflights was the weather back in England. About twenty minutes before the first aircraft, flown by flight lieutenant Blair over the Baltic States, was due to arrive, clouds rolled in from the North Sea and the aircraft had to divert to RAF Marston. Crampton was able to land at Sculthorpe during a break in the fog, after ten hours and twenty minutes in the air. The third RB-45C, flown by flight lieutenant Cremer, had to make a precautionary landing in Copenhagen due to engine trouble caused by icing up of the fuel filters. The crew took off again and landed at Prestwick.

The Growth of Soviet Nuclear Forces
As these covert overflights were under way, Soviet nuclear forces were growing in capability and number. The Soviets had begun mass production of their Tu-4 bombers (NATO code name Bull) at the end of the 1940s. There were reverse engineered copies of U.S. B-29s, which had landed in the USSR after being damaged over Japan during World War II. As of mid-1951, the CIA estimated that the Soviets had six hundred to seven hundred Tu-4s in service. This number was expected to increase to roughly a thousand aircraft by mid-1952. These were divided between three long-range air armies, two of which were based in the western USSR and the other in the Soviet Far East.
As the Soviet Tu-4 force was increasing in size, so was the number of Soviet nuclear weapons they would carry. A CIA estimate of September 4, 1951, projected the Soviet stockpile to be forty-five atomic bombs in mid-1951; the estimate for mid-1952 was a hundred weapons. These A-bombs were expected to have a yield of thirty to seventy kilotons of TNT and weigh between two and five tons. Based on this, the CIA believed that the USSR already had the theoretical capability to inflict a damaging blow on the United States. According to military estimates, if the United States were hit with between ten and fifty Soviet A-bombs, the country would suffer up to a million casualties, and most major cities would be partially destroyed. Attacks on SAC bases and port facilities would reduce or delay a U.S. atomic counterattack and hamper the countryís ability to supply its overseas forces.
The Soviets were also in the process of improving their nuclear weapons. In the fall of 1951, two years after the Joe-1 test, two more A-bombs were exploded. A report on the Joe-2 test to the acting director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Allen W. Dulles, read: ìAn acoustic signal of unusual intensity, apparently originating within the USSR, was picked up by stations of the Air Forceís Atomic Energy Detection System on 24 September 1951. The source of the signal was tentatively located . . . about 100 miles south southeast of Semipalatinsk, USSR. . . . The time of origin of the signal was 1015Z [that is, Greenwich mean time, or GMT] 24 September (about 1515 local time). . . . Considering this signal as a possible atomic explosion, weather prognostications were made to determine when and where the air masses would come out beyond the border of the USSR.î Weather aircraft were sent to pick up radioactive samples. The subsequent analysis of these samples indicated ìfresh fission products of an age corresponding to 24 September, which could only have come from a high order atomic explosion.î
The Joe-2 test was of an improved implosion bomb, with half the weight and twice the explosive yield of the copied U.S. A-bomb. It also used a new method of implosion, which reduced the diameter of the weapon. The result was a much more compact and aerodynamic weapon, compared to the egg-shaped casing of the first Soviet A-bomb. When debris from the Soviet test was analyzed, it indicated that the device ìprobably utilized only plutonium as the fissionable material (although a composite weapon cannot be excluded by the evidence). The efficiency of utilization of the plutonium was greater than that of the first explosion. . . . A study of the radioactive debris suggests that this explosion occurred on or slightly under the surface of the ground.î
This was followed by Joe-3 on October 18, 1951. Analysis of its debris indicated that this design had a composite core in which ìboth plutonium and uranium 235 were used as fissionable materials. The efficiency of utilization of the plutonium in the explosion was determined to be about 35 per cent, but that of the other component was not determined. The ratio of uranium 235 to plutonium was probably lower than that employed at present by the United States. If a model employing 7 kg of uranium 235 and 3.5 kg of plutonium is assumed, the yield would have been about 50 kilotons. This explosion did not occur close to the ground and the data are most consistent with an air burst.î This was significant, because it showed that it was an operational type of weapon rather than a test device.
As with the first Soviet test, the fallout sampling revealed details about the designs of the two weapons and, from this, the state of Soviet nuclear technology. The 1951 Soviet tests showed that they had mastered more efficient bomb designs. Both of the tests produced yields of forty kilotons (twice that of the first Soviet test). The Joe-3 test had, as the fallout data suggested, been an airburst. The weapon had been dropped from a Tu-4 and proved that the bomber could survive the shock wave from the explosion.
If the Soviets decided to launch an aerial attack on the United States, the Tu-4s would have to use forward bases located on the Chukotski Peninsula in the Soviet Far East, the Kola Peninsula in the northwest USSR, and the Baltic area. These were the closest Soviet-controlled areas to the United States. Even so, due to the limited range of the Tu-4 and the lack of an in-flight refueling capability in the Soviet Air Force, an attack on the United States would require one-way missions.
The CIA estimated that, from the Chukotski Peninsula, Tu-4s could reach targets within an arc between San Diego and Lake Superior. This would cover the atomic facilities at Hanford, Washington, the aircraft plants in Seattle and along the West Coast, and Pacific coast naval bases. Flying from the Kola Peninsula, Tu-4s could strike targets along an arc from Charlotte, North Carolina, to Portland, Oregon. Bombers taking off from the Baltic area could reach an arc from Charleston, South Carolina, to Bismark, North Dakota. From either area, New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., the industrialized Northeast and Midwest, and the Atlantic seaboard ports would all be within reach.
In the spring of 1952, there was a troubling new development. The SIGINT data indicated that the Soviets had begun flying formations of Tu-4 bombers in and out of the forward bases in Siberia. The airfields were on Dickson Island in the Kara Sea, at Mya Schmidta on the Chukchi Sea, and at Provideniya on the Chukotski Peninsula. It was now clear that the airfields on the Chukotski Peninsula and other areas of Siberia could support Tu-4 operations. It was suspected by U.S. intelligence that the Soviets had upgraded the World War II airfields stretching across Siberia, originally built to support Lend-Lease aircraft shipments, to accommodate Tu-4 bombers. The movements of these Tu-4s into the forward bases could represent preparations for an attack on the United States.
Although the CIA believed that the skill level of the average Tu-4 crew was below that of the average U.S. bomber crew of World War II, they assumed that only the best crews would be used in an atomic attack on the United States. Moreover, the Soviets would have no problem assembling target folders from publicly available information, such as navigation maps, radio frequency lists, and aerial photos of cities and factories. The targets themselves would be easily spotted using the bombing radar aboard the airplanes.
In the face of a Soviet attack, U.S. air defenses posed only a minimal threat to the bombers. United States radar coverage was spotty against high-altitude aircraft, and it had no radar able to detect low-flying bombers. They would have to be spotted visually, by Ground Observer Corps (GOC) volunteers. The GOC began a twenty-four-hour, year-round alert, called Operation Skywatch, on July 14, 1952. Despite the improved warning, the makeshift collection of piston-engine fighters, jet day fighters, and a limited number of problem-plagued all-weather interceptors would be hard pressed to deal with the obsolescent Tu-4s. The threat of a Soviet attack on the United States had now become an operational reality. To meet the danger, it was necessary to verify the status of Soviet air bases in Siberia. This would require a deep overflight.
Project 52 AFR-18
Following the detection of the Tu-4 movement to the forward bases in the spring of 1952, Defense Department and CIA officials again requested permission from President Truman to make deep overflights of Siberia. The proposal had been in abeyance following the loss of the original modified B-47B in the August 1951 ground accident. In the meantime, however, a more extensive program of shallow overflights had been started. This was a joint navyñair force effort, directed by the JCS, which was targeted against radar sites and airfields in eastern Siberia. The plans were closely held: In Alaska, only the two aircrews, the admiral commanding Fleet Air Alaska, the general in charge of the Alaska Air Command, and their deputies for intelligence knew of the overflights.
These shallow overflights teamed a navy P-2Vñ3W Neptune, which had been fitted with experimental SIGINT equipment in its nose, and an air force RB-50 photoreconnaissance aircraft. The Neptune would identify, locate, and home in on radar and radio signals across a wide range of frequencies. Once the installations were located, the RB-50 would photograph the radar sites and airfields. The P-2Vñ3W was piloted by Cmdr. James H. Todd; Lt. (jg) Richard A. Koch was the copilot for the overflights. The modifications to the P-2Vñ3W were completed early in 1952, and in March it was flying test missions out of Kodiak Island against the radar of the Alaska Air Command. After these flights were completed successfully, the pair of aircraft was ready to begin overflights.
The first joint overflight was made on April 2, 1952. The two aircraft maintained strict radio silence, even during takeoffs and landings. The Neptune normally took off from Kodiak or Shemya in the Aleutian Islands. The overflights were made during daylight, with the P-2Vñ3W flying at 15,000 feet. Its crew had to wear oxygen masks, because the P-2Vñ3W was not pressurized. The RB-50, which was pressurized, flew behind and above the Neptune. (The two aircraft had to coordinate their actions without radio transmissions.) The routes were fifteen to twenty miles inland from the Soviet coast. The joint overflights continued through the spring of 1952. Twice the Neptune was intercepted by Soviet MiG-15s. One of the interceptions was made over the Bering Straits, close to St. Lawrence Island. The other occurred over Soviet territory. The MiG-15s scrambled from a snow-covered runway, then caught up with the slow-flying navy airplane. Both times, no hostile action was taken; the MiG-15 pilots simply flew alongside the P-2Vñ3W, identified the aircraft, and took photos of the intruder.
The recovery base used at the end of an overflight varied according to the route. For one overflight, the Neptuneís final destination was Ladd Air Force Base in Alaska. The P-2Vñ3W came in for its landing late one night without radioing the tower. The Neptune had been detected on radar, and F-94s had taken off to intercept the unidentified airplane. Its arrival was unexpected, and the reception was hostile. As soon as the Neptune stopped, it was surrounded by gun-toting air police. They forced the exhausted navy crewmen to throw their dog tags onto the tarmac. The crew members remained aboard the airplane, under guard, for several hours, until they were cleared by higher authorities.
The final joint overflight was made on June 16, 1952. In all, nine missions were flown; the two airplanes had covered areas from the Kamchatka Peninsula, through the Bering Straits, and north to Wrangel Island, off the northern Siberian coast. Soon after these joint shallow overflights were completed, preparations began for an overflight program to penetrate deep into the heartland of Siberia. It was given the designation Project 52 AFR-18.
In June 1952, air force headquarters sent a directive letter to SACís Reconnaissance Division, outlining the general mission plan and the rules that were to be followed for the overflights. There were to be two overflights: a ìnorthern run,î to cover targets west of the Chukotski Peninsula, and a ìsouthern run,î over the Kamchatka Peninsula and eastern Siberia. Air force headquarters also directed that no target could be overflown twice. Added input came from General Ramey, who recommended that the two B-47Bs making the overflights penetrate the Soviet coastline together, then fan out to fly their individual routes. This was considered to be a directive by General Ramey and would be followed in the flight planning.
As Maj. Gen. Frank A. Armstrong, commander of the Sixth Air Division, based at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, and a limited number of staff personnel prepared the flight plan, a few changes were made. First, they proposed that Priority Target Number 1, Provideniya on the Chukotski Peninsula, be overflown by both missions rather than only once, as in the air force headquarters directive letter. The other was that the two proposed routes not have a common penetration point. Such a flight plan would result in a lower altitude at the penetration point and a slightly longer mission, and the routes would be less favorable with respect to Soviet air defenses.
By late July the two routes had been finalized. The northern run went from Ambarchik on the East Siberian Sea to Provideniya on the Chukotski Peninsula. The southern run went from Provideniya, then turned southwest past Anadyr to Magadan, then back east over the Kamchatka Peninsula. Due to the poor weather in August over Siberia, the flight planners recommended to General Ramey that the missions be scheduled for September. The available target information was also assembled for study by the crews. A report noted: ìThese materials are extremely poor since little information concerning the target area is available.î
As the overflight routes were being planned, the aircraft were being prepared. On July 5, 1952, air force headquarters ordered SAC to modify two B-47Bs for special reconnaissance missions over ìunfriendly areasî should approval be given. The primary modifications required for the overflights were the addition of a tail turret, which mounted a pair of .50-caliber machine guns, and a bomb bay camera pod.
The pilot selected to lead the overflights was Col. Donald E. Hillman, the deputy commander of the 306th Bomb Wing, which was the first and, at the time, the only wing to operate the B-47B. In late July or early August, Colonel Hillman was asked by General Armstrong to accompany him to SAC headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base. General Armstrong did not provide any details as to why. After arriving at Offutt, they were personally briefed by Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who described the reports of Soviet airfield construction, said that it had been judged necessary to photograph the airfields in order to verify the reports, and told Hillman that he had been chosen to lead the mission over Soviet territory.
Once Hillman returned to MacDill, he began detailed flight planning. This was done in the strictest secrecy, behind Hillmanís locked office door. Air force intelligence advised him that once the B-47s were detected, they could expect to meet resistance from a MiG-15 regiment headquartered at Provideniya, which was the target for both overflights, as well as fire from antiaircraft guns. Because this was a photographic mission, the B-47s would have to fly in daylight and clear weather. The men would have to rely on surprise, the airplanesí speed and altitude, evasive routing, the electronic countermeasures aboard the bombers, and, as a last resort, the B-47Bís unreliable tail turret.
The two crews selected for the overflights also began flying practice missions on the newly modified B-47Bs. All the men were hand-picked and considered the best available. Flying with Colonel Hillman were Majors Lester E. ìEdî Gunter (copilot) and Edward A. ìShakeyî Timmins (navigator). The crew of the other airplane was Col. Patrick D. Fleming (pilot) and Majors Lloyd F. ìShortyî Fields (copilot) and William J. ìRedî Reilly (navigator). Theirs were the only missions being flown at MacDill Air Force Base; a series of fatal B-47 accidents had resulted in the aircraft being grounded. The priority of the overflights was such that the training flights continued despite the grounding order.
At 11:00 a.m. on August 12, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett met with President Truman to discuss the overflights. Lovett gave the president memoranda, target justifications, and flight maps from JCS chairman Gen. Omar N. Bradley and DCI Walter Bedell Smith. Truman studied the documents and maps, then gave his approval for the northern run but asked that ìspecial considerationî be given to eliminating Priority Target Number 11. This would reduce the penetration depth of the northern run by some 275 miles and keep the route nearer to the coast.
As for the southern run, President Truman expressed concern over the length of the flight and the depth of its penetration. He was particularly apprehensive over the fact that the egress route was virtually parallel to the ingress route. Truman called it ìrunning the gauntletî and turned down the mission. He suggested that the JCS might want to consider some alternative that would not have the aircraft over the USSR for such a prolonged period.
The president emphasized that his approval of the northern run was subject to discussion with and concurrence of officials of the State Department. If there was a disagreement, President Truman added, he was prepared to hear both sides. As for the southern run, he said that he was willing to reconsider the matter ìif some less provocative and safer proposal can be made.î Trumanís only other concern was that the loss of a B-47 to the Soviets would compromise the air forceís latest equipment. He wanted to make sure that the JCS ìhad considered this aspect as an added element of risk.î
Three days later, General Ramey notified General LeMay by letter that President Truman had approved Project 52 AFR-18 but had authorized only the northern run; Priority Target Number 11 would be deleted from the flight. The letter continued: ìCoverage of the Northern Route will be limited to a single flight with only one pass over each prescribed target. An abort after penetration will terminate this approval.î Trumanís concern about the loss of a B-47 was also mentioned. General Ramey wrote: ìIn event of crash or forced landing in unfriendly territory the aircraft will be destroyed to the greatest extent practicable.î
With Trumanís approval, Project 52 AFR-18 moved forward toward a September overflight date. The reality that Colonel Hillman and his crew would soon be flying deep into Siberia, and what might happen to them, weighed on General Armstrongís mind. He would be the one to decide when the mission would be flown based on the weather forecast. A few days before the two crews were to depart on a ìtraining missionî to Alaska, their families attended a MacDill Officersí Club social. General Armstrong took Hillmanís wife aside and told her, ìI feel like Iím sending Don on a mission equivalent to sending Christ to Calvary.î Hillman later noted that however much this might have eased Armstrongís conscience, ìthey certainly generated wifely concerns on the home front, and there was little I could do or say to allay them.î
Finally, on Sunday, September 21, 1952, the two B-47Bs and their KC-97 tankers left MacDill on the first leg of the trip to Siberia. Their initial destination was Rapid City Air Force Base, where they would spend a six-day layover. During this time, the aircraft made several additional local training flights. It was also here that Project 52 AFR-18, like its predecessor the year before, almost came to a fiery end.
The B-47B was brand new and attracted a lot of attention at the base. One of those curious about the aircraft was Brig. Gen. Richard E. Ellsworth, the wing commander at Rapid City. General Ellsworth asked if he could make a flight in the B-47, and Colonel Hillman agreed. With General Ellsworth in the copilotís seat, the crew ran through the preflight checklist, and the B-47B began its takeoff roll. As the airplaneís speed increased, Hillman saw to his horror that the flaps were still fully retracted. In the confusion of the mixed crew, this item had been missed. The airplane was going too fast and was too far down the runway for a ground abort. Without the flaps, however, the B-47 could not reach flying speed, would roll off the end of the runway at two hundred knots, and explode in a fireball.
Colonel Hillman pulled down on the flap handle and watched as the indicator showed the flaps very slowly beginning to lower. It was not until nearly the end of the runway that the B-47 reached flying speed. Hillman later noted: ìI was looking at grassî when the airplane finally lifted off. Project 52 AFR-18 had been saved for another day. Hillman never forgot how close a shave it had been.
On Saturday, September 27, one of the KC-97 tankers took off for Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. The tanker was followed on September 28 by the two B-47Bs, and by the remaining KC-97 on Monday, September 29. All the aircraft arrived at Eielson without incident. It was only then that the other B-47 crew members were finally told that this was most definitely not a routine training flight.
The controlling factor for the overflight was now the weather. Despite the earlier predictions that it would be clear over Siberia during September, for a full two weeks conditions remained too poor for the overflight to be made. The crews continued to study the overflight route and flight plan. Finally, the forecast looked good, and on the evening of October 14, General Armstrong told the crews that they would go the next morning.

The First B-47 Overflight of the USSR
Just after sunrise on October 15, 1952, the two KC-97 tankers took off from Eielson, setting Project 52 AFR-18 in motion. An hour later, Hillman and Fleming also took off in their separate B-47Bs. They rendezvoused with the KC-97s near Point Barrow, Alaska, and took on full loads of fuel. If Hillmanís B-47 had suffered a problem at this point, Fleming would have made the overflight. Because both aircraft were flying normally, the mission continued as briefed.
The two B-47s left the tankers behind and flew west until they reached Wrangel Island, about a hundred miles north of the Siberian coast. Flemingís B-47 photographed and mapped the island, then headed east to the communications relay point off the coast of Alaska. Fleming began flying a racetrack pattern, to await any messages from Hillmanís B-47.
Hillman continued southwest, toward the Siberian coastline. As he drew closer to the coast, he turned the B-47 south for a point on the coast between Stanovaya and Ambarchik. The aircraft made landfall at about noon and continued to fly south. The crew turned on the bomb bay cameras; they would be left running throughout the overflight to prevent them from freezing up, which could happen if they were turned on and off. The weather had, to this point, been good. Soon after the aircraft crossed the coastline, however, the B-47ís crew saw scattered two-tenths cloud cover and some haze, which partially obscured the ground. The B-47 then turned east, back toward Alaska. The flight planners had hoped that Soviet radar operators would think that the B-47 was a friendly, if unknown, aircraft flying in from the western USSR.
The B-47 covered the first two of its five targets, taking photographs and radarscope images. By this time, the B-47 had burned off much of the fuel aboard, and it was able to fly above 40,000 feet and reach about 480 knots true airspeed, well over the B-47Bís normal cruising speed. As the aircraft headed toward the third target, its warning receivers began picking up Soviet radar signals; the B-47 was being tracked. Hillman alerted Gunter, sitting behind him in the copilotís seat, to be ready for the MiG-15s known to be stationed in the area. Gunter turned his seat around and manned the tail turret controls.
A few minutes later, Gunter reported over the intercom that he had Soviet fighters in sight. The MiG-15s were below and behind the B-47, trying to catch up with the fast-flying bomber. With their airplane now identified as hostile, Hillman broke radio silence. He reported to Fleming their location and situation; if they were shot down, the United States would know what had happened to them. Gunter continued to watch the MiG-15s, but they had scrambled too late and were unable to intercept the B-47. Hillman and the rest of the crew were still worried. The speed, altitude, and course of their airplane were now known to Soviet air defenses, and other flights of MiG-15s might already be positioning themselves to attack the B-47.
The B-47 continued on the planned overflight route, making periodic course changes to cover the three remaining targets. Despite their earlier concerns, the crew did not see any additional MiG-15s. Hillman later suspected that this was due to their repeated course changes, or perhaps because the Soviets did not have large numbers of interceptors stationed in that area. The B-47 covered Egvekinot, then flew along the coast and reached Provideniya, the MiG regimental headquarters. This completed the overflight, and the cameras were turned off. The airplane headed out of Soviet airspace toward the Seward Peninsula of Alaska. Hillman flew directly toward Eielson Air Force Base, landing well after dark. The flight had lasted seven and three-quarter hours and covered 3,500 miles. Of this, some 800 miles had been over the USSR. A few minutes after Hillmanís airplane landed, Flemingís backup B-47 touched down.
Ground crews immediately unloaded the camera magazines, each containing about three hundred feet of nine-inch film, and sent them to the base darkroom. The film was developed, then duplicated before it was flown to Washington, D.C., for analysis. General Armstrong was pleased by how the mission had turned out.
The Soviet response to the overflight was also quick in coming. On the morning of October 16, Hillman was told by intelligence officers that intercepted messages indicated the Soviet regional commander had been sacked and a second MiG regiment was to be moved into the area. A few hours later, Hillman and his crew again boarded their B-47B and made a nonstop flight from Eielson Air Force Base back to MacDill.
Six months later, in April 1953, Colonel Hillman was reassigned to SAC headquarters. A few days after his arrival, he was ordered to report to General LeMayís office. When he entered, General LeMay stood up and closed the door. Without saying a word, he pinned a Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) on Hillmanís blouse. When he saw the puzzled look on Hillmanís face, LeMay gave him a slight and rare smile. ìItís secret,î he said. The two other members of Hillmanís crew, as well as Colonel Fleming and his crew, also received DFCs. The award citations said only that they were for ìextraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight.î
The B-47B overflight had consequences far beyond the intelligence it had returned. The mission had established the precedent for subsequent overflight operations. The president of the United States, acting on the advice of the JCS, the DCI, and the secretaries of defense and state, had authorized a covert deep overflight of a hostile power. The presidentís decision to approve or disapprove the mission was on a case-by-case basis, as a result of his assessment of the risks versus the importance of the flight to the national security of the United States.
Just as important was the reason for the overflight. The B-47 was sent over Siberia to determine whether the USSR was preparing for an attack on the United States. When the photos from Hillmanís overflight were analyzed, they showed that the Soviets were not massing Tu-4 bombers at Siberian air bases. Although the Soviets were making long-range training flights to the forward bases, these were not in preparation for a nuclear attack on the United States. The B-47B overflight also established the principle, as Colonel Leghorn had foreseen, that aerial reconnaissance in the nuclear age was a means of providing advance warning of possible threats against the United States.

Ju Jitsu
After Crampton completed the overflights, he was given command of No. 101 Squadron, which had recently been reequipped with the RAFís first Canberra light jet bombers. Although Crampton was pleased to be given such a choice assignment, he found that the pilotís seat of the Canberra seemed small after having flown the RB-45Cóìnot unlike a Ford Escort after a stretched Cadillac,î he said.
While Crampton was trying to settle in, a second series of RB-45C overflights was being proposed. Sir John Slessor, chief of the air staff, suggested to General Vandenberg a joint U.S. Air ForceñRAF effort code-named Ju Jitsu. Slessorís September 12, 1952, letter read: ìI gathered from Nate [Twining] that the Presidentís reactions were ëWhy donít you do more of ití? On that, I suggested to Nate that we might each find three crews and do six sorties simultaneously in November. . . . I think it would be a great help in getting the Old Manís [Churchill] approval to do another Ju Jitsu if we could say that the U.S. as well as British crews would take part.î
The SAC London headquarters backed Slessorís proposed joint operation and also warned of the problems that not having U.S. participation might cause. It reported to General Twining: ìFirstly, one of the races scheduled will be over a course in which we have a primary interest and second, it is entirely possible that without our participation the Betting Commissioner [Churchill] here may reject Sir Johnís application.î United States participation proved impossible, and on September 18, General Vandenberg replied to Slessor: ìI agree with you it would be desirable for participation by aircrews of the USAF in the operation for the reasons you have stated. However, I regret to say that it will not be feasible to do so because of political considerations.î
In October 1952, Crampton was again ordered to Bomber Command; he was told that the special-duty flight was being re-formed and was asked if he wanted to again be its commander. He accepted, and within a few days he was back at Sculthorpe, working with ìHakî Mixson and undergoing refresher training. There were a few crew changes; Sanders was back as his navigator, but Sargent Lindsay had been badly injured in a crash. His place as copilot was taken by flight lieutenant McAlistair Furze, one of the flight commanders with No. 101 Squadron. ìMacFurze,î as he was less formally known, quickly mastered the RB-45C systems, which pleased Crampton. He said later that Furze ìwould have elbowed me out of the captainís seat given half a chance.î The other replacement was flight lieutenant Harry Currell, who took over as pilot from Bill Blair.
The special-duty flight trained through November 1952 and by early December was nearly ready for the overflights. The three routes were similar to those of the April overflights and were intended to get radarscope photos of long-range aviation airfields and other Soviet facilities. The missions were scheduled for the night of December 12ñ13, 1952. Only a few days before the overflights were to be made, however, they were abruptly called off. The special-duty flight was disbanded and its members were sent back to their original units. In a December 16, 1952, letter, air chief marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd told Maj. Gen. John P. McConnell: ìI am only sorry that the operation ended the way it didówithout the answers.î
Why Ju Jitsu was so abruptly canceled was the subject of much rumor among the crews. Crampton recalled that among the rumors was the belief that the political risks of the overflight were too greatóspecifically, that if one of the RB-45Cs had gone down in the USSR, it might have triggered a war. Certainly, events in the fall of 1952 were heading in a dark and dangerous direction. "