Executive Director National League of POW/MIA Families
June 28, 1995
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee
I welcome this first opportunity to appear before the 104th Congress, but regret that testimony on this issue is still necessary. As you know, I have testified frequently over the last 18 years to provide the POW/MIA families' views regarding the status of efforts to account for our relatives still missing from the Vietnam War. Mr. Chairman, I have a significant amount of material which buttresses my statement. With your concurrence, I wish to place it in the record.
In preparing for today's hearing, I reviewed my last testimony, both written and verbal. Sadly, it was all still quite relevant -- not much has changed in the past year. Despite the high level of activity and public attention, only EIGHT (8) Americans have been accounted for since the President lifted the embargo in February, 1994. With the current policy and approach, we see little hope that this pattern will change for the better.
We still see some Clinton Administration officials ignoring or dismissing U.S. intelligence assessments and the core data base both in public and with the Congress. We still see these same officials reaching for superlatives to describe Hanoi's level of cooperation, despite solid evidence to the contrary. Some U.S. officials still appear to view the process -- Vietnam's well-compensated efforts to support joint field activities -- as the measure of progress, rather than results which bring accountability. Sadly, many of the officials making the statements have no history on the issue and have made little effort to learen. As one example, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord reportedly stated that no stored remains had been repatriated by Vietnam since 1988. According to U.S. Government informatin, submitted for the record, 26 remains were returned with evidence of storage.
In fact, so little has changed that we are again seeing virtually the same orchestration in the Senate and the policy-level bureaucracy we saw just over a year ago -- only this time, the debate is over full normalization of diplomatic relations, rather than lifting U.S. opposition to Vietnam's access to International Financial Institution funds, lifting the trade embargo or establishing liaison offices.
Having succeeded in getting the embargo lifted, which at the time was portrayed as nirvana, some in the business community are already complaining that their financial interests in Vietnam are suffering competitive disadvantages, as important market opportunities are lost to their competitors. They're already pushing for the protection afforded by OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) against a possible decision by the Politburo to again nationalize private businesses. They're already seeking support from U.S. taxpayer funds available through the Trade and Development Agency and advocating further financial benefit to themselves by granting Vietnam Most Favored National tariff status. Some even go so far as to suggest, as they did last year, that having more Americans in Vietnam will help solve this issue. Unfortunately, but hardly a surprise, the past couple of years haven't seen any businessmen bringing us POW/MIA information.
Mr. Chairman, enough is enough! I believe it is time for the President to be informed of the REAL facts. It is time for his policy-level bureaucracy to be honest. If full normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations is their true objective, rather than as the President has consistently stated, then they should have the political courage and moral conviction to say so, rather than skewing facts to distort the perceptions of the Congress, the media, our nation's veterans and the general public.
Whether due to a lack of substantive knowledge, willingness to believe Vietnamese assurances or conscious decisions to distorted facts and continue to do so. Whether from the Departments of State, Defense and Veterans Affairs or the White House, statements are being made which, based upon our knowledge of the U.S. Government's data base, are not true.
Vietnam has consitently denied having documents available, then located some when it served their political or economic purposes. In the past, this pattern was for remains -- now, it seems those involved believe that only documents are needed to support full accountability. The list could go on almost endlessly; however, the facts to substantiate what I have said are included for the record with my written testimony. All are either direct copies of Defense Department documents or compiled accurately into the core data which the League provided to the Vietnamese in March, 1994.
There are many examples, but one or two will suffice. While still in Hanoi on this most recent delegation in May, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord was quoted as saying of the Vietnamese that the U.S. has "no reason to believe they are not making a good faith effort" and judged the documents turned over as "significant." Yet the official briefing on the trip stated, "We don't expect that these documents will lead directly or immediately to case resolution."
Despite that analysis, Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs Hershel Gober, co-leader of the delegation, was quoted in the June 19th ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL as stating "I sincerely believe that the Vietnamese are making an honest effort to make a full and objective accounting," noting that it isn't possible to account for all missing persons during war.
The League agrees that all 2,202 missing U.S. personnel will not be accounted for, nor have we ever held such expectations. For precisely that reason and to ensure realism, the League's initial charter in 1970, long before the end of the war, was based on obtaining the release of all prisoners and the fullest possible accounting, including the return of all recoverable remains. These latest documents will provide a few useful leads for follow-up. The families appreciate any and all information, but obtaining it should not require a high level U.S. Government delegation to Hanoi if, in fact, Vietnam is being fully cooperative and "making an honest effort" and a "good faith effort" as claimed by senior U.S. officials.
Other officials, some in less visible positions, have made similar statements, referring to Vietnam's cooperation as outstanding, superb or extraordinary, when official analysis indicates that cooperation consistently falls FAR SHORT of U.S. expectations.
In the months leading up to the Senate debate in 1994 and the subsequent lifting of the embargo, the Vietnamese were highly commended for turning over documents in late 1993 as evidence of their increased cooperation, but there was almost no comment on crucial analytical conclusions of the Defense POW/MIA Office.
The first, in September, was the Group 559 Shootdown Record pertaining to American losses in Laos, in areas then under Vietnamese control. DPMO's analysis stated:
"The significance of the Group 559 Shootdown Record rests most importantly in the fact that it provides clear proof of extensive record keeping and knowledgeability of U.S. losses in Laos by PAVN forces operating in that country. It also provides explicit cross references to where additional information might be located. Although it is difficult to believe that this document could not have been turned over to the U.S. side much earlier, or that additional Group 559 documents could not be turned over forthwith, it is still true that provision of this document represents significant cooperation by the Vietnamese and addresses longstanding requests by the U.S."
The second of the two examples occurred in December of 1993, when 18 documents were turned over to Ambassador Lord during one of his visits. Again, quoting DPMO's analysis:
"In and of themselves, these 18 documents are not significant in terms of case resolution and do not qualify as a satisfactory response to the query in August. While they contain a few minor leads that call for further investigation, their greater significance is that they indicate the strong likelihood that the SRV has more documents, especially the so-called `feeler' documents from which summary records are compiled.
The entire tenor of the Vietnamese response to U.S. requests for answers, partcilarly on remains and documents, continues to be `that's all we have' and to be `procedural' in nature, when in fact there is strong evidence that other documents exist and that there are at least some remains under the control of the SRV Government they have not yet returned. The turnover of documents (which they have clearly had for years) to the current delegation illustrates that the Vietnamese continue their longstanding practice of providing documents only to high level emissaries. This measured response, if sustained, does not augur well for early resolution of the POW/MIA issue."
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted the entire analysis for the record, as provided to the League by DPMO. I would also point out that Vietnam has yet to provide any of the documents used to compile the entire Group 559 Shootdown Record which, according to U.S. analysts, "appears to be written in a single hand." Logic dictates that it required original documents to compile such a summary. Yet, as previously noted, U.S. Government officials continue to commend Vietnamese cooperation.
It is my understanding that U.S. Senators have even been told that there is no compelling evidence that Vietnam continues to withould remains of Americans, and that the lack of such evidence was the basis for President Clinton's decision to lift the embargo. Mr. Chairman, bases on evidence supplied to the League by the Department of Defense and which the U.S. Government has provided repeatedly to the Vietnamese, including photographs, documents and otehr evidence, that statment is WRONG.
As you know, the League went to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in March, 1994. We took a large volume of POW/MIA case-related material that U.S. officials had provided to us for that purpose. A complete copy, with photographs, is submitted here for the record and your review.
The Clinton Administration pruposely avoided and continues to avoid publicizing this data, as did the League initially, in the hope that the promises made primarily to U.S. officials and to me would be fulfilled. They haven't! Of even greater concern is that U.S. officials don't negotiate with the Vietnamese based on the data, an approach not lost on the Vietnamese Politburo.
With such glowing commendations from policy-level officials, not to mention the steady flow of praise from JTF-FA Detachment 2 in Hanoi about support for joint field activities, is it any wonder that some in the Congress believe that the Government of Vietnam is being fully cooperative? Or that the President believes it? Worse yet, is it any wonder that the Vietnamese Politburo has not yet renewed and increased serious unilateral efforts to locate and return remains? Or to unilaterally provide the documents that our own government is confident that they have available?
Over the years, Vietnamese assurances have been numerous and contradictory. In 1982, a Vietnamese Politburo member denied holding any remains of U.S. personnel, but subsequently admitted to a senior White House official that remains were available in large numbers. (The Senate Select Committee followed this up partially and confirmed that the admission was made, but it was then buried.) Vietnam responded by repatriating relatively large numbers in 1985. In 1986-87, Vietnam halted unilateral remains repatraitions for political reasons, then resumed in large numbers in 1988, though to date have returned only 163 with evidence of central-level SRV Government storage.
Likely, many recall the mortician's testimony which withstood scrutiny by U.S. Government officials, in which he stated that he personally had processed around 250 U.S. remains, and that he had seen many more for an estimated total of over 400. Of those, only 163 have been returned to date, not even close to the number he personally processed, and a much lower number than expectations published by the interagency intelligence community in 1987, reaffirmed in 1992 by the POW/MIA Interagency Group in which I participated.
An unclassified copy if submitted for the record of material provided by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz to Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co which gives considerable detail on U.S. Government expectations. Mr. Chairman, you would have to request the specific numerical expectations from U.S. officials since the numbers were excluded from the copy given to the Vietnamese. The reason was our concern that the several hundred expected might be too low and estimate, and that under-estimation could impact adversely on the number ultimately received. Studies since 1992 also affirm significant numbers.
Recent assertions, to incude by U.S. Senators, that Vietnam has met the POW/MIA provisions of the Bush Administration's "road map" to improve bilateral relations with Vietnam are egregious distortions. That road map was written by the POW/MIA Interagency Group, in which I participated, and approved at the highest levels. Dealing with both the Cambodia settlement and POW/MIA issues, the road map was front-loaded with steps to account for last known alive (LKA) discrepancy cases, unilaterally repatriate remains and provide relevant records. Under no circumstances have the Bush Administration's road map POW/MIA criteria been met.
In addition, some of this commentary unfairly puts the burden of U.S. intelligence analysis on young military personnel working in Southeast Asia with no access to this data. A young serviceman stating hsi counterpart is providing good cooperation and support for joint field operations is hardly the basis for national policy; yet it has become a way to hide from facts.
Further, on July 2, 1993, President Clinton laid out four POW/MIA criteria related to Vietnam. Restated by Secretary of Defense Perry in his report to Congress on February 17th of this year, the criteria are valid for measuring accounting results:
1) Concrete results from efforts on their part (Vietnam's) to recover and repatriate American remains;
2) Continued resolution of discrepancy cases;
3) Further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos; and
4) Accelerated efforts (by Vietnam) to provide all POW/MIA related documents that will help lead to genuine answers.
Since President Clinton defined the criteria, progress on #2 has been almost totally limited to "fate determinations" produced by joint US/SRV investigations. Resolution means accountability, defined by the USG as the man returned alive, or his remains, or convincing evidence as to why neither is possible. In nearly all instances of the 117 with reported confirmation of death, evidence also indicates that Vietnam should be able to locate and provide remains. Of the 81 "special remains cases" (94 individuals) now being pursued jointly, unilateral efforts by Vietnam to locate and provide remains are required on all but the died-in-captivity (DIC) cases. The DIC cases require joint investigation due to wartime burial, mostly in the South.
On trilateral cooperation (#3), some Vietnamese witnesses have been located due to repeated U.S. requests and the joint archival research program and several have now been utilized during several joint operations in Laos.
Vietnam is now beginning to provide the names of additional witnesses; however, other than Group 559 summary, the SRV has not yet provided documents specifically related to the Lao (and Cambodian) cases which USG assessment indicates are the original source documents used to compile the Group 559 summary. Despite repeated requests, none have yet been turned over to the U.S.
Regarding criteria #1 and #4, despite July 1994 commitments, the SRV Government only very recently (May, 1995) began to implement its pledge to renew unilateral efforts on records, but in a very limited way with a few documents which appear to be first-generation copies of regional archive records. Most were not new information and reported on joint and unilateral investigations conducted years ago. Vietnam has not yet renewed and increased its own efforts to locate and return remains or begun a sustained effort to provide definitive POW/MIA records for U.S. Government review.
Unfortunately, a major flaw of current strategy is that U.S. officials continue to ask for reports on Vietnam's unilateral efforts, rather than asking for results. That approach gives Vietnamese authorities the impression that the U.S. is looking for convincing evidence that remains or original records are NOT available and, given Vietnamese cultural and nationalist sensibiities, guarantees an inconclusive outcome. If the Vietnamese turn over identifiable remains, no reports are needed or required; stored remains have routinely and rapidly been identified.
If the cumulative reports are accurate, senior officials now directly involved have recommended to the President that relatiosn be fully normalized and that Secretary of State Christopher visit Vietnam during his trip to the region in early August. If factual and objective, the rationale could not have been that Vietnam has fulfilled the POW/MIA criteria that President Clinton established which, clearly, have not been met.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs James Wold has stated his expectation that his organization's ongoing comprehensive case review of all unresolved incidents will be completed by mid-July. Unless altered for political reasons at a higher level, the League anticipates that the results of this "scrub" will further define U.S. expectations on accountability that Vietnam should be able to provide and will again number in the hundreds.
The results of this review should also enable the U.S. to respond accurately, at long last, to Vietnam's many requests for suggestions as to which cases are best pursued unilaterally versus jointly. The key is that both unilateral and joint efforts are required to achieve the fullest possible accounting. Excavations by CILHI and investigations by qualified specialists are NEEDED to resolve questions on cases which lend themselves to joint efforts and should be pursued jointly. Cases on which analysis indicates that the best results should be achieved by Vietnam, on its own, should be given to the Vietnamese for unilateral follow-up by their Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense teams. This approach, long advocated by the League, offers the best potential for results which will account for our missing relatives.
The DPMO's comprehensive review will also bring forward a list of Americans on whom the U.S. believes accounting can be achieved. It is one element of Senate Joint Resolution 34, the Smith/Dole resolution. Another is certification by the President that Vietnam is being FULLY COOPERATIVE with the U.S. in efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for our missing. The League strongly supports S. J. Res. 34, and its companion in the House, H.J. Res. 89, which you, Mr. Chairman, and our long-time supporter, now Chairman of the International Relations Committee, Congressman Ben Gilman, introduced.
It is appropriate, at a minimum, that President Clinton be willing to certify that Vietnam is being fully cooperative in meeting U.S. expectations on POW/MIA before moving nay further to improve relations with Vietnam. He has repeatedly pledged that progress in resolving this issue is the determining factor in his decisions regarding bilateral relations.
It is interesting that Vice President Gore, during an April 16, 1993 appearance on NBC's TODAY SHOW, responded to a caller's question by stating in part, "The great push towards normalization of relations is very strong and a lot of other countries are moving there, but it's not going to go forward until we're satisfied that the Vietnamese government has been totally forthcoming and fully cooperative in giving every last shred of evidence that they have on this issue." Within three months, and despite the lack of significant results, the President decided to move forward on Vietnam's highest agenda -- international funding for infrastructure development.
The League calls on all Members of Congress to take a stand and insist that before the United States moves any further to accommodate Vietnam's political and economic objectives, or those seeking profit at the expense of principles, the President certify to Congress that Vietnam is providing full cooperation in meeting expectations outlined in the U.S. Government's data base.
It is our view that in good conscience, the President cannot now state that Vietnam is being fully cooperative. We urge the President to instruct his senior officials to focus negotiations with Vietnam for unilateral efforts and results before considering further steps to improve relations. If Vietnam makes the decision to cooperate fully, the results will be apparent to all, and the League could support further steps, both diplomatic and economic, in response. Until the U.S. negotiates on the basis of its own data, and the Vietnamese Politburo decides to move unilaterally to provide results, it would be premature for the U.S. to normalize relations with Vietnam.
Before closing, I would point out that the League's focus on Vietnam now and in the past is not only due to their ability to locate and provide remains and information on Americans missing in Vietnam, but also their proven ability to help account for the 499 missing in Laos and the 77 unaccounted for in Cambodia. According to the U.S. data base, the level of Vietnamese control maintained over areas of Laos and Cambodia where U.S. losses occurred is 82.3% in Laos and 90% in Cambodia, though the percentage of Vietnmese control is higher on the 77 discrepancy cases in Laos, involving 139 personnel, at 90%. It is to Vietnam that the U.S. must look for the fullest possible accounting of Americans lost in all three Indochina nations.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions.