June 28, 1995
My experiences working toward the resolution of the POW/MIA issue have included military service as a Vietnamese linguist in the signals intelligence community, military service and civilian employment with the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), civilian employment as a debriefer for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Stoney Beach program, and civilian employment with Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA). Most of this experience has been as Team Leader or Team Member of Field investigation teams in Vietnam and Laos.
Although discussing the investigations of specific cases does give insight into the overall field investigation process, to gain a true understanding of the process and identify its faults, we must take a close look at how it changed with the establishment of JTF-FA. Based on my field experience both prior to and following the establishment of JTF, as well as my experience working with other investigation team leaders, I am in a unique position to comment on this change.
I participated in my first joint field activity in January 1989 while assigned on temporary duty to the JCRC Liaison office in Bangkok. This was the fourth iteration in Vietnam and was representative of JCRC's early field efforts. During this field activity, it was apparent that team members were making every effort to conduct thorough, meticulously documented investigations. However, since field investigations were still relatively new, it was also evident that the process was evolving and that team members were finding better and more effective methods of doing their jobs.
When I returned to JCRC in 1991, I participated in the 14th iteration in Vietnam in the capacity of assistant team leader. During this field activity, it was clear that the investigative procedures had been refined considerably since the earlier efforts and that the standards of success remained very high. As a Team Leader during subsequent field activities in Vietnam, I strove to maintain these standards of excellence despite what could honestly be classified as poor cooperation by my Vietnamese counterparts.
Shortly after the establishment of JTF-FA in January 1992, then BG Needham visited Bangkok and briefed the members of the office, which was redesignated JTF-FA Detachment 1, concerning the changes that would be made in our mission under his command. I recall clearly two points that he made during this briefing which left no doubt that the resolution process and standards of success for field investigations were going to change dramatically.
BG Needham began by criticizing JCRC's methods as being too slow and cumbersom. He felt that the delay between the conclusion of a field investigation and the release of the report of that investigation was far too long and that much of the information contained in these reports was unnecessary. He then explained what he called his "80 percent rule." His philosophy, and consequently that of his new command, was that completing a task quickly with an 80 percent standard of success was preferable to completing it perfectly but taking more time. He emphasized that this rule was to be the guiding principle in all JTF operations, including all field investigations.
BG Needham's second comment during his briefing was that he disliked the fact that he had civilian employees in his command and that he preferred an all military command where his disciplinary authority was absolute. This was in stark contrast to the JCRC philosophy, which acknowledged the transient nature of military personnel adn valued civilian employees as sources of operational consistency and institutional memory. As JTF grew,the input and authority of its civilian experts was systematically reduced and the authority of the military staff members, all personally selected by BG Needham, increased dramatically. This was done purposefully and in accordance with BG Needham' instructions.
Consistent with his emphasis on the military command structure, BG Needham instituted perhaps the most dramatic change in field investigation procedures: The assignment of infantry officers as investigation team leaders. The selection of team leaders by JCRC had traditionally been based on an objective evaluation of an individual's ability to communicate directly in the language of the country in which he would be working; his knowledge of the culture, customs, and geography of that country; and his ability to conduct and document thorough investigative efforts. According to BG Needham, the infantry officers selected as team leaders were chosen based on more important criteria: specifically, their ability to maintain military discipline among team members and their stamina during the often difficult treks to remote crash sites. In reality, the selection of junior officers who were preoccupied with their military career progression resulted in a virtual guarantee that team leaders would comply-unquestioningly with all command policies.
The rapid establishment of JTF-FA also led to the rather haphazard selection of junior military personnel to fill linguist and analyst billets. In many cases, native speakers of Vietnamese, Lao, and Khmer were recruited from military occupational specialities totally unrelated to the JTF-FA mission, to include truck drivers and fuel handlers. Analysts were typically selected from the ranks of order of battle (OB) analysts, whose analytical skills and methods differed considerably from that required to successfully analyze information obtained during field investigations. While discussing the qualifications of the military personnel assigned to JTF-FA, it should be noted that, although the resolution of the POW/MIA issue has been regarded as "The Nation's Highest Priority" for over a decade, neither JTF-FA nor any of the military services has developed a comprehenisve training program to reach linguists and analysts the skills necessary to support the JTF-FA mission. It is also interesting to note that my final assignment prior to my resignation from JTF-FA in September 1994 was the drafting of a team leader/report writing handbook to guide JTF-FA personnel in the conduct of field investigations. This was to be the first formalization of JTF-FA field investigation procedures and was scheduled for distribution during early 1995, long after many cases had been investigated and relegated to "pending" status. A command policy which intentionally compromised field investigation standards.
The combination of untrained, unqualified infantry team leaders and sometimes marginally qualified team members was alone enough to seriously degrade the quality of the investigation process. This decline was hastened, however, by the relentless pressure placed on team leaders by BG Needham. He demanded that greater and greater numbers of cases be investigated during each field activity and reduced the time allotted for preparing investigation reports. Investigation and report writing standards were thus further compromised to meet these demands.
During team briefings prior to the 21st JFA, the newly promoted MG Needham personally addressed team leaders and advised them of the command's intent to move cases to "Inactive" status. He complained that JCRC personnel had investigated some cases numerous times without conclusion and opined that such efforts irritated our Vietnamese and Lao counterparts. After the 21st JFA concluded, MG Needham remained in Thailand to personally review the investigation reports and recommend changes to team leaders. This was to be the first of his so-called "Murder Boards", during which team leaders were required to defend their recommendations concerning the cases they had investigated.
During the 22nd JFA, MG Needham's instruction to the teams was very similar, as was his methodology. With exception of one seasoned JCRC team leader who remained firm in his convictions, all team leaders complied with the push to move cases to inactive status. The one dissenting NCO was subsequently counseled for what was termed an improper attitude.
Following the 22nd JFA, I was assigned the task of translating the summary message of the activity in full into Vietnamese, an unusual and unprecedented effort. This message included statements concerning the proposed disposition of cases, including those cases which were to be made "INACTIVE." This translation was formally presented to the Vietnamese during the next technical talk as a clear message that the rules had changed and that the U.S. was preparing to CLOSE cases without recovering remains. This was a MAJOR U.S. POLICY SHIFT, but one that was never announced or acknowledged by the JTF command of the U, S. Government.
Due to criticism of the term "INACTIVE", on 28 April 1993 a JTF-FA/J3 memo was issued changing the wording of recommendations on case status from "INACTIVE" to "PENDING". This change was merely a matter of terminology and did nothing to alter MG Needham's intent to move cases into inactive status. During command briefings, he explained that his intent was for each case to have "Its Day In Court" and after a single investigation, be recommended for excavation or "Pending" status.
Now that a clear course had been defined and sufficient pressure applied, the infantry team leaders were left to do their work. The average number of cases investigated during a typical JFA increased dramatically over previous field activities. The average length of investigation reports was also reduced by approximately one-thrid. One infantry officer, who established the record for the greatest number of cases investigated during a single JFA, averaged two case investigations per day.
To get an idea of how thorough these investigations were, let us examine an investigation report prepared by this officer. This report documented the investigation of case 1648 during the 23rd JFA in May 1993. This case involved two individuals who were on a combat patrol in Thua Thien-Hue Province. Both individuals were struck by enemy fire and believed killed, but due to the presence of enemy forces, their bodies could not be recovered.
According to the summary paragraph of the investigation report, "The Team Conducted a Survey of the Last Known Location of Case 1648 with Negative Results.....Recommend No Further Joint Field Investigation be Conducted for Case 1648 and it be placed in the Pending Category." In the body of the report, however, a detailed description of the team's survey was provided. It stated "On 19 May, Having the use of an MI-8 Helicopter, the team conducted an Aerial Reconnaissance Flight over the last known location of Case 1648 Grid Coordinated (YD 335193). The flight was conducted at an altitude of 200 feet....the team saw No Material Evidence of any Remains or Apparent Grave Sites. See Survey Results."
The survey results in this report described the location as "Located in an Extremely Mountainous Area at Elevations Ranging From 500 to 1300 Meters." The Vegetation in the area was described as "Dense Jungle Undergrowth."
Thus we have a case moved to pending status based on a search for human remains and personal effects conducted from a moving helicopter at an altitude of 200 feet through dense jungle undergrowth. This is hardly what I would consider a thorough and responsible investigative effort. Unfortunately, actions such as this were not isolated incidents. After I began working on field investigations in Laos, I had the opportunity to serve as an analyst/assistant team leader for this officer. During this field activity, our Team was assigned to investigate an off-the-scope loss of an aircraft. This is an incident in which the location of the last known radio or visual contact of an aircraft is known, but the exact time and location of its loss are not. As such, the methodology used in investigating this case was to lay out the planned flight path of the aircraft, identify its last known location, and predict possible crash areas. This is done by comparing the aircraft's speed and direction of flight with known or suspected crash sites identified through aerial reconnaissance, U.S. records, and refugee reporting. The results of this analysis suggested that the team visit several different villages along the planned flight path of the aircraft to interview the residents. When I briefed this officer concerning the investigation plan, his response was "Why are You Going To So Much Trouble For an Off-The-Scope Loss? In Vietnam, we just go to the last known location and conduct a search. Then we go to the nearest village. If we don't find anything, it's pending."
Although these are only two specific examples, they reflect an attitude which was common among these officers during the height of JTF-FA's investigative activities. This was an attitude of "Win at All Costs," with winning being defined as placing cases in the Pending Category. Such an attitude, combined with these officer's ignorance of the language, culture, and customes of the countries in which they operated, makes it a virtual certainty that similar incidents of irresponsible action and poor judgement occurred. Althoug the JTF-FA command read these reports and was aware of the actions taken, they allowed this trend to continue since it was achieving the desired result and was in compliance with the aforementioned 80 percent rule.
It should be noted that I was not alone in my observations of the substandard investigative work performed by JTF-FA officers. In early 1994, I applied for two analyst positions with DPMO. During a conversation with a senior DPMO official and former member of the DIA PW/MIA Office, he confided that the primary responsibility of those selected to fill these positions would be the critical review of JTF-FA Field investigations which had been placed in the Pending Category. This review was necessary because many of the cases had been incompletely or improperly investigated and would likely have to be reinvestigated before they could be declared resolved.
Based on the likelihood that a significant number of flawed investigations were conducted under Gen Needham's command, I believe a thorough and objective review of these case investigations is necessary to gain an understanding of the progress that has actually been made on this issue.
Closely related to our impressions of recent progress on the MIA issue are our impressions of the cooperation we have been receiving from the Governments of Vietnam and Laos.
During the period I served as a team leader in Vietnam, I experiences and reported in detail to my superiors regular occurrences of witness coaching, prompting, and intimidation by my Vietnamese counterparts. I also experienced and reported the intentional withholding of information and documents by Vietnamese officials and witnesses and levels of cooperation so low that they would more properly be considered obstructions of our investigative efforts.
At the same time that I was reporting these experiences, I watched and listened in disbelief as JTF-FA issued press releases praising the Vietnamese and Lao for unprecedneted levels of cooperation.
So that you may better understand the poor cooperation I experienced while working with the Vietnamese Government, I offer a few specific examples:
During the 15th JFA, while working in Hai Phong and on Cat Ba Island, information pertaining to specific loss incidents in those areas was purposely withheld by the Vietnamese. This information was contained in a one-page document containing approximately 20 entries. Each entry included the details of the shoot down of a U.S. aircraft in the Hai Phong area during the war. Although the U.S. and Vietnamese had previously agreed that field teams could pursue the investigation of any case for which we obtained solid information, the Vietnamese only released information which, based on their analysis, they believed to relate to the cases listed on our formal work plan.
During this same JFA, i asked to confirm a specific location by viewing a recent Vietnamese military map. While viewing the map, I saw a notation regarding the crash site of a U.S. aircraft in the center of Cat Ba Island. When I inquired about the notation, the HaiPhong Military representative shouted at me, explaining that he had very strict orders as to the information he was allowed to provide and that the notation in question was not included among that information.
During the 16th JFA, while staying at the Duyen Hai District Peoples Party Committee Headquarters in Cuu Long Province, an intoxicated district official entered our quarters and verbally abused the American Team Members. When I asked him to leave our quarters he departed, only to return several minutes later with a loaded AK-47 Rifle. He threatened us for approximately 10 minutes before departing. When I was finally able to locate our Vietnamese counterparts, I informed them of the incident. They resolved the issue by prematurely concluding our field activities in that area and relocating the team the following day. This incident was reported in detail in my general observations message for that JFA, but it was never raised at a technical meeting and NO Apology was ever offered by the Vietnamese.
During the 18th JFA, I was the senior JTF-FA representative among three teams operating out of Dong Hoi Town, Quang Binh Province. Despite established operational precedences to the contrary, my Vietnamese counterpart established his own procedural guidelines which required that every U.S. request be submitted in writing. This resulted in substantial delays and an extremely inefficient working relationship. This individual also denied the U.S. team members use of our OWN Vehicles. These difficulties were reported to JTF-FA's detachment 2 in Hanoi as they happened, but NO ACTION WAS Taken by the Det-2 commander.
I am certain that cooperation has increased since I last worked in Vietnam, but I do NOT BELIEVE that this increase has been as substantial as claimed by JTF-FA and others in our Government. The book "INSIDE HANOI'S SECRET ARCHIVES" which details Vietnamese efforts to provide critical information outside established governmental channels seems a strong indiciation of this fact.
Although the specific examples of poor cooperation I have given here involve the actions of the Vietnamese, they are by no means the only ones to have displayed this tendency. An objective look at the behavior of the Lao government in its dealings with the U.S. will clearly show that they regularly only grant cooperation on specific mia-related issues in exhange for humanitarian assistance, funding of special projects, and even things as petty as the provision of field gear to Lao team members. Field activities in Laos have consistently been delayed and even cancelled due to Lao intransigence on certain issues. Even a cursory look at the correspondence between JTS-FA's detachment 3 in Vientiane and its headquarters will confirm the nature of Lao cooperation. Unfortunately, JTF-FA press releases concering Lao cooperation bear little resemblance to the messages from which they are allegedly derived.
It is clear that a number of very important decision, including the decision to normalize relations with the Socialits Republic of Vietnam, are closely tied to the progress that has been made on the PW/MIA effort and the cooperation we have received from the governments of Indochina. These are very real decisions which will have long lasting impact on our nation, its citizens, and future efforst to account for our missing servicemen. They must therefore be based on the reality of what has actually been accomplished. I urge that a comprehensive review of the investigations conducted by JTF-FA under MG Needham's command be conducted to assess the true nature of our progress on the resolution of these cases. In addition to assessin our progress, this review should seek to identify and correct consistent shortcomings in the investigative process so they will not be repeated in future investigations. I also urge that an objective assessment be made of the nature of Vietnamese and Lao cooperation on this important issue. Finally, sincerely hope that the findings of these assessments, and all future MIA-related actions will be publicized without embellishment or alteration so the families of the unaccounted-for and all Americans can have a true understanding of what is being done in their name. The truth, not time, heals all wounds.