News-Info-Alerts

To: ALL

From: Andi Wolos & Bob Necci

(POW-MIA InterNetwork)

Re: Integrity of NIE Questioned

Date: April 10, 1999

The following represents correspondence with respect to the highly questionable NIE report that was releases last fall. A copy of the document in question, National Intelligence Estimate 98-03, is available in our Archives . The correspondence is in chronological order.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (98-03)

The White House
Washington

April 10, 1997

Dear Mr. Leader:

You have requested clarification from me regarding Administration policy on POW/MIA issues with Vietnam. In view of a report recently provided to you by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligence. I am happy to respond, and I realize that some Members of the Senate have linked these matters to a confirmation vote on Douglas "Pete" Peterson to be our first Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

First, the President commits to continue to press the Government of Vietnam to cooperate on full accounting. We have established mechanisms through which the Vietnamese can respond to requests for information available only to them.

As you know, the President has determined that Vietnam is providing full-faith cooperation with U.S. efforts to obtain this information. We believe the President's determination is backed up by tangible assistance provided by Vietnam to the Department of Defense Joint Task Force (Full Accounting). I will direct the Intelligence Community to prepare a special National Intelligence Estimate on this matter, something that was last done in 1987. We will consult with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Intelligence Committee concerning the terms of reference for this new study.

Second, we will take immediate steps to ensure that collection requirements pertaining to the POW/MIA issue remain as a high priority for the U.S. Intelligence Community, and we will stay in close contact with the Intelligence Committee on this matter.

Third, I will ask for an updated assessment from the Intelligence Community on the so-called "735" and "1205" documents from Russian archives. We will continue efforts already underway to acquire additional information on these documents from the Vietnamese Government, including access to the alleged "735" author Hoang Anh, as well as other relevant party and government archival materials.

Fourth, the President asserted when we agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam that our principal goal was to

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enhance the full accounting process. This issue will be Mr. Peterson's highest priority as Ambassador. This task will include pressing for additional unilateral efforts by the Government of Vietnam to provide records and remains. We, therefore, hope that the full Senate will confirm Mr. Peterson at the earliest possible date.

I trust this is responsive to your concerns.

Sincerely,
Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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BOB SMITH
New Hampshire

United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903

November 25, 1998

The Honorable Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Sandy:

Please find enclosed a copy of A Critical Assessment concerning the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. This assessment was prepared by my office following the declassification and public release of the Key Judgments portion of the NIE this past August.

As you will recall, this an NIE was prepared in response to your personal commitment to the Senate Majority Leader and myself on April 10, 1997 when we confirmed our first US Ambassador to postwar Vietnam.

Sandy, in view of the very serious concerns I have outlined with the NIE in my attached report, I respectfully request you support my request that the NIE be retracted and that US policy makers be provided with a revised NIE that can be defended and relied upon in the context of US policy deliberations regarding Vietnam. I cannot stress enough how concerned I am about this matter.

I look forward to hearing from you and trust you will consider the concerns and requests I am raising with you in a thoughtful and serious matter.

With warm regards,

Bob Smith, U.S.S.

Unclassified when separated from classified enclosure

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BOB SMITH
New Hampshire

United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2803

November 25, 1998

The Honorable George Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Foreign Intelligence Board
Room 7D56, CIA Headquarters

Dear George:

Please find enclosed a copy of A Critical Assessment concerning the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. This assessment was prepared by my office following your declassification and public release of the Key Judgments portion of the NIE this past August.

I am making four requests of you with this letter. First, I request that you convene, in the next 60 days, a meeting of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) to consider my request that the referenced NIE be retracted for the reasons noted in my attached assessment.

Second, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to personally read the NIE, and then read my assessment of the NIE, before acting on my retraction request. I think you will agree with me that there are serious problems with the NIE. The problems can either be attribute to shoddy research or a deliberate, pre-determined strategy to discredit relevant information. In either case, it's a say commentary on the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Third, I request that a copy of my assessment of the NIE be disseminated to those who have already received the NIE itself, and I request that I be notified as to who these people are. I would be pleased to assist you in disseminating my assessment. And fourth, I request that both my assessment and the remaining portions of the NIE be processed for declassification immediately.

I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible, the I trust you will consider the concerns and requests I am raising with you in a thoughtful and serious manner. Finally, please know that I am available to meet with you at anytime to discuss this matter farther.

With warm regards,
Box Smith, U.S.S.

Unclassified when separated from classified enclosure

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BOB SMITH
New Hampshire

United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-2903

November 25, 1998

Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Chairman, Military Intelligence Board
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington DC

Dear General Hughes:

Please find enclosed a copy of A Critical Assessment concerning the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. This assessment was prepared by my office following the declassification and public release of the Key Judgments portion of the NIE this past August.

I am making three requests of you with this letter. First, I request that you convene, in the next 60 days, a meeting of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) in order for the MIB to consider the findings of my assessment and to make its recommendation concerning my requests that the NIE be retracted. Second, I request that you recommend the retraction of this NIE in your capacity as a member of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).

Third, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to personally read the NIE, and then read my assessment of the NIE, before acting on my retraction request. I think you will agree with me that there are serious problems with the NIE. The problems can either be attribute to shoddy research or a deliberate, pre-determined strategy to discredit relevant information. In either case, it's a say commentary on the U.S. Intelligence Community.

General, in view of the very strong personal assurances you gave me last year concerning the NIE, and the rigorous review to which it would be subjected. I trust you will consider the concerns and requests I am raising with you in a thoughtful and serious manner. Those of us who have worn or still wear the uniform worn by our missing servicemen from the Vietnam War have a special obligation on this issue, and I hope you will agree. Finally, please know that I am available to meet with you at any time to discuss this matter further.

With warm regards,
Box Smith, U.S.S.

Unclassified when separated from classified enclosure

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The White House
Washington

January 19, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter on the National Intelligence Estimate published earlier this year that assessed Vietnam's commitment to accounting fully for American missing in action during the Vietnam conflict, and examine Russian documents that -- if accurate -- would bring into question whether all American prisoners of war were released in 1973.

First, let me say that I appreciate your careful and detailed examination of this estimate. George Tenet has indicated that he welcomes such scrutiny as essential to helping make sure our intelligence agencies maintain the highest standards of research and analysis on issues that are critical to our national security. Indeed, he has mandated that more rigorous "red teaming" be incorporated into future estimates on such issues. In this particular instance, I understand he is placing your critique on the agenda for the next meeting of the Intelligence Community body that originally approved the Vietnam POW/MIA estimate.

I believe it important to note that the estimate was drafted by experts who represent our intelligence agencies' collective wisdom on the POW/MIA issue. They worked in accord with long-standing procedures governing finished intelligence assessments. They laid out a methodology and noted problems or gaps in available information. Their product was reviewed by some of our most senior intelligence offices, and released ultimately under the authority of the DCI himself. We depend on this process to yield informed, balanced and unbiased assessments on key foreign policy matters.

For this reason, the must take exception to any suggestion that I or any member of the National Security Council staff sought to influence the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community in this estimate. Each of us at the NSC understands the importance of ensuring that our intelligence agencies conduct their work in this objective fashion, without outside interference. The best

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interests of the military and the country demand that we endeavor to achieve the best analysis of the facts and then tailor our policy to these facts, rather than vice versa.

Let me take this opportunity to underscore the President's personal commitment to the fullest possible accounting of our POWs and MIAs as the cornerstone of his Vietnam policy. This Administration will continue to work with the Government of Vietnam, and dedicate our own resources, to ensure that this goal is achieved. With the help of dedicated individuals such as yourself, I am confident that we will succeed.

Sincerely

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Robert C. Smith
Chairman
Select Committee on Ethics
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20340

U-14019/DIO-E A P
27 January 1999

Honorable Robert C. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

Thank you for your letter of 25 November and the accompanying critique of the National Intelligence Estimate that assessed Vietnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. I have personally review the issues you raised and discussed them with various other interested parties. I also recently chaired a meeting of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) that, at your request, reviewed this matter in some detail, and subsequently represented MIB views at a National Foreign Intelligence Board meeting that considered your request. Since the issues you raised centered on the contents of a National Intelligence Counsel product, NFIB principals agreed that the appropriate venue for responding to your concerns would be the DCI, speaking on behalf of the full Intelligence Community. I understand that a formal response from the DCI will be provided to you in the near future. I fully support his response.

I want to take this opportunity to assure you of my continuing heartfelt and personal commitment to the Defense Intelligence Agency's role in assuring the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIA personnel.

Sincerely,
Patrick M. Hughes
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

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Richard C. Shelby , Alabama, Chairman
Robert Kerrey, Nebraska, Vice-Chairman

United States Senate
SSCI #99-0859-A
Select Committee on Intelligence
Washington, DC 20510-6478

March 18, 1999

The Honorable Eleanor Hill
Inspector General
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Ms. Hill:

In November of last year, the Office of U.S. Senate Bob Smith produced A Critical Assessment of the April 1998, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 98-03) on the Vietnam/MIA issue. After convening the Military Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Board in January 1999 to address Senator Smith's concerns, the Director of Central Intelligence concluded that the NIE 98-03 was accurate.

Senator Smith continues to assert, however, that the NIE 98-03 is a product of either "shoddy" research or possible politicization, which may reflect a premeditated and deliberate effort to discredit relevant information. He believes that this intelligent estimate should be retracted and that U.S. policy-makers should disregard its conclusions.

The Committee takes the Smith's charges seriously -- especially regarding the possible politicization of intelligence reports in order to support the Administration's policy goals with Vietnam. Therefore, the Committee requests that the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency Inspectors General examine the April NIE and address the charges levied in A Critical Assessment, insofar as they suggest a premeditated effort to discredit relevant information, inadequate analysis or possible politicization. We believe such an

The Honorable Eleanor Hill
March 18, 1999
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inquiry is necessary to determine the NIE's analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness.

Sincerely
Richard C. Shelby
Chairman

J. Robert Kerrey
Vice Chairman

CC: Senator Bob Smith