Commentary by CDR Chip Beck, USNR (ret) ::
Maybe I do not understand what the controversy is over S755, but it appears that some people believe that rapid action in the case of a downed pilot, or someone in trouble on the ground is not a matter of life and death. The question, as officials seem to be arguing, is whether we should demand action in 48 hours or 10 days.
Since I have been involved in some successful rescues in my military and intelligence career, I would say that both time frames are in excess of what is required for success. Of the two, I would say that a reaction time of 48 hours is too long, and ten days is absurb.
In 1972, a Special Forces Colonel and an SF Sergeant were being pursued in the jungles of north Laos by a company of North Vietnamese Army regulars hell bent on capturing the two men. They were part of an operation to regain the offensive against an aggressive NVA operation that involved two regiments of enemy forces.
I had just returned from several hours in the jungle myself when I returned to our base of operations to learn that my two friends had already been under pursuit for more than three hours. Up to that time, not one action had been taken for their rescue, which I considered a dereliction of duty, and said so in very impolite terms to several superiors who had not a clue of what to do.
Within minutes of my return from the field, a special team of commandos was preparing to enter the jungle to intercept the two fleeing men, anticipating their likely route of escape. I commandeered a chopper, mobilized a second, and called for some TACAIR support (ancient T 28s) to meet us over the zone of operations. Within minutes of arriving over the jungle, the two men on the ground flashed us with a signal mirror from the middle of a bamboo thicket where they were surrounded by the NVA.
Ordering the T 28s to lay down a bombing run on a treeline where the NVA were firing from, our two choppers did a classic rescue where one chopper went in under fire and the other covered the first. There was no consideration of whether we might also get killed in the attempt. It was simply a case of Americans on the ground needing immediate help.
We succeeded.
Back at the airstrip, the senior of the two men, Colonel Bill Buckley, brushed off the dirt from his bush jacket and asked, "What took you so long?"
That was only 3 hours. Another 45 minutes and they would have been dead or captured. In 48 hours, they would have been halfway to Dien Bien Phu. In ten days they would have been in Hanoi.
A month later, another Special Forces Major was trapped on a mountain top with indigenous troops, while a Regiment of NVA attempted to capture him. As nightfall fell, one of my superiors, a civilian, stated that this was a military affair and went to bed. The Special Forces Sergeant that I had rescued the month before stayed up with me all night long as we coordinated a rescue plan that brought in assets from outside the country.
To keep the Major alive, a chopper pilot and myself literally had to risk our own lives twice in the night to retrieve vital information from a mountain peak with no lights on it. The data we recovered allowed the defenders of the beseigned position to anticipate where the heaviest assaults were going to come from and repulse them.
By dawn, we had 6 Jolly Green Giants land from Thailand, refuel at our airstrip while my superior still slept, and rescue the Major in a daring dawn operation.
When the Sergeant and I reported that the Major had been rescued, my superior, who was eating breakfast when we told him, smiled and said, "See, I told you THEY would take care of it."
As these two incidents taught me, time is of the essence in such cases, and "they" is us.
These were not the only loss or rescue operations I was involved in over 33 years. Both 48 hours and 10 days are too long to wait in my experience. However, of the two, the 10 day period sends a signal (to those who have gone through it) that the high command has better things to do."